"Operational Probabilities of Jet aircraft.", dated 5th Mar. 1945, A.I.3(b) report to Col. Kingman Douglass

[Andrew Arthy]

Hi Richard,

I just stumbled across this while digging for something else. It's an Allied report based on ULTRA and other intelligence sources, 'Intelligence on German Development of Jet Aircraft', undated, but probably from April 1945:

"[referring to late-July 1944] It is at this point that there begins a substantial flow of reports from the Japanese Naval Attache in Berlin on the subject of jet aircraft. He reported on the use of the Me.163 and Ar.234, but either thought or was told that in both instances the aircraft was the Me.262. But his subsequent reports have been substantial and highly informed, perhaps because the Germans sold the Japanese the plans fo the Me.163.

...

If it had been available considerable information could have been secured from the reports in October of the Japanese Naval Attache. Difficulties of decoding some times accounted for these delays. Sometimes vagaries of distribution contributed. In general, this material has not regularly and promptly been made available to USSTAF Intelligence.

Eventually, from this Japanese material emerged the first complete description of the Ar.234, a picture of the dispersed Messerschmitt production in South Germany, and indication of proposed substantial production, and a clear indication that the speed of the jet aircraft was causing trouble in developing tactics. Also, during October the Japanese visited Dr. Heinkel in Vienna and recieved a rather melodramatic account of his hard lot which nevertheless revealed that hte He.280 was not likely to appear, but that Heinkel had a potentially important jet engine. There were also some details of a single engine jet which were later of great interest."

Cheers,
Andrew A.
Air War Publications - www.facebook.com/airwarpublications

[Richard T. Eger]

Dear Andrew, et. al.,

Andrew, thanks for your supporting comments regarding a companion report. The reasons that I question the titled report is that it comes off as somewhat of a history of each aircraft, that the Japanese seem to have been given far more access than they needed to have, and that this minutia had somehow found its way into Allied intelligence hands. It appears that the writer of the report seems to have gone through a fairly thick set of Japanese intel reports to piece together this information. Here's what the report has to say about the Me 163:

"1. The Me.163 has now been undergoing test and experimentation, as welll as operations intermittently, for a year. It has raised serious problems in (a) design, both airframe and engine (b) pilot training and (c) control. Apparently the present Me.163 B is so unsatisfactory that it is to be superseded by the Me.163 C. This sub-type, reported twice by the Japanese, to be a Junkers product, was to be in prototype stage at the end of February.

"The training picture is not clear. Initially, experienced pilots were re-trained under Test Group 16, at Zwischenahn, later at Udetfeld, now at Brandis. For a time pilots, presumably inexperienced, were trained by J.G.102. Somewhat vague P/W reports indicate training at Jesau last summer of young, inexperienced pilots. The Japanese say that pilots of Me.163 must be experienced glider pilots, must have had some bomber or fighter flying experience, and should if possible have some combat experience. There have been some rumours on the medical aspects of the problem, and the Japanese Ambassador's conversation with Oberst Gollob clearly indicates that the high speed of the Me.163 has brought serious problems along with it.

"Control problems arise from speed and the limited range of the Me.163. The Japanese are our only source. But they are more interested in this type than in any other and have been more persistent in inquiries about it. Their reports have been sufficiently consistent to indicate some reliability. According to them, control is of such importance that the Senior Signals Officer of a Group is the Commanding Officer. The aircraft is sent up, almost like an A.A. shell, when the enemy aircraft are nearing the target. So far it has not been possible to operate more than 5 in one operation. The usual procedure, apparently, is to send up one or two at a time at intervals of three minutes. Getting the aircraft back creates tension because it is peculiarly vulnerable to attack just before and just after landing. To refuel an aircraft for flight requires an hour.

"It follows from the above that operation of the Me.163 is limited as to airfields. It can operate only where the ground control apparatus is in place. And where the special fuel required can be stored and handled. There is some indication of transport difficulty as there are only a limited number of tank trucks which can carry the special fuel.

"According to the Japanese again, difficulties have been met in the manufacture of the special fuel. No troubles with the so-called T stoff have been indicated, but serious delays have occurred with one element of the so-called C stoff. This element, known as B, constitutes 1/3 of the C solution. According to the Japanese, the Germans aimed at a production of 300 tons per month of B element but so far have made only 30 per month. This amount will provide 100 tons of C stoff, enough (according to the Japanese) for 200 sorties. If, as the Japanese have said, there are now 48 Me.163 in operating units, it follows that the G.A.F. produces each month only enough fuel to fly each aircraft 4 times a month. If training flights are being carried on, the number of operational sorties possible is still further reduced.

"The Japanese have not indicated any operational units of Me.163 beyong the ones in the Leipzig area (presumably Brandis is meant) and ones proposed for the Stettin area. There are only occasional glimpses of possible Me.163 operations in the West. No unit is known to be there. Test Unit 16 was long at Zwischenahn but had certainly left there by September. Presumably the airfield at Zwischenahn still has its T and C stoff installations.

"There have been indications of courses at Giebelstadt for handling of special propellants but no indication that it is an operational base. In September inquiries were made whether Deelen and Twente could be used by Me.163. It developed that Deelen had been destroyed, and there has been no indication of operations at Twente. In the late summer orders were given to prepare sketches for Me.163 dispersal at Frankfurt/Rhein Main, but nothing further has been heard. In the early winter the Todt Organisation detachment at Husum reported on the near completion of T and C stoff installations at an airfield, presumably Husum, although this airfield does not seem a likely Me.163 base. Despite this negative evidence, there have been constant crew reports of sightings of Me.163 in the West, notably in the Coblenz/Cologne area.

"In summary, it appears that the present Me.163 is capable of operations only on a very limited scale in a very limited area. The improved Me.163 C will not appear before early summer, if then. The only known operational unit is I J.G.400 with 4 Stafeln, each (according to the Japanese) equipped with 20 aircraft - 12 for operations and 8 for reserve. There is a II J G 400 in process of being set up."

Regards,
Richard