Looking for recommendations on books on the air war against Reich oil production

[Richard T. Eger]

Dear Frank,

Thanks for the recommendation. I just ordered it from Abebooks, as I find sometimes they are cheaper than Amazon.

Hopefully, it contains the impacts on the Luftwaffe and oil production over time. I like that it equally looks at the effort from both the Bomber Command and 8th and 15th Air Force perspectives. The other 2 books appear to be slanted from the British end. Also, I'm happy to see that it looks at the interaction and synergism of the transportation and oil targets.

What I'm trying to do is back up a bit and get a bigger picture of what was going on. In my research dealing with the Me 262, while the jet issue held interest of the Intelligence types, it was essentially a non-target in terms of its production. The best that I've come up with was it was felt the decentralization made it too hard to conduct an effective bombing campaign. But, my gut feel says there was more to it than that, thus the need for a bigger view. Much as in Haines' Command Decision, there were only 3 prime assembly sites for the Me 262, the attacking of them likely pretty much wiping out any chance to use the aircraft. All were forest assembly sites. One was very well documented, the other 2 not. Even the well documented one was never attacked.

Regards,
Richard

Correction: There were 4 prime Me 262 assembly sites, all in forests.

[taitbb]

You are right, my apologies for that link as well. I have downloaded numerous free docs from scribd with never a problem. I guess not this one. I know I downloaded said document free from somewhere, but no longer know where.

Originally Posted by Richard T. Eger

Dear taitbb,

New web address just about as bad as the other. This time, an unending pile of downloads before actually getting to the document. Fortunately, I was able to bail out without having to shut down my computer.

Anyway, I got the book coming from Amazon, which is my preferred reading method. Anything long, I'd print off and, with so many pages, the expense of the ink would be worse than the cost of a book. I'm a diehard fan of physical books.

Regards,
Richard

[Richard T. Eger]

Dear All,

Today, I received the book Oil as a Factor in the German War Effort, 1939-1945. It does include the informative charts on oil production I had hoped for. At first glance, I don't see similar information about the campaign's impact on Luftwaffe operations.

Now, what I can say many of you may already know, but I thought I'd share with you for those that don't.

The oil campaign began in earnest in May 1944. Oil stocks peaked at 610 M (thousand) tons at the end of 1940, then dropped to a low of 255 M tons at the end of 1941. I'm guessing this was partly a result of drawdown and partly a result of production capacity. Stocks climbed thereafter, reaching a peak of 570 M tons at the end of April 1944, production exceeding consumption during this period. Thus, if the Luftwaffe had the planes and pilots, it was prepared to mount a decent defense of Germany. That said, Allied air forces were growing and the long range escort fighter became a reality, so the tides were turning against Germany even if it could maintain its fighter defense force.

However, with the beginning of the oil campaign in May 1944, things took a decided turn for the worse. Consumption outstripped production and oil stocks rapidly dwindled, hitting 160 M tons at the beginning of November. After a slight uptick, the situation continued downward, with oil production essentially completely crushed in February 1945. The last stock figure shows 80 M tons at the end of February 1945.

The RAF and USAAF both contributed strongly to the oil campaign. From May 1, 1944 to May 8, 1945, the RAF dropped 98,697 short tons on oil targets while the USAAF dropped 136,109 short tons.

Where the RAF contributed the lion's share of tonnage was in the bombing of cities and areas. During the same timeframe, the RAF dropped 317,767 short tons, whereas the USAAF dropped 87,845 short tons.

The subject of the impact of the oil campaign on Luftwaffe operational capability is not totally ignored. It is covered in a chapter entitled "The Crippling Effect of Fuel Shortages on the Luftwaffe". Covering 4-1/2 pages of text, it does give an abbreviated overview of the impact on Luftwaffe operations. While there are no charts or tables of supporting information, there is given a bit of insight as to the conflict of events that set the Luftwaffe toward a disaster course. The decision to drastically ramp up aircraft production in 1944 held its own Achilles' heels. Quoting: "In the last quarter of 1944 the production of aircraft of all types had been averaging 3,100 a month." So, Germany had pulled off a "production miracle", to quote my friend Daniel Uziel. But, with so many aircraft to fly, you needed more fuel to fly them at the same time as fuel availability went in the opposite direction. You also needed more trained pilots to fly them, and, due to the fuel shortage, pilot training took a huge hit. Further, lack of fuel meant that only 1 in 5 new aircraft got a full check out before being put into service.

I have an analogy I use for such a situation: Imagine you are in the middle of a lake and your rowboat springs a leak. You have 2 choices: Row like hell for the shore or bail like crazy and hope you don't sink. The first alternative is the only viable one and that's what Germany tried to do, but was unsuccessful. The other one you simply drown.

Regards,
Richard

[Jukka Juutinen]

I do not remember the exact figure, but Niklas Zetterling pointed out in his book "Normandy 1944" that even before the war German oil production (and consumption) was minuscule in comparison with US figures. As far as consumption goes, true even today. Us economy would probably collapse if the US gasoline price rose to European levels (currently some 100 % increase).