Australian Spitfires

[JeffK]

Originally Posted by JoeB

Since your post, I see others posting perhaps more familiar with the actual Japanese losses than I (judging by other threads on other fora), but the main point is you seem to be quoting Spit claims, not the actual Japanese losses. I didn't say 2 but rather 3 A6M's; what Hata/Izawa "Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in WWII" p.129 gives as 202 Kokutai losses for March through September 1943. That was AFAIK the only A6M unit involved. The JAAF lost a Ki-43 (see earlier post). There was as I mentioned at one time an Aussie website with the breakdown day by day, claims and real losses for each side, perhaps from one of the other books mentioned in the thread. ISTR it had fewer than 3 A6M's actually downed by Spits over Darwin per J records.

Joe

JoeB,

Thanks for the info that there are others here that are more familiar than us at Japanese losses. Sadly they cant be bothered in posting their knowledge.

Unless they post their irrefutable evidence, these figures will probably never be known.

A PS to the comparison against G'canal. The Japs there had a limited choice of target and due to the range, a limited attack line. Over Darwin the Allied airbases were strung out over 60+ miles and the attackers a wider choice of directions to approach from. Even the fact that the raids were not as heavy and were intermittantly flown stretched out the defenders.

There were also tactical errors made, the Spitfire pilots included a number of pilots recently out of training and the Spit V was not happy in the hot & dusty (or hot & wet) conditions.

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by JeffK

JoeB,
Thanks for the info that there are others here that are more familiar than us at Japanese losses. Sadly they cant be bothered in posting their knowledge.

Unless they post their irrefutable evidence, these figures will probably never be known.

Well I'd like to see as much info as possible also too, but as was mentioned the J side of those combats has been published in more than one place, no real reason to base an analysis on Spit claims (or the J claims, or really anybody's claims in any air combat, unless we really know the claim accuracy of a large sample of other combats by the same units in similar conditions).

A little more delving into the bookshelves the J fighter losses by date given in Price, Osprey series "Spitfire Mark V Aces 1941-45" (which was mentioned by another poster) are:
March 15: 1 A6M; May 9: 1 A6M lost, one crashlanded on rtn; Jun 20: 1 Ki-43; Sep 13: 1 A6M. 5 total, presumably the 3 A6M's + ki-43 in the H/I books doesn't include the crashlanding. The Spit losses to air combat, probably from, or wrecked in combat damage crashlandings totals 31 in Price.

Another comparison is the 49th FG P-40's defending Darwin in 1942. The Kagero series book on "3/202 Kokutai" by Pajdosz and Zbiegniewski (filling in some P-40 losses from Rust "Pacific Sweep") only gives results for the combats April 25 onward. In those it says the then 3rd Ku lost 8 A6M's and downed 15 P-40's; 3 more had been lost in March/early Apr assuming no other J losses. The overclaim ratio was broadly similar (quite high) for all air arms in both those bombing campaigns.

Ignoring the apparent difference in P-40 and Spit results, and focusing on the P-40 v. F4F results (where national considerations factor out) I don't see how they could be considered really equivalent based on some special disadvantage to defending Darwin. The F4F's engaged A6M's in many tactical situations in G'canal campaign (v. med altitude bombers but also at lower alt, v carrier planes, over J convoys etc) and in the 4 carrier battles in 1942, some clear defeats for both sides in various situations, but there was a pretty clear tendency toward rough parity. The USAAF facing the A6M's in other 1942 situations didn't even do as well as they did at Darwin. Later, USAAF P-40's fought on more or less equal terms with A6M's (often in mixed forces w/ more advanced US planes). But those potentialities aside, the F4F units of 1942 performed better as a historical fact.

Joe

[Brian]

Hi Jeff & JoeB

2 May 1943: No Japanese losses

15 May 1943: PO1c Kuratoshi Yasuda 202 Kokutai FTR

20 June 1943: Lt Shigeto Kuwata 59th Sentai FTR

22 June 1943: Lt Kunihiko Kuroshi 59th Sentai FTR

7 Sept 1943: PO1c Yoshio Terai 202 Kokutai FTR

Hope this helps.

Happy New Year

Brian

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by Brian

2 May 1943: No Japanese losses

15 May 1943: PO1c Kuratoshi Yasuda 202 Kokutai FTR

20 June 1943: Lt Shigeto Kuwata 59th Sentai FTR

22 June 1943: Lt Kunihiko Kuroshi 59th Sentai FTR

7 Sept 1943: PO1c Yoshio Terai 202 Kokutai FTR

Thanks. Could you give the source for that? Two that seem unusual are 15 May and a second JAAF raid 22 June. An official Aussie list of raids v. Northern Ter. doesn't include raids either of those dates.
http://home.st.net.au/%7Edunn/bomboz.htm

[Jim Oxley]

Not only are the 15 May and 22 June odd dates for raids, but also 7 September. A review of actions over Darwin for May shows that the only raid was on the 2 May, a disastrious day for No.1 Wing. The only other actions during May occurred at Millingimbi, an Island off the northern coast of Arnhem Land, some 275 miles east of Darwin. Millingimbi was the home of No.59 Operational Base, which was a staging and refuelling base used by the Beaufighters of No.31 Squadron on their raids over Timor. It was also used for the same purpose by the Husons on No.2 Squadron, and as an emergency landing field for the Liberators of the 380th BG, normally based south at Fenton. The Japanese were well aware of Millingimbi, and raided it several times. During May '43 they raided it on 9 May, again on 10 May, a reconnaissance flight on 23 May (which also covered Darwin) and a final raid on 28 May. On 22 June No.1 Wing was scrambled when two formations of approaching enemy aircraft were picked up by radar. The Wing spent 55 minutes flying around Darwin on different vectors from Control until recalled. No contact was made. The radar log for that day shows that the enemy formations came no closer to Darwin than Bathurst Island (80 miles north west), then turned away. The only other activity recorded between Raids 55 (22 June) and Raid 56 (28 June) was a Japanese reconnaissance flight recorded overflying Fenton airbase on the 27 June. The action on 7 September is not classed officially as a raid, as it was a reconnaissance flight consisting on one Ki-46 escorted by approximately 20 Zero's. No.1 Wing was scrambled an interception did take place approximately 20 miles off the coast. Due to radio interference and poor Ground Control direction (as to height and direction of enemy) the Spitfires arrived piecemeal down sun and below the enemy force, were bounced and a very confused fight followed. No.1 Wing made claims for 5 fighters destroyed, 4 probably destroyed and 7 damaged! Only one was confirmed. In return three Spitfires were shot down, with one pilot killed.

[Brian]

Hi guys

Although I am working on a book on Darwin, I haven't reached the 1943 period as yet, so relied on published material for my information.

'Japanese Naval aces & Fighter Units in WW2' (Hata/Izawa) states PO1c Terai FTR Darwin 7/9/43 (Appendix B, page 384); also on page 283 that PO1c Yasuda killed Dutch Easi Indies 15/5/43 (probably not an operation against Darwin, my mistake)

'Japanese Army AF Fighter Units and Their Aces' (Hata/Izawa/Shores) states (page 295) that Lt Kuroishi FTR Darwin 22/6/43.

I have yet to do my own research.

Cheers
Brian

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by Brian

Hi guys
'Japanese Naval aces & Fighter Units in WW2' (Hata/Izawa) states PO1c Terai FTR Darwin 7/9/43 (Appendix B, page 384); also on page 283 that PO1c Yasuda killed Dutch Easi Indies 15/5/43 (probably not an operation against Darwin, my mistake)

'Japanese Army AF Fighter Units and Their Aces' (Hata/Izawa/Shores) states (page 295) that Lt Kuroishi FTR Darwin 22/6/43.

The published sources I know are the H/I (+Shores in JAAF) books, Price's Osprey Spit V book (a reliable author AFAIK, though I assume he used other secondary sources for a book like that) and the Kagero 3/202 Ku book (they mention an article by Shores as a possible source). Does anyone know others?

Those sources anyway agree on an A6M loss Sep 7. I'd never looked closely at the pilots lost appendices in H/I books. The May 15 must be non-Darwin as you say. The text of H/I JAAF p.41 says an attempted fighter sweep June 22 didn't make contact, consistent with what Jim Oxley just said from Allied side, so presumably the loss that day was non-combat. The losses mentioned in the Kagero book otherwise are not quite consistent with Price's but his account totaling 4 A6M and 1 Ki-43 loss seems more methodical and complete, not 100% clear from the Kagero text if claims or real losses are quoted in some cases.

Joe

[bearoutwest]

In case some of you are interested in the book "Spitfires over Darwin 1943", that was mentioned in previous posts on this thread. It has recently been republished. I think it's now in it's 4th re-print and into the 2nd (updated) edition.

I've not noticed it in any Western Australian bookshops, but have just received my copy purchased directly from the publishers. Contact details as follows:

TechWrite Solutions (Vic) Pty Ltd
PO Box 2003,
South Melbourne VIC 3205
Australia
e-mail: spitfires@techwrite.com.au

It set me back $32.50 (Aust dollars), including postage within Australia.

...geoff

[Graham Boak]

It is worth adding that one key result obtained by the Spitfires in N. Australia was blinding the Japanese effort by shooting down the previously invincible Dinah. The Japanese were unable to obtain vital reconnaissance information and hence unable to plan or assess bombing raids. The importance of these missions can be illustrated by the above reference to 20 Zeros escorting a single Dinah.

As a result of the introduction of the Spitfire the Japanese bomber forces stopped doing daylight missions and switched to night attacks, before being moved to another front where better results could be expected. This was despite its mechanical problems, operational misuse, and fairly limited success against Japanese fighters, as fairly fully described above and elsewhere.

It is worth noting that Spitfire operations in extreme environmental conditions elsewhere e.g. North Africa and the Arakan, do not show the level of mechanical problems experienced in these early Australian operations. Shortcomings in the preparation and support must be strongly suspected. Later Australian use gave much less trouble, showing that it could be done in the SW Pacific, as elsewhere.

[rldunn]

It often helps to have some information on what the other side was doing. Japanese reconnaissance of Australia by the 70th Independent Squadron continued until the summer of 1944 when the war situation which had previously reduced their operations over Australia completely diverted them to other operations.

Japanese daylight bombing by navy bombers ended in July 43 when their escort force (Air Group 202) was widely dispersed due to the threat caused by the recently arrived 380th BG equipped with B-24s which engaged in bombing raids over a wide territory. The navy carried out two night raids in August 1943. The Japanese army (75th Flying Regiment) obtained cooperation from a contingent of navy Zero fighters and carried out a day raid against Drysdale Mission in early Sept 43.

After Sept 43 the approaching monsoon season meant a sustained bombing campaign could not be mounted for some time. By Nov 43 a part of Air Group 753 was diverted to the Marshalls due to the invasion of the Gilbert Islands. The group was also sent to other parts of the Indies. By the time good weather returned in April 44 the Japanese were in no position to engage in a bombing campaign over Australia.

The mission of 20 Zeros accompanied by a reconnaissance plane was not an escort mission of the recce a/c but an "air annihilation mission" by the fighters with the recce accompanying them as a guide plane. During this same period the Japanese carried out other recon missions without escorts. It helps to know Japanese air doctrine.

Ascribing the end of Japanese bombing of Australia or the supposed end of reconnaissance there to action by the intercepting Spitfires to the exclusion of more pertinent factors results in a one sided and distorted view of events.

RLD