Did KG 26 hit the cruiser Molotov in 1942?

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Andrey Kuznetsov

It seems the time of loss of He111 1T+JH from 4./KG26 has fixed.
At 02:33 msk (01:33 MEZ) "Molotov" shot down a torpedo plane. The plane had inflamed in the air and then burned at sea 3-5 minutes.
At the same time (01:30=02:30 msk) MAS568 had attacked the cruiser with 2 torpedoes and claimed 2 hits (zero hits really). "Molotov" saw the boat and open fire at 02:30 msk.

According to Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, 4.(F)/122 had two losses in Aug.42. I know about the loss 23.Aug but when was 2nd loss?

Hello Andrey,

Thank you for looking further at this interesting incident. Do you mean that you have found the German report for the time of loss of the Heinkel and it matches Soviet information?

If MAS 568 did not hit the Molotov, then who did? Was it the crew of the lost Heinkel?

4.(F)/122 did not lose any other aircraft in August.

Warm regards,

Paul

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Hello Paul

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

Do you mean that you have found the German report for the time of loss of the Heinkel and it matches Soviet information?

It is an educated guess. Both sides saw the burst at 02:30-02:33 msk, when "Molotov" shot down a plane, which fell in flames and had burned 3-5 minutes. At the time-frame in question it was the sole "bright and loud" event in the area.

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

If MAS 568 did not hit the Molotov, then who did?
Was it the crew of the lost Heinkel?

"Molotov" was torpedoed a hour before MAS568 attack.
So it maybe:
1) MAS573 attack -but time of the attack (00:12=01:12 msk) doesn't match well to the time of Molotov's damage (00:26=01:26 msk)
2) Torpedo plane attack whose success remained unknown for Fliegerführer Süd (and maybe for the crew himself). But it is strange. I doubt that it was lost 1T+JH because it was obviously downed a hour after the torpedo hit., so he had enough time to report about the success and also unclear why he remained in the area so long after the attack.
3) Pure speculative version - it was a drifting mine. "Molotov" was damaged during the turning circle so it was possible to struck a mine by the stern part of the shipboard.

"Tagesabschlussmeldung Fl.Führ.Süd für 3.8.42" maybe useful for the analysis but...
I had tried to order Luftwaffe documents in USAFHRA/AFHRA 2-3 times during past 10-15 years but never once received the answer (in contrast with NARA).

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

4.(F)/122 did not lose any other aircraft in August.

It is strange. According to Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, 4.(F)/122 had 2 losses due to enemy action in August.

Warm regards,
Andrey

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Andrey Kuznetsov

It is an educated guess. Both sides saw the burst at 02:30-02:33 msk, when "Molotov" shot down a plane, which fell in flames and had burned 3-5 minutes.

"Molotov" was torpedoed a hour before MAS568 attack.
So it maybe:
1) MAS573 attack -but time of the attack (00:12=01:12 msk) doesn't match well to the time of Molotov's damage (00:26=01:26 msk)
2) Torpedo plane attack whose success remained unknown for Fliegerführer Süd (and maybe for the crew himself). But it is strange. I doubt that it was lost 1T+JH because it was obviously downed a hour after the torpedo hit., so he had enough time to report about the success and also unclear why he remained in the area so long after the attack.
3) Pure speculative version - it was a drifting mine. "Molotov" was damaged during the turning circle so it was possible to struck a mine by the stern part of the shipboard.

"Tagesabschlussmeldung Fl.Führ.Süd für 3.8.42" maybe useful for the analysis but...
I had tried to order Luftwaffe documents in USAFHRA/AFHRA 2-3 times during past 10-15 years but never once received the answer (in contrast with NARA).

I entirely agree with your suggestion that the blast was associated with the loss of the plane, since there appears to be no other plausible explanation.

Of your suggestions as to who might have hit the Molotov, I think there is a good case that it was MAS 573. The time difference is relatively small and could be accounted for by poor record keeping. It is indeed implausible that the Heinkel flew around for an hour after making an attack. I had not quite understood this time difference, between the torpedo hit and the shoot down, before. I would discount a drifting mine, I believe there were no such incidents with warships in this part of the Black Sea during the entire war. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a mine could have been carried into the area by currents.

I am sorry to hear that you have had trouble with AFHRA, perhaps another forum member can help get through to them?

Warm regards,

Paul

[Andreas Brekken]

Hello, all

Andrey - I guess you are referring to the Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldung when you mention two losses in August 1942 durch Feindeinwirkung.

With regards to this, it is correct that the 4.(F)/122 did not 'loose' any further aircraft in August 1942 - but the term Abgang is not necessarily defined as total loss. It indicates that the aircraft is taken off the operational strength of the unit due to damage they can not repair themselves at their base of operations.

In August 1942, the 4.(F)/122 reported three incidents, on August 16th, 23rd and 29th respectively. 2 due to enemy inflicted damage - and one without enemy inflicted damage.

Only the incident on August 23rd resulted in a total loss, and in my opinion the other enemy inflicted damage is related to the crash landing at Odessa on August 29th - even if the damage was relatively small in percentage.

Regards,
Andreas B

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

In the excellent Joel Hayward's book "Stopped at Stalingrad" is mentioned, that daily report of Fliegerführer Süd for 3.Aug.42 (Tagesabschlussmeldung Fl.Führ.Süd für 3.8.42) survived the war (with reference to USAFHRA K113.309-3 vol.6 Fl.Führ.Süd Ia Nr.: 4450/42 geh.). Maybe content of this report is known to some forum participants?

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Thank you, Andreas!

Do you know, how many combat-ready planes and crews had II./KG26 in the beginning of August 1942?

Best regards,
Andrey.

[Andreas Brekken]

Hello, Andrey.

On 31.07.1942 the entire II./KG 26 had 13 combat ready aircraft, and 17 non ready - thus 30 aircraft all in all. However - 10 of the aircraft reported was at Grosseto for Lufttorpedo training. (LT-Lehrgang). So in the unit there were only 20 aircraft at the operational bases at that point in time.

On 10.08.1942 they had only 6 combat ready aircraft in the entire Gruppe - out of a total of 30 all in all (including the 10 aircraft still training at Grosseto).

Regards,
Andreas B

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Andreas Brekken

On 31.07.1942 the entire II./KG 26 had 13 combat ready aircraft, and 17 non ready - thus 30 aircraft all in all. However - 10 of the aircraft reported was at Grosseto for Lufttorpedo training. (LT-Lehrgang). So in the unit there were only 20 aircraft at the operational bases at that point in time.

Hello Andreas,

Thank you for this data. Having looked at my notes, I can confirm that it was 6./KG 26 that was at Grosetto at this time. So much for the suggestion that it was this unit that hit the Molotov!

Warm regards,

Paul

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Hello Andreas.

Thank you a lot! So British radio intelligence was probably right about 6 planes from II./KG26 had operated at night 2/3.Aug.42. Surprisingly Soviet analysis soon after the raid says about 6 torpedo planes too - despite chaotic situation during the night.

Best regards,
Andrey

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Andrey Kuznetsov

Thank you a lot! So British radio intelligence was probably right about 6 planes from II./KG26 had operated at night 2/3.Aug.42. Surprisingly Soviet analysis soon after the raid says about 6 torpedo planes too - despite chaotic situation during the night.

Andrey, did the after-action analysis suggest that there were multiple torpedo-bomber attacks, or just one attack by all 6 aicraft? I believe the German standard procedure was to make a formation attack if at all possible, even at night.

Warm regards,

Paul