The momentous cost of Bomber Command.

[Sid Guttridge]

My first thought is that the cost of Bomber Command cannot be viewed in isolation from the impact of Bomber Command on Germany in damage and expenditure.

My second thought is that, if there was no Bomber Command, one has to find a viable alternative that would have caused the Germans equivalent damage, expenditure, lost production and redirected military assets.

43,000 Churchill tanks is a nonsensical alternative. Firstly, they could have addressed not a single one of the targets Bomber Command did; secondly, Churchill tanks did not use either the same materials or industrial plant and so were not a direct production equivalent; and thirdly, unlike the Lancaster, they were poor at what they did.

The article seems to assume that the number of duds and misses by Bomber Command bombs were a unique problem. However, only the smallest proportion of bullets or shells hit a significant target either. Less bombs does not automatically mean more of more accurate missiles.

Despite its unrealistically narrow focus, the article was an interesting read.
Nor does Bomber Command seem prohibitively costly, given that it absorbed at most 15% of defence expenditure.

Certainly winning the war cost Britain a fortune. However, the alternative of losing it doesn't seem particularly financially attractive either!

[Steve Smith]

I initially found this discussion of interest but that soon began to wear off. I think that Tony is just interested in a confrontation to voice his own opinion and using statistics to his own advantage to justify a point.

Is this discussion about, 1) the financial cost, 2) targeting, 3) strategy, 4) accuracy, or a mix of all.

As far as I am concerned the courage, determination and sacrifice of all those who served in the ranks of Bomber Command is unquestionable.

Like wise as far as accuracy is concerned No.3 Group who pioneered the use of GH and where the only main force group within the command to be thus equipped carried out a number of very accurate raids on Benzol / oil plants / coking plants as well as transportation targets from October 1944 onwards. Bombing accuracy was measured at times to within 500 yards, or better. The Group operated in all weathers and importantly did not require to see the target. We seem to be missing the contribution of this group.

[tcolvin]

I better explain my point then, Steve, which is to question Churchill's BC-based war strategy.
The question was raised in 1945 according to the following passage, and remains unanswered to this day.

"Tedder also told me that on his railway journey from the Crimea to Moscow (January 1945), he had passed through no town, other than Sevastopol, which was as badly damaged as were most of those of our own bombing targets which we had already over-run. He had also been interested to find that, however badly hit, damaged plants were soon back into production. The enormous strength of the Russian Air Force, mainly a fighter-bomber force, had impressed him, but his view was that the Russians had no understanding, in the sense that we had, of the proper use of an air force. To them it had been perfected as another form of artillery. In the note that I made of this conversation, I asked myself who was right - the Russians or us".
(From Apes to Warlords', page 320).

I believe the Russians were right, but expect few of the people on this board to agree.

Tony

[SES]

The role of Air Power is to gain, maintain and exploit air superiority in pursuance of strategic and operational objectives, everything else is rubbish.
bregds
SES
Been there, done that for more than 40 years.

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

I see the problem; you are using the word 'extrapolation' statistically while I am using it evidentially.

I have quantified, rightly or wrongly, the effect of aiming 19,000 tons of bombs onto an area of 0.72 sq kms (the equivalent of 67,000 tons/sq mile).
BC & 8USAAF never put the shipyard out of action and never killed any of the workers, although much repair work was needed, because they were notoriously inaccurate.
They destroyed only two military targets of significance (U-boats on the stocks) in the shipyard. Significantly, this was done by 8USAAF operating in daylight and using their Norden sights.

Wilhelmshaven's shipyard was not egregious, but typical of what strategic bombing could achieve in 1939-45, or the LW in Birmingham, Hull and Coventry.
Pictures showed the roofs off the buildings and general dereliction.
Harris showed Zuckerman his famous Blue Book that was filled with such pictures of destruction, but both Zuckerman and Harris knew that reports coming out of Germany showed that all the while production was increasing despite the apparent devastation.

This effect is now quantified, as Fahey has quantified BC's costs.
BC's effectiveness was not static, and did improve over time.
But in Wilhelmshaven's case, as in most others except a virgin target like Dresden, BC's nightly visitations just made the ruins in the city centres bounce once more.
If you think Darmstadt was different, then there's nothing to stop you doing the analysis.
I'll warrant you'll find no difference.
BC knew their dossier was dodgy, but continued because they were convinced Germans couldn't take it and their morale was about to crack. Ditto the USA failing in their effort to bomb the Vietnamese to the negotiating table.

Tony

Looks mighty devastated to me.

Before and after aerial photos of the bombing of Wilhelmshaven: The German port city of Wilhelmshaven was bombed twice in 1943 -- once by the USAAF on January 27, and again by the RAF Bomber Command on February 11-12. These aerial reconnaissance images show Wilhelmshaven before and after the two bombings. The second bombing, carried out at night, was especially challenging because of dense cloud cover. Planes equipped with the RAF's newly developed H2S ground-mapping radar located strategic targets, then illuminated them with parachute flares. A successful strike on a naval ammunition dump south of Wilhelmshaven caused widespread destruction of dockyards and the city.

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

I better explain my point then, Steve, which is to question Churchill's BC-based war strategy.
The question was raised in 1945 according to the following passage, and remains unanswered to this day.

"Tedder also told me that on his railway journey from the Crimea to Moscow (January 1945), he had passed through no town, other than Sevastopol, which was as badly damaged as were most of those of our own bombing targets which we had already over-run. He had also been interested to find that, however badly hit, damaged plants were soon back into production. The enormous strength of the Russian Air Force, mainly a fighter-bomber force, had impressed him, but his view was that the Russians had no understanding, in the sense that we had, of the proper use of an air force. To them it had been perfected as another form of artillery. In the note that I made of this conversation, I asked myself who was right - the Russians or us".
(From Apes to Warlords', page 320).

I believe the Russians were right, but expect few of the people on this board to agree.

Tony

At what cost to the Soviets Tony? You moan about the number of lives lost by BC yet that was minuscule compared to the Soviet military lives lost in the tactical war they fought.

[Steve Smith]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

I better explain my point then, Steve, which is to question Churchill's BC-based war strategy.
The question was raised in 1945 according to the following passage, and remains unanswered to this day.

"Tedder also told me that on his railway journey from the Crimea to Moscow (January 1945), he had passed through no town, other than Sevastopol, which was as badly damaged as were most of those of our own bombing targets which we had already over-run. He had also been interested to find that, however badly hit, damaged plants were soon back into production. The enormous strength of the Russian Air Force, mainly a fighter-bomber force, had impressed him, but his view was that the Russians had no understanding, in the sense that we had, of the proper use of an air force. To them it had been perfected as another form of artillery. In the note that I made of this conversation, I asked myself who was right - the Russians or us".
(From Apes to Warlords', page 320).

I believe the Russians were right, but expect few of the people on this board to agree.

Tony

Tony,
Having amassed a number of books and primary source material during my 30 year of interested in Bomber Command, I am sure I can find within the pages or volumes a quote from any number of high ranking officers or Air Ministry or governmental "names" to answer this post, but to be honest I can't be bothered.
I am certain that any post that does not agree with your views you will I am sure find a quote in your favour and try and contradict it.

[tcolvin]

Kutscha,
a) The pictures you published are of the Mariensiel arsenal that was destroyed on February 11, 1943, and thought to be one of the largest wartime explosions in NW Europe caused by BC. It was covered in the audit I posted. The arsenal was over 3 kms from the aiming point in the Bauhafen, which says it all about BC's accuracy. The result of the explosion was of little strategic consequence at that stage of the war.
b) The losses in the Anglo-Canadian infantry divisions in NW Europe between June 1944 and April 1945 were proportionately greater than in BC, and I would not be surprised to learn they were higher than in the Russian infantry - if you have figures please publish them as I would like to compare them. The problem with the Anglo-Canadian infantry was crap infantry weapons, crap tanks, crap tactical aircraft support, crap artillery, and crap leadership compared with Russian. So I do not know what point you are trying to make.

Steve, You are obviously as tired as I am of argument. Why don't you just state your conclusions after studying BC for 30 years. Perhaps some of us will learn something. I promise to say nothing.

Tony

[Icare9]

The losses in the Anglo-Canadian infantry divisions in NW Europe between June 1944 and April 1945 were proportionately greater than in BC, and I would not be surprised to learn they were higher than in the Russian infantry - if you have figures please publish them as I would like to compare them. The problem with the Anglo-Canadian infantry was crap infantry weapons, crap tanks, crap tactical aircraft support, crap artillery, and crap leadership

Tony, you're moving this into an arena which few of us can contend with. If you are now claiming that (despite Churchill tanks, which you were anxious to have more of) the D-Day Invasion forces had inferior equipment, then your opinions should be voiced in a more broader forum such as WW2Talk, than in an Aviation based one.

I feel that you are determined that your view be correct and will brook no contradiction. That isn't a reasoned basis for debate, you may find a more stimulating environment for your views elsewhere now you have broadened your arguments into an OVERALL strategic overview.

Like BC, the Army did the best with what it had, not just equipment, but use of tactics to outflank the Germans doggedly resisting the Anglo Canadians. Again, by totally absorbing all the German effort against them, they drew away defenders to allow the Americans to break through, culminating with the Falaise Gap and the abandonment of France by the Germans. And how, if everything they used was poor, did they achieve such a resounding defeat on the Germans?

BC by its continued Operations succeeded in holding back a vast amount of German manpower and resources, slowing development of what could have been war winning weapons such as the V1, V2 and jets. That allowed the Russians to achieve battlefield superiority sooner. However, I am sure you will have yet another answer to support your view.

Just don't hint that the lives of those who died were "thrown away" wilfully.

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Kutscha,
a) The pictures you published are of the Mariensiel arsenal that was destroyed on February 11, 1943, and thought to be one of the largest wartime explosions in NW Europe caused by BC. It was covered in the audit I posted. The arsenal was over 3 kms from the aiming point in the Bauhafen, which says it all about BC's accuracy. The result of the explosion was of little strategic consequence at that stage of the war.
Tony

11/12 February 1943

Wilhelmshaven. This was an interesting and important raid by 177 aircraft - 129 Lancasters, 40 Halifaxes and 8 Stirlings. The Pathfinders found that the Wilhelmshaven area was completely covered by cloud and they had to employ their least reliable marking method, skymarking by parachute flares using H2S. The marking was carried out with great accuracy and the Main Force bombing was very effective. Crews saw through the clouds a huge explosion on the ground, the glow of which lingered for nearly 10 minutes. This was caused by bombs blowing up the naval ammunition depot at Mariensiel to the south of Wilhelmshaven. The resulting explosion devastated an area of nearly 120 acres and caused widespread damage in the naval dockyard and in the town. Much damage was also caused by other bombs.