The confirmation of air victories of top Allied aces by LW sources?

[GuerraCivil]

The renowned Finnish airwar historian Hannu Valtonen seems to suggest that only about 1:15 or 1:16 of Soviet claims during WW2 could be verified by enemy loss records! However he points out that there were differencies between units - the VVS KF (Northen Fleet Aviation) being more accurate than 7th Air Army at the northern flank of Soviet Western Front - for example Boris Safonov´s possible overclaim ratio being only the "average WW2 standard" of about 3:1.

I guess that the "best" Soviet units (in terms of claim accuracy) reached a level of claim accuracy comparable to those of other air forces. For example the 49 IAP was fairly accurate in Winter War and probably the most succesfull Soviet fighter unit in that war although other units were credited with more "kills". When it comes to overclaiming, Soviets were at least not much worse/overoptimistic than Japanese.

It would be interesting to know more about the "real heroes" who did not get rewarded for their exploits because they were "too accurate" with claiming and did let others (more optimistic claimers) to take the laurels of more glory with less justification. HGabor suggests quite convincingly that of German top aces Helmut Lipfert was much more precise with his combat reports than Hartmann and may actually have shot down more planes down.

The actual top Allied ace of WW2 against Luftwaffe has probably been someone else than Ivan Kodzehub who will remain as the top man against Luftwaffe in official records. I guess that there are other Soviet candidates who may have a score comparable to those of Jonhnie Johson, Gabby Gabreski or George Beurling.

With George Beurling I´m quite skeptical with his score but this stems partly from his book which I did not like much. I did find "Malta Spitfire" as a piece of propaganda and even as such not that well written. I have read better pilot memoirs than that one. Probably Beurling was much better as a fighter pilot as he was as a writer. Maybe if he had lived longer, he could also have written a better account or improved edition of his book with the help of some skillfull editor (focusing more in other things than Allied propaganda needs which must have been focus in original 1943 edition!).

[Juha]

Hello Nokose, IIRC 159 IAP was the most dangerous opponent of the FiAF 109G pilots during the Soviet Summer 1944 Offensive. I have always wondered why it was not given the Guard status. Have you any opinion on that?

Juha

[Juha]

Originally Posted by GuerraCivil

...With George Beurling I´m quite skeptical with his score but this stems partly from his book which I did not like much. I did find "Malta Spitfire" as a piece of propaganda and even as such not that well written. I have read better pilot memoirs than that one. Probably Beurling was much better as a fighter pilot as he was as a writer. Maybe if he had lived longer, he could also have written a better account or improved edition of his book with the help of some skillfull editor (focusing more in other things than Allied propaganda needs which must have been focus in original 1943 edition!).

You might try to form your own opinion on Beurling's claims by reading Shores' et al Malta: The Spitfire Year. But it is sometimes difficult to form a firm opinion, the Shores' book didn't make me any surer on Bär's claim accuracy, but Bär seems to be a difficult case in this issue.

Juha

[Nokose]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello Nokose, IIRC 159 IAP was the most dangerous opponent of the FiAF 109G pilots during the Soviet Summer 1944 Offensive. I have always wondered why it was not given the Guard status. Have you any opinion on that?

Juha

Juha, No I have no idea why they didn't become a GIAP. They had pilots that became HSU and aces. They received P-40 with good radios when other units didn't have any radio. Maybe a Russian member with more knowledge of the unit and what it took can answer. I have just begun looking at how the VVS touched JG 54 and the units attached to them in 1942 and 1943 (1941 and 1944 are still not areas that I do more then take notes on).

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Juha

It was understandable to think that under dictatorship Germany could mobilize its resources more totally to military production than a democracy, even during the war.

Juha

Hello Juha,

I sympathise with your view, the point that I would emphasise is that during the war, democracies can and should mobilise their populations more effectively than dictatorships, by achieving the active consent of the voters. The main problem for Britain was precisely this, that the population was often skeptical about the chances of victory and sometimes distrusted the motives of the government. The fact that Churchill lost the general election immediately after the war shows that political unity was very difficult to maintain.

Nick correctly points out that Germany's industry suffered from severe weaknesses. A few of these were common knowledge, including its dependence on raw material imports. Had Britain mobilised her own resources and those of the Empire with anything like the intensity that Speer later achieved in Germany, Britain's armed forces would have had a decisive material superiority over not only Germany, but Italy too.

On the subject of the optimal subject for research, I would strongly argue in favour of a new general history of the Second World War, based on the archival material which has become available worldwide. It is very important that it becomes commonly understood just how the Western democracies won the war and the mistakes that they made in the process. To put it succinctly, this is of the greatest importance for current policy.

Regards,

Paul

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by GuerraCivil

The renowned Finnish airwar historian Hannu Valtonen seems to suggest that only about 1:15 or 1:16 of Soviet claims during WW2 could be verified by enemy loss records! However he points out that there were differencies between units - the VVS KF (Northen Fleet Aviation) being more accurate than 7th Air Army at the northern flank of Soviet Western Front - for example Boris Safonov´s possible overclaim ratio being only the "average WW2 standard" of about 3:1.

Hello GuerraCivil,

Thank you for summarising Valtonen's thoughts. This is consistent with recent research on air operations over Nomonhan (Khalkhin Gol) in 1939, where Japanese and Soviet overclaiming was very substantial. This may have been partly a product of the employment of less experienced units in these air battles. In the case that you cite, the war in the Arctic, the 7th Air Army was one of the least important Soviet commands and did not receive much attention from the VVS leadership. It is important to note, nevertheless, that the Northern front as a whole was a succesful economy of effort undertaking for the Axis, with Soviet losses being far higher than those of Germany and Finland.

Regards,

Paul

[GuerraCivil]

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

the Northern front as a whole was a succesful economy of effort undertaking for the Axis, with Soviet losses being far higher than those of Germany and Finland.

Controversial - one could also say that Germans failed very decisively at the Northern front as they were unable to achieve strategic key targets like Murmans and cutting the sea traffic between USSR and its Western allies. Also the cutting the railroad of Muurmanni (connecting Murmansk to central Russia) failed and Valtonen has shown that German air attacks were rather teethless. Germans overestimated grossly the results of their efforts. They destroyed much less aircraft, less tonnage, less equipment and less manpower of enemy than they claimed. Enemy seemed to replace heavy losses at surprising speed from "infinite" resources (when enemy losses actually were not that heavy as Germans thought).

In far north there was not even such initial great success as in the south - Soviet planes were not destroyed on the ground or hunted down in air combat at massive scale. LW was surprisingly weak - but its resources in north were limited and it was a secondary front. For example the JG 5 was the last unit to receive any new Bf 109 type or FW 190. They did fly with "Emil" longer than any other LW unit.

Germany lost the war even at the northern flank of its Eastern front because German achivements were too modest - far less than was needed to win the war. Germans overestimated their chances and underestimated the enemy.

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by GuerraCivil

Controversial - one could also say that Germans failed very decisively at the Northern front as they were unable to achieve strategic key targets like Murmans and cutting the sea traffic between USSR and its Western allies...

Hello GuerraCivil,

The reason that there is dispute on this point is because German successes are measured against their stated intentions, rather than the resources available to them. The same is true, in a different way, of much of the literature about the war in the West. A careful analysis of capabilities would suggest that the Germans often assigned themselves objectives which were unattainable, while conversely the Western Allies set low targets for themselves.

Precisely because the Arctic was a secondary theatre, as you write in your second paragraph, the Axis military effort should be considered very successful, in relation to what was possible. The Germans did underestimate the enemy, but this did not have the disastrous consequences that it had elsewhere on the Eastern front. This was partly because the climactic and terrain conditions did not allow for large-scale Soviet offensives, but the effectiveness of the Axis defensive measures in the Arctic is noteworthy. The Soviet armed forces expended large numbers of men and equipment in the theatre, especially in 1943 and 1944, for no significant military gains.

Regards,

Paul

[Edward L. Hsiao]

Hello,

It is true that Soviet aircraft lacks good gunsights to aim at an another aircraft during WWII.

Edward L. Hsiao