Luftwaffe Myths

[RT]

by late 1944 90 Allied divisions were facing 60 German divsions in Western Europe..in the East it was 560 Soviet divisions vs. 240 German...some have argued that the Soviets had won the war by 1944, whether the Anglo-Americans invaded or not...


I wonder why they don't made it ??? Germany against Russia no match even at 1 against 2, but with the landing all the best divisions were driven to the west, so at that time they are fighting 1 against 4 or 5, in the air 1 against 15, same situation in Italia where they opposed nearly no air opposition

rémi

[Ruy Horta]

RT, that is not entirely fair since the German Wehrmacht had operated on the fireman principle for quite some time out of poverty. Sending the best units to hotspots to stop the fire and relocate. Troops were moved to the area of direct crisis, in this case from the Eastern Front to the Western. Lets not forget that together with those crack divisions were also a lot of mediocre ones.

The original thread wasn't clear and it was more of a challenge to the community than an effort to start a constructive discussion.

When we discuss the Luftwaffe we tend to compare it with the RAF and USAAC/F and while forcing it in that mold conclude that it failed miserably. At that point we fail miserably because although the Luftwaffe may have failed to win the war it did so while faced with a very different set of circumstances. Yes, some of these are socio-political, others are industrial and technological and last but not least there is the geo-strategical side.

The Brits were out-producing the Germans in bombers, because they were getting a lot of (war) material from the US, and could thus afford to allocate massive resources to their strategic bomber arm.

Besides, a large strategic bomber force is a luxury that you can only enjoy under special circumstances. Britain enjoyed that luxury because of its geographic location. In the past this enabled it do concentrate on the Navy and now the RAF instead of having a big standing army like its continental adversaries. The long range "strategic" bomber was a weapon of stalemate and attrition, not a war of movement. Germany did not have the resources (nor the luxury) to produce and equip for both.

The Soviet miracle may have been the successful movement of their production facilities beyond the range of German bombers, but it is arguable if the Luftwaffe had the strength to concentrate on these targets even if they had not moved. More significant was their removal from the advancing German armies. At that point the tank was more important than the bomber.

Side notes:
Actually in 1939-40 bombers like the Hampden, Wellington and Whitley were the RAF's equivalent of "strategic" bombers, to these you must compare the Do 17, Do 215, He 111 and Ju 88. They don't compare badly.

Besides in the beginning of the war the Luftwaffe bomber force was both strategic in thinking and equipment, yet flexible to fully support the army if the situation required it to do so.

It is in the sustained effort in its over extended position that it "failed". That its higher (and political) leadership was mediocre is beyond dispute. Ironically Goering for all his failings did proof to be instrumental in its massive growth program during latter half of the thirties, an other thing we easily overlook with 20-20 hindsight. That first battle was won by the Luftwaffe before any shot was fired and it did influence early allied decision making and action.

[FalkeEins]

but the Allies were always going to 'out-produce' the Germans since the latter had no means of hitting major Allied production centres -whether that be America or the Urals- surely a major failing of Luftwaffe planning, procurement and strategy..? of course ultimately the Luftwaffe finished the war with the same pre-war types in service (109, He111, Ju 87 etc etc), whereas the Hampdens and Whitleys had long gone..

Ruy, you seem to be saying in effect that the Luftwaffe performed ‘well’ given that it was waging a war under changed circumstances, a war for which it not been conceived....presumably you see these changing circumstances as starting to impact from, say, about December 1941 ?...

That line of argument unfortunately brings us back to the Battle of Britain and the importance of Britain’s geographical situation for the continued prosecution of the war in the West. The Luftwaffe -supporting the army- couldn't impede the BEF at Dunkirk & more crucially failed to bring to the British to their knees or the negotiating table during the summer of 1940.

[Juha]

A bit off the topic, but
FalkeEins
Soviet divisions had appr. ½ of the manpower of German divisions, so comparing the number of divisions doesn’t necessary give right picture, even if many German divisions were badly understrenght.

RT
What You think was wrong with 1., 3. – 7., 12. – 14., 16., 17. and 24.PzDs and PzGrD GD with usually are counted as among the best divisions of WM. All were in the East iduring summer 44

Juha

[Ruy Horta]

Originally Posted by FalkeEins

but the Allies were always going to 'out-produce' the Germans since the latter had no means of hitting major Allied production centres -whether that be America or the Urals- surely a major failing of Luftwaffe planning, procurement and strategy..? of course ultimately the Luftwaffe finished the war with the same pre-war types in service (109, He111, Ju 87 etc etc), whereas the Hampdens and Whitleys had long gone..

Ruy, you seem to be saying in effect that the Luftwaffe performed ‘well’ given that it was waging a war under changed circumstances, a war for which it not been conceived....presumably you see these changing circumstances as starting to impact from, say, about December 1941 ?...

That line of argument unfortunately brings us back to the Battle of Britain and the importance of Britain’s geographical situation for the continued prosecution of the war in the West. The Luftwaffe -supporting the army- couldn't impede the BEF at Dunkirk & more crucially failed to bring to the British to their knees or the negotiating table during the summer of 1940.

Britain could only out produce because they were let off the hook in the winter of 1940 and were receiving massive support from the US.

The British have history on its side, at least that part which they choose to high light, thus it would take more than a continental defeat (at most a major setback) or a single summer of bombing to crack their will.

But no, I don't regard 11 dec as crucial, although I regard it as a fundamental mistake by Hitler. It was Barbarossa which turned the table in the war against Britain. With the Eastern Front it was impossible for the Germans to make the strategic shift in allocated resources needed to defeat Britain. That shift in resources was actually part of pre war military planning, but Hitler choose to shorten the war by quickly defeating the Soviets first (he might be forgiven if one looks at the history of the eastern front in WW1 and the quick unexpected victory against Anglo-French in 1940)..

Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain are important only in as far as it didn't give Germany the quick settlement they were after in their gamble. But I think it is an illusion to think that Britain would have lasted long if she had to sustain the full pressure of the German war machine for an extended period. Tough as it may have been for war time Brits, and the British people can certainly be proud of their country and themselves during this period, it certainly wasn't the full German war machine nor its full potential that was aimed at them.

As for the Luftwaffe not being able to impede the BEF in its evacuation, that's true, but is it that by which we measure its performance? If so, what does that make of the Allied AF during the Sicilian evacuation? Perhaps we should judge it by the fact that the BEF was so quick in leaving the continent in the first place, something that the RAF could not change either.

But I am entering a tit for tat discussion, something that I did not want to do. A lot of pointless writing that has no other purpose than amusing some anonymous OP.

Falke, like I seem to write often these days, we won't agree, so it is better to agree to disagree.

[Ruy Horta]

Originally Posted by Juha

What You think was wrong with 1., 3. – 7., 12. – 14., 16., 17. and 24.PzDs and PzGrD GD with usually are counted as among the best divisions of WM. All were in the East during summer 44.

Juha,

Good point.

We tend to focus on the veteran units that were moved to the west, forgetting about the experienced and crack units that stayed in the East. Besides many of the veteran units pulled out of the East were under strength and in need of replacements.

[RT]

RT
What You think was wrong with 1., 3. – 7., 12. – 14., 16., 17. and 24.PzDs and PzGrD GD with usually are counted as among the best divisions of WM. All were in the East iduring summer 44

....Nd the vast majority of SS-units move to west, idea was just to hold the front, nd wait for a miracle or the Wunderwaffen..



but the Allies were always going to 'out-produce' the Germans since the latter had no means of hitting major Allied production centres -whether that be America or the Urals- surely a major failing of Luftwaffe planning, procurement and strategy..? of course ultimately the Luftwaffe finished the war with the same pre-war types in service (109, He111, Ju 87 etc etc), whereas the Hampdens and Whitleys had long gone..

The brits finish the war with 1946 models like the spifire, nd the beaufighters, Germany with 1918 models like the Ar234 nd Me262

No necessity to go on that way, the strategic-war is merely the ressource-war, without gas, rubber, "special metals" ...the better is to expect that war will not last,
when you hv the good allied-steel you could produce good bombers those with turbo-compressors not using coupled-fighterengines

Remi

[Juha]

Hello RT
not all SSDivs were transferred to West, of the mechanized SSDivs 3. and 5. SSPzDs stayed in East as well as 11.SSPzGrD. And LW’s Fallschirm PzD Hermann Göring was transferred from Italy to East and not to West in July 44
And IMHO SS mechanized divs were not better than Heer’s best mechanized divs, for ex. somehow it was the 2.PzD (not SS) that got farthest during both Mortain and Ardennes counterattacks, not any of SS PzDs .

Juha

[FalkeEins]

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain are important only in as far as it didn't give Germany the quick settlement they were after in their gamble. But I think it is an illusion to think that Britain would have lasted long if she had to sustain the full pressure of the German war machine for an extended period.

Ruy I don't necessarily disagree with you - your posts are interesting & perfectly valid. I guess I'm playing devil's advocate in any case. I'm interested in the notion that the BoB was not 'the full pressure of the German war machine'. I think this was a view also expressed most notably by Prien in the Foreword to Teil 4 of his Jagdfliegerverband series. Of the 90+ days that the BoB lasted, the Luftwaffe only appeared in British skies on 45 of them..or similar. I suppose Hitler could have used the winter of 1940-41 to build up his invasion fleet and mass-produce aircraft as well as re-equipping the Bf-109 with drop tanks for another attempt in 1941 - rather than go East. Even so 200 fighter pilots lost for nothing during the summer of 1940 seems a pretty high price to pay for a 'draw'.

[Juha]

Hello Ruy
I don’t entirely agree with You. Britain and Commonwealth stood alone against Germany almost a year from late June 40 onwards. With surface power of Kriegsmarine crippled during Norway campaign there wasn’t much else to try against GB than air-attacks and U-boat campaign. And LW losses during the BoB were a bit under 2000 a/c permanently lost and apr. 3400 flying personnel KIA/POW, to me that doesn’t sound as half-hearted attempt. And those almost straight after substantial losses during the May-June 40 campaign.

Juha