Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

Regardless, the competing German firms seems to have been putting with a twin cowl MG at the start (which was pretty much standard for the biplanes they replaced anyway)

There does seem to have been an attitude that "if it was good enough for Boelcke, then it's good enough for us." It seems with the Bf 109 that increasing the armament beyond 2 x MG 17 was a messy compromise every time (bulges on the cowling, a breech between the pilot's feet, underwing gondolas) — Prof. Messerschmitt didn't leave much space for luxuries like armament.

I agree with you that the I-16 seems to have been well ahead of the pack (and IIRC, Alfred Price wrote that it a particularly good cannon).

[Juha]

Hello
On Spitfires at the beginning of the war.
According to Price, 306 had been delivered to RAF, 10 sqns were fully equipped with it and one was in the process of re-equipping. A further 71 Spitfires were in MUs, 36 were already written-off.
Also Price wrote that 11 of the Spits in MUs were being employed for trials work and one was at CFS. S0 it seems that according to Price, 199 Spitfires were in sqns, of which one was in the process of re-equipping. The difference was exactly 12 to the Bowyers' figure I gave earlier, maybe it is explained by the Spits at 609 Sqn or the question is on the 12 Spits employed in tests or at CFS, were they incl. in those in MUs or not.

On I-16, Soviet 20mm ShVAK was good and powerful cannon, but rather heavy for I-16, so most I-16s produced had 4 x 7,62mm mgs, the last production version had 1 x 12,7mm + 2 x 7,62mm mgs.

Juha

[tcolvin]

Two biographies (by AJP Taylor and Anne Chisholm/Michael Davie) describe Beaverbrook's [b] achievements as Minister of Aircraft Production [MAP].

1. B was an appeaser and wanted a peace negotiated with Hitler - a fact excluded from the influential book 'Guilty Men' written by B's employees Michael Foot, Peter Howard and Frank Owen.
2. Churchill [C] ignored the king's advice not to employ B because it would upset influential Canadians.
3. Churchill's friendship with B was personal, and ignored B's politics. “I needed his vital and vibrant energy”, C wrote.
4. B said the RAF reacted negatively to his appointment; “They saw the power and the authority passing elsewhere....[They were] utterly distressed and completely hostile”.
5. B took no salary, used his own cars, paid for his own petrol, bought his own armoured car (£695) and then presented it to the Army to be used by Dempsey in France. B provided and paid for most of his staff.
6. B worked at first from his home at Stornoway House until it was bombed, and then in an ICI building on the Thames near Lambeth Bridge.
7. B employed; civil servants - Eaton Griffiths, Edmund Compton and Sir Archibald Rowlands; Air Ministry staff - Sir Charles Craven and ACM Sir Wilfred Freeman; personal secretaries from his newspapers – George Thomson, David Farrer and JB Wilson; Parliamentary private secretary – Lord Brownlow; industrialists – Patrick Hennessy (Ford), Trevor Westbrook (ex Vickers Armstrong and given control over both the Civilian and RAF's Repair Organisations; and others – Gp Capt Grahame Dawson, RB Bennett, Jennie Lee, who visited factories to tell people to carry on when the sirens sounded, and who acted as a messenger for discovering whether the reason for delay was men, management or lack of material, and Stephen King-Hall MP.
8. The Minister's Council comprised Craven, Freeman, Rowlands and Hennessy. “There was no discussion. Each member reported the most urgent problems, and B snapped out orders that the difficulties must be overcome” (Taylor).
9. B imitated Lloyd George's precedent as Minister of Munitions in WW1. Lloyd George had removed production from the War Office and continued to fight with them afterwards.
10. B followed no routine, treating his senior staff as he had treated his editors, calling them at all hours. He used bullying and flattery, and when these didn't work he had rows with; Bevin over manpower; Nuffield over Castle Bromwich since Nuffield thought he could build Spitfires like cars. For 9 months Castle Bromwich produced nothing so B took it over and employed thousands of women as suggested by Westbrook, and started production. Nuffield stormed into B's office and threatened to have B sacked, who replied there was nothing he would like better. Churchill told Nuffield, “I cannot interfere with the manufacture of aircraft”.
11. B disregarded protocol, left few records, and ran his Ministry over the telephone. His people then did the same.
12. B was nervous about the bombing, and falsified his attendance record, being at Cherkley on September 15 but recorded as being in London.
13. B's method was to run the production line at full speed and deal only with the problems or bottlenecks as they arose. He then with drama and swift action focussed the entire energies of the MAP on finding a solution. “In B's time the production line never worked smoothly”. (Taylor)
14. T Usher described B's working method to Taylor; “B was, during the interview I had with him, talking to the Hamilton Air Screw Co of Hamilton, Ohio, proposing payment for propellers at a time when gold resources were totally exhausted. At the same time he was carrying on another conversation, on another telephone, with the secretary to Sir Geoffrey De Havilland in Hatfield and raising hell because Sir Geoffrey was out to lunch for two hours....There were at least six other people lined up with memoranda to discuss with him whilst my father and I sat in front of his desk”.
15. B boasted of successes no one else could have achieved, such as; releasing from internment a German Jewish expert (the only one in Britain) in the design of aluminium extrusion presses, called Loewy, who had brought his staff to refuge in Britain. Military Police and security experts appealed to Churchill that Loewy be kept interned but C never replied; taking over the Ferry Pools and manning them with civilians to release RAF pilots in spite of Air Ministry refusal; placing orders with Packard for Merlin engines without approval; instituting the trans-Atlantic ferry service (Atfero) in opposition to the Air Ministry who stopped it as soon as B left the MAP; telling the factories to 'work seven days a week and disregard all labour regulations”, which brought him into conflict with Bevin, who was right since tired men are less productive.
16. But B did not always have his way; C did not establish the Army Air Force which B recommended, nor transfer Coastal Command to the RN. B wanted his workers to disregard air raid sirens and be protected by barrage balloons, AA guns and fighters “If B had had his way, Fighter Command, AA Command and most of the British Army would have been solely occupied during the autumn of 1940 in protecting aircraft factories”. (Taylor)
17. B supported Dowding's refusal to make useless gestures such as sending fighters to France, making offensive sweeps across the Channel, or forming 'the big wing'. B was coached by Max Aitken, his son and CO of 601 Sqn from June 1940, to become involved in strategic disputes, because the MAP was as much involved with development as production. There were arguments about training aircraft for the BCATP, dive bombers for the Army, and the FAA's needs. The Air Ministry argued that B should produce what they decided, but he claimed only he knew what types and numbers could be produced. B, supported by Dowding, wanted to replace the fighters' 8 machine guns with cannon, and the manufacturers said it could be done, but he Air Ministry opposed the move.
18. B decided where the fighters should be sent, and dealt directly with Park.
19. Westbrook took the spares from RAF stores and used them in production. He cannibalised aircraft to keep others flying. The Air Ministry resisted, but were overruled.
20. On July 13, Freeman wanted to resign, but changed his mind and in November did not want to return to the Air Ministry when recalled. Freeman wrote; “Your kindness to someone who must have appeared slow to understand and appreciate your methods I shall ever remember with gratitude”.
21. The RAF put it about that B's success was due to Freeman, although B himself had already made that point to Freeman himself.
22. The main complaint was B's piracy in raiding other departments' supplies. But B argued to Lt-Gen Sir Ian Jacob (not an admirer of B), who accepted its truth, that this piracy resulted in an increase in total availability because those who had been robbed took measures to find alternatives which they would not otherwise have done.
23. B resigned four times between May and December 1940, and later told C that the resignations were a deliberate act of promotion. There were other such acts that were pointless; the appeal for aluminium pots and pans produced less than one day's consumption and aluminium was never in shortage with plenty of new aluminium pots in the shops; the Spitfire Fund yielded £1 million/month when availability of sterling was not the factor limiting Spitfire availability. But these campaigns generated a feeling of urgency.
24. Dowding told Templewood/Hoare; “The country owes as much to B for the BofB as it does to me. Without his drive behind me I could not have carried on during the battle”. Strong bonds of sympathy and outlook developed between B and Dowding who were opposites in character. Farrer wrote, “When their talks were finished, B would get up from his chair, accompany Dowding to the front entrance of the Ministry two floors below, and show him to his car. To no one else except Churchill did he pay a similar attention”. Dowding and B both believed the bomber could be beaten off by sufficient fighters, while the Air Ministry believed there was no defence except retaliation by bombers which took priority over fighters. (Taylor)
25. Fighter production had leapt in April 1940 (March 177, April 256, May 325) before B took over, and the improvement continued in May before B could have had an impact. The improvement in fighter production was due to their taking an increasing percentage of rising total production (Feb 19.6%, Mar 20.6%, Apr 23.7%, May 25.4%, June 28.0%, July 29.8%, Aug 29.7%).
26. The Air Ministry claimed B's 'success' was due to the plans and preparations made before B took over. If B had not taken over, then two things would have resulted; fewer fighters and more bombers, and a reduced sense of urgency. Taylor concludes that these two results could have cost Britain the BofB. The champions of the Air Ministry do not disagree. Their objection was the excessive cost of B's achievement. Joubert wrote; “In fact B.... played hell with the war policy of the RAF. But he most certainly produced the aircraft that won the BofB. What he did in the summer of 1940 set back the winning of the air war over Germany by many months. The bomber production programme was disrupted to allow of high-speed production of fighters. And who can say that he was very wrong?” B always admitted a willingness to sacrifice the future for the present. The heavy bomber development was stopped for only two months, and its biggest cause of delay was the need to resolve teething problems of new technology, American industry was more successful here than British industry. The Air Ministry complaint was a red herring. B did not believe in victory through bombing, and he was right.
27. B wanted to meet the needs of the Army, and in July 1940 placed a large order for dive bombers in the USA. The Air Ministry protested and refused to supply or train pilots. Sinclair persuaded Margesson to cancel further orders. Complaints about lack of dive bombers became acute in 1941 in North Africa, and B was blamed for the deficiency. B wanted to reply, but C stopped him.
28. B pushed the Whittle jet, but the Air Ministry neglected it when B left the MAP. Barnes Wallis always said the development of his large bombs happened despite the Air Ministry and due to B's support.

Tony

[Kurfürst]

Very very informative Tony, thanks for sharing that!

[Juha]

Hello Tony
thanks a lot for your informative message. I have read neither of the biographies, so nice to have summary of them. However, biographies usually have the problem that they tended to make their subject more important than he/she was or at least see the issues at least partly through the subject’s eyes. That said, I must admit that AJP is my favourite British historian, as a person, and I have usually enjoyed greatly his books. But the truth is that from Furse’s biography on Freeman one gets a somewhat different picture on Beaverbrook’s achievement. Furse saw things clearly from Freeman’s point of view, but generally it is a good book. Freeman had already seen before the establishment of MAP, that Nuffield was ineffective in aviation field.

On Loewy, according to Furse, he was allowed to continue his work after the outbreak of war but many of his assistants were interned. What B did was to rescue those Loewy’s collegues and other experienced a/c engineers from interment camps and put them to work for the MAP. This was one of B’s unorthodox ways which greatly impressed Freeman as did some of his ruthless ways to get changes done quickly. But generally Freeman had rather negative view on B’s actions. In fact the chapter on B's time in the MAP in Furse's book has the heading: "Magic is nine-tenths illusion" - the Beaverbrook myth.

On Whittle jet, Furse gives exactly opposite view. According to him, Freeman went so far as to conceal its existence from B for nearly a week with the result that it was not cancelled, and merely lost its priority status from 20 May to 11 June1940. Freeman also asked, via Tedder, Joubert to dissuade B from halting the development of A.I. radar.

On cannon armament, now prototype cannon Hurricanes and Spitfires were tested during summer 1939 but tests run into difficulties because 20mm Hispano, which was designed as Motor-Canon, did not at first take well installations into wings, becoming very unreliable. When 19 Sqn was equipped with canon armed Spit Mk Ibs during the BoB, its pilots soon became very frustrated with it and in the end its CO got his way and they gladly changed their new Mk Ibs to second-hand mg armed Mk Ias.

Juha

[Evgeny Velichko]

May 20, 1940 after the occupation of Abbeville, Hitler said he was willing to sign a separate peace with England at any time (Ref: Jodl Diary 01.02 ~ 26.05.40).

2 June, Hitler told the commander of Army Group "A" Runshtedt that if England now wish to end the war, and consents to a reasonable peace, which he expected of it, he (Hitler) would have been, at least, is free to perform its real great problem - the struggle against Bolshevism (Ref: Gen.Inf. Sodenstern).

In June 1940, there were a number of events have strengthened Hitler's determination to conduct a military campaign against the Soviet Union - the Baltic States notes 14/16 June and, especially, the decision of "Bessarabia" issue June 23-28.

June 22 France surrendered to Hitler and Luftwaffe banned on flights over Britain, not to provoke the British. Goering allow his pilots to join the battle at a meeting with the British aircraft, including over La Manche, but the latter were forbidden to cross.

30 June F. Haider met with Sekreter Ministry of Foreign Affairs Weizsäcker, who reported that Hitler's attention turned to the East. However, if England still will not be reluctant to conclude the world is likely to require further demonstration of military force.

July 3, in the diary of Franz Halder's record appears on the operational tasks of the General Staff - in addition to Britain, "eastern problem" is put forward in the first place. You can tell that by the beginning of July, Russia has firmly taken its place in the plans of the German military on direct and repeated instructions A. Hitler.

July 13 at a meeting of top military leaders shared the view that Britain is not going to make peace, because hopes on Russia.

In the end, on July 16 came Directive No.16 (rather cautious content) which mentions the invasion plan "Seelowe".

July 19 during a speech in the Reichstag, Hitler turned to London with "last call for prudence, is still hoping to conclude a compromise peace.

However, without waiting for an answer, July 21, Hitler called a meeting senior leaders OKL and OKM (Eshonnek and Roeder, respectively), which noted that the threat of invasion - the best way to get Britain to appeal to reason, but the invasion should be effectively applied only if will not be another opportunity to get Britain to make peace.

The next day, Goering was summoned to headquarters for instructions on preparing the company in the East. On the same day in the Halifax rejected the proposal to Hitler.

July 28 released a memorandum of fact that Britain must continue to struggle (against the shipping company). "Seelowe" continue to prepare until the spring of 1941 as well as the invasion of Russia. Sounded even the idea of invading Russia in the autumn of 1940. In the end, Halder wrote in his diary: Russia - Spring 1941

On July 31 meeting, ar the Berghof, Hitler told his generals on the coming war c Russia, the nearest possible landing in England were determined at 20 ~ 26 September (with all the preparations, including the formulation of minefields and haul, had to be completed by September 15).
Many of those present realized that this year no invasion will not happen.

[tcolvin]

Everything you say is correct, Evgeny.

Hitler believed Britain refused to make peace because Churchill expected Russia to save Britain. Therefore destroying Stalin was the key to Lebensraum and peace with Britain.

The problem we have is that we cannot be sure that all of the documents about the British peace party have been published.
This is because the Royal Family were involved.
The Hess documents have been placed in the Royal Archive where they are legally immune from FOI legislation.
It is also possible that Churchill knew Hitler was bluffing about Seeloewe from Enigma decrypts.

If only the Russian archives would be opened to reveal what Stalin was told by the British spies (Blunt, Philby, Rothschild etc) about British knowledge of Hitler's intentions.

Tony

[Evgeny Velichko]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Everything you say is correct, Evgeny.

Hitler believed Britain refused to make peace because Churchill expected Russia to save Britain. Therefore destroying Stalin was the key to Lebensraum and peace with Britain.

The problem we have is that we cannot be sure that all of the documents about the British peace party have been published.
This is because the Royal Family were involved.
The Hess documents have been placed in the Royal Archive where they are legally immune from FOI legislation.
It is also possible that Churchill knew Hitler was bluffing about Seeloewe from Enigma decrypts.

If only the Russian archives would be opened to reveal what Stalin was told by the British spies (Blunt, Philby, Rothschild etc) about British knowledge of Hitler's intentions.

Tony

Russia was a target for Hitler since his (Hitlers) book "MK".
He decided to invade to USSR before FC ended, and far before BofB started.