"Zerstorer" Hardback by John Vasco and Peter Cornwell - Coming from Wingleader in 2025

[INM@RLM]

I was invited to review this volume by another forum, only to discover when I attempted to post that there was a character limit of just 5,000.
So with that as context as to the form of presentation, I offer a few observations and findings below.

This 2025 release is the expanded and updated second edition of a work originally published in 1995. The new edition includes a very great many more photographs and the quality of their reproduction has been improved significantly.
What is very clear about this book is that the two authors have invested an enormous amount of effort through several decades in the execution of this extremely demanding project. Although the authors have aimed to produce "the most up-to-date information concerning the Bf 110 in 1940", for those with some familiarity in the matter, the eye is drawn to more than a few imperfections. All perhaps might have been avoided with a little extra care, but, in fairness, putting together even an update of a study this broad and ambitious might have become a totally exhausting task even for a pair of authors.

Only a few slips are to be found amongst the photo captions, but many more are evident in the text. What follows are a few examples that fall into three broad categories. Almost all are selected just from the earlier part of the book.

The first natural grouping is that tighter proof-reading should have caught each of these cases:
In the new first chapter on the Sitzkrieg, the I./ZG 76 events of 14th and 17th April described towards the end actually belong in the next chapter covering Scandinavian operations.
In Chapter 2, the 1995 statement that I./StG 77 was the Stuka Gruppe deployed to Norway, included in the earlier edition at p.13 has been repeated here on p.14 although it should have been corrected to I./StG 1 (subsequently accurately identified later in this second chapter).
In Chapter 3 describing the 1940 development of the night-fighter force om p.32 we have "On 1st July Falck's reorganised command stood as follows:" with the three Staffeln of I./NJG 1 and their commanders then listed below. The next paragraph then starts "Simultaneously, Blumensaat's IV.(N)/JG 2 was subordinated to Falck's command to form the cadre of a second Gruppe in NJG 1." whilst in the next column of the same page appears the statement: "Before the end of June, Falck's emergent night-fighter force was expanded by the addition of Zerstörerstafel KG 30 who were redesignated 4./NJG 1 ...". So now apparently we have two 4./NJG 1 in existence at the same time. Readers really should not have to wrestle their way through such contradictions, especially when the sequence of events has been well described in other published sources.
In Chapter 4 covering the Western Campaign the text includes considerable detail on the eight Bf 110 losses suffered on 11th May, yet the table of losses and damage that follows this chapter in the new edition wholly omits all of the 11 May entries that appeared in the 1995 version of this table. (This was no more than a spot check: I have not exhaustively compared the content of the 1995 & 2005 table versions, but someone should have done this before this book went forward to the final print.)
On p.85 the code of a 1./ZG 2 loss is given as A2+KH yet I./ZG 2 used codes beginning with 3M. (Note though that in the table at p.95 the code of this aircraft is stated correctly as 3M+KH.)
Noticeably missing also is a lack of curiosity and precision in regard to Zerstörer bases in France through the summer of 1940, with no mention at all being made of the mass physical transfer on 28-Aug-40 of almost every Bf 110 Zerstörer Staffel in Luftflotte 3 northwards and eastwards to Luftflotte 2, made in accordance with Goering's orders at the Karinhall conference of 19th August. It has also to be said that the table with bases and commanders of the Gruppen in France on 1st July 1940 at p.97 is the same as that of the 1995 edition and still contains multiple errors, whilst excluding any mention of III./ZG 76 which is actually noted opposite on p.96 as having arrived at Laval on 30-Jun-40.
There are also more than a handful of typos (HS 126 for Hs 126, JAVA for JaVA, Margat for Margate, Richenau for Reichenau, Gelbe for Gelb, 3,00 for 3,000 etc. etc.) all of which should have been eliminated at the proof reading stage.

Second, closer study of the Mankau and Petrick volume would have eliminated misdirects such as these:
p.70 includes the statement: "The use of underwing tanks on Bf 110s has, up to present. believed to have first occurred on the Bf 110s of ZG 26 in early 1941 ...". In fact M&P noted that the minutes of a Generalluftzeugmeister staff meeting recorded that by 12th July 1940 18 drop tanks were on hand with "Ob.d.L Fritzlar" although none of the 100 ordered for I./ZG 76 had yet been delivered. Including the drop tanks released by the StratR Bf 110 recorded on pp.70/1 as shot down on 24th May, by implication an initial allocation of at least 20 drop tanks had arrived with the AufklGr ObdL for possible use with at least half of the six StratR Bf 110 D-1s delivered in April 1940.
pp.98 & 130 WNr. 3164 was a Bf 110 D-1 StratR example delivered fitted with a Dackelbauch (so not a D-0 as printed here) [Later on though at pp.182 & 205 WNr. 3165 from this same small batch of three is correctly identified as a Bf 110 D-1.]
p.99 Bf 110 D-0/B, DE+CJ was WNr. 3321 and not 3322 as printed here. [Corroborating M&P, the Lebenslaufakte cover for Bf 110 D-0, WNr. 3325, DE+CN was discovered at Erla Werk VI, Brussels in Oct-44.] DE+CJ was in fact the first of the D-0/B factory conversions delivered by Messerschmitt Augsburg in June 1940.
No reference that I can trace is made here to the policy decision to re-engine four Bf 110 Gruppen with DB 601 Ns during the battle over Britain.

Third, some of the 'connective text' used as bridges between different sections of the air combat details are simply misleading. Three examples:
Hitler's directives refute the statement at p.13 that the Scandinavian Campaign was "aimed at securing Germany's exposed northern flank against possible invasion."
On p.53 after the breakthrough at Sedan the main German thrust was not "west to the coast at Boulogne and Calais" but towards Abbeville at the mouth of the Somme.
At p.85 it was not the case that in the second phase of the French campaign "Guderian's armour started to punch through from Sedan towards Dijon and the Saone". Rather his thrust was launched from bridgeheads over the River Aisne either side of Rethel that had first been secured by infantry infiltrating a porous French front.

I could go on but that would simply be tedious and this is only purposed as a short-form review. Overall, to these eyes then it appears that the scope and degree of effort required to produce a genuinely root-and-branch revision were rather underestimated by the authors and the finished product has suffered because of that.

In sum, there is a great deal here to be most grateful for in this large, beautifully produced and most handsomely illustrated volume, but regrettably the many slips still included mean this is unlikely to be regarded as the final definitive account. Excellent but still, unfortunately, an opportunity missed.

[John Vasco]

'...In the new first chapter on the Sitzkrieg, the I./ZG 76 events of 14th and 17th April described towards the end actually belong in the next chapter covering Scandinavian operations...' Not directly connected to Scandinavian ops.. so we decide where to place it, not you.

I./StG 77 existed at the same time as I./StG 1.

II. Gruppe was formed from IV.(N) Gruppe of Jagdgeschwader 2 on 1 July 1940, although the Gruppe was renamed III./NJG 1. The second formation occurred the same date, 1 July, from renaming Z./Kampfgeschwader 30 (Zerstörer/KG 30). So, the II. Gruppe was immediately re-named III. Gruppe. So your contention that there were two 4./NJG 1s is wrong.

Yep, A2 is a typo on page 85. As is your 2A in your reply. Oh dear! Typos happen in every work...

Why the need to show a mass transfer of units?

What are the errors in the table on page 97?

‘..The use of underwing tanks on Bf 110s has, up to present, believed to have first occurred on the Bf 110s of ZG 26 in early 1941…’ This is no more than a statement of what has gone before in print by others. The book states that K9+AH on 24th May was a ‘D-1’, so what’s your problem with your long-winded paragraph? Please explain your words ‘…so not a D-0 as printed here…’ as the logic of it escapes me.
‘By implication’ – what does that mean. Implication of what?

You state that DE+CJ (3321/3322) was ‘…the first of the D-0/B factory conversions delivered by Messerschmitt Augsburg in June 1940…’. Perhaps you have looked at a different document than Petrick/Mankau, since their book shows that the block 3311-3418 only commenced production/completion from July 1940.

DB 601 Ns. Petrick/Mankau page 27 references this engine. Also, my interview(s) with Wolfgang Schenck in which he mentioned in detail the receipt of ‘N’ engined Bf 110s shortly after the loss of Martin Lutz on 27th September 1940, and his immediate flying of them in October 1940.

If the Scandinavian campaign was not to secure Germany’s northern flank (as well as exploiting all that it could from the countries invaded), then you tell me what the point of it was.

After the fall of Dunkirk, look at any campaign map and you will see that the German army struck west & south. Or maybe they did not – you tell me…

Regrettably, your many slips in your post show that, notwithstanding the depth of any research you have done (I am not aware of anything you have published, since you do not post on here with your real name), you have made mistakes in your post.

So, tell us all who you really are...

[Adriano Baumgartner]

My knowledge on the Bf 110 types and variants is almost nill, however I do give support to John Vasco statement that criticisms should be open and clear, signed by real names and persons.
Typos frequently happens, even after several reviews, with most of all writers, including "sprog writers" like me. Several of you (us) who have been published have passed throughout this kind of mistake (me including)...and that will not to demean or to denigrate no one.
Criticism, when frank help us becoming better human beings and professionals, but it most be not cowardly done, under the protection of walls, rather eye on the eye and openly.

[AndyMa]

Well, if someone has made mistakes in a review, then it is indeed fair game to comment in return.
However, I'm not sure why someone should be criticised for pointing out a typo. Yes, we all make them, but when dealing with serial numbers, it's quite important to arrive at the correct number...

[John Vasco]

Originally Posted by AndyMa

Well, if someone has made mistakes in a review, then it is indeed fair game to comment in return.
However, I'm not sure why someone should be criticised for pointing out a typo. Yes, we all make them, but when dealing with serial numbers, it's quite important to arrive at the correct number...

I didn't criticise. Read my post properly! I admitted the 'A2' error, but in turn pointed out their '2A' error.
So what are you on about, exactly...?

[INM@RLM]

John Vasco requested a couple of references ("tell me ..."). It would be ungraceful not to oblige with responses.

1. If the Scandinavian campaign was not to secure Germany’s northern flank (as well as exploiting all that it could from the countries invaded), then you tell me what the point of it was.

The Telling:
OKW Directive signed by Hitler on 1st March 1940.
"The development of the situation in Scandinavia makes it necessary to prepare for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by formations of the Armed Forces ('Case Weser-exercise'). This would anticipate English action against Scandinavia and the Baltic, would secure our supplies of ore from Sweden, and would provide the Navy and Air Force with expanded bases for operations against England."
Source: Trevor-Roper: Hitler's War Directives
i.e. nothing at all to do with "securing Germany's exposed northern flank against possible invasion."


2. After the fall of Dunkirk, look at any campaign map and you will see that the German army struck west & south. Or maybe they did not – you tell me…

The Telling:
The point I made actually related your account of the events after the breakthrough at Sedan: there was no mention of Dunkirk in your own published text on this page.
After Sedan the Germans actually struck west and north, not south as you wrote here: check the map at p.179 of Robert Forczyk's 'Case Red' or any equivalent study. First the pocket was closed by reaching the coast at Abbeville on 20 May, and only after that cordon had been made relatively secure were Boulogne and Calais attacked by the Germans coming up the coast from the south. Consequently Boulogne was not assaulted and captured by the Germans until three days later. It took even longer to secure Calais because of the "Stop Order" issued on the evening of the 23rd May. This is all further confirmed in detail by the map in Guderian's 'Panzer Leader' (multiple editions), and he was the man directly in charge of assaulting these two ports.
Sources as noted in the response.
So it was very much not the case that - as stated in 'Zerstörer'- the German thrust after 13th May was "west to the coast at Boulogne and Calais"

I've now corrected my typo and converted 2A into A2. My apologies, and thank you for that, John.

[John Vasco]

'...The Telling:
OKW Directive signed by Hitler on 1st March 1940.
"The development of the situation in Scandinavia makes it necessary to prepare for the occupation of Denmark and Norway by formations of the Armed Forces ('Case Weser-exercise'). This would anticipate English action against Scandinavia and the Baltic, would secure our supplies of ore from Sweden, and would provide the Navy and Air Force with expanded bases for operations against England."
Source: Trevor-Roper: Hitler's War Directives
i.e. nothing at all to do with "securing Germany's exposed northern flank against possible invasion."...'


If you actually believe that, then all I can say is that you are an apologist for the Third Reich! You are beginning to show your true colours...

[John Vasco]

'...The Telling:
The point I made actually related your account of the events after the breakthrough at Sedan: there was no mention of Dunkirk in your own published text on this page.
After Sedan the Germans actually struck west and north, not south as you wrote here: check the map at p.179 of Robert Forczyk's 'Case Red' or any equivalent study. First the pocket was closed by reaching the coast at Abbeville on 20 May, and only after that cordon had been made relatively secure were Boulogne and Calais attacked by the Germans coming up the coast from the south. Consequently Boulogne was not assaulted and captured by the Germans until three days later. It took even longer to secure Calais because of the "Stop Order" issued on the evening of the 23rd May. This is all further confirmed in detail by the map in Guderian's 'Panzer Leader' (multiple editions), and he was the man directly in charge of assaulting these two ports...'
After Dunkirk, the Germans did attack west and south. Third Reich apologist strikes again. Twisting things to suit their (I say 'their' because I don't know whether you are male or female) agenda again.

History being re-written - over the decades I've seen many like you on the internet who try to change the factual course of history. I'm calling you out, Nazi.

And so, coward, come out from behind your pseudonym and tell us WHO YOU REALLY ARE!

You've piled into others on here in the past. Take me on, coward!

[INM@RLM]

Forgive me John, but if you attack west and south from Dunkirk, you will find yourself back in Calais, and the Germans had already captured that before they secured Dunkirk.

Again though your #58 is irrelevant to what you wrote on p.53 of 'Zerstörer', which is where we started.

This is great fun though.

[John Vasco]

Originally Posted by INM@RLM

Forgive me John, but if you attack west and south from Dunkirk, you will find yourself back in Calais, and the Germans had already captured that before they secured Dunkirk.

Again though your #58 is irrelevant to what you wrote on p.53 of 'Zerstörer', which is where we started.

This is great fun though.

You're just a shit-stirring clown. Lok at a proper map of the whole of France. Oh dear, you won't do that. You'll crap yourself.

Back to yer bedroom and bite yer pillow because you are being challenged.

And who are you, coward? Still smacks of a Nazi sympathiser through and through. Come on, don't be shy. It is great fun nailing you, Mr. Anonymous.

And by the way, please tell us all that you have ever had published. Or are you just a bedroom keyboard warrior? Tell us who you are. Are you famous? Or just a no-mark? I suspect a no-mark...