Red-Cross marked He59s July 1940

[ju55dk]

Originally Posted by Bruce Dennis

Good thread.
The rules to which Peter refers work both ways: if you want the status and protection of a non-combatant then you cannot carry out military tasks. The orders produced by Junker show that the Luftwaffe was following proper procedures in May, but orders are orders and they were changed in July. The existence of the earlier orders adds to my belief that the July orders were in response to the lack of progress.

There is absolutely no evidence in the different KTB of the Seenotdienst that the order were changed at any time. On the contrary teh crews were ordered to not operate where they had any chanse of meeting enemy shipping or aircraft. If they had to carry out an oepration were you could exspect enemies you had to have fighter cover. The Luftwaffe had at that time enough recce aircraft that wre armed and faster. But at the same time the Seefliegerunits did also operate He 59, so it's easy to see the confusion.

Brian has quite rightly questioned whether or not the mention of a convoy constitutes ‘spotting’. The allegation is that the red-cross marked aircraft were sent to look for convoys. There were no transcripts of the German R/T conversations that originally raised suspicion among the WAAF Y Service listeners, but their professionalism by this stage was well established. It would be difficult to state that they had misunderstood or over-reacted without casting doubt on every other report they turned in during the same period. This simply was not a factor. Their training and experience ensured that the Y Service reports were taken at face value by the entire Intelligence and Operational structure even at the height of a crisis. The fact that other independent intelligence sources corroborated, and amplified, the suspicions of the listeners should underline the solid nature of the information they passed on.

As an experienced intelligence-officer since the days of the cold war, I can verify of course mistakes are made. To say that the y-service was without is simply not true. But to say if they were mistaken at some points all messages picked up should be quistened is absolute rubbish.

It seems clear that the RAF shot down these aircraft, and it may be in dispute as to how many were actually marked with red-crosses, but surely we are not discussing who had the moral high ground? The war had claimed all of Britain’s allies and the German thrust was pointless unless Britain surrendered: the stakes were high on both sides and the odd punch ‘below the belt’ should not surprise anyone. I am not justifying either the misuse of rescue aircraft or shooting them down, but in this case I am satisfied that German red-cross marked aircraft were used for convoy spotting and were therefore ‘fair game’.

Regards to all,
Bruce

I'm not going into a debate about the right or wrong in this matter. The Luftwaffe did now that the matte was in doubt. Also it must be remembered that the convention during the war are a somewhat different from today. In the old one as an example it was allowed to take hostages among the civilian population.

Junker

[Brian Bines]

Brian,

A quick count up of Luftwaffe aircrew rescued by Seenot. aircraft or launch and Kriegsmarine vessels from what I have noted comes to 176 men in the July-Oct. period. I'd use this for guidance only as someone who has gone into Seenotdienst history may have a more accurate figure.
Just out of interest on the subject did any other Air Force attempt Air Sea Rescue under Red Cross markings,

Regards

Brian Bines

[Larry deZeng]

I'm not going into a debate about the right or wrong in this matter. The Luftwaffe did now that the matte was in doubt. Also it must be remembered that the convention during the war are a somewhat different from today. In the old one as an example it was allowed to take hostages among the civilian population.
Junker

The 1908 Hague Rules of Land Warfare, the 1940 British Army field manual for the administration of occupied territory and the U.S. Army Field Manual with amendments through 1943 that covers the same subject all allowed for the taking of civilian hostages as well as the executing of civilian hostages under certain circumstances. Read the main trial transcript (12,000 pages) for Nürnberg Case VII (the Southeast or Hostage Case) and you will find endless discussion and citations on this matter. Further, both the prosecution and defense exhibits are full of documentation on the subject, too.

If those interested will go to Freiburg and spend a week or two researching the OKW war crimes files, they will find numerous files on Allied war crimes committed in North Africa, at sea in the Mediterranean, on Sicily and in Italy. The intentional shooting up of clearly marked Sanitäts- Ju 52s and German ambulances marked with a huge red cross on the roof by RAF and USAAF aircraft was one of my favorites. There are also files there on the shooting down of the Seenot aircraft, too. Documented reference to all this in published format can be found in the several books by Alfred M. deZayas (run his name through ABA Books, Amazon and Google).

Larry

[Brian]

Thanks once again, guys.

Some discussion! Excellent!

Thanks Brian for the figures - they provide a guide. I have a note that some 200 airmen (RAF and Luftwaffe?) were lost over the Channel in 1940, and that some could have been saved had the RAF/FAA adequate seaplanes etc. Any comment on this?

Were Walruses armed when they were used on ASR missions?

One point I don't believe that has been mentioned was that Dowding and Churchill were very angry when the French released all their thousands of prisoners from the fighting in France etc, which included some 400 airmen who had been shot down

"They would be used to bomb this country, and thus force our airmen to shoot them down for the second time over ..."

I'm sure this would have been fresh in their memories when the decision to shoot down the Red Cross aircraft was made.

Cheers
Brian

[Brian Bines]

Brian,

The lack of a one man dinghy was probaly one of the biggest problems facing downed RAF fighter pilots. I believe survival times for a man down in the North Sea varied from 20 minutes to a few hours depending on the time of year. So without a dinghy even with a properly equipped ASR service the airman would have to be found pretty quick.
I have also seen a claim that the RAF shirt with its detachable collar was a problem, if worn on operartions it could constrict around a downed airmans throat in the sea.
Going back to P/O Clarke in ' Strike from the Sky' following his Roc mission on 8th. Aug. he said on ASR 'it showed up our inefficiency compared with the Germans'. Suprising as Britain is a Maritine nation, still as already said hindsight is always very accurate. Considering the short time between the Chamberlain agreement and the war the RAF had a hell of a lot to do bringing the Spitfires and Hurricanes operational, I guess there was not time for everything.