Response to Glider and Juha.

[tcolvin]

Glider and Kutscha,

"Tempest IIs produced during the war were intended for combat against Japan, and would have formed part of a proposed British Commonwealth long range bomber force based on Okinawa, Tiger Force. The Pacific War ended before they could be deployed." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawker_Tempest

Basta. Let's call it a day.

Tony

[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Remember what Gill said; 2 sorties would guarantee a hit on a bridge. On the basis of cost-benefit, the Vengeance always won hands down.

Not on this planet. On 7th May 1944, five P-47 Thunderbolts of the 365 Fighter Group attacked the steel railway bridge at Vernon, France. The weapon of choice was 1000-lb. General Purpose bombs. A sixth pilot started his run, then broke off when one of the three spans of the bridge fell into the River Seine. All this was verified by photographs, and marked the first time that this unit had ever dive-bombed a target.

Oh yeah, and there was intense ground fire. All of the major crossings over the Seine were flak traps. There is no reason to expect that a slow-flying Stuka or Vengeance would have survived this trip.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Col George R Halliwell flew the A-36 from July 1943 to March 1944. He said this; "I've dive-bombed in the P-40 and the A-36 in WWII, in the F-80 and F-86 during the Korean War and in the F-4 Phantom against North Vietnam. Against all these the accuracy of the A-36 stood out head and shoulders above all the others and this was primarily because you could utilise the truly vertical dive with the A-36". (quoted in "Straight Down" by Peter C Smith, which is a must-read if you are interested in dive-bombing).

I have a copy of Straight Down!, but you are disingenuous about the contents. Most of the highlights about "accuracy" or dive-bombed targets are based on pilot claims, not post-strike photos or ground investigations. The only piece of back-up material I saw in this book was one picture of a bridge cut, which the author attributed to A-36 attacks.

There are quite a few more pictures of bridges taken out by 9th Air Force Medium Bombers, published by John Moench in his Marauder Men. The P-47 Thunderbolts of the 368th Fighter Group were credited with 33 bridges destroyed.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

On July 12, 1943, just as the A-36A was proving itself to be an invaluable weapon, the Truman Committee of the Senate issued a press release; "The Army has concluded that it will have little need for additional dive-bombers, for the reason that dive-bombers cannot be operated unless there is a clear air superiority, and then only when the ground forces are not adequately equipped with anti-aircraft equipment".

Except that the A-36 was, in reality, just another fighter-bomber. It was only masquerading as a specialized dive-bomber. Ironically, that fact is exactly why the A-36 was a lot more versatile than the Ju-87 which you so admire. A Mustang refitted with dive brakes and a low-altitude supercharger might have been helpful at certain times, but the value of those refinements were exaggerated by the author.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

This press release accurately reflected RAF thinking, so I am afraid your worst fears are true and the USAAF was "brainwashed by the RAF and could not think for themselves"

Nearly all pilots who weighed in on this matter believed that the Mustang was not well suited to fighter-bomber operations. The 370th Fighter Group history reinforces that oft-repeated opinion. The group flew P-38s until replaced by the P-51 in 1945, and the change was not entirely well received. Every pilot who was asked said that, for various reasons, the Lightning was better than the Mustang in the ground attack role.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The single-seat Typhoon and P47 would bomb with far less accuracy than a slower Blenheim IV bomber which was equipped with bomb sights manned by a trained bomb aimer who would direct the pilot.

Unless the Blenheim squadron had radio navigation aids, the aircrews had no hope of outperforming a P-47 fighter-bomber squadron against the typical targets. It doesn't matter whether it was level bombing, dive-bombing, skip-bombing, or any other kind.

On 17th July 1944, one squadron of P-47 Thunderbolts from the 362nd Fighter Group attacked the heavy bridge over the Seine at Rouen, France. 1,000-lb. GP bombs were used and five direct hits were scored, making two of four lanes impassable. The weapons were released in level flight, and more importantly, the pilots did this while flying blind over the target. The flight was controlled by a ground radar station built by IX TAC. The primary tools included a MEW radar, a SCR-584 radar borrowed from a U.S. Army artillery unit, and a salvaged Norden bombsight which acted as a computer and was moved over a custom map table to guide the air strike by radio.

On the same day, the IX TAC introduced two other weapons that proved to be more effective than GP bombs on certain types of targets. Fourteen P-38s of the 370th Fighter Group dropped napalms on a German headquarters at Countances, and fourteen rocket-armed P-47s of the 406th Fighter Group attacked the Nevers railyards with HVAR.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

There was no good reason for replacing the Vengeance in RAF service. It was done to avoid continuing RAF embarrassment at its success, news of which was filtering back to the UK (see Peter C Smith)..

I don't think that any RAF Thunderbolt pilot would accept that opinion. Also they were quite smitten by the destructive power and psychological benefits of napalm fire bombs. A thick jungle hideout might slow down bullets and fragments, but the bush offered considerably less protection against burning jellied gasoline.

Originally Posted by tcolvin

There is no mystery why the A36 was dropped. The USAAF did not want it and decided to kill production on March 22, 1943, even before the A-36 had flown its first mission. The decision was made on the recommendation of a Board of Officers convened to study the USAAF's needs and requirements, and to "evaluate current dive-bombers now in production". Their opinion was that, "dive bombers in general, and converted Navy dive-bombers in particular, were not so useful for the tactical conditions encountered by Army Air Forces combat units as were low level attack bombers"

For some reason, you still ignore Luftwaffe officers who reached the same consensus. Ernst Kupfer, Hubertus Hitschhold, and Paul Deichmann to name a few. In his manuscript German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army, General Deichmann wrote that: "one important disadvantage of the dive-bomber was that it could not be employed when the cloud ceiling was lower than 2,600 feet, since the bombs could only be released in a relatively vertical dive. The manufacture of these aircraft ceased in October 1943" …

He continues: "When it became evident during the war that the Ju-87 was too slow to protect itself, the decision was taken after numerous tests to equip the ground attack units with FW-190 planes, a fighter model, after various adaptations in the plane's equipment. Operational testing of this model commenced early in 1942"...

Deichmann added that 1,100-lb bombs "came into use as an emergency measure" because direct hits on a small target like a tank was wishful thinking, and it was hoped that a larger blast from a near miss might immobilize the tank if close enough. However, "the explosive pressure of this bomb could not incapacitate a tank unless it exploded within roughly 12 feet of the target, and immediately above the ground" … "In practice, near hits capable of putting a tank out of action proved a rare exception."

Originally Posted by tcolvin

I suppose you know the quantified inaccuracy of Typhoon RPs provided by the Operational Research Sections of 21AG and RAF.The percentage of shots hitting a; a) small gun position was 0.2%; b) Panther tank 0.5%; c) large gun position 0.8%; d) army hut 2.8%; and e) large building 10.0%. The number of sorties needed for a 50% chance of a hit on; a) was 44; for b) 18; c) 11; d) 3; and e) 1.

Here is another statistic: In 1944, live fire tests against a captured tank by RAF Typhoons scored three direct hits out of 64 rockets fired. But I don't think it's unreasonable to conclude that the best Ju-87 pilot in the Luftwaffe might drop 500 bombs before he scored three direct hits on enemy tanks.

Testimony from German prisoners told the RAF that being attacked by aircraft rockets had a demoralizing effect that was similar to flame weapons like napalm. The nature of the attack was even more terrifying to the victims than the damage it caused.

[Bill Walker]

Originally Posted by Six Nifty .50s

Ernst Kupfer, Hubertus Hitschhold, and Paul Deichmann to name a few. In his manuscript German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army, General Deichmann wrote that: "one important disadvantage of the dive-bomber was that it could not be employed when the cloud ceiling was lower than 2,600 feet, since the bombs could only be released in a relatively vertical dive. The manufacture of these aircraft ceased in October 1943" …

He continues: "When it became evident during the war that the Ju-87 was too slow to protect itself, the decision was taken after numerous tests to equip the ground attack units with FW-190 planes, a fighter model, after various adaptations in the plane's equipment. Operational testing of this model commenced early in 1942"...

Deichmann added that 1,100-lb bombs "came into use as an emergency measure" because direct hits on a small target like a tank was wishful thinking, and it was hoped that a larger blast from a near miss might immobilize the tank if close enough. However, "the explosive pressure of this bomb could not incapacitate a tank unless it exploded within roughly 12 feet of the target, and immediately above the ground" … "In practice, near hits capable of putting a tank out of action proved a rare exception."

Wow. The RAF high command had even brain washed the Luftwaffe!

[MarkRS]

More research on the JU87 removal of dive brakes:
The dive brakes were removed for the ground attack versions of the JU87, not the dive bomber. Specifically, versions JU87 D-5 and the Ju87 G (anti tank) circa March 1943.

[tcolvin]

Glider,
I note you also have found no quantification of the accuracy of dive-bombing compared with glide-bombing, nor indeed of RPs and bombs compared with airborne PAKs. So we're left with anecdotes and opinion.

The army required a TAF that could;

1. destroy machine guns and PAKs
2. destroy hardened defences
3. destroy artillery
4. destroy tanks and StuGs
5. suppress or neutralise fire so the army could move on the battlefield
6. destroy bridges

Based on anecdotes and experience, 2TAF should have had no difficulty destroying the Wesel bridges (6), having brought down all of the Seine bridges from the Paris banlieues to the sea. Postwar they plumped for mediums, and not fighter-bombers. The Vengeance could certainly have done the job when combined with FLAK suppression by strafing fighters.


Machine guns and PAKs (1) were beyond the capability of 2TAF's RPs and glide-bombing. 2TAF claimed and believed they could do it, but in effect were providing a bit of 5) – fire suppression. In some circumstances this was better than nothing, but because of the vulnerability of Spitfire and Typhoon to infantry weapons, support was necessarily tentative. On a cost-benefit basis there was no sense in sacrificing a Typhoon plus pilot for an MG42. It was here the Il-2 gained, not because it was more accurate, but because its immunity to infantry weapons permitted intensive use. For higher value opposition, such as the 88-mm Pakfront, the Vengeance would have gained because of accuracy.


Hardened defences (2) were beyond 2TAF's capabilities. Something perhaps could have been done with the Vengeance and hollow charge bombs, even if it only achieved suppression (5) for long enough to enable movement by tanks and infantry.


Artillery (3) was protected by FLAK. 2TAF's answer was to fly mediums above the FLAK, but accuracy was poor because of height and visibility. This was the target of choice for the Vengeance when combined with simultaneous strafing by fighters to suppress the FLAK.


Tanks and StuGs (4) were targeted by RP Typhoons which were hopelessly inaccurate. 2TAF also used Bombphoons; I know of a half-squadron of Bombphoons attacking in vain a StuG in Kervenheim. 2TAF hadn't the equipment for destroying AFVs. They needed an airborne PAK mounted in an armoured aircraft, like the Ju-87G or Hs129B. The RAF used an unarmoured Hurricane IID in this role in the desert with success, but losses from FLAK required it be armoured, and armour was ordered from Britain. This ran up against Air Ministry policy so the Hurricane IID was scrapped.


That covers the range of equipment inadequacy. The flawed structural relationship between 2TAF and 21AG was a more serious matter that fed back to cause the equipment problem.


You again raise a red herring with the question of the Ju-87 being too slow to defend itself. This became a serious matter for Deichmann only when the GAF lost air superiority. As the problem appeared for the GAF it disappeared for the RAF who began flying their Heavies in daylight for the first time. Thus no problem either for the Vengeance.


Tony

[Juha]

Hello Tony
according to my sources, those Hurri IIDs used operationally by 6 Sqn in the desert had extra armour, only 92 first out of 300 IIDs had only the same armour protection than IICs because it was first thought that with 2 40mm guns a/c was already overburdened, but those lightly armoured planes were mostly used for training. and the later planes had extra 368lb (167kg) extra armour which produced considerable performance penalty. And IID was followed by a definite armoured ground attack version. Mk IV, which were used to the end of the war in Med and in Far East. IMHO GA Hurris were as well armoured as was rationally possible to given power.

And if the FLAK was too dangerous to fighter bombers it would have took heavy toll also from srafing fighters trying to support Vengeances.

Effectiveness of air support depended on many factors, so one can took individual cases to prove any opinion one wants. During Karelian Isthmus operations in Summer 44 hundreds of Soviet Il-2s or Pe-2s didn't manage to destroy a single AFV of the Finnish Armoured Div. IIRC the most effective air attack on it was made by Il-4 medium bombers, they damaged a AA tank. Also the most effective air attack on Finnish infantry I can recall was made by Il-4s, not Il-2s. They managed to disperse badly a reserve infantry battalion and caused very heavy losses to it. Was the Il-4 better CAS plane than Il-2, IMHO no. I have no info on their relative effectiveness against Finnish artillery and terrain here made life must more difficult to GA planes than the plains in Ukraina. But if intelligence could pinpoint a unit not dug in a forest a medium bomber unit could deliver clearly more HE on it than an Il-2 unit

Juha

[Kutscha]

Hurricane Mk IVs operated from UK bases, No 137, 164 and 184 Squadrons.

It should be noted Juha that in the desert there wasn't the cover for AFVs to hide in, unlike in NW Europe.

I guess Tony is thinking these Vengeance dive bombers were sitting around doing nothing on UK bases for 2 years till June 1944.

[Juha]

Hello Kutscha
1) yes, but they were replaced in early 44 by Typhoons in ETO, but continued serve till end of the war elsewhere

2) that was what I was saying, in Ukraina (or in the desert) there was much less cover than in Finland

Juha

[glider1]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Glider,
I note you also have found no quantification of the accuracy of dive-bombing compared with glide-bombing, nor indeed of RPs and bombs compared with airborne PAKs. So we're left with anecdotes and opinion.

The army required a TAF that could;

1. destroy machine guns and PAKs
2. destroy hardened defences
3. destroy artillery
4. destroy tanks and StuGs
5. suppress or neutralise fire so the army could move on the battlefield
6. destroy bridges

Based on anecdotes and experience, 2TAF should have had no difficulty destroying the Wesel bridges (6), having brought down all of the Seine bridges from the Paris banlieues to the sea.

I happen to think that any airforce would have difficulty knocking down the Wesel bridges for the reasons stated earlier mainly their construction.

Postwar they plumped for mediums, and not fighter-bombers.

Sorry but I believe you to be wrong on this. B25/B26/Boston/Baltimore were all withdrawn very quickly after the war. Mosquitos were kept for a while but mainly in the PR/NF versions with some bombers. However, post war the Hornet, Tempest II and Vampire jets were brought into service as fighter bombers, can you tell me how you came to the statement that the RAF plumped for Medium Bombers?

The Vengeance could certainly have done the job when combined with FLAK suppression by strafing fighters.

You overate the effectiveness of Flak suppression, the Vengence would have had serious/very serious losses. Plus I understand that they could only carry 500lb bombs in a config of 2 x 500lb and 2 x 250lb. A good combination but the weapon of choice for bridges is 1000lb boombs.

Machine guns and PAKs (1) were beyond the capability of 2TAF's RPs and glide-bombing.

Rubbish, 4 x 20mm is more than enough for a gun why use a 1000lb bomb.

2TAF claimed and believed they could do it, but in effect were providing a bit of 5) – fire suppression. In some circumstances this was better than nothing, but because of the vulnerability of Spitfire and Typhoon to infantry weapons, support was necessarily tentative.

Tentative support?. I take it you can support this statement with example of calls for support being declined.

On a cost-benefit basis there was no sense in sacrificing a Typhoon plus pilot for an MG42. It was here the Il-2 gained, not because it was more accurate, but because its immunity to infantry weapons permitted intensive use. For higher value opposition, such as the 88-mm Pakfront, the Vengeance would have gained because of accuracy.

It was a very unlucky Typhoon pilot who was lost to an LMG, he was a difficult target and well proctected, the Vengence was vulnerable, big, low and slow.

Hardened defences (2) were beyond 2TAF's capabilities. Something perhaps could have been done with the Vengeance and hollow charge bombs, even if it only achieved suppression (5) for long enough to enable movement by tanks and infantry.

A big statement with nothing to support it. Do you have examples of 2TAF failing to destroy a target that they attacked? Remember here that the IL had a smaller bomb load and smaller bombs so how much better would the VVS be?

Artillery (3) was protected by FLAK. 2TAF's answer was to fly mediums above the FLAK, but accuracy was poor because of height and visibility. This was the target of choice for the Vengeance when combined with simultaneous strafing by fighters to suppress the FLAK.

You keep saying this so lets get specific
a) Have you any example of mediums being used against artillery?
b) Have you any examples of FB's not being used against artillery?
c) If as you believe the RAF were scared about using FB against flak so FB's would attack, why would they use FB's against flak so the Vengence could attack?
d) If as you believe the RAF were scared about using FB against flak, why were FB's being used against shipping and airfields up to and including the last day of the war. Targets which any decent book on attack missions will tell you are amongst the most heavily defended targets of all?
e) If as we know the RAF FB didn't hesitate to attack heavily defended targets stuffed with 20 and 37mm guns, why do you believe they were afraid of an LMG, against which they were well protected?

Tanks and StuGs (4) were targeted by RP Typhoons which were hopelessly inaccurate. 2TAF also used Bombphoons; I know of a half-squadron of Bombphoons attacking in vain a StuG in Kervenheim.

And I know of an attack where 8 Typhoons attacked and left two german tanks destroyed and four smoking. Both our examples are exceptions that do not make them the rule. The average was somewhere in the middle.

2TAF hadn't the equipment for destroying AFVs. They needed an airborne PAK mounted in an armoured aircraft, like the Ju-87G or Hs129B. The RAF used an unarmoured Hurricane IID in this role in the desert with success, but losses from FLAK required it be armoured, and armour was ordered from Britain. This ran up against Air Ministry policy so the Hurricane IID was scrapped.

I always thought that the Hurricane IID was replaced with the Hurricane IVD, not a cancellation but an improvement.

That covers the range of equipment inadequacy. The flawed structural relationship between 2TAF and 21AG was a more serious matter that fed back to cause the equipment problem.

This is a new one on me, can you expand of the flawed relationship as it could be a difficult issue whatever the equipment

You again raise a red herring with the question of the Ju-87 being too slow to defend itself. This became a serious matter for Deichmann only when the GAF lost air superiority. As the problem appeared for the GAF it disappeared for the RAF who began flying their Heavies in daylight for the first time. Thus no problem either for the Vengeance.

The problem for both the Ju87 and the Vengeance is that slow speed makes you a very easy target. We have discussed in some detail the difference between the well armoured but easier to hit IL 2 and the less well armoured but harder to hit Typhoon and as you know my opinion is that they would balance out.
The Venegnce would have the worst of both worlds being easier to hit than the Typhoon whilst lacking the protection of the IL2.

[Kryten]

BoB and Malta pilots are quoted in many publications stating JU87 was a sitting duck coming out of it's dive!
even to worn out and patched up Hurricanes in Malta.
sorry to interrupt.