Book on French AF 1939-40?

The whole "ULTRA" deciphering activity in Britain, which provided the Allies with incredibly important and useful intelligence, started in Poland thanks to the Polish secret service (I presume) and in particular a young Polish mathematician who was a genius and a member of the team. They had performed all the fundamental and the most important work already when Poland was invaded. They passed the whole thing to the French, who continued the work already 1939 with the help of some Polish experts and kept the British entirely informed, with some British officers taking part in the ongoing work. Numerous German messages were decrypted already albeit they were only a small fraction of the whole coded radio traffic. They probably decrypted some decisive messages on operation "Paula" but I understand at least the French had a well-placed German agent in Luftwaffe headquarters, too (Schmidt; I think he was a relative of LW general Schmidt). Britain certainly had some good agents in Germany too.

When France was invaded too obviously the whole Enigma-business was passed on to the British, who further refined and developed it, hence Bletcheley Park etc.

There is no doubt that all this remarkable activity was started by Polish experts.

You see, it is fully possible to discuss Poland and France at the same time without wholesale insulting a whole country or a whole air force. That's a relief!

[CJE]

Nick,
We could start a long discussion about it that would be OT.
Let me just say that AH did not want to make war on Great-Britain and tried everything to end hostilities against a foe that he respected a lot (more than France).
Had not WC moved into 10 Downing Street on the very day of "Fall Gelb", no doubt that Lord Halifax would have opened peace talks with Germany.

Ruy, I tried to send you a PM but your box is full. Please do something, thanks.

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

The high ranking french officers didn't come to the field, the British delegation visits them (at their respective headquarters?).

-Yes this is fully possible but not credible - 0 % credibility - on the day of a massive German air attack aimed at airfields the Allies were aware of! You may be crazy but there are some limits somewhere. Please remember that general Vuillemin was the C-i-C of the French Air Force and on this battle day he had other concerns than drinking a nice cup of tea with a few Rosbifs.

Douglas is just expressing surprise that there is no welcome, which is then explained by the impending air attack. Something that could serve as a confirmation of the date.

- My foot! They probably made a navigation error and landed at a wrong airfield, possibly Orly, Marseille or Bordeaux! Then Douglas didn't want to admit such an error... Coming PRECISELY on June 3 is out of the question. They had about 95 % chances of being shot down by German fighters, or by FRENCH fighters, or by French AAA. This is RI-DI-CU-LOUS, please try to understand at last. Why not on June 1st or 4th, hmmm? Why precilesy June 3? To be able to libel every single Frenchman afterwards? No high-ranking HQ general from any country ever went on sight-seeing PRECISELY at the place and on the day of a big battle.

The talks themselves don't seem out of place either, the British looking for some reassurance in case Italy entered the war. The extended text wasn't quoted by me, so don't be too quick to dismiss events.

- This is all very fine but why the hell precisely on June 3?

His personal courage should not be questioned, he was just being realistic in his assessment.

- Come on! I was just joking about rushing into some shelter. I would have run faster myself and taken shelter first!

I'm disappointed to see a lot of assumptions and at best educated guesses.

- Is this aimed at sweet little me? I only can repeat that the whole Sholto Douglas-story is totally incredible from the first to the last word. It is not true. It was entirely invented, possibly to show (after the war!) what a hero SD was. Remember that his behavior during the Battle of Britain was extremely objectionable in the "big wing" discussion. Later his "nonstop offensive" which achieved nothing but heavy British losses really was no basis for glory (see "The JG 26 War Diary", volume 1, by D. Caldwell, page 212). He needed to show what a great man he was, for he was not.

If the dates and places are correct, - GZ : BUT THEY ARE NOT! - I am not convinced that Douglas did not see numerous fighters, and that he did see air force personnel in the officers' mess. Whatever misinterpretations he may have made, it left a bad impression on him.

Now please let us travel from France to England, namely to many RAF fighter airfields during the Battle of Britain. It certainly happened often that RAF fighters did not take off when German formations were flying overhead and even bombing nearby places. How come? They were waiting, and rightly so, for the order to take off and accomplish their mission within a whole, complex strategical and tactical system. A foreign observer as dumb as Sholto Douglas, possibly a Franek Grabowski, would have been outraged at all the RAF fighter pilots not jumping at the enemy's throat immediately.

See?

[CJE]

It certainly happened often that RAF fighters did not take off when German formations were flying overhead and even bombing nearby places.

Any evidence?

Originally Posted by CJE

It certainly happened often that RAF fighters did not take off when German formations were flying overhead and even bombing nearby places.

Any evidence?

Very simple : read a few books (in English!) on the BoB. I read about 20.

To sum up, Dowding and Park were obviously right when they didn't want to engage all their fighter squadrons at the same time, which would have meant that they would have been back on the ground, refuelling and rearming, all at the same time too and the Huns would have had an excellent opportunity to catch and hit them on the ground in spite of AAA. Besides, it was similar within the Armée de l'Air in May-June : the last serviceable 2, 3 , 4 or 5 fighters of a Groupe de chasse, if the rest were not, were kept for protecting their own airfield (above all the precious aircraft, even undergoing repairs). Don't infer from this that French fighters were wiped out for it would be a serious error, but this situation did exist sometimes. The neighbouring Groupes de chasse were generally all right.

I think it happened only once during the BoB that there were no reserves left - within 11 Group but 10 and 12 Groups nearby also totalled hundreds of fighters, part of which could have been used in an emergency : on one occasion all 11 Group-squadrons were airborne, as can be seen in the film on the BoB*. Nevertheless they had not taken off all at the same minute but with differences of up to 30 minutes in certain cases I guess, so that some sqns were able to land, refuel and rearm before the others did, and take off again if necessary.

* This was on August 18 or September 15 I think.

[Franek Grabowski]

Originally Posted by Grozibou

They were waiting, and rightly so, for the order to take off and accomplish their mission within a whole, complex strategical and tactical system. A foreign observer as dumb as Sholto Douglas, possibly a Franek Grabowski, would have been outraged at all the RAF fighter pilots not jumping at the enemy's throat immediately.

Nope, Krasnodębski and Zumbach were pilots with some experience, and knew their trade. Quite contrary to you, they were at Etampes, and took part in those combats. They managed to UK and they wrote their statements for Polish officials. They marked quite clearly, that the French pilots from Etampes did not want to engage the enemy. They either flew in the other direction or engaged solitary aircraft, instead going for the main force. Poles and Czechs commented, that French pilots took best aircraft in order to escape faster from the enemy, leaving crap for their allies.
This is in perfect agreement with the situation at Villacoublay.
I suggest you to look further for French airmen at both Etampes and Villacoublay, instead of suggesting that Zumbach had no knowledge about fighter tactics. The latter makes you just ridiculous.

[robert]

Actually Zumbach didn`t take part in air combats in September 1939 so I doubt in his combat experience at this stage.

Robert

[Franek Grabowski]

Originally Posted by robert

Actually Zumbach didn`t take part in air combats in September 1939 so I doubt in his combat experience at this stage.

Robert

Lesson one, reading of text and understanding it.

Nope, Krasnodębski and Zumbach were pilots with some experience, and knew their trade.

Where is combat experience mentioned?

[robert]

So I must say that you are just ridiculous because every pilot in French Campaign has had some experience unless you mean cooking experience.

Robert

[Franek Grabowski]

Well, turn back to lesson one.