He 111 from KG 55 shot down

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Andrey Kuznetsov

The banal answer is "They inflicted some damages and disruptions, but weren't a big problem". I'll try to answer less banal some days later, maybe in separate topic.

Thank you, Andrey, will wait for that!

Warm regards,

Paul

[landser88]

Well they were even a problem. I try to explain this a bit, because I made two interviews with two members of the so called "Eisenbahnexperten".
Low flying was necessary to find a train in the darkness. They easily copied the railroad in hoping to find some trains no way. Didn't that, then they attacked the next railroad station in the area. Of course they used ZV (Zeitverzögerung) bombs for very low bombing.
After every attack, they got next day from a recconaisance plane the result in pictures. And they could see the destroyed trains, flags, depots etc. as they mentioned a 80% effectivity. Well not every crew reached these results, it was the question of experience.
And last but not least, in the book KG 55 you can read: "Der Feindnachrichten-Abhördienst im Stabe General Pflugbeil berichtete uns, wie der Schwiegersohn Stalins (der damalige Eisenbahnminister General Karganowitsch) über die Schmidt'schen Vandalen schimpfte und befahl, diese Himmelskunde herunterzuholen."
Olt. Franz Schmidt was the Staffelführer of the 14 (Eis.).

With many regards

Miro

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by landser88

Well they were even a problem. I try to explain this a bit, because I made two interviews with two members of the so called "Eisenbahnexperten".
And last but not least, in the book KG 55 you can read: "Der Feindnachrichten-Abhördienst im Stabe General Pflugbeil berichtete uns, wie der Schwiegersohn Stalins (der damalige Eisenbahnminister General Karganowitsch) über die Schmidt'schen Vandalen schimpfte und befahl, diese Himmelskunde herunterzuholen."

Thank you very much for an interesting background story, Miro. Two very interesting people to interview!

The Abhördienst story is somewhat inaccurate, as is common with such tales. Two different people are confused, perhaps for enhanced effect:
Ла́зарь Моисе́евич Кагано́вич (English: Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich) was head of the People’s Commissariat of Ways of Communications (NKPS), the Soviet railway ministry.

Андре́й Алекса́ндрович Жда́нов (English: Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov) was head of the Leningrad City Committee of the Communist Party during the war. It was he who could be considered Stalin’s brother-in-law (Schwiegerbruder), but Zhdanov’s son married Stalin’s daughter only after Zhdanov himself had died in 1948.

There is a similar story about the famous Soviet P-39 Airacobra ace, Алекса́ндр Ива́нович Покры́шкин (English: Alexander Ivanovich Pokryshkin). The story runs that from spring 1943 Soviet radio intercept stations heard German alert messages with the text "Achtung! Pokryshkin ist in der Luft!" I assume that in both of the above cases, the actial radio communications were rather more prosaic and to the point Possibly, both stories were intended to maintain morale during a period of extremely high atrittion for both the German and Soviet air forces on the Eastern front.

Miro, I have sent you a private message.

Warm regards,

Paul

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Thanks to Miro for the interesting info from interviews.

About the nice story about Feindnachrichten-Abhördienst I fully agree with Paul.

As for real results of Eisenbahn-Staffeln, I has browsed published directives and orders of Stavka and General Staff of Red Army for March-August 1943. The sole relevant document is the request of investigation of two events:
19.Jun.43 explosion of 30+ rail wagons with ammunition on Volkhovstroy station due to air raid.
21.Jun.43 explosion of 27 rail wagons with ammunition due to direct hit into train on the railroad Kursk-Kastornoye.
Request was steamed by clear breaking of order (dated 21.May.43) about limit for maximal number of wagons in ammo- and fuel trains in frontline areas (20 wagons).

So Luftwaffe railroad activity had forced to limit the length of trains with dangerous load. But it was not only due to Eisenbahn-Staffeln activity but also due to usual bombing raids, armed recce (day and night), daytime ground attack missions etc, even due to German sabotage acts.

Both losses mentioned above weren’t Eisenbahn-Staffeln successes. 19.Jun. it was a large raid, 21.Jun. - ground attack of 3 Bf109.

Eisenbahn-Staffeln activity was one of factors that has forced the strengthen the air defense, of course. But detailed analysis of their share in comparison with other Luftwaffe units is impossible due to lack of detailed data about the number of sorties, claims etc.

Best regards,
Andrey

[Paul Thompson]

Thank you, Andrey!

It is perhaps significant that the two incidents occurred at such a short interval in June 1943. In that month, the scale of the Luftwaffe’s attacks against targets in the Soviet rear areas was perhaps the biggest during the whole war. These attacks included the big Luftwaffe raid on Kursk railway station on 2 June, but I assume from your information above that relatively little damage was caused.

Your remark that Luftwaffe activity forced changes in the movement of trains can be compared to the effect of German U-boat attacks on Allied sea communications, where the most important consequence was the creation of the convoy system and the consequent reduction in the efficiency of the Allied merchant fleets. There were no convoys for trains, of course, but a reduction in the size of ammunition trains would necessarily render supply less efficient, particularly given the shortage of locomotives in the USSR.

I would suggest that the Eisenbahn-Staffeln did have some influence, since they were the only Luftwaffe units specifically focused on railway attacks, while the rest of the German force was small and often too preoccupied with other tasks. Of course, other units could still be very effective, as your examples show. I wonder which Bf 109 unit conducted the attack on 21 June. Possibly Schl.G 1 or JG 3?

Warm regards,

Paul

[landser88]

Thank you Andrey and Paul for your comments.

Oh yes, the russian defence was going well stronger by the time. They stopped the trains after warning about comming the trainhunters and they put some AA on the trainroad between the depots.
The trains were now add by AA on carriage.
On 24th June 1943 by a night hunting the crew of He 111 H-16 G1+CY got the worst surprise, as they attacked a big train in Millerowo. The train was equipment by two heavy AA (each 4 cannons-guns) on carrriages in front and behind the train. The member said to me after he saw the heavy, never seen before AA fire, he thought it is his last time in life. Luckily they could break ab by a wild turning and escape.
To Andrey - the exactly figure of sorties, data and claims are in the KTB of the KG 55 in Bundesarchiv Freiburg.

Miro

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by landser88

Thank you Andrey and Paul for your comments.

On 24th June 1943 by a night hunting the crew of He 111 H-16 G1+CY got the worst surprise, as they attacked a big train in Millerowo. The train was equipment by two heavy AA (each 4 cannons-guns) on carrriages in front and behind the train.
To Andrey - the exactly figure of sorties, data and claims are in the KTB of the KG 55 in Bundesarchiv Freiburg.

You are welcome, Miro!

Thank you for describing the events of the night of 24 June. Ми́ллерово (english: Millerovo) coordinates 48°55'N 40°24'E in Rostov Oblast, Russia was and remains a significant railway station. The AA guns on the train were probably not quadruple, since the only quadruple Soviet weapons at the time were 7.62 mm Maxim M-4 machine guns. The weapons more likely to have been employed by the defenders were either 37 mm model 1939 (61-K) cannon or 25 mm model 1940 (72-K) cannon.

The reminder that KG 55's KTB exists is a useful one. As most members here probably know, Pawel Burchard put part of the Kriegstagebuch online, see:

II./KG 55
http://www.yogysoft.de/pawel/_kursk/...df/KG55-II.pdf

III./KG 55 and 9.(Eis)/KG 55
http://www.yogysoft.de/pawel/_kursk/...5-III-eisb.pdf

I understand that the file references for the KTB at Freiburg are RL 10/120, RL 10/121 etc.

Warm regards,

Paul

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Hello Miro,

Originally Posted by landser88

To Andrey - the exactly figure of sorties, data and claims are in the KTB of the KG 55 in Bundesarchiv Freiburg.

I know that surprisingly many KG55 documents survived the war. But what about timeframe March-June 1943?

Best regards,
Andrey