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Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the BofB, is there any dispute about the point made by Clive Ponting in his book '1940, Myth and Reality', that the BofB was won largely, but not entirely, in spite of the RAF's generalship.
Last edited by tcolvin; 20th September 2010 at 17:59. Reason: Layout |
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Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
Have you read Terraine's "The Right of the Line"?
IMHO an excellent analysis of the RAF during the war. I'm enjoying the BBC's BoB season, but have shut off my "critical" filter to simply enjoy the myth Regardless how you look at it, the Battle of Britain was an epic fight and the mythical part of it is just as important as the cold facts. Yesterday watching Ewan and Colin McGregor was pure joy. With just enough drama added to include a perfect lump in the throat at the end. I have a soft spot for Ewan as an actor, his brother looks like a nice guy as well. The docudrama adaption of Geoff Wellum's "First Light" is a nice example that such an approach to history can work (helas no points for History Channel, or the Cheap Reenactment Channel, which is what it should be called). I think the success of The Battle of Britain is the success of the myth, which is as ingrained in the national ethos today, as it was back then. It was an epic victory, adding some extra drama and excitement just adds to the overal magnificence. Do we really have to think about the fact that the RAF had a force multiplier with radar, defensive combat over friendly territory and the short legs of the Jagdwaffe? That the margin was even smaller if we just count fighters, as the bombers were just flying targets when it comes to air combat? Finally that an RAF defeat in the south, that is losing air parity, would still leave any hypothetical invasion force that had to face the might of the Royal Navy? Britain was hardly the "small" isolated european country of the myth It was one of the biggest empires the world has ever seen, albeit in decline. An empire with still the largest and arguably most powerful navy in the world. The Kriegsmarine had shot its bolt with the Norwegian invasion. The surface forces would have been of little effect in a German invasion of the south coast of England. The British people might have feared an invasion (and fear is a great way to mobilize the people in time of crisis), but how many really thought in terms of defeat? Hind sight is 20-20 granted, but Britain's defense was formidable and the RAF was only the first hurdle, not even the most difficult one... My thought are in no way to detract from the courage that was shown on a daily basis by all those young men from the RAF that risked their lives in an effort to defend their country. Far from it, like I wrote earlier, I didn't get a lump in my throat and moist eyes for being a cynic as I watched both shows. In the end I love the myth and have only the highest regard for the few.
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Ruy Horta 12 O'Clock High! And now I see with eye serene The very pulse of the machine; A being breathing thoughtful breath, A traveller between life and death; |
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Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
If I can take these points one at a time
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David |
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Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
Tony, I know you love doing this "why everyone was wrong" thing but in this case it wouldn't have hurt to read a little more widely before cranking up the old contrarian routine. This was all said years ago in Dizzy Allen's "Who Won the Battle of Britain?"
I have seen arguments (possibly in Angus Calder's "The People's War" or Len Deighton's "Fighter" but I couldn't swear to it) that Beaverbrook's achievements were as much a myth as anything else you cite. For instance it is arguable that he arrived too late to affect much during the BoB itself and that his measures achieved short term success at the expense of mid-term chaos (and exhausted workers who started making mistakes) that then had to be sorted out. When you write "the RAF in general stubbornly adhered to tradition and hidebound procedures … Dowding's System of air defence [was] the exception that proved the rule" you're just trying to have it both ways. in the late 1930s the RAF ordered fighters and started building an air defence system to defend against an attack by unescorted bombers from Germany. There was no air defence system like it anywhere else in the world. That system and those aircraft proved good enough to handle attacks by escorted bombers coming from France in 1940. All in all, I'd say that was a pretty impressive feat of planning and implementation. The German pilot:aircraft establishment of 1:1, their training infrastructure and their "fly-till-you-die" system (no tours of duty, just the odd break beside a lake) were all part of Germany's failure to plan for anything but a short war. In 1940 Luftwaffe Intelligence was a contradiction in terms. The Spitfire and Hurricane were designed from the outset to carry eight machine guns, the Bf 109 for two (perhaps on the basis that if it was good enough in 1917 it was good enough in 1935). The Bf 109 of 1939, playing catch-up, had half the Spit/Hurricane armament and in mid-1940 it jumped ahead for a short time. You mentioned the Blenheims: a Blenheim achieved the first ever kill with airborne radar during the Battle, something the Luftwaffe couldn't manage for about another two years. Nobody got everything right but the RAF still won the Battle of Britain. |
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Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
I think there is a sickness in British society these days.
Clive Ponting certainly did not do much, if any, research. Quote:
Bf109s - 1107 on hand, 856 serviceable Pilots - 1126 present, 906 ready Single engine fighters Date: 28.09.40 Bf109s - 920 on hand, 712 serviceable Pilots - 917 present, 676 ready Single engine fighters Date: 28.12.40 Bf109s - 829 on hand, 586 serviceable Pilots - 915 present, 711 ready http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/gob.htm Quote:
What a nightmare for FC control trying to co-ordinate these odd a/c into the battle. Considering that most of the airfields in 11 Group were FC airfields I don't see much problem re-arming and re-fueling. Actually a Fw190 could not be re-fueled at a Bf109 base unless there was C3 fuel present and certainly could not be serviced. |
#6
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Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
Disposition of RAF FC squadrons on Aug 13 1940. One thing to keep in mind is the nearness of 10 and 12 Group Spitfire bases to 11 Group.
10 Group No. 87 Squadron (Hurricane No. 213 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 238 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 92 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 234 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 609 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 247 Squadron (Gladiator) No. 604 Squadron (Blenheim) 11 Group No. 17 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 32 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 85 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 56 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 151 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 501 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 615 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 111 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 1 (RCAF) Squadron (Hurricane) No. 1 (RAF) Squadron (Hurricane) No. 257 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 43 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 145 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 601 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 54 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 65 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 74 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 266 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 610 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 64 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 600 Squadron (Blenheim) 12 group No. 73 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 249 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 46 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 242 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 229 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 616 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 222 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 611 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 66 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 19 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 264 Squadron (Defiant) No. 29 Squadron (Blenheim) 13 Group No. 607 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 3 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 504 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 232 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 605 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 253 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 245 Squadron (Hurricane) No. 41 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 72 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 79 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 603 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 602 Squadron (Spitfire) No. 219 Squadron (Blenheim) No. 141 Squadron (Defiant) http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-30.html |
#7
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Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
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__________________
Kurfürst! - The Messerschmitt Bf 109 Performance Resource Site http://www.kurfurst.org/ |
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Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
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From memory, RAF night fighters practically doubled their kills each month through the Blitz months of 1941. |
#9
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Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
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The March 1933 specification of the RLM - which ultimately lead to the 109 - specified either -a single, very powerful but heavy 2cm MG C/30 Motorkanone - two engine cowl-mounted 7.92 mm (.312 in) MG 17 machine guns, or - one lightweight, engine-mounted 2c MG FF cannon with two 7.92 mm MG 17s. Regardless, the competing German firms seems to have been putting with a twin cowl MG at the start (which was pretty much standard for the biplanes they replaced anyway), but the idea for heavier armament was there, from the start, and the technical aspects of the planes clearly anticipated such (see use of side mounted superchargers of the engines - this made engine mounted guns possible). The British AM's revision for specs for gun armement (8-gun batteries) came in April 1935.The French were also adopting engine mounted cannons for the fighters at about the same time, and the Soviets were absolute pioneers of cannon armament on their I-16s AFAIK. Quote:
The first Spits came into service August 1938, but production was so slow they couldn't even muster a full Squadron until the end of the year, when the cannon armed 109E production started. The Emil then very rapidly started to equip units - I believe a large number of airframes were already produced, they were waiting for the Daimler-Benz engines to arrive. The Jumo powered 109D, that was the sole type employed in September 1938 (780 or so in service) was rapidly replaced by Emils by the start of the war; in July 1939, there were already some 500 Emils (and 50 of the old Doras) in service, and this roughly doubled by the end of September 1939, with some 90% of the 1125 available day fighters being the most recent type (see: http://ww2.dk/oob/statistics/se30939.htm). In short, effectively (meaning: in meaningful numbers) cannon armed 109s and eight gun Hurricanes/Spitfires came into service at about the same time. Quote:
As for the E-1, it seems to have been produced parallel and with roughly the same production ratio as the cannon E-3 until early 1940, and made up about 35-40% of the force during BoB. I've always wondered why this was so; there's an early war propaganda picture showing two 109Es in flight, and the leader is flying a cannon E-3 while the wingman an all-MG E-1. I was wondering if there was some tactical doctrine behind it, stipulating that the leader responsible for the attack will be flying a heavier armed aircraft, with armament suitable against bombers, while a wingman with an armament more suitable against fighters will be protecting him..? It should be noted that it was an exception for a fighter to be armored until mid-1940, so MG armament would be still effective. IMHO it would worth looking at if JGs were equipped in such fashion, with an equal mix of E-1s and E-3s.
__________________
Kurfürst! - The Messerschmitt Bf 109 Performance Resource Site http://www.kurfurst.org/ |
#10
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Re: Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?
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