Luftwaffe Aces KIA in Normandy in 1944

[Christer Bergström]

In another thread, Franek Grabowski asks for some details surrounding the detahs of some of the Luftwaffe’s aces at Normandy in the summer of 1944:

Concerning those 'super veterans' as you call them, please give samples how those and other aces like Huppertz, Simsch, Weber, Wurmheller or Zweigart were outnumbered in their last combats. (Thread “La-7 Att Franek” on the Allied AF Forum, Fri Feb 25, 2005 11:42 am)

Major Herbert Huppertz, a veteran who was in first-line service from 1939, attaining 70 victories, and served as III./JG 2’s Gruppenkommandeur: On 6 June 1944, Huppertz testified to the value of the German “super veterans” over Normandy - particularly in exceptional cases when Allied airmen due to a combination of bad luck and poor planning were caught without the numerical superiority which they usually enjoyed. At noon on 6 June 1944, Obstlt. Kurt Bühlingen (who scored his 100th victory on 7 June 1944) and Huppertz participated when 29 Fw 190 attacked at least 24 Thunderbolts (of US 365 FG) and Typhoons (of RAF 183 Sqn). The Germans claimed to have shot down six Allied fighters - including two Typhoons in less than two minutes by Huppertz - against a single own loss. Actual Allied losses in this engagement were five (two P-47s, three Typhoons). (Clark, “Angels Eight”, p. 42.) That same evening, Huppertz caught eight Typhoons of 164 Sqn and shot one down, with F/O Roberts KIA. (David Clark, CD “Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary”, 6 June 1944.) During another mission late on 6 June, Huppertz engaged the numerically superior formations of Allied aircraft which by that time swarmed the whole sky in the area (on 6 June 1944, the USAAF and RAF conducted 14,674 sorties over the Normandy area - against only 319 Luftwaffe sorties). During this single mission, Huppertz was entangled in combat with several Allied fighter units, involving both Mustangs and Thunderbolts, but in spite of all odds he claimed a Mustang and a Thunderbolt. David Clark has identified the former as one of US 352 FG’s losses, while the Thunderbolt was one of a total of 2,302 Thunderbolts despatched by US 8th and 9th AF (Freeman, “The Mighty Eighth War Diary”, p. 259; Rust, “The 9th Air Force”, p. 84.) Thus, Huppertz had scored five victories in a single day.

At around 0945 on 8 June 1944, a formation of Fw 190s of III./JG 2 were engaged by both Mustangs and Thunderbolts: Mustangs from 361 FG’s Mustang (whereby Hptm. Wurmheller claimed one Mustang, while 361 FG failed to shoot down any of III./JG 2’s Fw 190s), and Thunderbolts from possibly both 56 FG and 353 FG. Four Fw 190s were claimed by 353 FG during the morning mission, and 56 FG simultaneously claimed one or more Fw 190s. 56 FG made its claims when it attacked a group of German fighters which were taking off from an airfield. Only two Fw 190s were lost by the Germans in that very uneven combat, and one of them was flown by Huppertz - who was killed. (David Clark, CD “Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary”, 8 June 1944.)


Hptm. Karl-Heinz Weber, a veteran with over 500 combat missions from the autumn of 1940, and 136 victories, Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 1: At around 1000 hrs on 7 June 1944, about 10 Bf 109s of III./JG 1, commanded by Hptm. Weber, were en route to the frontlines. (Clark, “Angels Eight”, p. 56.) But already northeast of Paris they were attacked from above by 30 Allied fighters (Prien, “JG 1/11”, pp. 1008 - 1009), and Weber crashed to his death at Pontoise, north of Paris. Apart from Weber, one more III./JG 1 Bf 109 was shot down in that combat. It is possible that Weber was killed in combat with 24 Mustangs from 306 and 315 squadrons of 133 (Polish) Wing, which claimed to have shot down four Bf 109s in the Dreux area. (David Clark, CD “Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary”, 7 June 1944.)

Hptm. Josef Wurmheller, a veteran with over 300 combat missions from 1939 and 102 victories, commanded 9./JG 2 at Normandy: On 22 June 1944, Wurmheller was killed when he collided with his own wingman near Alencon. (Obermaier, “Die Ritterkreuzträger der Luftwaffe”, Vol. 1, ed. 2, p. 38.)



Hptm. Siegfried Simsch, a veteran with around 400 combat missions from the autumn of 1940, and 54 victories: Simsch was killed in action early on 8 June 1944, when I./JG 11 despatched around 20 Fw 190s in a fighter-bomber mission against the Allied landing fleet. Having endured the hellish fire from hundreds of AAA guns from the landing fleet, the dispersed remnants of I./JG 11 were attacked by numerically superior Allied fighters. (Prien, “JG 1/11”, pp. 1019 - 1020.) The Allies conducted 1096 fighter sorties for beach patrol (David Clark, CD “Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary”, 8 June 1944), and it is possible that many of these fighters engaged Simsch - but according to David Clark’s “Angels Eight”, he was killed in combat with Mustangs of 339 FG, which formed part of 869 Mustangs and Thunderbolts of US 8th Air Force which simultaneously were out on search-and-destroy missions against lines of communications. (Freeman, “The Mighty Eighth War Diary”, p. 262.) David Clark writes: “Simsch spotted a small formation of P-51s from 339th FG of the US 8thAF and immediately attacked not realizing that the whole FG was in the vicinity - the others hidden by clouds. Attacking from above, the 503rd FS and 505th FS swept down.” (Clark, “Angels Eight”, p. 62)

Oblt. Eugen-Ludwig Zweigart, a veteran in first-line service since the fall of 1940, with 69 victories, with III./JG 54: All I know is that on 8 June 1944 his Fw 190 A-8 (WNr 170736, “Black 3”) was shot down in aerial combat near Le Cambaux. Zweigart baled out but was gunned to death has he hung in his parachute. Based on US 8th AF’s reports, Roger A. Freeman wrote: “On the 8th [of June 1944], 130 enemy aircraft were sighted during the day, mostly Me 109s and Fw 190s in twos and threes.” (“The Mighty Eighth”, p. 166.) US 8th AF alone performed 2077 sorties over Normandy on 8 June 1944, and these 2077 pilots sighted a total of 130 German aircraft - mostly flying in twos and threes.
On 8 June 1944, the Allied fighter pilots claimed to have shot down 60 German fighters (David Clark, CD “Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary”, 8 June 1944), and Luftflotte 3 claimed 21 victories. (Prien, “JG 1/11”, p. 1021.) Actual Luftwaffe losses were either 30 aircraft (Clark, “Angels Eight”, p. 63) or 36 aircraft (Prien, “JG 1/11”, p. 1051)while the Allies lost 42 aircraft. (Freeman, “Mighty Eighth War Diary”, p. 261 - 262, 2nd TAC Losses, and http://www.geocities.com/AF9th/new_page_13.htm )

Some interesting examples of the vast Allied numerical superiority over France during the invasion of France is given by the combat reports which are published in 20th FG’s chronicle, “King’s Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association”:

On 25 June 1944 in the evening, a formation of 49 Lightnings from US 20 FG attacked 15 Bf 109s near Chartres. (“King’s Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association”, p. 161.)

The US report from the mission against targets north of Paris on 28 June 1944, shows a total of 25 German fighters intercepting 684 heavy bombers escorted by fourteen Fighter groups with a total of 569 fighters. US 20th FG, with 46 Lightnings, was attacked by eight Fw 190s and Bf 109s. (“King’s Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association”, p. 162.)

The report for 14 July 1944 reads: “This morning 524 P-51s and P-47s were dispatched to support a special heavy bomber operation in the Chartres area. Enemy opposition was characteristically meagre and 4 of 10 Me 109s and Fw 190s encountered were shot down by our fighters.”

All best,

Christer Bergström

[Franek Grabowski]

Originally Posted by Christer Bergström

In another thread, Franek Grabowski asks for some details surrounding the detahs of some of the Luftwaffe’s aces at Normandy in the summer of 1944:

Oh yes, finally!
Now before discussing it further, some comments concerning Normandy's Campaign research. Unfortunatelly details of German operations are quite scarce to say the least. Quite often there are errors in both dates and times, locations are unprecise and there are almost no narratives. Situations where nothing fits are quite common.

Major Herbert Huppertz, a veteran who was in first-line service from 1939, attaining 70 victories, and served as III./JG 2’s Gruppenkommandeur: On 6 June 1944, Huppertz testified to the value of the German “super veterans” over Normandy - particularly in exceptional cases when Allied airmen due to a combination of bad luck and poor planning were caught without the numerical superiority which they usually enjoyed. At noon on 6 June 1944, Obstlt. Kurt Bühlingen (who scored his 100th victory on 7 June 1944) and Huppertz participated when 29 Fw 190 attacked at least 24 Thunderbolts (of US 365 FG) and Typhoons (of RAF 183 Sqn). The Germans claimed to have shot down six Allied fighters - including two Typhoons in less than two minutes by Huppertz - against a single own loss. Actual Allied losses in this engagement were five (two P-47s, three Typhoons). (Clark, “Angels Eight”, p. 42.) That same evening, Huppertz caught eight Typhoons of 164 Sqn and shot one down, with F/O Roberts KIA. (David Clark, CD “Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary”, 6 June 1944.) During another mission late on 6 June, Huppertz engaged the numerically superior formations of Allied aircraft which by that time swarmed the whole sky in the area (on 6 June 1944, the USAAF and RAF conducted 14,674 sorties over the Normandy area - against only 319 Luftwaffe sorties). During this single mission, Huppertz was entangled in combat with several Allied fighter units, involving both Mustangs and Thunderbolts, but in spite of all odds he claimed a Mustang and a Thunderbolt. David Clark has identified the former as one of US 352 FG’s losses, while the Thunderbolt was one of a total of 2,302 Thunderbolts despatched by US 8th and 9th AF (Freeman, “The Mighty Eighth War Diary”, p. 259; Rust, “The 9th Air Force”, p. 84.) Thus, Huppertz had scored five victories in a single day.

Combats of D-Day are a real mess. I was working with something more rather than David's Data Tables (which I highly recommend) but still it was not possible to make satisfactory combat links. As yet the day awaits further research.

At around 0945 on 8 June 1944, a formation of Fw 190s of III./JG 2 were engaged by both Mustangs and Thunderbolts: Mustangs from 361 FG’s Mustang (whereby Hptm. Wurmheller claimed one Mustang, while 361 FG failed to shoot down any of III./JG 2’s Fw 190s), and Thunderbolts from possibly both 56 FG and 353 FG. Four Fw 190s were claimed by 353 FG during the morning mission, and 56 FG simultaneously claimed one or more Fw 190s. 56 FG made its claims when it attacked a group of German fighters which were taking off from an airfield. Only two Fw 190s were lost by the Germans in that very uneven combat, and one of them was flown by Huppertz - who was killed. (David Clark, CD “Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary”, 8 June 1944.)

I am surprised! Data included in David's CD does clearly indicate both 56 and 353 FGs claimed at significantly different times and locations and does not support thesis they were involved in combat with JG2. Also 361FG was clearly involved in combat with JG11 and not JG2. I cannot find opponent of JG2 but it is possible they were bounced by Allied AA.

Hptm. Karl-Heinz Weber, a veteran with over 500 combat missions from the autumn of 1940, and 136 victories, Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 1: At around 1000 hrs on 7 June 1944, about 10 Bf 109s of III./JG 1, commanded by Hptm. Weber, were en route to the frontlines. (Clark, “Angels Eight”, p. 56.) But already northeast of Paris they were attacked from above by 30 Allied fighters (Prien, “JG 1/11”, pp. 1008 - 1009), and Weber crashed to his death at Pontoise, north of Paris. Apart from Weber, one more III./JG 1 Bf 109 was shot down in that combat. It is possible that Weber was killed in combat with 24 Mustangs from 306 and 315 squadrons of 133 (Polish) Wing, which claimed to have shot down four Bf 109s in the Dreux area. (David Clark, CD “Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary”, 7 June 1944.)

Data on David's CD are inaccurate. Squadrons of 133 Wing were flying separate sorties. 315 Sqn (12 Mustangs) flew in the Rouen are when one Section of 4 got entangled with some chasing of Germans. Finally they spotted a formation of Me 109s and engaged them, claiming 4-0-1 Me 109. There was no other Allied unit claiming at the time and in the very general area. Account of one survivor match pretty well to the combat report of one of the Polish pilots involved, while circumstances of another loss fit quite well to another report. I do not know if there was any overclaim on the Polish part as there could have been another German unit involved as well. III/JG26 lost two aircraft in the general area in unknown circumstances. I do not know how 4 Mustangs were multiplied to 30!
This combat was described in my article in French Ciel du guerre magazine but for some reason they have not printed my name.

Hptm. Josef Wurmheller, a veteran with over 300 combat missions from 1939 and 102 victories, commanded 9./JG 2 at Normandy: On 22 June 1944, Wurmheller was killed when he collided with his own wingman near Alencon. (Obermaier, “Die Ritterkreuzträger der Luftwaffe”, Vol. 1, ed. 2, p. 38.)

Wurmheller was involved in combat with 441 and 442 Sqns RCAF. At least two Gruppen flew the mission, so I suppose they were around 30 aircraft. Canadians flew in the Wing formation at best, so around 30 as well. It is believed the victor could have been F/O Fleming of 441 Sqn.

Hptm. Siegfried Simsch, a veteran with around 400 combat missions from the autumn of 1940, and 54 victories: Simsch was killed in action early on 8 June 1944, when I./JG 11 despatched around 20 Fw 190s in a fighter-bomber mission against the Allied landing fleet. Having endured the hellish fire from hundreds of AAA guns from the landing fleet, the dispersed remnants of I./JG 11 were attacked by numerically superior Allied fighters. (Prien, “JG 1/11”, pp. 1019 - 1020.) The Allies conducted 1096 fighter sorties for beach patrol (David Clark, CD “Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary”, 8 June 1944), and it is possible that many of these fighters engaged Simsch - but according to David Clark’s “Angels Eight”, he was killed in combat with Mustangs of 339 FG, which formed part of 869 Mustangs and Thunderbolts of US 8th Air Force which simultaneously were out on search-and-destroy missions against lines of communications. (Freeman, “The Mighty Eighth War Diary”, p. 262.) David Clark writes: “Simsch spotted a small formation of P-51s from 339th FG of the US 8thAF and immediately attacked not realizing that the whole FG was in the vicinity - the others hidden by clouds. Attacking from above, the 503rd FS and 505th FS swept down.” (Clark, “Angels Eight”, p. 62)

The circumstances seem to fit well. This means about 20 against 30+, hardly a substantial numerical advantage of Americans. I really do not know what the total number of Allied sorties has to do with it!
BTW
Simsch was considered a Mischling by the German authorities. Interesting, is not it?

Oblt. Eugen-Ludwig Zweigart, a veteran in first-line service since the fall of 1940, with 69 victories, with III./JG 54: All I know is that on 8 June 1944 his Fw 190 A-8 (WNr 170736, “Black 3”) was shot down in aerial combat near Le Cambaux. Zweigart baled out but was gunned to death has he hung in his parachute. Based on US 8th AF’s reports, Roger A. Freeman wrote: “On the 8th [of June 1944], 130 enemy aircraft were sighted during the day, mostly Me 109s and Fw 190s in twos and threes.” (“The Mighty Eighth”, p. 166.) US 8th AF alone performed 2077 sorties over Normandy on 8 June 1944, and these 2077 pilots sighted a total of 130 German aircraft - mostly flying in twos and threes.
On 8 June 1944, the Allied fighter pilots claimed to have shot down 60 German fighters (David Clark, CD “Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary”, 8 June 1944), and Luftflotte 3 claimed 21 victories. (Prien, “JG 1/11”, p. 1021.) Actual Luftwaffe losses were either 30 aircraft (Clark, “Angels Eight”, p. 63) or 36 aircraft (Prien, “JG 1/11”, p. 1051)while the Allies lost 42 aircraft. (Freeman, “Mighty Eighth War Diary”, p. 261 - 262, 2nd TAC Losses, and http://www.geocities.com/AF9th/new_page_13.htm )

I really do not know what the stats had to do with this single combat.
Circumstances of III/JG54 operations are quite messy and sometimes obviously inaccurate. I have contacted Mr Urbanke in this regard but he did not disperse my doubts. Circumstances and place of combat fit pretty well to combat of Czechoslovak fighters, though there is no indication he was machinegunned. I cannot exclude he was hit by a ground fire!
I do not know strenghts of both units at the time, but 36 vs about 10 seems the most unfavourable proportion for the Germans, hardly an overwhelming numerical superiority.

On 25 June 1944 in the evening, a formation of 49 Lightnings from US 20 FG attacked 15 Bf 109s near Chartres. (“King’s Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association”, p. 161.)

Well, hardly an 10:1 numerical advantage.

The US report from the mission against targets north of Paris on 28 June 1944, shows a total of 25 German fighters intercepting 684 heavy bombers escorted by fourteen Fighter groups with a total of 569 fighters. US 20th FG, with 46 Lightnings, was attacked by eight Fw 190s and Bf 109s. (“King’s Cliffe: The 20th Ftr. Grp Association”, p. 162.)

Do I have to understand all 1200 Allied aircraft were at one place and time? Following this logic we can achieve really tremendous disproportions. Also, from the description we cannot find if the whole FG fought with those aircraft.

The report for 14 July 1944 reads: “This morning 524 P-51s and P-47s were dispatched to support a special heavy bomber operation in the Chartres area. Enemy opposition was characteristically meagre and 4 of 10 Me 109s and Fw 190s encountered were shot down by our fighters.”

As above.

[Christer Bergström]

Regarding Huppertz’s (III./JG 2) last combat on 8 June 1944:

As you said yourself, Franek, combats of D-Day are a real mess - not least due to the large number of aircraft involved - and there are errors in both dates and times, locations are unprecise, etc. Unless we assume that 56 and 353 FGs engaged German ghost aircraft - i.e. non-existent Fw 190s - we have to assume that they encountered the German fighters which were in the air for real. Since both 56 and 353 FGs claimed Fw 190s during the morning mission over France, we have to conclude that those belonged to the Fw 190 unit which is known to have flown in that area by that time - namely III./JG 2. That leads us to the conclusion that the pilots of 56 and 353 FGs made an error when they calculated the area where they clashed with Fw 190s - which would be plausible, contrary to the alternative, which implies the existence of “ghost Fw 190s”.

Franek’s thesis “361FG was clearly involved in combat with JG11 and not JG2” is based on Clark’s personal assumption that 2./JG 11’s (not II./JG 11, as Clark writes) Ofw. Kokisch was shot down by 361 FG at around 0950 hours. (David Clark, CD “Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary”, 6 June 1944.) However, in the chronicle on JG1/11 (page 1020), Prien tells us that Ofw. Kokisch crashed at Rennes - which is too far away (100 miles) from the area where 361 FG operated to be explained as a mere navigational error. (Clark has made several erroneous judgements based on the material which he presents on his CD, and what I have done is not only to take everything which Clark says for granted, but I use the material presented by Clark as one of many sources upon which I build my picture of the air combats.)

I don’t know why Franek dismisses not only that III./JG 2 was engaged by 56 FG, 353 FG, and 361 FG - but even by any Allied fighter unit at all! The statistics presented on Clark’s CD clearly show that all those fighter groups were fighting Fw 190s in the vicinity by the same time, no other Fw 190 unit can be traced as airborne in that area by that time - and III./JG 2’s Wurmheller claimed to have shot down a Mustang! Still Franek draws the inexplicable conclusion that: “I cannot find opponent of JG2 but it is possible they were bounced by Allied AA.” I am surprised!

This also is surprising: All sources state that Wurmheller was killed when he collided with his own wingman near Alencon, but Franek writes: “It is believed the victor could have been F/O Fleming of 441 Sqn.”

Regarding Simsch’s last combat, I get the impression that Franek wants to reduce the number of involved Allied aircraft at any price - thus unconsciously implying that despite their access to ULTRA, the Allied were unable to make rational use of their numerical superiority.

The facts are that:

a) On 8 June 1944, I./JG 11 despatched around 20 Fw 190s in a fighter-bomber mission against the Allied landing fleet. Having endured the hellish fire from hundreds of AAA guns from the landing fleet, the dispersed remnants of I./JG 11 were attacked by numerically superior Allied fighters. (Prien, “JG 1/11”, pp. 1019 - 1020.) Note - of the originally 20 Fw 190s, some had by then had already been shot down or damaged by the AAA, while the remnants were dispersed. Thus we can assume that there were maybe 10 - 15 Fw 190s without battle damage, divided as they were after a fighter-bomber attack into an AAA barrage into maybe half a dozen small groups, each consisting maybe one, two or three planes. So obviously, these small groups were attacked by several Allied fighter units. We don’t know exactly how many Allied fighters that engaged the battered remnants of I./JG 11 after the terrifying encounter with the AAA barrage, but to give anyone a chance to judge I gave these vital background facts:

b) the Allies conducted 1096 fighter sorties for beach patrol (many of which surely must have engaged Fw 190s which attacked those beaches, unless the commanders of the beach patrols ought to have been court-martialled), and

c) another 869 Mustangs and Thunderbolts of US 8th Air Force simultaneously were out on search-and-destroy missions against German lines of communications at Normandy.

Indeed, we have to expect that among the Allied fighters which attacked the scattered small groups of III./JG 2 Fw 190s after their attack over the Normandy beaches, probably most were among those assigned to provide the beaches with fighter cover against precisely such air attacks. However, according to David Clark’s “Angels Eight”, Simsch was killed in combat with Mustangs of 339 FG, which formed part of the 869 other US fighters which also were airborne in the area. Thus, it is plausible to assume that Simsch and III./JG 2 were hemmed in by various Allied fighters from several units, assigned with two different tasks.

Franek’s own conclusion from all of this is highly improbable: “This means about 20 against 30+” Please remember that these figures are only Franek’s own conclusion!

Rather, it would seem probable that a German formation consisting of Simsch’s Fw 190 and maybe one or tow other Fw 190s was fighting to survive in an environment where hundreds of Allied fighters were hunting maybe half a dozen small groups of Fw 190s, each consisting one, two or three planes which desperately tried to escape after a costly fighter-bomber mission into a terrible AAA barrage.

Or should we assume that not only did the AAA on the huge fleet (which was tasked to cover the sensitive landing fleet against German air attacks) fail to inflict any damage to 20 Fw 190 fighter bombers, all those 1096 fighters which were assigned to provide the landing beaches with fighter cover also missed the 20 fighter-bombers and allowed them to escape - until nothing more than a relatively small formation of US Mustangs - assigned with a completely different task - was lucky to catch the (nota bene complete!) formation of 20 battleworthy Fw 190s!? (Also, we don’t know the number of Mustangs participating in the mission with the that the US fighter group in question, 339 FG; all we know is that all three squadrons participated in the fight against Simsch. How come Franek assumes that three whole squadrons of 339 FG numbered no more than 30 Mustangs, when the normal number of US fighters participating in a single 8th AF squadron mission by that time was between 15 and 18 - which would give an assumed total of fifty 339 FG Mustangs involved in Simsch’s last combat .)

In conclusion, if we pay attention to all known factors, it is hard to arrive at a conclusion similar to Franek’s.

In the case of the Polish unit involved in the combat on 8 June 1944, I can easily accept the facts which Franek presents, since I have no contradicting facts, and apparently Franek is better informed regarding that particular combat. So possibly this was one of the exceptions when the Allies failed to make use of their numerical superiority over Normandy, and fortunately for the Poles they managed without the usual reinforcements from masses of other Allied fighters on that occasion. Yes, I agree with Franek that it is strange that the German report deals with over 30 Mustangs if no more than four Mustangs engaged the ten Bf 109s.

However, Franek’s way of first denying the vast Allied numerical superiority, and then - when I provide him with a row of facts which testify to this vast numerical superiority even under the very special conditions which he demands (“a single combat where we know the exact number of aircraft on both sides, where the Germans were outnumbered by ten to one”) - simply dismissing all evidence by pointing at the very nature of the vast concentrations of Allied aircraft which he previously denied, is . . . surprising.


What is the purpose of this discussion? To add our respective knowledge in order to together arrive at a better understanding? Or to defend a prejudical position at all costs?

I gave one example of 524 P-51s and P-47s supporting a heavy bomber operation in the Chartres area, encountering 10 Me 109s and Fw 190s. Obviously as a way to dismiss that uncomfortable fact, Franek resorts to scholastic tricks: “Do I have to understand all those Allied aircraft were at one place and time?” - As if 524 P-51s and P-47s supporting a special heavy bomber operation could be on the same spot simultaneously, even if it was aimed precisely against the Chartres area! :!: As if Franek knew that those 10 Me 109s and Fw 190s were on the same spot simultaneously, and not divided into maybe two or three groups! :!: As if this combination of scholastics and illogical bad mathematics would neutralise the whole impact of the vast Allied numerical superiority! :!: :!: Objections of the kind which Franek brings forward here, are only humiliating to the one who uses such tricks to slip out of a situation which he for some reason finds uncomfortable.

Why not face it? The fact that the Luftwaffe was outnumbered by eight to one in the air over Normandy had a very powerful impact on the outcome of that air war - particularly when the majority of the German pilots were inadequately trained rookies who were easy prey to the "normally" trained Allied fighter pilots!

Again - please remember that this is only a hobby, so stay friends! My harsh words to Franek are only because I want to advice against the use of discussion methods which brings such an interesting discussion to a sad end where everyone just withdraws in dismay.


All best,

Christer Bergström

[Franek Grabowski]

Originally Posted by Christer Bergström

Unless we assume that 56 and 353 FGs engaged German ghost aircraft - i.e. non-existent Fw 190s - we have to assume that they encountered the German fighters which were in the air for real. Since both 56 and 353 FGs claimed Fw 190s during the morning mission over France, we have to conclude that those belonged to the Fw 190 unit which is known to have flown in that area by that time - namely III./JG 2.

The problem is that III/JG2 was not there. What were the units encountered by Americans I do not know but it is possible they are simply not recorded in known scarce documents. That happens there is limited data for 1944 losses that did not involve human losses.

Franek’s thesis “361FG was clearly involved in combat with JG11 and not JG2” is based on Clark’s personal assumption that 2./JG 11’s (not II./JG 11, as Clark writes) Ofw. Kokisch was shot down by 361 FG at around 0950 hours. (David Clark, CD “Daily Data tables of the Normandy Air War Diary”, 6 June 1944.) However, in the chronicle on JG1/11 (page 1020), Prien tells us that Ofw. Kokisch crashed at Rennes - which is too far away (100 miles) from the area where 361 FG operated to be explained as a mere navigational error.

This does not deny the fact 361 FG could fight with JG11.

I don’t know why Franek dismisses not only that III./JG 2 was engaged by 56 FG, 353 FG, and 361 FG - but even by any Allied fighter unit at all!

It is not my problem.

The statistics presented on Clark’s CD clearly show that all those fighter groups were fighting Fw 190s in the vicinity by the same time, no other Fw 190 unit can be traced as airborne in that area by that time - and III./JG 2’s Wurmheller claimed to have shot down a Mustang! Still Franek draws the inexplicable conclusion that: “I cannot find opponent of JG2 but it is possible they were bounced by Allied AA.” I am surprised!

Have you ever heard of Naval Spotters' Pool? I assume you did not. Several clipped wing Spitfires and Seafires that operated exactly in the area were claimed as P-51s.

This also is surprising: All sources state that Wurmheller was killed when he collided with his own wingman near Alencon, but Franek writes: “It is believed the victor could have been F/O Fleming of 441 Sqn.”

Please, present all those sources, documents preferably. I have to dig it up but I do not see any contradiction between both facts.

Regarding Simsch’s last combat, I get the impression that Franek wants to reduce the number of involved Allied aircraft at any price - thus unconsciously implying that despite their access to ULTRA, the Allied were unable to make rational use of their numerical superiority.

I assume every Allied pilot had Ultra in his aircraft and was chasing every German aircraft that appeared on the sky.

a) On 8 June 1944, I./JG 11 despatched around 20 Fw 190s in a fighter-bomber mission against the Allied landing fleet. Having endured the hellish fire from hundreds of AAA guns from the landing fleet, the dispersed remnants of I./JG 11 were attacked by numerically superior Allied fighters. (Prien, “JG 1/11”, pp. 1019 - 1020.) Note - of the originally 20 Fw 190s, some had by then had already been shot down or damaged by the AAA, while the remnants were dispersed. Thus we can assume that there were maybe 10 - 15 Fw 190s without battle damage, divided as they were after a fighter-bomber attack into an AAA barrage into maybe half a dozen small groups, each consisting maybe one, two or three planes. So obviously, these small groups were attacked by several Allied fighter units.

In your post you have noted it was JG11 who attacked US unit!

We don’t know exactly how many Allied fighters that engaged the battered remnants of I./JG 11 after the terrifying encounter with the AAA barrage, but to give anyone a chance to judge I gave these vital background facts:

Just a few lines above you was surprised III/JG2 could have suffered losses due to AA.

b) the Allies conducted 1096 fighter sorties for beach patrol (many of which surely must have engaged Fw 190s which attacked those beaches, unless the commanders of the beach patrols ought to have been court-martialled), and

Allied AFs were not VVS RKKA were pilots were executed because of flying technique errors.

c) another 869 Mustangs and Thunderbolts of US 8th Air Force simultaneously were out on search-and-destroy missions against German lines of communications at Normandy.

For a lenght of a day. So?

Franek’s own conclusion from all of this is highly improbable: “This means about 20 against 30+” Please remember that these figures are only Franek’s own conclusion!

You may check battle order of 339 FG, could not you?

all we know is that all three squadrons participated in the fight against Simsch. How come Franek assumes that three whole squadrons of 339 FG numbered no more than 30 Mustangs, when the normal number of US fighters participating in a single 8th AF squadron mission by that time was between 15 and 18 - which would give an assumed total of fifty 339 FG Mustangs involved in Simsch’s last combat .)

Based on knowledge that the basic formation was 4 aircraft I am free to assume FS formation had 12-16 aircraft. It is also worth to note that (often) FGs did not fly in single formations as you try to make us believe in it.

In the case of the Polish unit involved in the combat on 8 June 1944, I can easily accept the facts which Franek presents, since I have no contradicting facts, and apparently Franek is better informed regarding that particular combat. So possibly this was one of the exceptions when the Allies failed to make use of their numerical superiority over Normandy, and fortunately for the Poles they managed without the usual reinforcements from masses of other Allied fighters on that occasion.

Nope, it was not unusual and Poles never got any reinforcements. You are trying to bend facts to make them fitting to your theories.

I gave one example of 524 P-51s and P-47s supporting a heavy bomber operation in the Chartres area, encountering 10 Me 109s and Fw 190s.

No scholastics but apparently you do not know how the escort of bombers look like. Get educated on it first.

Why not face it? The fact that the Luftwaffe was outnumbered by eight to one in the air over Normandy had a very powerful impact on the outcome of that air war - particularly when the majority of the German pilots were inadequately trained rookies who were easy prey to the "normally" trained Allied fighter pilots!

Why not face it, Red Air Force was not a substantial threat for Luftwaffe?

I am afraid you tend to outwrite me. Please remember, that the value of a historical work is not necessarily quantity.

[Christer Bergström]

Is there any campaign where one side’s numerical superiority can’t be dismissed through a combination of scholastic tricks and selection of isolated events?



Let me play this game with the Soviet Winter War against Finland: The Finns started with 41 operational fighter planes against 900 Soviet aircraft. Let’s try to dismiss that.

Note - everything below is only a joke.

Okay, here we go. I’ll start with a quotation that could become a classic:

1. ”Do I have to understand all 900 Soviet aircraft were at one place and time? Following this logic we can achieve really tremendous disproportions.”

2. Here are some examples which shall prove that the Soviets actually enjoyed no numerical superiority in the air:

a) On 2 February 1940, two Finnish Fokker D-XXIs attacked a lonely SB of 57 AP/VVS KBF and shot it down. (Finnish sources.)

b) On 3 February 1940, five Finnish Fokker D-XXIs attacked three unescorted DB-3 bombers of 10 AB/VVS KBF and shot all three down in the uneven fight. (Finnish sources.)


c) On 4 February 1940, four Finnish fighters intercepted four VVS KBF DB-3s. (Finnish sources.)

d) On 18 February 1940, at least three Finnish fighters intercepted and shot down two unescorted DB-3 bombers. (Finnish sources.)

By carefully selecting these cases, we have transformed the reality of the Winter War - wh9ich was one of a huge Soviet numerical superiority in the air - into a relation where a total of 14 Finnish aircraft encountering the sum of 8 Soviet aircraft in these carefully selected cases give a totally distorted picture of the realities. One gets the impression that the Soviets won the Winter War only because they fought so bravely and skilfully against those Finns!


Since it is our purpose in this game to deny the effect of the numerical superiority, thus creating a brighter view of the accomplishments of the Soviet airmen in the Winter War, allow us also to portray Soviet figures as unquestionable facts. Thus we continue:

e) On 19 February 1940, the crew of Mayor Tokarev, commanding 1 AP/VVS KBF, warded off attacks by fourteen Finnish Fokker D-XXIs against their lonely DB-3 bomber. Six Finnish fighters were shot down.

Hilarious, isn’t it?

Okay, now someone arrives and tries to demonstrate how useful the numerical superiority was to the Soviet AF in the Winter War by asking us to imagine a reversed situation: 41 operational Soviet fighter planes against 900 Finnish aircraft: Would that alter the situation in the air during the Winter War? ops:

Okay, first allow us to counter by this: Imagine that Urho Kekkonen crossed the Mannerheim line completely nude in the winter of 1939/1940, wouldn’t that alter the situation completely, since the Soviets would have laughed themselves to death?

Then let’s get on track again: Well, maybe their numerical superiority was one secondary contributing factor to the Soviet dominance in the air during the Winter War, but I will blatantly state that of far greater importance was superior Soviet tactics, training, and a superior command. And the Soviets were superior regarding perseverance of their air force!

So, allow me to conclude with this regarding the outcome of the Winter War in this little game: “The Finns stood no chance against highest quality Soviet war machine that annihilated the enemy within a few months.”

[Ruy Horta]

Okay, first allow us to counter by this: Imagine that Urho Kekkonen crossed the Mannerheim line completely nude in the winter of 1939/1940, wouldn’t that alter the situation completely, since the Soviets would have laughed themselves to death?

So can we have a picture of Urho?

[Christer Bergström]

So can we have a picture of Urho?

Yes, when Franek has posted that photo of Pamela Anderson crossing the Mareth line in 1943, "tan and naked".
http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/viewto...t=537&start=75 :P

[Franek Grabowski]

Yes, when Franek has posted that photo of Pamela Anderson crossing the Mareth line in 1943, "tan and naked".

Colour or black and white?

Let me play this game with the Soviet Winter War against Finland: The Finns started with 41 operational fighter planes against 900 Soviet aircraft.

Do you think it was a good show by the Soviets? I think Finns should have been wiped out within a day or two, but they managed to fly through the entire campaign. So, is the numerical superiority that much important?

[Christer Bergström]

Franek,

So, is the numerical superiority that much important?

Wait a minute, let me switch over to Monty Python's world. . .

Okay, here comes my answer, and please remember that everything below is a joke:

"So, is the numerical superiority that much important?"

No, didn’t I show you above? :P

Imagine that the Finns also had 900 aircraft (instead of just 41 fighters) to meet the 900 Soviet aircraft. There goes the Soviet numerical superiority. Wouldn’t have changed the situation in the air during the Winter War a bit, eh?

So, is the numerical superiority that much important? :P





“The Finns stood no chance against highest quality Soviet war machine that annihilated the enemy within a few months.”

[John Beaman]

...what is the "David Clark table", you guys are referring to?