German & Allied radar

[Crumpp]

By what measures did the Germans not have numerical superiority in the battle of Britain, though?

Single Engine fighters....

But the possibility of a Luftwaffe victory was effectively compromised by plans, laid down in the prewar period, that provided Fighter Command with a quantitative advantage and the means to sustain this advantage.
This article seeks to clarify the part played by logistics in the Battle of Britain and how it shaped the outcome. For brevity, the analysis focuses primarily on the single-seat fighters deployed by the respective air forces. It was in this arena that the Luftwaffe needed to prevail if it were to achieve air superiority over southern England and, in so doing, defeat the Royal Air Force.
Wastage

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m...24/ai_74582443

The RAF's sortie rate was much higher as well according to the RAF's own official History:




As for the 11th Group theory doing all the fighting, that is not the case again according to the RAF's own official History:




It is hard to reverse culture however. Especially when it is engrained in the British School children from an early age that the Spitfire held off the vast armada of the German Air Force:




http://www.schoolhistory.co.uk/



All the best,

Crumpp

[Nick Beale]

I'm not actually sure that British children are taught about the Battle of Britain (someone with kids may well correct me!). Everyone seems to get taught about WW2 with a big emphasis on the Holocaust nowadays.

When I made that remark about numerical superiority, I simply meant "how many aircraft did each side possess altogether?" Fighter Command had 650–750 fighters to cover the whole country. IIRC the Luftwaffe had a lot more. The Germans only needed to put up fighters at the point of attack in numbers appropriate to the size of bomber formation they were escorting (plus any diversionary sweeps they chose to send over). Much of the RAF effort on any given day was against minor incursions — nuisance raids, reconnaissance aircraft etc. Therefore I'm not sure what sortie total or rates tell us, since each side was trying to do a different job and would necessarily employ its aircraft differently.

Certainly Britain was producing/repairing enough fighters to replace its losses and to strengthen Fighter Command over the period of the Battle while the Jagdwaffe was slowly getting weaker.

[Ruy Horta]

As forces the RAF and Luftwaffe were pretty well matched. Although nominally enjoying a small superiority, the Luftwaffe didn't have enough superiority in numbers to achieve a significantly favorable attack ratio.

Fighters vs Fighters is what matters in air superiority. The bombers are of secondary importance (although they always get thrown into the numbers game).

If you add defensive bonus and radar, the RAF might even have had the odds in favor from the start, but saying so will spoil some of the glory.

The Luftwaffe might have had a chance to gain superiority over a small area in the south, more likely parity, but that still leaves the Channel and the RN to deal with. In 1940/41 a very difficult nut to crack.

IMHO the 1940 Luftwaffe was never capable of defeating Britain in a strategic air campaign, although Britain might have lost the will to fight, it could not really have lost air the battle. Even with a loss of air superiority, the faith in the RN and the advantage of an island nation as taught in history (wars against Spain and France), would have strengthened the British will to fight. It doesn't take much to believe in that moral strength, although some may have been shocked enough to have a momentary lapse of said faith (after Dunkirk).

It would have taken a radical built up of the Luftwaffe in 41 & 42 to really start grinding down Britain, including an air campaign over the Atlantic. But then again, Germany would have had to divert resources from their Army and Navy to wage such a campaign.

Economically Germany was already drawing the short straw the minute the first shot was fired (although this time the literal price that Britain had to pay was much higher than in WW1).

IMHO the best chance of the Luftwaffe to speed up the defeat of Britain was in a strategic effort against shipping, together with the strongest card in the German pack the U-Boats.

IMHO (not only limited to Germany) the inferiority complex of Air Forces made them blind to anything but "orthodox" strategic air war. Although the Luftwaffe was never blind to the needs of the Army, it was still trying to do it the airman's way. In the case of Britain being an island, the most efficient solution had an emphasis on naval operations, with the air force in support.

[Bruce Dennis]

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

As forces the RAF and Luftwaffe were pretty well matched. Although nominally enjoying a small superiority, the Luftwaffe didn't have enough superiority in numbers to achieve a significantly favorable attack ratio.

Fighters vs Fighters is what matters in air superiority. The bombers are of secondary importance (although they always get thrown into the numbers game).

If you add defensive bonus and radar, the RAF might even have had the odds in favor from the start, but saying so will spoil some of the glory.
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IMHO the 1940 Luftwaffe was never capable of defeating Britain in a strategic air campaign, although Britain might have lost the will to fight, it could not really have lost air the battle. ...
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IMHO the best chance of the Luftwaffe to speed up the defeat of Britain was in a strategic effort against shipping, together with the strongest card in the German pack the U-Boats.

...In the case of Britain being an island, the most efficient solution had an emphasis on naval operations, with the air force in support.

Ruy, at the risk of starting a new debate, I am firmly of the opinion that radar (and the supporting organisation such as the filtering room) gave the crucial advantage to the defenders. With radar, the advantage was with the defenders, as in a classic military seige: take it away, and the need to keep standing patrols and the inability to meet the attackers at altitude would have been disasterous, almost certainly leading to losses too heavy to bear. The Channel shipping would have then been at the mercy of the Luftwaffe and it would have become a test of the national charecter to resist demands to surrender.

If the LW high command had been served by a more astute intelligence system, or had they been capable of reacting to the evidence of their own early combats over Britain, they would have seen that the British were aware sufficiently in advance of the approaching LW formations in a manner that only radar could provide. This realisation did not happen early enough, and when it did the response was not good enough to salvage their plans.

IMHO, it is clear that if the LW had knocked out the British radar they would have gained air supremecy.

Bruce

[Crumpp]

Bruce says:

IMHO, it is clear that if the LW had knocked out the British radar they would have gained air supremecy.

IMHO it is not so clear. The fact is the RAF had numerical parity in Single Engine fighters and quickly moved to numerical superiority due to logistics.

Nick says:

Fighter Command had 650–750 fighters to cover the whole country. IIRC the Luftwaffe had a lot more.

One would think that it might work that way but it not the case. If you want air superiority you have to win it.

The only aircraft capable of gaining and keeping air superiority is a fighter.

Other sources give slightly different figures, but most agree that the Luftwaffe deployed an effective strength of slightly more than 900 Bf 109 fighters out of some 1,000 aircraft. This comprised the bulk of their single-seat fighter force. Approximately 150 aircraft remained in other theatres, including Germany, to defend against possible Bomber Command attacks. [34] By comparison, Fighter Command could field 52 squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires, nearly 1,100 aircraft (Table 3). Thus, in terms of single-seat fighters, the opposing air forces were fairly evenly matched, albeit Fighter Command was outnumbered more than 3:1 overall.

However, when looking at the overall picture, Figure 3, it is evident that Fighter Command steadily fielded more single-seat fighters as the battle progressed. In fact, as the Royal Air Force grew stronger, the Luftwaffe grew weaker. [36]

What makes this all the more surprising is that Fighter Command's operational losses were significantly higher than those suffered by the Luftwaffe's fighter force (Figure 4). This was equally true for the Battle of France as it was for the Battle of Britain. Thus, for 4 months, July-October 1940, Fighter Command lost more than 900 Hurricanes and Spitfires [37] compared to 600 Bf 109s recorded by the Luftwaffe quartermaster returns. [38]

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443/pg_6?tag=artBody;col1

The sortie rates tell us how many aircraft each side put into the air. Sortie rates, like radar and logistics, are a force multiplier.

IMHO, removing one of these force multipliers, such as radar, would prolong the struggle but would not in of itself, change the outcome.


All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

the most efficient solution had an emphasis on naval operations, with the air force in support.

I agree. IMHO, it would have take a comprehensive and prolonged assault with considerably more resources than Germany possed at the time.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Juha]

Hello Crump
the sortie rate in message #41 is probably misleading, probably comparing the real FC sorties to the LW sorties observed by British. According to Hooton's Eagle in Flame p. 14 LW flew Aug 12-18 2150 bomber sorties of which 1650 were daytime and 3825 fighter sorties vs 4730 FC day and 186 night sorties. So in daytime LW flew more sorties but FC flew more sorties than LW fighters. Of course I should dig out also BC sorties but I have not time for that right now.

Juha

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

Fighters vs Fighters is what matters in air superiority. The bombers are of secondary importance (although they always get thrown into the numbers game).

Now that wasn't very intelligent of the Germans to fly all those bombers over southern England even though they were filled with bombs. Without the bombers there would be no reason for defending fighters to take off. This was seen after the German defeat in BoB when RAF fighter sweeps of France went largely ignored.

The fact is the RAF had numerical parity in Single Engine fighters and quickly moved to numerical superiority due to logistics.

Be sure those single engined fighters based in the Oerkneys, Northern Ireland and other bases a long way from southern England should be counted even though they did not actually participate in the air battles over southern England. Why only count the Bf109 and not the Bf110 in the number or was the Bf110 only there for seeing the sights?

"Other sources give slightly different figures, but most agree that the Luftwaffe deployed an effective strength of slightly more than 900 Bf 109 fighters out of some 1,000 aircraft. This comprised the bulk of their single-seat fighter force. Approximately 150 aircraft remained in other theatres, including Germany, to defend against possible Bomber Command attacks."

Approx. 1/3 of FC's ~1100 fighters (~366) were not in the battle area. This gives the Germans an approximate 3:2 advantage in s/e fighters and over 3:1 overall in the battle area.

[Bruce Dennis]

In fact the coastal convoy routes were extremely vulnerable to attack from air and sea, and coastal artillery as well. The Royal Navy was not equipped to defend the Channel from air attack, which had been the responsibility of the RAF in all prewar planning, but the RAF had just been in a fight in France that had specifically not been a part of prewar planning. The threat to shipping was seen as paramount at the time, and shaped events that followed. German air superiority would have necessitated a drastic and possibly fatal rethink of the means of supplying the south of England with everything carried by the coastal traffic, from coal to wood. Since invasion was assumed to follow shortly after a German victory, priority was being given to defensive planning. There was no realistic alternative method of supply prepared, and the importance of British coastal trade cannot be emphasised enough.


Concerning radar, rather than get into a ‘what if’ debate, may I just say that the reasons for my conclusions are based on the appreciation at the time of where the greatest threats lay, and ‘how many fighters’ was only a part of that. What had been seen as enough fighters to defend the island had been depleted and the demands on Fighter Command were to become enourmous. The over-riding concern at the time was where to put the fighters and when to fly them. The other factors used by historians, such as fighter repair and replacement rates, would have been completely different if fed into a scenario wherein the front line aircraft were not used efficiently. That is where the advantage of radar and it’s efficient use must be placed, as the factor that enabled the controllers to obtain the maximum from the aircraft available, without wastage in false starts and late interceptions. It was not, as I see it, a case of the radar being merely a component of the system: the entire air defence of the UK was built around and dependent upon it with no effective means of filling the void had it been knocked out.

Bruce

[Jérémie Tarpon]

In order to assess the respective efficiency of the Allied and German radars, it is also useful to consider how the Luftwaffe performed against the Allied air attacks, especially from mid-1941 to mid-1943 when JG 2, JG 26 and JG 1/JG 11 resisted a growing air offensive in the West without having to divert strength from the Russian front. Of course, the objectives of Fighter Command were not those of the Luftwaffe in 1940, but it may be argued that its leaders did the same mistakes than Göring during the BoB, applying rigid tactics against a flexible fighter force guided by an obviously efficient ground control system. Besides other factors (like the superiority of Fw 190s over Spitfire Vs), the Luftwaffe had the advantage of being able to ignore the (rather weak in the mid-war period) effects of daylight bombing on occupied territories, so as to fight only when the more favourable conditions were met; but one important role of ground control is exactly to create these "more favourable conditions".

It would thus be interesting to assess the part played by the German radar and ground control system in this undecisive, but IMHO real German victory.

Jérémie