Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?

[drgondog]

While I agree Paul's general comments, one has to be careful regarding the loss statistics vs the readiness status to 'compete'. If I used that analysis and applied it to say, the 355th or 4th FG's over a period of time - one would judge both to be ineffective based on losses.

Typical AAF ETO fighter pilot strength ranged from 80 in September 1943 to 100 in December 1944 to 110 in April 1945.

In all three cases (4th, 355th and JG 26), the measurable have to include the percentage of experienced combat pilots versus the newer replacements. In all three cases, the ewer guys (in case of 355th for example) with 10 combat missions or less comprised more than 60% of the MIA/POW/KIA. Of the 190 355th FG/2SF pilots from Steeple Morden MIA.
144 were KIA/POW. 28 Evaded, 5 were rescued. Then 13 were KIFA.

During the 1st 12 months September 14, 1943 through September 1944 the 355th loss of pilots was 138 KIA/POW or more than 137% of its operational strength in 1944 and 171% of 1943 strength. More than JG 26's % totals for 1943. The loss of skilled flight and squadron leaders to rotation assignments after Tour of Duty was another 32 pilots in reduction of combat effectiveness - another factor Not in comparison with JG 26 statistics but weighing heavily on potential 355th FG statistics.

Of the top 5 8th AF Victory credit achievers, the average of the 56th, 357th and 352nd FG's were lower - but still higher than the JG 26 statistics quoted above - and dominantly strafing losses, except for 56FG and 357FG. High experience/high scoring pilots in 8th AF were lost far more to flak than German fighters after February 1944.

The US practices (because they could afford to do so) was to rotate key experience back to train the rookies and better prepare them. It 'hurt' the individual combat Fighter Groups, but made the new replacements better for the practice. The LW practice, however force the TO&E to have a high level of skill at leadership positions through the Spring of 1944 - at the expense of cannon fodder coming from flight schools or bomber re-assignments.