Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?

[drgondog]

While I agree Paul's general comments, one has to be careful regarding the loss statistics vs the readiness status to 'compete'. If I used that analysis and applied it to say, the 355th or 4th FG's over a period of time - one would judge both to be ineffective based on losses.

Typical AAF ETO fighter pilot strength ranged from 80 in September 1943 to 100 in December 1944 to 110 in April 1945.

In all three cases (4th, 355th and JG 26), the measurable have to include the percentage of experienced combat pilots versus the newer replacements. In all three cases, the ewer guys (in case of 355th for example) with 10 combat missions or less comprised more than 60% of the MIA/POW/KIA. Of the 190 355th FG/2SF pilots from Steeple Morden MIA.
144 were KIA/POW. 28 Evaded, 5 were rescued. Then 13 were KIFA.

During the 1st 12 months September 14, 1943 through September 1944 the 355th loss of pilots was 138 KIA/POW or more than 137% of its operational strength in 1944 and 171% of 1943 strength. More than JG 26's % totals for 1943. The loss of skilled flight and squadron leaders to rotation assignments after Tour of Duty was another 32 pilots in reduction of combat effectiveness - another factor Not in comparison with JG 26 statistics but weighing heavily on potential 355th FG statistics.

Of the top 5 8th AF Victory credit achievers, the average of the 56th, 357th and 352nd FG's were lower - but still higher than the JG 26 statistics quoted above - and dominantly strafing losses, except for 56FG and 357FG. High experience/high scoring pilots in 8th AF were lost far more to flak than German fighters after February 1944.

The US practices (because they could afford to do so) was to rotate key experience back to train the rookies and better prepare them. It 'hurt' the individual combat Fighter Groups, but made the new replacements better for the practice. The LW practice, however force the TO&E to have a high level of skill at leadership positions through the Spring of 1944 - at the expense of cannon fodder coming from flight schools or bomber re-assignments.

[Juha]

Excellent points, Drgondog
It is nowadays easy to forget how bloody WWII was and that when facing competent, well equipped opponent, losses tended to be heavy in those days. In 1943 Germans still had mostly well trained pilots flying good fighters even if the Allied planes had catch up in quality and partly even overtaken the German ones plus competent fighter controllers operating with help of radar.


Juha

[drgondog]

Juha - you also touched on a VERY important tactical advantage the Allies developed in 1944. For the 8th AF there were two very important communications development which proved to be a force multiplier.

The first was the excellent co-ordination between bomber task force leaders and 8th/9th AF escort Group and Fighter Squadron commanders via C Channel. This enabled US fighters the ability to hear and respond to cries for help from various bomb groups under attack where the fighter escort was not locally positioned. There are countless examples where a Fighter Group leader heard the call, then dispatched a squadron to go forward or backward to help out.

The second was Type 16 or Beachyhead, etc, ground based radar searching for unidentified swarms of aircraft and directing US/RAF fighters on Sweeps or Area Patrols to intercept.

The other subtlety, often missed, is that the overall practice and precision of organizing the 8th BC over East Anglia - per plan and timing - along with discipline from 8th FC to pick up their assigned bombers, by position, as identified by Tail code, much more often than not placed the fighters in effective escort position.

Neither the RAF, nor the LW ever demonstrated the ability to place 500 to 2000 bombers in the right place and time for a small (relatively) force of fighters to escort the bombers in relays. The RAF doctrine of night attacks made the requirement non important - but the LW had great difficulty in organizing many units from disparate locations into a large attacking force -

[GuerraCivil]

About LW having abandoned the "finger four" at the western front by the beginning of 1944 my source is Caldwell: JG 26, Top Guns of the Luftwaffe. (page 224 in my Finnish edition).

Caldwell also gave me the idea to think that P-47 achieved aereal domination over Western Europe before the P-51 with longer range replaced it (page 396 in my edition of "Top Guns"). To make it more precise: P-47 Razorback achieved air superiority for the Allied in the areas of its range before P-51 B extended the airwar even further into German airspace. Probably also the Spitfire IX was able to turn the balance at the areas of its limited range.

When it comes to German dayfighter losses of Big Week (Feb. 1944) and the role of 8th USAAF fighters in it, I guess that ten Fighter Groups of P-47´s still shot down more German fighters than two Fighter Groups of P-51´s (+ 2 Fighter Groups of P-38) despite the more limited range of P-47´s? Even the bombing targets in the limited range of P-47´s had to be defended by Germans and thus they had to accept to facing P-47 escorts and subsequent losses in fighter vs. fighter -combat when defending the targets inside the range of P-47.

From the book of David Isby (The Decisive Duel Spitfire vs. 109, p. 362-363) about the situation of Luftwaffe by the end of March 1944: during first three months of 1944 Luftwaffe lost 3091 fighters of which 70,5 % in the defence of Germany and in the west: "For the fighter units (of LW) this was like losing Battle of Britain every month repeated without ceasing".

Fom the posts above one can conclude that the decisive change happened already in 1943 although Luftwaffe could still win big single battles against 8th USAAF bombers. Although well armed, even the heavy bombers could not be flown unescorted into well-defended enemy airspace in daylight with acceptable losses - this was what the Germans were yet able to demonstrate convincingly. Although the exaggerated air victory claims of the gunners of US bombers were taken granted at their time (at least in the official Allied propaganda) even they were not enough to make the loss rates of unescorted bombers acceptable.

From the book of Isby I found out also that Germans were still in late 1943 able to win battles at some secondary fronts like the East Aegean (the Dodecanese Campaign). Bf 109´s were still able to achieve air superiority over Spitfires there in autumn 1943. (Isby 2012, p. 300-301)

Although the eastern front was considered "easy" or at least easier than west by LW fighter pilots, it may have contributed to the downgrading of pilot training in late 1942. According to sources referred by Isby many German fighter schools were closed/downgraded by then and lots of instructors sent to help in east. During late 1942/beginning of early 1943 the Stalingrad battle caused a loss of 1000 trained aircrews to Luftwaffe, including many "irreplacebale" instructors. Isby: Future Bf 109 pilots would not learn to fly on instruments because their instructors had died in Stalingrad (campaign). (Isby 2012, p. 286).

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

While I agree Paul's general comments, one has to be careful regarding the loss statistics vs the readiness status to 'compete'. If I used that analysis and applied it to say, the 355th or 4th FG's over a period of time - one would judge both to be ineffective based on losses.

Typical AAF ETO fighter pilot strength ranged from 80 in September 1943 to 100 in December 1944 to 110 in April 1945.

Hello Bill,

Thank you very much for providing a great degree of higly relevant detail! I agree that comparing losses to initial unit strength can be deceptive, depending on the volume of pilot flow compared to the initial stock. As you noted, the comparative statistics don't seem to be readily available, but in general terms JG 26 would have had a far smaller flow of pilots being rotated or reassigned. The USAAF fighter groups should have had significantly more pilots than JG 26 over the course of the year, relative to average unit stength.

You are right to highlight that the rate of attrition of less experienced pilots was far higher, the same conclusion was reached by the Red Baron studies of the Vietnam War and this seems to be an established general rule for most types of combat. I was able to briefly look through Top Guns just now for the losses of JG 26 commanders and I can say that they were high, 2 Gruppe COs (Galland and Seifert) and 4 Staffel COs (Ebersberger, Keller, Ruppert and Zink). That's only looking at those killed and only out of those who held commands at the end of 1942. I don't know the relevant data for the 355th, but I imagine the loss of commanders were considerably smaller and hence the overall effect on unit cohesion lower.

Regards,

Paul

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

Hello Bill,

Thank you very much for providing a great degree of higly relevant detail! I agree that comparing losses to initial unit strength can be deceptive, depending on the volume of pilot flow compared to the initial stock. As you noted, the comparative statistics don't seem to be readily available, but in general terms JG 26 would have had a far smaller flow of pilots being rotated or reassigned. The USAAF fighter groups should have had significantly more pilots than JG 26 over the course of the year, relative to average unit stength.

In all fairness to your original observation about the losses of 1943 JG 26 we should also remember that Jagdgeschwader strength of say 12 squadrons would map more closely to 3 8th AF FG with 9 squadrons of 16 aircraft (on operations) and as far TO&E, including full staffing of flights plus Group HQ pilots, would be closer to 25 per squadron in late 1943 plus 4 per HQ

You are right to highlight that the rate of attrition of less experienced pilots was far higher, the same conclusion was reached by the Red Baron studies of the Vietnam War and this seems to be an established general rule for most types of combat. I was able to briefly look through Top Guns just now for the losses of JG 26 commanders and I can say that they were high, 2 Gruppe COs (Galland and Seifert) and 4 Staffel COs (Ebersberger, Keller, Ruppert and Zink). That's only looking at those killed and only out of those who held commands at the end of 1942. I don't know the relevant data for the 355th, but I imagine the loss of commanders were considerably smaller and hence the overall effect on unit cohesion lower.

Regards,

Paul

Absolutely true, The 355th lost a Deputy Group CO in November 1943 (evaded) and another Deputy Group CO in June 1944 plus one 357FS CO in May 1944 plus another 358FS CO in March 1945. All flak related except first one. An anomaly for the 355th is that of 21 air aces, none were shot down by LW fighter - six were downed related to strafing (one rescued behind enemy lines, one WIA/evaded, three were POW and one was KIA).

The experience levels of the lost aces were much higher - the one rescued was my father, a major and 354FS CO, one evaded/WIA (Captain Cullerton-flight leader and second highest strafer), one POW was top ace (Capt Henry Brown - flight leader), one POW (major Lenfest- 354FS Ops Officer -stuck in mud trying to rescue Brown) the first 355th ace (Capt Norm Olson 357FS Ops Officer) and one high altitude flak (Capt Koraleski - 354 Ops officer.)

Regards,

Bill

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Juha - you also touched on a VERY important tactical advantage the Allies developed in 1944. For the 8th AF there were two very important communications development which proved to be a force multiplier.

The first was the excellent co-ordination between bomber task force leaders and 8th/9th AF escort Group and Fighter Squadron commanders via C Channel...

Neither the RAF, nor the LW ever demonstrated the ability to place 500 to 2000 bombers in the right place and time for a small (relatively) force of fighters to escort the bombers in relays. The RAF doctrine of night attacks made the requirement non important - but the LW had great difficulty in organizing many units from disparate locations into a large attacking force -

Bill, you and Juha are right to emphasise the development of electronic warfare. May I ask for a good source for USAAF EW developments? There is some data on Luftwaffe radio interception in a November 1944 AMWIS posted by David Isby on his excellent website, http://spitfirevsbf109.com/files/Rad...ioTracking.pdf .

Radar was important, but I doubt it had much strategic significance for the bombing campaign. Judging by this link - http://www.qsl.net/p/pe1ngz//airforc...radar-old.html - AMES Type 16 was broadly similar to a Würzburg-Riese, so it couldn't provide GCI support for missions deep into occupied territory. Quite possibly the USAAF tactics that you talked about, Bill, were more important than any radar support. In Vietnam, the EC-121Ts provided very advanced radar technology, but they did not lead to a decisive change in the air war, because of rigid tactics and political constraints.

The Eighth and the broader USAAF in Europe were very impressive organisations once they had reached peak efficiency, that is indisputable. This was partly because of their enormous size. On 2 November 1944, the day of the famous defeat for the Luftwaffe, the Eighth put up 1,100 effective heavy bomber sorties and 873 escort sorties. I. Jagdkorps could only launch 490 sorties in response. With that kind of US numerical superiority reinforcing the organisational advantages that you described, the Luftwaffe could not fight effectively. In fact, the Eighth was huge even when compared with Bomber Command. The 11 March 1945 record-breaking RAF attack on Essen was flown by 1,079 aircraft, including 36 Mosquitoes (data from Middlebrook's War Diaries). The Eighth not only had more aircraft, but they were also higher-performance, with the B-17s especially having a higher practical ceiling on operations than the Lancaster and Halifax, as well as a much heavier armament.

I am expanding the post because I've just seen your reply above, took too long to type up my own message!

Originally Posted by drgondog

In all fairness to your original observation about the losses of 1943 JG 26 we should also remember that Jagdgeschwader strength of say 12 squadrons would map more closely to 3 8th AF FG with 9 squadrons of 16 aircraft (on operations) and as far TO&E, including full staffing of flights plus Group HQ pilots, would be closer to 25 per squadron in late 1943 plus 4 per HQ

Of course, the German JGs were much bigger. I would caveat your correction with the observation that USAAF groups fought as a whole unit quite often,
while the Jagdgeschwader concentrated very rarely. The Luftwaffe was very late in forming the multi-Gruppe Gefechtsverbande, in my opinion.

Originally Posted by drgondog

Absolutely true, The 355th lost a Deputy Group CO in November 1943 (evaded) and another Deputy Group CO in June 1944 plus one 357FS CO in May 1944 plus another 358FS CO in March 1945. All flak related except first one. An anomaly for the 355th is that of 21 air aces, none were shot down by LW fighter - six were downed related to strafing (one rescued behind enemy lines, one WIA/evaded, three were POW and one was KIA).

The experience levels of the lost aces were much higher - the one rescued was my father, a major and 354FS CO, one evaded/WIA (Captain Cullerton-flight leader and second highest strafer), one POW was top ace (Capt Henry Brown - flight leader), one POW (major Lenfest- 354FS Ops Officer -stuck in mud trying to rescue Brown) the first 355th ace (Capt Norm Olson 357FS Ops Officer) and one high altitude flak (Capt Koraleski - 354 Ops officer.)

Very interesting, thank you yet again! Do you think the absence of losses in air combat was because the 355 FG pilots were especially skilled, or because the Luftwaffe skills happened to be eroding? A broader question that arises from this is why P-51 aces were permitted to strafe so often. It did cause damage to the Luftwaffe, but it also seems an unecessary gamble with the vulnerability of the Merlin cooling system to be taken into account.

Regards,

Paul

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by GuerraCivil

About LW having abandoned the "finger four" at the western front by the beginning of 1944 my source is Caldwell: JG 26, Top Guns of the Luftwaffe. (page 224 in my Finnish edition).

Caldwell also gave me the idea to think that P-47 achieved aereal domination over Western Europe before the P-51 with longer range replaced it (page 396 in my edition of "Top Guns"). To make it more precise: P-47 Razorback achieved air superiority for the Allied in the areas of its range before P-51 B extended the airwar even further into German airspace. Probably also the Spitfire IX was able to turn the balance at the areas of its limited range.

I respect Don's opinions and we have had the discussion before. What I point out is the P-47 did well against the LW, when the LW chose to engage within the operational radius of the P-47. Unfortunately the concept of Strategic Air Power stopped at that radius, but beyond that radius the LW was able to engage in heavy number with both s/e and t/e day fighters plus bring t/e night fighters to bear with no concern about fighter escort. You COULD say the Spit IX and P-47D were more or less establishing air superiority almost to Hannover, past Frankfurt and down to Stuttgart - leaving German Oil, Chemical, Aircraft engines and airframes and Ball Bearings safely protected - until the Mustang B with 85 gallon fuselage tank added.

When it comes to German dayfighter losses of Big Week (Feb. 1944) and the role of 8th USAAF fighters in it, I guess that ten Fighter Groups of P-47´s still shot down more German fighters than two Fighter Groups of P-51´s (+ 2 Fighter Groups of P-38) despite the more limited range of P-47´s? Even the bombing targets in the limited range of P-47´s had to be defended by Germans and thus they had to accept to facing P-47 escorts and subsequent losses in fighter vs. fighter -combat when defending the targets inside the range of P-47.

True, but to set the context properly, one of the Mustang groups had only been operational 9 days. To better frame the discussion in two more weeks two more Mustang groups became operational and combine they destroyed more German fighters than all the P-47 FG's combined between Big Week and March 31...

From the book of David Isby (The Decisive Duel Spitfire vs. 109, p. 362-363) about the situation of Luftwaffe by the end of March 1944: during first three months of 1944 Luftwaffe lost 3091 fighters of which 70,5 % in the defence of Germany and in the west: "For the fighter units (of LW) this was like losing Battle of Britain every month repeated without ceasing".

Fom the posts above one can conclude that the decisive change happened already in 1943 although Luftwaffe could still win big single battles against 8th USAAF bombers. Although well armed, even the heavy bombers could not be flown unescorted into well-defended enemy airspace in daylight with acceptable losses - this was what the Germans were yet able to demonstrate convincingly. Although the exaggerated air victory claims of the gunners of US bombers were taken granted at their time (at least in the official Allied propaganda) even they were not enough to make the loss rates of unescorted bombers acceptable.

[/i]

Recall that of the 3091 fighters lost in Q1 ( or whatever the number was) that a considerable number of strafing losses to Mustangs occurred in that March and succeeding months. Those are also operational losses due to all causes.

If we pick on March/April 1944 to parse Defense of Reich losses against 8th and AF ---- from Caldwell's Day Fighters in Defense of the Reich
MAR, 1944 LF-Reich
sorties=2464 Losses=354, KIA/WIA=202 (Dominantly Mustang)
MAR LF-3
sorties =1094 Losses =70, KIA/WIA=43 (Dominantly P-47/Spitfire)

APR, 1944 LF-Reich
sorties =3487 Losses =370, KIA/WIA=206 (Dominantly Mustang)
APR LF-3
sorties =1100 Losses =48, KIA/WIA=19 (Dominantly P-47/Spitfire)

1943 Total LF_Reich or Mitte
sorties =13,377 Losses =703, KIA/WIA=396 (Dominantly P-47/Spitfire)
1943 Total LF-3
sorties =7294, Losses =278, KIA/WIA=134 (Dominantly P-47/Spitfire)

Observation - the Mustang did not get all the aircraft destroyed against the LF-Reich, some were due the bombers, some were due the P-38, a few P-47. Similarly not all the VC's against LF-3 were P-47s and Spits, some were by Mustangs and P-38s over lowlands and France.

Summary - an extraordinary total of KIA/WIA losses by the LW in March and April 1944 were primarily due to Mustangs - and Nearly as many as all of 1943

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Recall that of the 3091 fighters lost in Q1 ( or whatever the number was) that a considerable number of strafing losses to Mustangs occurred in that March and succeeding months. Those are also operational losses due to all causes.

If we pick on March/April 1944 to parse Defense of Reich losses against 8th and AF ---- from Caldwell's Day Fighters in Defense of the Reich
MAR, 1944 LF-Reich...

Observation - the Mustang did not get all the aircraft destroyed against the LF-Reich, some were due the bombers, some were due the P-38, a few P-47. Similarly not all the VC's against LF-3 were P-47s and Spits, some were by Mustangs and P-38s over lowlands and France.

Summary - an extraordinary total of KIA/WIA losses by the LW in March and April 1944 were primarily due to Mustangs - and Nearly as many as all of 1943

Hello Bill,

I am also sceptical of the Q1 number, it does feel more like the total of losses to all causes, but I will try to look that up and clarify.

The extracted data does support your point and I think it is unambiguously true that the Mustang was the main tool of the Luftwaffe's destruction during Big Week and the period up to D-Day. I have added up the total losses of twin-engine Luftwaffe aircraft presented in Don's book and I think the numbers highlight the influence of the Mustang's long range in 1944, even though these losses were not exclusively due to P-51s:
Q3 1943 – 25 aircraft
Q4 1943 – 132
Q1 1944 – 308 (12 times as many as in Q3 1943)
Q2 1944 –185

Coming back to what was happening in 1943, I extracted the full list of commander casualties from Don Caldwell's website. The Spitfire was the most commmon cause of loss (7 out of 21 cases), followed by the B-17 (4 cases) and P-47 (3 cases). I think that this kind of evidence clearly supports my view that the Luftwaffe was under extreme pressure by early to mid-1943 and that even the early operations of the Eighth caused a crisis. The point that I would highlight about targets outside of P-47, or even Spitfire, range is that attacks on those targets constituted an attempt to win air dominance rather than just air superiority, which had already been won in the Fighter Command operational area. To return to a point I have made previously, air dominance was not strictly necessary to secure Allied landings or win the war more generally. Table of JG 26 losses below:

9/8/43 Beese, Artur Oblt. WIA 1 CO W of Cambrai Spitfire
5/14/43 Borris, Karl Hptm. WIA 8 CO Issigen-Wevelgem B-17
10/24/43 Ebersberger, Kurt Hptm. KIA 4 CO 3km S of Hesdin Spitfire
8/17/43 Galland, Wilhelm-Ferdinand Maj. KIA II CO nr Liege-5km W Maastricht P-47
4/5/43 Geisshardt, Fritz Hptm. KIA III CO Ghent B-17
12/1/43 Hoppe, Helmut Hptm. KIA 5 CO Epinoy a/f Spitfire
7/31/43 Kelch, Günther Hptm. KIFA 7 CO Neuwerk-Knechtsiel crashed
3/24/43 Keller, Paul Oblt. KIA 10J CO Ashford own bomb
5/14/43 Leykauf, Erwin Oblt. no 12/54 CO Wevelgem a/f taxi
4/15/43 Matuschka, Siegfried Oblt. KIA 4/54 CO near St. Inglevert Spitfire
3/20/43 Mietusch, Klaus Hptm. WIA 7 CO Krasnogvardeisk a/f engine
6/22/43 Naumann, Hans Hptm. WIA 6 CO near Antwerp P-47
6/13/43 Ruppert, Kurt Hptm. KIA III CO Neumünster B-17
11/25/43 Seifert, Johannes Obstlt. KIA II CO nr Bethune-5km S of Estaires P-38 - coll
10/10/43 Staiger, Hermann Hptm. WIA 12 CO near Dorsten B-17
5/13/43 Stammberger, Otto Oblt. WIA 4 CO near St. Omer Spitfire
11/3/43 Steindl, Peter-Paul Hptm. WIA 11 CO E Friesland-Holtgast P-47
6/17/43 Sternberg, Horst Oblt. WIA 5 CO W of Hazebrouck Spitfire
11/29/43 Sternberg, Horst Oblt. WIFA 6 CO c/l Lille-Nord a/f Spitfire
3/5/43 Zink, Fülbert Hptm. no 2 CO S of Shvinochovo combat
3/14/43 Zink, Fülbert Hptm. KIA 2 CO E of Werschinskojec missing

Regards,

Paul

[GuerraCivil]

Just a small note of the above list of combat casualties of JG 26 in 1943:

Is the list of KIA and MIA airmen or including also WIA? Or in general when they were shot down?

Karl Borris and Klaus Mietusch were not killed in combat in 1943 to my knowledge. Borris survived the war and Mietusch was KIA in 17.9.1944. Both were pretty active pilots in late 1943 and in 1944 so I would not consider them to be "knock-out" of action in 1943.