Allied air superiority in 1944: P-47 D Razorback decided it?

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by GuerraCivil

Just a small note of the above list of combat casualties of JG 26 in 1943:

Is the list of KIA and MIA airmen or including also WIA? Or in general when they were shot down? ....

Hello GuerraCivil,

I know the formatting was a little troublesome at first, but I did edit it The abbreviation WIA appears 8 times in the above list, so it should have been hard to miss. I assume the list is of known aircraft losses involving these pilots, since Leykauf's incident and the first of two incidents involving Zink carry the "no" remark instead of KIA/WIA. This would suggest that they suffered no injuries in these two cases.

I have sent you a PM this time, I forgot the first time that I mentioned it, in one of the above posts.

Regards,

Paul

[drgondog]

Paul - I will respond to various questions after I get back from a day trip.

My only point in favor of JG 26 is that comparing losses based on pilot staffing and aircraft availability suggests comparing one JG (i.e. JG 2 or JG 26) losses against three US Fighter Groups. The three US Fighter Group loss comparison for 1943 through August means looking to all the losses of the 4th, 56th and 78th FG then factor RAF losses to the JG 26 also to try to normalize loss per sortie comparison.

Having said that, when a US or Brit pilot escapes the cockpit - he is 99% POW or DOW whereas the JG 26 pilot returns to fight again.

Other comments
Briefly the Type 16 and Beachyhead Control was limited in range - extremely useful during the Normandy campaign, Operation Market Garden and the Battle of the Bulge, but not at all useful in the Battle of Germany. The aircraft to aircraft communications from bomber leaders to fighter leaders was extremely important.

To the question of 'low air to air losses for the 355th'.. The 355th finished fifth in air combat victory credits with 355 air, 508 ground for losses of 41 air/90 strafing credits.

The 4th FG by contrast had 549 air/461 ground for losses of 86 air/92 strafing

The 56th had 665 air/320 ground for losses of 54 air/84 strafing

The 352nd had 504 air/275 ground for losses of 41 air/41 strafing

The 357th had 595 air/107 ground for losses of 55 air/36 strafing

These are the four ahead of 355th in air to air totals - all except the 4th FG had superior air to air statistics but all also had several aces downed in air combat. Why? I have no answer but will observe that all were more aggressive about leaving escort to pursue German fighters - that is a leadership trait based on "stick with the bombers' versus "Pursue and destroy" (IMO).

That doesn't, statistically, explain why the 355th had no air to air losses of aces as they had more air victory credits than the trailing nine Fighter Groups and had a better ratio than say the 78th, the 353rd, the 20th, the 55th, the 359th and 364th FG's.

As well as the 4th FG, which is more explainable as they had more engagements by a significant margin.

There were more 355th Flight, Squadron and HQ leaders lost than I named in the previous post but all except three (non aces but one had 4.5 VC's) were downed by flak.

I have no real explanations for the anomaly

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Paul - I will respond to various questions after I get back from a day trip.

My only point in favor of JG 26 is that comparing losses based on pilot staffing and aircraft availability suggests comparing one JG (i.e. JG 2 or JG 26) losses against three US Fighter Groups. The three US Fighter Group loss comparison for 1943 through August means looking to all the losses of the 4th, 56th and 78th FG then factor RAF losses to the JG 26 also to try to normalize loss per sortie comparison.

Having said that, when a US or Brit pilot escapes the cockpit - he is 99% POW or DOW whereas the JG 26 pilot returns to fight again.

Other comments
Briefly the Type 16 and Beachyhead Control was limited in range - extremely useful during the Normandy campaign, Operation Market Garden and the Battle of the Bulge, but not at all useful in the Battle of Germany. The aircraft to aircraft communications from bomber leaders to fighter leaders was extremely important.

To the question of 'low air to air losses for the 355th'.. The 355th finished fifth in air combat victory credits with 355 air, 508 ground for losses of 41 air/90 strafing credits.

The 4th FG by contrast had 549 air/461 ground for losses of 86 air/92 strafing

The 56th had 665 air/320 ground for losses of 54 air/84 strafing

The 352nd had 504 air/275 ground for losses of 41 air/41 strafing

The 357th had 595 air/107 ground for losses of 55 air/36 strafing

These are the four ahead of 355th in air to air totals - all except the 4th FG had superior air to air statistics but all also had several aces downed in air combat. Why? I have no answer but will observe that all were more aggressive about leaving escort to pursue German fighters - that is a leadership trait based on "stick with the bombers' versus "Pursue and destroy" (IMO).

That doesn't, statistically, explain why the 355th had no air to air losses of aces as they had more air victory credits than the trailing nine Fighter Groups and had a better ratio than say the 78th, the 353rd, the 20th, the 55th, the 359th and 364th FG's.

As well as the 4th FG, which is more explainable as they had more engagements by a significant margin.

There were more 355th Flight, Squadron and HQ leaders lost than I named in the previous post but all except three (non aces but one had 4.5 VC's) were downed by flak.

I have no real explanations for the anomaly

Bill,

Thank you for the great comparative data about the USAAF fighter groups. I look forward to your post when you come back with considerable interest. The research task that you outlined would be very worthwhile, in my opinion. My hypothesis is that the RAF and especially the USAAF loss rates would be far lower than the JG 26 rate, both for the entire units concerned and for their various commanders.

Your point about the dominant important of radio reinforces what many other sources say. The SCR-522 and related sets were probably the best available to any combatant air force at the time, so this was another important measure where US technological superiority affected the operational and strategic level of the air war.

Your explanation for the 355th as a statistical outlier sounds right to me in view of the fact that we discussed earlier, that Luftwaffe fighters had orders to attack the bombers above all else. That was a self-defeating approach, to my mind, but the Luftwaffe did not have another reasonable alternative. It is thus possible that those groups which stuck more closely to the bombers would meet German fighters less often, as the German formations would have been broken up by other units. I'll try to look up data on the 332nd, that may shed some light on this specific hypothesis.

I don't think that the absence of ace losses in air combat is necessarily such an extraordinary anomaly. Ace losses across the Eighth were fairly low, at least in air combat, certainly by the standards of the Soviet and German equivalents. It could be that if a statistical distribution is constructed, it would suggest that more fighter groups 'should' not have lost aces!

Regards,

Paul

[drgondog]

Paul - by the very nature of a very high population of 'aces', the Attack attitude against German fighters in any concentration was prevalent. So, by the very nature of the beast he is constantly engaging and thereby places himself at greater risk than those pilots at flight lead (or even squadron and Group lead) that were more content to hold escort positions rather than engage. So, I do expect more air to air losses in aces due to the increased combat probability and the very real possibility of being hit from behind while concentrating on someone in front of you. Frequently, the wingman was hit first... but once that type of fight has been engaged the ods of being shot down yourself are higher.

I agree that Goering's orders severely impacted the well tuned aggressiveness of the experienced LW day fighter pilots. The Split Ess and dive to obey orders and try to avoid combat killed a lot of German fighter pilots caught in the dive - rather than respond with a turn into the US fighter and engage in a tactically neutral position.

The other unintended consequences included letting US pilots hone advanced training skills by not attacking early and aggressively to kill the newly arrived pilots, thereby permitting a more paced exposure in many case to refine tactics and gain better awareness of relative strengths and weaknesses of the P-47 and Bf 109 and FW 190.

I don't have the statistics on air to air losses for the 332nd so can't comment other than to say that for Mustang groups that are compared to the 332nd from the June Ops date have far more air to air VC's in the same period as well as pilots that achieved ace status since the 332nd had zero despite having four squadrons in the group and two with significant experience in P-40s and P-47s before converting to P-51's.

IIRC the 332nd had ~ 100 air to air scores credited by USAF 85 from June through May 1945, but recall that all other FG's had only three squadrons?

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Paul - by the very nature of a very high population of 'aces', the Attack attitude against German fighters in any concentration was prevalent. So, by the very nature of the beast he is constantly engaging and thereby places himself at greater risk than those pilots at flight lead (or even squadron and Group lead) that were more content to hold escort positions rather than engage. So, I do expect more air to air losses in aces due to the increased combat probability and the very real possibility of being hit from behind while concentrating on someone in front of you. Frequently, the wingman was hit first... but once that type of fight has been engaged the ods of being shot down yourself are higher...

Hello Bill,

My appologies for not getting back earlier, had my schedule disrupted by travel in the last couple of days. I see the force of your point that aces are by nature aggressive and so should be at higher risk than other pilots. I probably can't say anything useful on this specific subject without doing a lot more research, but I can offer a hypothesis that perhaps the aggressiveness of the aces in the 355th was somewhat restrained by the attitude of the group's leadership, is there any truth in that suggestion?

With regard to the point about Luftwaffe fighters diving away, the technical issue that we discussed above was of critical importance. In a sense, Göring was ordering what had been good Luftwaffe practice for years, but it was not much use against the Thunderbolt and Mustang. There must also have been a problem of skill erosion on the German side. Many aces of all the various wartime air forces record being able to defend themselves when diving to disengage, even against higher-performance aircraft. This required good aerobatic skills and a high level of situational awareness, so inexperienced pilots would have had particular problems in these situations.

I wonder whether more aggressive German tactics could have actually killed many new USAAF fighter pilots. Since the USAAF did suspend deep penetration raids after Second Schweinfurt, I think it is likely they would have done the same if German tactics suddenly improved and caused a high loss rate among the escorts. The USAAF and RAF had the numbers by 1943 to maintain air dominance over the Benelux and northern France in virtually any circumstances, unless Speer’s ministry would have somehow managed to produce thousands of Me 262s and get them in service before it was too late. As it was, you are entirely correct to point out that the USAAF fighter groups rapidly accumulated experience because of their comparatively low loss rates.

I haven’t been able to find the 332nd air-to-air loss statistics in books, but I found the VC totals in the Osprey Aviation Elite title for this group. The total is 119 kills, 8.5 probables, 27 damaged . There were nine pilots with 3 or more confirmed kills. The most important reason for the comparatively low claim total of the 332nd was probably the weakness of the Luftwaffe in southern Europe after June and especially autumn 1944.

Regards,

Paul

[GuerraCivil]

Regarding German tactics and fighter strategy it seems reasonable that they wanted to concentrate in heavy bombers - these were the primary targets. Germans had cities and other vulnerable targets to defend from the terrible rain of bombs. Germans had less fighters and pilots than Allied so it made sense to try to avoid to lose them in fighter vs. fighter engagement.


Germans had a problem to deal with both heavy bomber campaign and their fighter escorts at the same time. It was easier for the Allied fighter forces - they could concentrate almost solely on the destroying of enemy fighters and thus seek fighter vs. fighter situations more aggresively. They had also planes (P-51, P-47, Spitfire IX) equal and in some respects superior to German standard fighters. The combat skills and tactics of the Allied fighter pilots were also updated - the Allied had learned their lessons and incorporated the German inventions in their combat training and tactics.

Germans had not anymore their earlier advantages (technical superiority and superior tactics) which did contribute so much to their earlier success against Allied fighters up to 1942. At the Eastern Front they could hold more time in air with their superior tactics compared to Soviets but even there the sheer enemy numbers were too much at the end.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

Hello Bill,

My appologies for not getting back earlier, had my schedule disrupted by travel in the last couple of days. I see the force of your point that aces are by nature aggressive and so should be at higher risk than other pilots. I probably can't say anything useful on this specific subject without doing a lot more research, but I can offer a hypothesis that perhaps the aggressiveness of the aces in the 355th was somewhat restrained by the attitude of the group's leadership, is there any truth in that suggestion?

I do feel that Colonel Bill Cummings was less aggressive than Blakeslee, Martin, Zemke, Mason, Dregne and several others of 1943 and 1944 vintage. When he led the group he was focused on protecting the bombers to the point of not personally leading an attack on the LW and reigning in his squadron CO's. When he was Not leading the 355th on a particular day, his appointed Group CO for that mission were aggressive (Kinnard, Dix, Marshall, Kucheman, Szaniawski, Hovde, Elder, Myers, Graham, Sluga). There are many examples where the 355th chose to stay in relative close escort - and in many cases fill in for unprotected bomber boxes elsewhere, when big fights were spotted nearby. I am not criticizing Cummings. He served as the longest continuous Fighter Group commander in the ETO - from November 1942 when it was activated through early November 1944. No one else was close in the ETO and offhand maybe not in AAF.

Also in fairness to Cummings, his 355th went from near last in victory credits for 8th FC Fighter Groups as of March 1944 to number three in total aircraft destroyed behind 56th FG and 4th FG by the end of April. The 355th finished in the top third with air and top in ground destruction under his leadership with a combined low loss to assigned bombers relative to other groups... but certainly not close to 332nd statistics of 27+.

With regard to the point about Luftwaffe fighters diving away, the technical issue that we discussed above was of critical importance. In a sense, Göring was ordering what had been good Luftwaffe practice for years, but it was not much use against the Thunderbolt and Mustang. There must also have been a problem of skill erosion on the German side. Many aces of all the various wartime air forces record being able to defend themselves when diving to disengage, even against higher-performance aircraft. This required good aerobatic skills and a high level of situational awareness, so inexperienced pilots would have had particular problems in these situations.

The LW could always out dive the P-38 because of the critical Mach issues arising from its fat wing - but not the P-47 or P-51, and in particular the P-51 because of the delayed drag rise of the laminar flow wing coupled with only a small movement of the Center of pressure during the Mach transition. Until the P-47D-25 (?? have to check) put a dive flap at 30% chord the P-47 stick forces were very high - similar to but not as bad as the P-38 - due to the rearward movement of the CP during BL separation.

On the other hand the 109 and 190 could always out dive the VVS counterparts in a tough situation, It is likely that the experienced LW pilot transitioning from East did not know that the Dive was Not an effective disengagement maneuver in the ETO.

I wonder whether more aggressive German tactics could have actually killed many new USAAF fighter pilots. Since the USAAF did suspend deep penetration raids after Second Schweinfurt, I think it is likely they would have done the same if German tactics suddenly improved and caused a high loss rate among the escorts.

I believe they could have bought some time - but not without out high cost of "trade attrition" - which the US and RAF could afford. The net result is that a lot of talented US fighter pilots gained experience to combine natural ability and aggressiveness with tactical knowledge - and go on to become Very good fighter pilots and fill leadership positions with depth and breadth in ETO fighter squadrons.

Many of the future fighter aces and flight/squadron leaders may have been taken out of the fight - thereby delaying the crushing combination of many experienced pilots - quickly- with the technical tools of parity or better in the escort aircraft.

The USAAF and RAF had the numbers by 1943 to maintain air dominance over the Benelux and northern France in virtually any circumstances, unless Speer’s ministry would have somehow managed to produce thousands of Me 262s and get them in service before it was too late. As it was, you are entirely correct to point out that the USAAF fighter groups rapidly accumulated experience because of their comparatively low loss rates.

I haven’t been able to find the 332nd air-to-air loss statistics in books, but I found the VC totals in the Osprey Aviation Elite title for this group. The total is 119 kills, 8.5 probables, 27 damaged . There were nine pilots with 3 or more confirmed kills. The most important reason for the comparatively low claim total of the 332nd was probably the weakness of the Luftwaffe in southern Europe after June and especially autumn 1944.

Regards,

Paul

Paul - the Mustang equipped 52nd, 31st, 325th FG's continued at a solid pace, far outstripping the 332nd.. but the 332nd Did outscore (slightly) the P-38 equipped 1st, 14th and 82nd FG's in the same time the 332nd got Mustangs.

I think you are correct about nine with 3 or more air VC's but recall that only one (Archer) got four. Another point must be made about the 332nd reputation for not losing many of their escorted bombers to the LW. Recall that four squadrons to provide escort is 33% more fighters to escort them and provide cover.

To get to the ratio of Victory Credits to Perceived Cause of Losses due to Air Combat, somebody will have to pull all the MACRs and make some judgments regarding Cause. Personally I looked at more that 13000 ETO Macrs and read every one to parse "Definitely shot down" to "Last seen in combat with enemy air" to 'Last seen in vicinity of reported enemy air" to 'Unknown". When developing my statistics for my book "Our Might Always - History of the 355th FG", I assigned each of the first three categories to "Loss to air to air combat".

There were relatively few "unknown" and when I encountered that category in the Macr along with time and location, I searched Tony Woods lists to try for a match. When it was 'close' then that record made the Loss-Air category.

[GuerraCivil]

Of all USAAF fighter units in Europe the most efficient to my knowledge was 56th FG and they flew with P-47 until the end of war. Perhaps speaks something for the merit of P-47 that 56 FG kept flying with it although "better" P-51 would have been available.

Although Mustang was somewhat better technically (specially longer range) the P-47 Razorback was essential in building up the self-confidence and combat experience of USAAF fighter units during 1943 and early 1944 (when big numbers of efficient fighter version of P-51 were not yet available).

P-47 airframe could also take lots of punishment of enemy fire and still bring the pilot home. This probably saved the life of many less experienced USAAF fighter pilots and increased their survival chances from their first combats. The famous episode of Robert Johnson surviving with totally holed-up P-47 on 17.6.1943 is perhaps the best example of the strength of P-47 airframe.

Later the same abilities made P-47 ideal fighter-bomber which was able to deal with intercepting enemy fighters if necessary. The P-51 was perhaps the best piston-engined fighter of WW2 but USAAF had to have P-47 also!

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by drgondog

I do feel that Colonel Bill Cummings was less aggressive than Blakeslee, Martin, Zemke, Mason, Dregne and several others of 1943 and 1944 vintage. ...

Hello Bill,

That’s a valuable sketch of Cummings’ command style. I would think it shows that he was something of a by-the-book officer and focused on the primary mission assigned to him, namely protecting the bombers. The overall statistics that you describe are a firm testament to his success, in my view, since the group still performed very well in air combat, despite his deliberately restrained tactics.

Originally Posted by drgondog

The LW could always out dive the P-38 because of the critical Mach issues arising from its fat wing - but not the P-47 or P-51, and in particular the P-51 because of the delayed drag rise of the laminar flow wing coupled with only a small movement of the Center of pressure during the Mach transition. ...

The successful adoption of the laminar flow wing on the Mustang was one of many ways in which the US exploited its overwhelming technological superiority in the closing years of the war. The RAF did use the laminar flow wing on the Spitfire XIV, but this was a compromise modification of an old design, rather than a new product like the Mustang. The biggest problem that the USAAF had, and which persists to this day, is the grotesquely extended time it took to get any version of the Mustang to the battlefield. Even the A-36 made it to the MTO only in mid-1943, which was far too long. In short, the Mustang was half a generation ahead of its contemporaries and could have had an even greater impact if it was developed more quickly.
The first Thunderbolt sub-type with the dive flaps might be the P-47D-30-RA/RE, but the sources I have are contradictory. I would point out that all late Bf 109s had even worse problems with stick forces than the Thunderbolt, so in comparative terms the USAAF was well off even with the early P-47s.

Originally Posted by drgondog

Many of the future fighter aces and flight/squadron leaders may have been taken out of the fight - thereby delaying the crushing combination of many experienced pilots - quickly- with the technical tools of parity or better in the escort aircraft.

It is difficult to assess this, it was certainly a possibility. The one thing that makes me believe that this would be unlikely is the USAAF attitude to loss rates. Apart from heavy bombers and even then in a relatively limited set of cases, the USAAF did not accept high casualties and would go far to avoid them. The Ploesti raid is an extreme example, where a single high-risk raid was only followed up when the operational conditions were completely transformed.

Originally Posted by drgondog

Paul - the Mustang equipped 52nd, 31st, 325th FG's continued at a solid pace, far outstripping the 332nd.. but the 332nd Did outscore (slightly) the P-38 equipped 1st, 14th and 82nd FG's in the same time the 332nd got Mustangs.

You are correct, the other Mustang groups of the 15th were more successful, possibly due to their superior experience. The comparison with the Lightning groups might be a little inappropriate, since they were used as dive-bombers fairly regularly after June 1944. I don’t know much about the effective strength of various fighter groups in combat, but the following tidbits from Mahoney’s book on the 15th are interesting. On 17 July, the 332nd flew escort with 46 P-51s, while the 325 flew 47 Mustangs on 5 September and 58 on 14 October. I draw the tentative conclusion that the 332nd may not have put more aircraft in the air than other groups, at least in the routine cases.

Originally Posted by drgondog

To get to the ratio of Victory Credits to Perceived Cause of Losses due to Air Combat, somebody will have to pull all the MACRs and make some judgments regarding Cause. Personally I looked at more that 13000 ETO Macrs and read every one to parse "Definitely shot down" to "Last seen in combat with enemy air" to 'Last seen in vicinity of reported enemy air" to 'Unknown". When developing my statistics for my book "Our Might Always - History of the 355th FG", I assigned each of the first three categories to "Loss to air to air combat".

The volume of information you sorted through is incredible! How long did the MACR project take you to complete?

Regards,

Paul

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by GuerraCivil

Of all USAAF fighter units in Europe the most efficient to my knowledge was 56th FG and they flew with P-47 until the end of war. Perhaps speaks something for the merit of P-47 that 56 FG kept flying with it although "better" P-51 would have been available.

Although Mustang was somewhat better technically (specially longer range) the P-47 Razorback was essential in building up the self-confidence and combat experience of USAAF fighter units during 1943 and early 1944 ...

The P-51 was perhaps the best piston-engined fighter of WW2 but USAAF had to have P-47 also!

Hello GuerraCivil,

I think the 56th is an exception that proves the rule. The 56th was extremely experienced in the use of dive attack tactics which made best use of the Thunderbolt's high service ceiling and high diving speed, its two primary performance advantages.

The Mustang was not somewhat better than the P-47, but decisively so. It had lower drag and higher acceleration, contribution to substantially better overall manoeuvrability. Bill has discussed above the P-51s advantage in the dive.

I would strongly suggest that the USAAF did not, strictly speaking, need either the P-47 or P-51. The Lightning did encounter serious problems over Europe, but any long-range escort fighter was an insurmountable problem for the Luftwaffe, as the Tunisian campaign demonstrated.

Regards,

Paul