Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?

[Kutscha]

Maybe Tony should do more research than just a Wiki article, like read the book I mentioned.

There was 2 shipyards with 12 month access to the Atlantic, Sorel and Quebec City. There was another in Montreal with limited access to the Atlantic. Those yards on the Great Lakes had to wait for the spring breakup before any ships they constructed after the freeze could reach the Atlantic. Have you ever worked outside in a Canadian winter?

Besides corvettes, these Canadian yards also had to produce minesweepers and frigates. It took 5 years to produce those 100 or so corvettes.

"On May 31, 1941 Commodore L. W. Murray, RCN, was appointed commander of the Newfoundland Escort Force, later the Mid-Ocean Escort Force, reporting to the British Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches. A few days later the first Canadian corvettes joined his command."

Numbers of ships arriving and losses in North Atlantic convoys inbound to Britain (ships arriving/losses)

1939 700/5 (7.1%)
1940 5,434/133 ((2.5%)
1941 5,923/153 (2.6%)
1942 4,798/80 (1.7%)
1943 5,667/87 (1.5%)
1944 7,410/8 (0.1%)

Now what was it you were saying about how much better the escorts were doing in 1941?

One can have a 1000 ships but they are useless if there is not trained crews to man them. The Canadians did not have trained crews.

What did you say about the American 4 stackers, Oh yes,

The USA contributed the square root of FA to the early battle of the Atlantic - few of the 50 rust-bucket four-stackers that were sent in exchange for bases were actually used, and only after they had been refitted at great expense.

Since you put so much stock in Wiki, read what it has to say about the Matilda's reliability.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matilda_II

How many tank transporters did the British have in NA? The closer Rommel got Egypt the worse his logistics became. The same for the British going the other way.

[tcolvin]

This discussion is getting bogged in detail; as Juha says there was no frozen mud in North Africa.
7RTR managed to keep its high maintenance Matilda IIs running, but after Compass they had clocked an average of 1,200 hours and needed a major overhaul, especially of the Rackham steering clutches, so they were shipped from Tobruk to Alexandria. They were in any case not indispensable to the matter under discussion of whether Tunis could have been taken before the Germans arrived. Wavell thought he could do it given the army's domination over the Italians who had taken heavy losses, and the overwhelming strength of the RN's fleet that included three 15-inch battleships (Warspite, Valiant and Barham) an aircraft carrier, cruisers, destroyer screen and landing craft. Churchill himself did not doubt it, but preferred to try for a hat trick of bizarre exploits - Dardanelles, Norway and now Greece/Crete. Why Wavell ever agreed to the Greek adventure when he knew the benefit of clearing Italy out of North Africa is still one of history's big imponderables.

The small U-boat construction early in the war by a Kriegsmarine wedded to heavy surface ships (18 submarines built in 1939 and 50 in 1940) was contained by the RN and RCN without US assistance. The big expansion of U-boat construction did not produce the big threat until late 1941 and 1942 (199 submarines built in 1941, 237 in 1942) when the US contribution became significant in terms of closing the air gap and using hunter-killer groups, but by then the UK was no longer independent.

Singapore was not reinforced, and India was not built up as a supplier of arms and troops due to Churchill's neglect of these opportunities and in spite of dire warnings of the consequences of neglect from the Chiefs of Staff. Enigma intercepts showed Churchill that the Germans had given up on Seeloewe in September. Churchill could then have sent significant numbers of Spitfires and Hurricanes to Malaya and North Africa instead of leaving them in the UK with nothing much to do except make work for themselves.

Tony

[John Beaman]

Tony, you are correct in your assessment of the neglect Churchill and the Imperial Chiefs of Staff did concerning the Mid-East and the Far East. and, there was certainly intelligence regarding German intentions as well as Japanese intentions. However, we are looking at this with the benefit of knowing everything and with modern/communication information sharing.

You must keep in mind how paranoid Churchill and the British were at this point with Enigma as their only window to the enemy's operations (and they weren't always trusting of this). They had decisively lost the Battle of France in 30 days, they had narrowly escaped losing the BoB, had the crap bombed out them from September '40 on, U-boats whacking away at their seaborne lifelines, and other surprises. Also, in mid-1941 there was absolutely no guarantee the US would ever get into the war. It was being VERY conservative to hold back Spitfires and other updated material from those theaters, but safe. Plus, the IGS and even the Americans did not really take Japanese military capabilities very seriously. The old "we are better by far" mindset.

While too conservative from our viewpoint, Church worked with what information he had at the time and made the decisions. It worked and that's the important thing. Once the US entered the war in both the Pacific and Europe, WWII was over, albeit 4 long bloody years of struggle, and thanks to the USSR.

[Laurent Rizzotti]

First, what is this discussion of taking Tunis ? To take it you will have to cross the whole of Vichy French-held Tunisia, and that was not a brillant political idea. The Syria-Lebanon affair was a bloody campaign, and lasted more than a month, for a smaller territory that was far more difficult for the French to supply/reinforce and for the Axis to assist.

Taking Tripoli will be hard enough. I think that the British Army vehicles when they stopped were probably in a poor state, and supply lines were hard stretched. Even if ports were captured, I'm not sure they could be used at full capacity.

Then to come back to the BofB, while both the English and German rank of file and civilians were thinking the invasion will come, I wonder what the leaders of both sides thought of it ?

Especially, I wonder if the British sent reinforcements to Middle East during the summer of 1940. IMHO, this will be a sign that they thought an invasion was unlikely, as these is no reason to keep your backyard garden under guard if your house is open to everybody. Suez was important, but less than London.

[tcolvin]

Apologies to Laurent and to all for a senior moment.
For Tunis read Tripoli. (I must have confused the names because Tunis is where von Arnim made his final stand).
Tripoli is where Rommel landed and which Wavell thought he could take as per this cable.

"A.P Wavell to CIGS. 10 February 1941, 1900 hrs.
Extent of Italian defeat at Benghazi makes it seem possible that Tripoli might yield to small force if despatched without undue delay. Am working out commitment involved but hesitate to advance further in view of Balkan situation unless you think capture of Tripoli might have favourable effect on attitude of French North Africa.
Further advance will also involve naval and air commitments and we are already far stretched. Navy would hate having to feed us in Tripoli and Air Force to protect us. On other hand possession of this coast might be useful to both.
Will make plans for capture of Sirte which must be first step; meanwhile cable me most immediate your views as to effect on Weygand and war situation generally. Will probably go Cyrenaica discuss matter with Wilson 12th or 13th February."

Churchill in 1948 said unapologetically; "They said I was wrong to go to Greece in 1940...... They now say that I went to Greece for the wrong reasons. How do they know? The point is that it was worth it". (ie "delayed the German invasion of Russia by six weeks. Vital weeks. So it was worth it. If you back a winner it doesn't really matter much what your reasons were at the time").

Tony

[Kutscha]

It took two months to the British to advance 500 miles and defeat the Italian Tenth Army. They reached El Agueila on February 9. Now, under much more difficult circumstances, they have to advance another 450 miles and defeat the Italian 5h Army.

Yes, that light force would be the 7th Armoured Division with a tank strength of twelve A13 Cruiser tanks and forty Mark VI Light tanks.

You might look down on details Tony but they poke all kinds of holes in your theories.

[DuncanM]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the BofB, is there any dispute about the point made by Clive Ponting in his book '1940, Myth and Reality', that the BofB was won largely, but not entirely, in spite of the RAF's generalship.

1. British fighter production, repair and storage systems were reorganised successfully by Beaverbrook's Ministry of Aircraft Production as a result of its separation from the Air Ministry in May 1940. The result was that British fighter availability increased from 644 at the beginning of July 1940 to 732 at end October, while German fighter availability declined over the same period from 725 to 275.
2. The RAF nevertheless managed to create a shortage by; over-allocating pilots to squadrons (26 pilots for 20 aircraft);
3. The RAF starved the vital 11 Group of Spitfires, giving it a split of 70% Hurricanes/30% Spitfires while other less critical Groups had a 50/50 split.
4. 11 & 12 Group airfields had resident Blenheim night-fighter squadrons throughout the BofB when their space could have been utilised by Spitfire day-fighters. Coastal Command and FAA airfields in 11 & 12 Group areas were not switched over to day-fighters.

Tony

1) the effect of this "reorganization" was a catastrophic decline in production of non-fighter aircraft, and the FAA, in particular was to pay a steep price for this, due to a lack of aircraft and slow introduction of new types. Re-organization is often a euphemism for "disorganization", and Beaverbrook certainly achieved the latter.

2) This meant that a squadron could rotate pilots and allowed for leave and illness and prevented a reduction in the squadron's operational strength.

3) The Hurricane is a better plane than it is commonly given credit for. It was better at operating from rough/grass fields and was easier to service and had higher operational availability. It was also cheaper and was built in larger numbers so that it could absorb larger losses through aerial combat or through ground attack.

4) The daylight assault by the Luftwaffe certainly captures the popular imagination but the night attacks and attacks on coastal shipping were also important concerns and no doubt the placement of night and CC squadrons reflected this.

[tcolvin]

I don't look down on details, Kutscha, but I believe the high standard of British staff work ensured consideration of the type of detailed objection you raise, and in so doing would have found alternatives – such as moving by sea.


Please consider this timeline:


Feb 5; Hitler wrote to Mussolini offering the help of an armoured division on condition the Italians did not retreat to Tripoli.
Feb 9; British Army reached El Agheila.
Feb 10; Mussolini accepted Hitler's offer.
Feb 11 am; Rommel arrived in Rome where he was assured the Italians would stand at Sirte.
Feb 11 pm; Rommel arrived in Catania where he received grave news; “Wavell had taken Benghazi, destroyed the last Italian armoured formation south of the town and was about to advance into Tripolitania ... It was not impossible that the next few days would see the arrival of the leading British troops in the outer environs of Tripoli. As the first German division would not be complete in Africa until the middle of April, its help would come too late if the enemy continued his offensive. Something had to be done at once to bring the British offensive to a halt”. (Rommel Papers). That “something” was this cable telling Wavell to abandon Tripoli and go to Greece.
Feb 11 pm; Cable from CIGS to Wavell; “This problem has been heavily discussed by Defence Committee last two days. I put it up. General feeling is that assistance to Greece and/or Turkey must come first apart from strain on Navy and RAF which advance to Tripoli would involve. Official wire will follow tonight”.


And please consider this passage from a letter written by Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for India, to the CIGS on February 1, 1941 (which was never sent);
“ .... the Germans and Italians have probably ruled out a rapid advance on Tripoli as beyond Wavell's powers. They may do so all the more if, as is likely, he finds himself held up in the broken country between Derna and Benghazi [NB, he wasn't]. On the other hand I doubt whether there are any technical difficulties about the advance beyond Benghazi, the first few hundred miles of which are along a motor road most of it close to the sea, and through sheer desert. I doubt whether a rapid advance, even with a comparatively small mechanised force, would meet any serious resistance the greater part of the way, especially if the heavier stuff, infantry, artillery, etc, and stores came along by sea. For Wavell in his particular situation, sea transport should take the place that troop-carrying lorry transport did for the Germans last May; but with this difference - that our troop-carrying vessels cannot only support the mechanised advance, but even, if necessary, go ahead of it for the purpose of outflanking the enemy. Similarly, in our light balloon-tyred armoured fighting vehicles we have something which can move across the desert a good deal faster than the Italians can, and so should be in a position to out-flank them on the land side as well. All this taken together suggests that against a swift rush Wavell will find no serious resistance, or if he does, can envelop and mop it up as he mopped up Bardia and Tobruk.
The biggest danger facing such an advance is if the Germans are given time to establish a powerful air force in Tripoli. But this means not merely flying the aircraft across, but somehow shipping across from Sicily all the cumbrous ground establishments required. No doubt they are thinking of doing this, but they may well be too late if Wavell comes along much faster than they expect......” (John Connell, Wavell, page 322).


Tony

[tcolvin]

DuncanM, can you recommend a study of what Beaverbrook did and what effect he had on aircraft production?
My understanding is he worked on the phone, kept few records, and boasted of real achievements such as sorting out Castle Bromwich by axing bomber production there, sacking Nuffields and hiring Vickers to produce only Spitfires, while Corelli Barnett never understood that world-class productivity was achieved there.

Tony

[DuncanM]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

DuncanM, can you recommend a study of what Beaverbrook did and what effect he had on aircraft production?
My understanding is he worked on the phone, kept few records, and boasted of real achievements such as sorting out Castle Bromwich by axing bomber production there, sacking Nuffields and hiring Vickers to produce only Spitfires, while Corelli Barnett never understood that world-class productivity was achieved there.

Tony

You can start with these online sources, and UK libraries probably have copies of the sources listed but not on-line:
http://funsite.unc.edu/hyperwar/UN/UK/index.html

This is a complex topic and I don't claim to have read all the available sources, but the effect of Beaverbrook on aircraft production is debatable.

Here's some background, but unfortunately not well sourced:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ministe...aft_Production

http://www.battleofbritain1940.net/document-42.html

There are also a number of good sources in
Warfare state: Britain, 1920-1970
By David Edgerton