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  #21  
Old 31st October 2018, 20:22
Bruce Dennis Bruce Dennis is offline
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UNDERGROUND FACTORIES IN GERMANY

"ITEM N° 21,22,31
FILE N° XXXIII-36 SECRET UNDERGROUND FACTORIES IN GERMANY Reported by C.I.O.S. Party 536

(L) HAMMERWERKE FACTORY, near Hausberg Porta Westfalica, Minden
This factory, of the multi-storey type, was constructed in underground quarries on the East side of the Weiser gap south of Minden. The quarries were situated in the Porta Sandstone above the Dachs I Refinery, and had been enlarged by the Gewerkeschaft Porta to house the Phillips Radio Valve factory from Eindhoven, in Holland.
Constructional work is said to have started in March, 1944 and to have been completed in September, 1944. Production started in February, 1945.
Contracts
The following were interrogated-
Herr Goosens, engineer, Dutch, speak English.
Herr Pott, mining engineer, manager of the Gewerkeschaft
Porta.
Herr Haupt, formerly engineer on plant installation now custodian of the factory for the military Government

Geology
The geology of the area has already been described in the
sections dealing with Dachs I and Denkmal Stollen. The Hammerwerke factory nine storeys high was constructed in the Porta sandstone (photograph No. 21) and being south of Dachs I was at a higher level as a result of the dip of this stratum as can be seen in the geological motion attached to this report (Fig. 8A.) The two factories were to have been connected by an internal shaft.
There was no evidence of rock falls in the factory area.

Lining & Support
The workings were for the most part unsupported and the rock surface only whitewashed. At a few points steel joists and timber laggings had been used.

Excavation
The little excavation done on this site was carried out simultaneously with Dachs I and no separate data was available on labour, costs or progress.

Entrance
The main entrance, on the seventh floor, was protected by a blast wall of concrete 1.1 metres thick, and was connected with the main road at Hausberg by funicular railway.

Water Supply
Process water was pumped from the River Weser. Water was available from the town supply.

Sewage Disposal
Sewage was disposed by gravity into the Weser after treatment.

Air Attack
There was no evidence of air attack on this site.
Engineering Services
(a) Heating
The Boiler House was located on the surface at road
adjacent to the entrance of the Porta (Dachs I) factory.
The boiler was of the horizontal type in three sections:-
1. Cornish boiler design with corrugated flue.
2. Section comprising smoke tubes.
3. Smoke box section.
Steam was taken off the middle section, which was also provided with dead weight safety valve, and thence proceeds to
the super heater section located round the crown of the smoke box.
Steam and condense mains were taken through the entrance of the Dachs I factory and thence by means of a sloping tunnel up to the ground floor of the Hammerwerke Factory and to the various steam heater batteries associated with the ventilation plants.
(b) Ventilation
Six separate plenum extract systems were installed all of similar character and dealing with the floors in groups. Each system draws fresh air from, and discharges vitiated air to, the cliff face.
Each inlet system comprised a main inlet fitted with a wire grill leading into a concrete spray chamber thence to an eliminator and finally to the fan chamber. The water sprays were not connected, but it was clear that they were to be supplied with water from the main supply and that this water would be rejected to waste.
Two types of delivery fan were used:–
1. Double inlet type in an enclosed fan chamber following spray and eliminator chamber.
2. Single inlet fan with duct connection to the spray and eliminator chamber.
Each inlet fan discharged into a main delivery duct constructed in building board, at the respective ceiling level, and vertical metal ducts were taken down to floors as required with adjustable discharge openings near each floor level.
Vertical extraction ducts with inlets at high level, as required, were connected to a main extraction duct, also constructed in building board, running adjacent to the corresponding main fresh air delivery duct. The main
extraction duct was connected to the extraction fan chamber and thence to atmosphere. At the time of the inspection all fans were running but heater batteries and water sprays were out of commission. Condensation was evident on the lower floors but the general state of the factory suggests that production heat energy in conjunction with the use of steam heater batteries had resulted in a reasonable air condition.
(c) Electric Power and Lighting
The electric supply was taken from the sub-station at Porta (Dachs I) at 6,000 volts and the high tension cables were brought up through the service tunnel and taken to four transformer stations. The voltage was than transformed from 6,000 volts to 400 volts 3 phase 4 wire, each of these transformers was rated at 800 KVA.
Low tension feeder cable were taken as risers to metal closed cabinets containing main switches, fuses, circuit breakers and relays.
Circuit wiring was taken at high level and in general was supported by a series of galvanised multi-strand steel cables which also served as earthing wire collectors. Each steel cable was thoroughly bonded to the rising watermain.
Drops to machines and table inspection lights were taken from special metal junction boxes with porcelain interiors.
All metal parts and components were earthed on to the galvanised straining cables by means of single strand cables, approximately No. 18 gauge.
An attempt was made by interrogation to gain information regarding the type of earth leakage system installed but the only information offered was that every power unit had a leakage trip and that transformer were earthed at the star point.
The general illumination and local bench lighting were of a high standard for example 4 kilowatts of lighting load has been installed in an inspection bay approximately 25' x 25'.
(d) Fire Protection
Fire hydrants complete with hose reels were provided in metal cabinets fixed to walls and connected to the rising waterman. Portable fire extinguishers were also provided.
(e) Gas Installation
Gas for process work was obtained from the town supply and the installation followed conventional standards for the class of work under consideration.

Production and Layout
This factory consisted of nine floors with layout as shown on the attached print and situated in the same hill as the Oil Refinery, Dachs I, which is the subject of a separate report. This factory was first put into operation in February, 1945 when
it was intended to reinstate the production hitherto obtained from Philips Eindhoven factory, Holland. All plant and equipment even down to the inspection benches and stools were transferred from Eindhoven. This factory was very impressive in so far that there was ample spacing, and lighting was particularly good.
The ultimate production was to have been 12,000 radio valves per day, but it was ascertained that up to the date of ceasing production, some 7,000 serviceable valves only had been issued. This in no way represents the total number of valves actually manufactured since it was made clear by the Production Engineer (Dutch) that the number of defective was considerable and this in the main was due to inclusion of dust at the final assembly stages. It should be appreciated that this dust trouble would not be discernible by casual observation. Nevertheless, the question of dust did not apparently interfere with the manufacture of component parts nor did it affect work carried out in the tool room and maintenance shop. Walls had been whitewashed but not otherwise treated or lined.
The total labour force spread over three shift would have been 1,200/1,400, the vast majority being female, mainly young Jewish girls from concentration camps. Three shifts were arranged via:- two of 6 hours, and one of 8 hours, the break coming between 3.0 am and 7.0 am.
Production arrangements were as follows :-
lst floor - Toolroom and general maintenance shop. This plant was in first class condition, amply spaced and machines were of first class make, including several American tools such as Gorton and Milwaukee Milling machines. This floor also housed the gas production
mixing plant required in production and was distributed to the required stations on the other floors by normal pipe distributing system.
2nd floor - This was essentially devoted to grid rolling and all the requisite plant for this operation had been installed and its condition was good.
3rd floor - Allocated to component assembly. This floor was also used as a main stores for component parts.
4th floor - Mainly for assembly and testing.
5th floor - This was laid out for the drawing of filament wire. and testing, but it was obviously not yet in full production. A side gallery on this floor was occupied by a separate firm, Carsten of Hamburg, who
were apparently responsible for stamping out the mica parts which were subsequently used by Philips in the assembly.
6th floor - Had no defined use at the time of visit, except for a few offices and it was understood to have been used as sleeping quarters.
7th floor - This was the main entrance and exit for the whole factory, and contained a certain amount of plant for preparation of cathodes and filaments.
8th floor - Preparation of cathodes and filaments.
9th floor - This was used for offices and ablution, and had a small exit probably used by staff only.
Access for employees to the respective floors was by stairway, and for goods, a lift 4 x 3 metres and having a capacity of 5,000 kilograms was installed to serve floors 1 to 7.
The only external access provided to this factory from the main road was by means of a funicular railway which terminated at the level of floor 7 and about 200 ft. from the tunnel entrance."

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  #22  
Old 31st October 2018, 20:55
Bruce Dennis Bruce Dennis is offline
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G.A.F. INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR

"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 394/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE
STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM
SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER
FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR
MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

G.A.F. INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR – II.
Sources and Dissemination of Intelligence.
1. This, the second report of the series dealing with G.A.F.
Intelligence during the War, is based mainly on the interrogation of
Hauptmann ZETZSCHE who, during the Period of Major WODARG's office, was
in control of Gruppe A of the department "Foreign Air Forces West" under
Chef Ic.
2. The infuriation set out in this report falls into two main headings
of "Sources" and "Publications". The paragraphs dealing with the German
"Y" Service as a source of intelligence have been purposely reduced to a
minimum, since a series of eight reports covering that subject alone is
to be issued shortly by A.D.I.(K).

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE.
FOREIGN AIR FORCES WEST.
3. The department of Foreign Air Forces West, under Major OWE (see
A.D.I.(K) 393/1945, Appendix IV) and with a staff of about 100, was
responsible for covering Great Britain, the Empire, the U.S.A., France,
Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and the Middle East.
4. The two Gruppen of the department "A" and "B", dealt respectively
with military aspects and political and economic questions. In spite of
the far greater commitments of Gruppe A, departmental strength was
equally distributed between the two Gruppen.
5. The following are the sources upon which Foreign Air Forces West
depended for collation of intelligence.
German "Y" Service.
6. The German Y-Service - Abteilung 3 of General MARTINI's staff –
supplied collated data to Chef Ic. In spite of Generalleutnant SCHMID's
complaints of that department's methods of working (see Part I para.
31), Hauptmann ZETZSCHE stated that this source provided extensive data
for Allied Order of Battle, subordinations and chains of command,
operations, radar developments and ferryings of aircraft from the U.S.A.
7. Four sub-sections of Abteilung 3 covered all aspects of Allied
activities, and issued daily intelligence summaries which were
telephoned or teleprinted to Chef Ic. Ten-day and monthly appreciations
of Allied activity were also issued, the latter containing valuable
Statistics of Allied incursions.
8. One section, Chi-Stelle (codes and cyphers) Referat B covered all
radio and radar intelligence on the western front such as details of
current air operations, including Gee-H and Oboe attacks. The southern
front was similarly covered by Chi-Stelle Referat C, and a sub-section,
Referat C-1, dealt with Allied transport and ferrying traffic, this
latter was of special value to Ic in assessing Allied production and
losses.
9. Radar intelligence from both Western and Southern fronts was
collated by a section known as Funkleitstand. A monthly report was
issued which was of great help to Ic in assessing Allied radar and the
effects of German jamming. A liaison officer was maintained by
Funkleitstand with the P/W Interrogation Centre at Oberursel for the
purpose of clearing up obscure points by interrogation of Allied
aircrew.
10. Another section, the Zentrale Funkaufklärung (ZAF) was set up at
Treuenbrietzen for tactical evaluation of radio and radar data received
in the area of Jagdkorps I. As this section was solely concerned with
tactical considerations, its relations with Chef Ic were not close.
Prisoner of War Interrogation.
11. Excellent results were obtained from the close co-operation with
Auswertestelle West - formerly Dulag Luft; collated reports resulting
from detailed interrogation of Allied aircrew provided valuable matter
for Ic publications as well as for filling in gaps in Order of Battle,
etc., left by the "Y" service, and supplying the Y-Service itself with
working data.
12. The actual methods employed by the Germans in the interrogation of
their prisoners has been set out in detail in A.D.I.(K) 388/1945. It is
perhaps worth recording that Oberst WODARG was frequently caused no
little embarrassment as a result of Generalleutnant SCHMID of Jagdkorps
I being on the distribution list for P/W interrogation reports; SCHMID
usually had his copy first, and WODARG found it disconcerting to have to
tell GOERING things he already knew.

Air Reconnaissance.
13. The G.A.F. strategic reconnaissance effort was limited by lack of
fast aircraft types. During the period leading up to the invasion,
reconnaissance of England by day had been practically nil; at the end of
May 1944 two Me.109's succeeded in carrying out a probing reconnaissance
of the Isle of Wight under cover of cloud and an American four-engined
sortie. The invasion fleet in Southampton was covered only once -
whereupon a night attack by Fliegerkorps IX followed. Beyond a few
isolated daylight efforts, reconnaissance results consisted entirely of
night flash bomb cover - mainly valueless - and visual reconnaissance by
Me.410's.
14. With the introduction of the Ar.234 subsequent to the invasion, the
situation improved steadily. Airfields, harbours, London etc. could then
be effectively covered. Nevertheless there were still too few aircraft
(three names of pilots only were to be read on aerial photographs), and
the enemy picture obtained continued to be only a partial one. This
state of affairs was partly due to the emphasis placed on tactical
reconnaissance, the results of which were of interest only to the Army
and G.A.F. operation commands.
15. Scientific evaluation and appreciation of aerial photographs by Ic
was made difficult through bad organisation, the G.A.F.
Hauptbildabteilung being subordinated to the General der
Aufklärungsflieger.

Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies West) and 3 S.K.L.
16. Ic placed great value on the information on Order of Battle,
subordinations and directions of thrust of Allied ground forces supplied
by Fremde Heere West, which for its own part found the Ic enemy air
situation report extremely useful, in that the Order of Battle of air
ground support units showed a clearer cut and timelier picture of enemy
intentions than the movement of military ground forces.
17. Fr.H.W. issued extremely good appreciations. Alone with Ic/West it
pointed continually to the probability of one sole landing on the
Normandy coast, in opposition to the firm Wehrmachtsführungsstab belief
in the likelihood of a second landing in the Straits of Dover.
18. Intelligence received from 3.S.K.L. the Naval liaison unit, was for
the most part scrappy, owing to the dearth of information regarding the
occupation of Allied harbours and the distribution of the Allied navies,
landing craft and merchant fleets.

Reports from Operational Commands.
19. Ic officers at the front complied only partially with Chef Ic's
requirements, owing to a variety of reasons, such as Chef Ic's lack of
personal influence, the sometimes poor quality of the Ic officers
themselves, and the emphasis placed at the front on the reporting of the
enemy’s actions rather than on knowledge about him, such knowledge being merely designated as enemy propaganda.
20. The main teak of Operational Command Ic's was to teleprint to Ops.
Staff In a current enemy situation report, comprising Order of Battle,
operations, tactics and any special considerations such as possibilities
of air landings, invasion eta. These reports were, however, only
forthcoming at irregular intervals and even then seemingly with an ill
grace. Thus, with the exception of the Luftflotte 3 Ic appreciation
prior to the invasion, Front Ic reports could not be considered as a
regular source of intelligence comparable with Auswertestelle West or
the W/T Listening Service.
21. A further duty was also neglected by Ic's at the front, that of
passing up Staffel reports to Chef Ic and passing down Chef Ic reports
to the Staffeln. Instead, every month each Operational Command
painstakingly produced its own comprehensive report of the air situation
carefully printed and edited and covering enemy incursions, operation.,
Order of Battle strength, subordination., etc., the figures naturally
differing between one Command and another, and from those of Chef Ic who had other sources at his disposal.
22. As for the sources available to Operational Commands, on which the
reports were based, Oberstleutnant OHLETZ, one-time Chief Intelligence
Officer of Luftflotte 6, gave the following as sources available between
January 1941 and March 1943:-
i) The Luftflotte tactical and strategical reconnaissance units.
These were at the disposal of the Ic as and when required.
ii) A signals intercept unit for the Luftflotte 6 area.
iii) The interrogation centre for Russian flying and Flak personnel.
iv) A photographic unit.
v) Evaluation of battle experience of Luftflotte 6 units.
vi) A captured equipment evaluation centre.
vii) Current data from adjacent Luftflotten.
viii) Reports from Ic-Heer, supplied by the Army Group Centre.
ix) Reports from the Military Intelligence Service affecting
Luftflotte 6 area.
23. OHLEZ states that results of a tactical nature were distributed by
him to Luftflotte 6 units. Full details were sent to O.K.L. Ic and Army
Group Centre, and brought to the daily conferences of the Flottenchef
with his Chief of General Staff and officers in charge of operations.
24. It is therefore not difficult to understand why Operational Command
Ic's with such resources at their disposal and in view of their special
operational commitments, should feel themselves independent and to some extent intolerant of control by Chef Ic, and why Chef Ic on his side,
with responsibility for the accurate assessment of the full enemy
situation, and viewing the situation solely from this standpoint, should
maintain that Ic's at the front were overstaffed and negligent of their
true functions.

Evaluation of the Press.
25. Each Intelligence organisation in Germany made its own arrangements
for the procuring and evaluating of foreign newspapers and periodicals.
Chef Ic obtained its papers either through the R.S.H.A. or the G.A.F.
Air Attachés in Bern, Stockholm and, up to 1944, Madrid, Lisbon and
Ankara; Papers were at least four weeks out of date when received owing
to poor R.S.H.A. organisation. American newspapers and periodicals were
received only occasionally and in small numbers. Luftwesen was
responsible for supply within Ic, and thus provided a further cause of
delay.
26. Intelligence was extracted from press reports concerning
personalities (e.g. from "Aeroplane, "Tatler" and "Sphere"), production
figures, photographic material, tactics and economics matters.
Technical Intelligence.
27. Enemy aircraft armament was covered mainly by Chef Technische
Luftrüstung section A/Rü, and Ic could neither guide nor co-ordinate its
work. Generally speaking, A/Rü took upon itself to keep industry and
Operation Commands informed, Ic serving to pass its reports down to unit
level.
28. These reports mare very good and complete, but came much too late
to be really valuable, since TLR-Rü invariably waited until the last
details were known on any subject before issuing a report upon it. For
the same reason Ic only received at long and irregular intervals reports
on Allied aircraft shot down.

Broadcast Monitoring.
29. Of special interest and value were the broadcast links between the
news agencies and their correspondents in the various capitals of the
world. Of broadcasting stations, the B.B.C. and Swiss stations were
considered the most reliable, Daventry in particular being appreciated
for its figures concerning Allied sorties and losses. Indeed, during the
period between the invasion and collapse, BBC reports were often the
only source of reliable information on the war situation.
30. Radio monitoring was done by O.K.W.-Chi, its Naval counterpart the
Seehausdienst, and the Forschungsamt, the results being sorted out and
distributed by Ic/Luftwesen.

Agents.
31. The complete failure of the German Agent Organisation as a source
of reliable information was attributed by ZETZSCHE to the following
causes:-
i) The unsuitability of personnel both at home and abroad.
ii) Lack of agents in high positions.
iii) Many agents inspired by British Intelligence, e.g. Hector,
Josephine probably, and Ostra for certain.
iv) No agents in America.
v) Agents' reports evaluated and issued without reference to Ic,
final judgment on them being passed by Abwehr I/Luft (later
R.S.H.A. Mil.Amt).
vi) The splitting of the Agent organisation between Haupt Amt IV
and Haupt Amt VI of the Mil.Amt, thus giving rise to two
separate organisations abroad.
vii) The final assumption of control by the S.D. causing the whole
organisation to fall to pieces, and the flow of useful reports
to cease altogether.
32. Liaison was maintained with the Militärisches Amt through Oberstleutnant von DEWITZ. From the middle of 1944, however, agents' reports were not passed out to Commands owing to their proved unreliability.

Attaché Reports.
33. Attaché reports came from Amtsgruppe Ausland (Admiral BÖRKNER) of O.K.W. which passed to Ic important reports from military, Naval and
G.A.F. attachés, as well as direct from Air Attachés in neutral
countries, organised by the Ic Attaché Gruppe.
34. For the most part attaché reports consisted of descriptions of
economic conditions and morale abroad, sometimes amounting to no more
than translations of newspaper reports. Little of any value was ever
received concerning England, France or U.S.A. On the other hand attachés
often swallowed whole rumours issued by the Allies for German
consumption, e.g. rumours concerning the imminent invasion of Norway,
the Balkans, etc.
35. Air attaches were not held in very high esteem partly owing to
their being considered poorly chosen for the task and partly owing to
lack of firm direction by Ic (Luftwesen).

Diplomatic Reports.
36. Reports from the Foreign Office and agencies abroad came to Ic both
through Amtsgruppe Ausland of O.K.H. and through the Ic Liaison Officer
with the Foreign Office, Hauptmann EHRENHAUS (Ic/Luftwesen/Pol). They
were of little military value.
37. Intelligence concerning foreign diplomatic exchanges was received
from the Forschungsamt (subordinated directly to GOERING) through
Ic/Luftwesen/Abwehr, and was given a restricted distribution. It
consisted of intercepted Allied radio-telegrams (e.g. London-Stockholm),
ordinary radio reports (e.g. Atlantic Radio) and intercepted traffic
between diplomats and ministers on certain links, Ankara-Moscow (Turks),
Bern-Washington (Americans), London Washington (Poles).
36. The last-mentioned source was of great value before and during the
invasion and after the breaking-off of Turkish-German relations. In
general the Forschungsamt reports contained a great deal of significant
information concerning economic and political matters.

Reports from Repatriated Germans.
39. The Army, Navy, G.A.F. and Gestapo interrogated at will both
military and civilian repatriates. A general lack of direction and coordination resulted. Auswertestelle West, Oberursel, was responsible for
the G.A.F. interrogations and obtained many interesting details on enemy
morale and supply.

FREMDE LUFTWAFFE OST (FOREIGN AIR FORCES EAST).
40. This section, the eastern front counterpart of Fremde Luftwaffe
West, covered the Soviet Union, China, Sweden, Finland and the Balkans.
It was organised into the following subsections:-
i) Aufmarsch.
In this section the Russian Order of Battle was worked out in
the greatest detail. Since the bulk of the Soviet Air
Forces was employed tactically in support of the Armies at the
front, this work was of the utmost scope and importance.
Appreciations of the air situation were issued whenever
necessary, on average every three to five days. Maps showing
the locations of Soviet flying units were issued on the 1st
and 15th of each month.
ii) Training and Organisation.
This section covered Soviet subordinations and chains of
command, the organisation of Soviet flying schools and the
training of pilots.
iii) Archives.
This section was responsible for provision of target data. It
covered Soviet Industry, power plants, oil installations, ball
bearing factories, etc. It issued industrial reports, based
mainly on P/W statements and W/T intercept material supplied
by the Forschungsamt.
iv) Auswertestelle Ost (Evaluation Centre East).
This organisation differed from Auswertestelle West in that it
dealt only with the most important and knowledgeable
prisoners, as for instance the Russian Inspector of Fighters
who landed with his staff by mistake on a German airfield in
1943. Thirty to forty P/W at the most were at Auswertestelle
Ost at any one time. The remainder were dealt with by the
interrogation centres of the individual Luftflotten, which
reported anything of interest daily. Since the Listening
Service provided the complete Soviet Order of Battle, and
knowledge of Soviet tactics was deemed unimportant, P/W were
only kept for what information they might provide concerning
Soviet organisation.
Auswertestelle Ost was located near Karlsbad and was under the
command of Oberstleutnant MOLTERS.

MELDEWESEN.
41. As the receiving and distributing centre for all data concerning
German and Allied operations, Meldewesen constituted an information
bureau highly appreciated by its users, i.e. O.K.W., O.K.L., GOERING,
Operational sub-areas, etc. The limited communications and staff of Ic
were however, insufficient to cope with the stream of enquiries from
HITLER, GOERING, Chief of General Staff and the rest, so that the flying
units were perforce neglected and the very success of this section
tended to have a detrimental effect on the work of Ic as a whole.

LUFTWESEN.
42. This department was an unhappy attempt to co-ordinate a number of
widely differing functions. It comprised the following sub-sections,
some of which have been already referred to:-
L/Abwehr, which was responsible for the maintenance of security
within the G.A.F. and for the security training of the flying units. For
the first task it did not dispose of sufficient personnel, and as
already indicated, Fremde Luftwaffen West and Ost were the only
departments competent to carry out the second. However, from the middle of 1944 an Oberleutnant ROLFES was appointed liaison officer with German P/W camps with the object of exploiting the intelligence possibilities of this source.
L/Pol. Maintained Ic liaison with the Foreign Office. His main
effort was to produce his "Aussenpolitischen Wochenbericht", a weekly
report on the political situation, reflecting Foreign Office views and
mainly emphasising the reasons for an Anglo-American-Soviet Russian
conflict of views.
L/Informationsdienst sorted and distributed radio reports sent in
by O.K.W./Chi.
L/Presse received reports from the Army, Field Propaganda companies
etc. as well as foreign publications.
Liaison with the S.D. was provided by Major MERKWITZ and Hauptmann
BULA.

Attaché Gruppe. Owing to the total lack of accommodation in Berlin,
the close direction of Attachés by Luftwesen was made impossible and
their control virtually ineffective.

INDEPENDENT SPECIALISTS.
43. Ic Wirtschaft. In this section Oberstleutnant SEIDL, with the
assistance of one officer, issued a monthly report on Anglo-American
bombing attacks, comprising details of damage, falling-off of production
etc. and predicting probable future Allied tactics.
Ic/See. This department covered purely Naval matters.
Ic/Bild. Theoretically for the purpose of Ic-liaison with the Main
Photographic Section, this department was rendered superfluous owing to
the practice of subordinate units by-passing Ic and dealing direct with
the Hauptbildabteilung.

PUBLICLTIONS ISSUED BY Ic.
44. The succeeding paragraphs in this report are in the form of a
catalogue of publications issued by Chef Ic. Hauptmann ZETZSCHE's
assessment of the scale of contribution to the subject matter of these
reports by the various sources of intelligence already mentioned will be
found in Appendix I to this report. A diagram prepared by Hauptmann
ZETZSCHE summarising the sources which went to make up Ic's publications
appears in Appendix II.
(a) Maps showing Order of Battle.
Maps of the Western Front (Great Britain and France), Southern
Front (Italy), Mediterranean area and the world as a whole were issued
monthly down to Divisional level and to O.K.W., O.K.L., O.K.H. and
O.K.M. Printing difficulties were responsible for this limiting of
distribution.
(b) Rechenzettel (Allied Strength Estimate).
Issued monthly down to Divisional level and to the Flugmeldedienst.
(c) Truppenfeststellungen.
Covered unit transfers, rearmament and changes of subordination and
command, quoting the source of each item, e.g. Presse, Grönbild
(covername for Listening Service). (Issued every two to three days to
Luftflotte Ic's and the Flugmeldedienst).
(d) Appreciations of the Air Situation.
Teleprinted at three to five-daily intervals to specialist
departments of O.K.W, O.K.H., O.K.M., Luftflotte Ic's and Air
Observation Units, these appreciations covered tactics employed against
special targets, new operational procedures, estimates of Allied
production and losses, ferrying figures, invasion potentialities.
(e) Red Books.
Issued by Gruppe B of Fremde Luftwaffen West, the so-called Red
Books contained data concerning Allied targets and airfields and those
of neutral countries.
(f) Target Data and Photographs.
Also issued by Gruppe B.
(g) Notes on Allied Air Armament.
Figures of Allied production and losses, derived mainly from press
and radio reports were prepared for O.K.L. headquarters units. German
and agent reports of aircraft shot down were disregarded owing to
unreliability. These figures, as well as Ic predictions, proved more
accurate than those issued by TLR/Rü.
(h) Reports on Allied Morale.
Contained notes on morale, supplies, political questions, economy,
etc. derived from P/W statements and extracts from captured letters.
(i) Foreign Comment on the Air War.
Press and radio opinion concerning the German and Allied air
forces, presented in tendencious form to illustrate various themes, such
as, for instance, that the G.A.F. was handmaiden of the German Army.
(j) Ic Kurzmeldungen.
Immediate reports on new aircraft types, new operational
procedures, new commanders and their characteristics, new weapons and
apparatus, etc. Distribution was extremely varied to include all
possible interest parties. Up to the middle of 1944 advance warnings of
Allied attacks, derived from P/W interrogations, captured maps and
target data, were also promulgated in this form. After that date, to
avoid unnecessary delay, they were issued independently at source by

Auswertestelle West.
(k) Stichworte zum Feindeinsatz (Notes on Enemy Operations).
Contained extracts from P/W interrogation reports of special
interest, evaluations of captured documents, press and radio reports
etc. Cartoons from the foreign press added immensely to its popularity.
It was issued every three to five days and distributed to some 60
departments (O.K.L., Commands, Flugmeldedienst Units, Research,
Industry, etc.).
(l) P/W Interrogation Reports.
Demand for these was great largely owing to the political
observations they contained, and until about August 1944 they were
allowed a wide distribution. After this data the original reports were
limited to Commands sod Air Observation Units, the remainder receiving
"Stichworte sum Feindeinsatz" instead.
(m) Blue Books.
Instituted by KIENITZ at the end of 1943, the Blue Books dealt with
subjects of a confidential nature, e.g. American day operations, A1lied
ground support, British navigation, etc. However, in spite of a wealth
of illustration and good printing they proved a failure, being too bulky
to be easily read, apart from the contention in certain high quarters
that they only amounted to Allied propaganda.
(n) Einzelnachrichten des Ic Dienstes (Special Ic Studies).
The first of this series was brought out in the middle of 1943,
nothing of the kind having been attempted before. At first they appeared
weekly on such subjects as "American day and British night operations",
"Experiences of Fliegerkorps IX in the bombing of London", etc. With the
dropping of the Blue Book series round about June 1944, E-N began to
include such restricted subjects as "Allied twin-engined operations',
"American fighter navigation", etc. Difficulties were encountered in its
distribution, which were countered by the printing of 3,000 copies. It
was highly valued by such as managed to get hold of it, and was in
constant demand by the Wehrmacht, industry and research.
(o) Schnellbildsendungen (Rapid Photo Delivery).
This was a system, inaugurated by Ic/See, of delivering negatives to
Commands in order that the latter might run off as many prints as were
required by subordinate units. The system was originally utilised by
Ic/See for distributing Ship types, but Ic applied the idea generally to
the swift distribution of new aircraft types, captured H2X negatives,
and apparatus, aerial photographs of airfields, etc.
The system did not work effectively; for instance, it took longer to
procure both positives and negatives from the Main Photographic Section
than to obtain the required number of prints. Moreover, the shortage of
photographic material at Commands made it difficult for them to do the
necessary printing from the negatives which they received. Finally, the
previous system of delivering normal prints had to be reverted to.

A.D.I.(K) and Walter A. Frank
U.S. Air Interrogation. for:- S.D. Felkin
2nd October 1945 Group Captain.
SECRET. APPENDIX I.
AN ASSESSEMENT BY HAUPTMANN ZETSCHE
OF THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF IC SOURCES
TOWARDS FINAL APPRECIATIONS BY CHEF IC.
A. ORDER OF BATTLE.
W/T Listening Service……………………………………… 70%
P/W Statements )
Captured Material )…………………………………………… 20%
Press ……………………………………………………………………………… 1%
Air Photos ………………………………………………………………… 9%
B. SUBORDINATIONS AND CHAINS OF COMMAND.
W/T Listening Service……………………………………… 50%
P/W Statements )
Captured Material )………………………………………… 5%
Press ……………………………………………………………………………… 45%
C. PERSONALITIES.
Press ……………………………………………………………………………… 90%
P/W Statements )
Captured Material )…………………………………………… 10%
D. OPS. APPRECIATIONS.
P/W Statements ……………………………………………………… 55%
Captured Material ……………………………………………… 20%
W/T Listening Service …………………………………… 20%
Press ……………………………………………………………………………… 5%
E. TECHNICAL APPRECIATIONS.
P/W Statements ……………………………………………………… 30%
Captured Equipment …………………………………………… 50%
Press ……………………………………………………………………………… 20%
F. ESTIMATES OF ENEMY PRODUCTION.
Ferrying and O.B. Data (Mainly W/T
Listening Service) …………………………………………… 35%
Enemy Losses …………………………………………………………… 30%
Radio and Press …………………………………………………… 30%
P/W Statements ……………………………………………………… 4%
Agents' Reports …………………………………………………… 1%
G. ESTIMATES OF ENEMY LOSSES.
P/W Statements ……………………………………………………… 20%
Press and Radio …………………………………………………… 40%
W/T Listening Service ………………………………… 30%
Neutral Reports …………………………………………………… 9%
Agents' Reports …………………………………………………… 1%"

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Radio and radar equipment in the luftwaffe

"A. D. I. (K) Report No. 365/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.
RADIO AND RADAR EQUIPMENT IN THE LUFTWAFFE – V.

I.F.F.
1. This report is the fifth of the series dealing with radio
and radar equipment in the Luftwaffe. As in the case of the
previous four reports (A.D.I.(K) 343, 357, 362 and 363/1945), it
is based on interrogation of General Nachrichtenführer MARTINI,
Director General of G.A.F. Signals, and some members of his
staff, and has been supported by a number of relevant documents
of recent date which were in the possession of the General's
Chief of Staff.
2. For convenience in reading, the report is divided into
three main sections covering the following applications of
I.F.F.
A - Flak.
B - Early Warning Radar.
C - Air-to-Air Recognition.

GERMAN VIEWS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF I.F.F.
3. Before the outbreak of war the practical application of
radar was mainly concentrated upon its use as an aid to Flak,
and the Germans did not realise the importance of an early
warning service until after hostilities had begun. In
consequence the need for the identification of friendly aircraft
picked up by radar sets arose initially mainly in conjunction
with Flak requirements.
4. Owing possibly to the fact that the first solution to the
Flak problem was not as successful as that achieved in
connection with early-warning radar, while at the time great
importance was attached to Flak as a defensive weapon, much
effort was devoted in the first few years to producing a
suitable identification system for that arm.
5. By 1944, the American bomber force was able to bomb Berlin
by daylight in clear weather with insignificant losses by Flak,
despite the application of various radar and optical aids. As a
result, Flak had fallen into disrepute as to defensive weapon.
6. This opinion of the ineffectiveness of Flak was very
pronounced among the members of the Signals Staff of the G.A.F.
and it is hoped to give their reasons for this view in a later
report in this series on Ground Radar. Flak was regarded by them
as an out of date weapon and for this reason as well as on
account of the inherent difficulties of the problem, practically
no effort was made to provide a means of identification of
friendly aircraft for Flak purposes during the later stages of
the war.
7. On the other hand the position of early warning radar was
exactly the reverse and as early warning became vital so the
G.A.F. attached ever greater importance to I.F.F. for early
Warning radars, particularly in connection with bad weather and
night raids involving feints and spoof sorties. It was
considered essential to obtain a clear picture of the tracks of
Allied raiding aircraft and to avoid any confusion with German
fighter aircraft which also flew in group. The latest endeavour
in this field went so far as to provide separate identification
for different G.A.F. night fighter units in order to assist
ground control still further.
8. Increasing attention was also being paid to air-to-air
recognition between German aircraft but this, though considered
desirable, was not thought to be nearly so important as the
essential requirement that friendly aircraft should be
recognisable to the early warning service In order that a true
picture of the progress of Allied bomber attacks could be
obtained and fighter aircraft vectored to the attack by ground
control.

A – I.F.F. FOR FLAK
9. At the beginning of 1939 it was intended to equip all
Flak sites with a radar fire control apparatus then being
developed by the firm of Lorenz. The Lorenz apparatus proved
unsatisfactory and in the course of 1939 the Würzburg, produced
by Telefunken, was adopted for Flak fire control.
10. The need for the recognition of friendly aircraft for Flak
purposes had been apparent to the Germans and an I.F.F. set for
use with the Würzburg was produced, and was available at the
outbreak of war. It was known as the Zwilling and was given the
designation FuGe 25.
11. The 50 cm. Würzburg transmission received by the FuGe 25
caused the FuGe 25 transmitter to broadcast an audible morse
signal on the same frequency, which could then be heard by the
Würzburg operator in his headphones. As this was not a retransmission
of the Würzburg radar pulses, it gave no indication
of range and might equally well have originated from an aircraft
in the vicinity beamed by some other Würzburg. General MARTINI
was fully aware at this stage that the FuGe 25 was no real
solution to the identification problem.
12. Meanwhile, the firm of Gema had produced the Freya for
the Navy, and in October 1939 eight of these had been taken over
by the G.A.F. and were stationed on the East end North Frisian
Islands, where they proved their value la combatting early
British bombing attacks directed against the North Sea ports.
13. In November 1939 Gema demonstrated an I.F.F. set for use
with Freya which proved to be forerunner of the FuGe 25A
Erstling. General MARTINI recognised immediately that this Freya
I.F.F. which operated on the principle of returning the Freya
pulses and which provided range measurement, was a far superior
solution and he endeavoured to use his authority to have the new
principle universally adopted for Flak.
14. At that time many different departments were involved and
partly on this account and partly because FuGe 25 Zwilling was
sponsored by the Technisches Amt, MARTINI failed to gain his
point. (see also A.D.I.(K) 334/1945),paras. 95-96). It was only
with great difficulty that he was able to persuade the R.L.M. in
early 1940 that an order for 3,000 FuGe 25A for Freyas should
be placed and even then considerable delay occurred before they
were supplied.
15. During 1940 and 1941 the shortcomings of the Zwilling
gradually became apparent, particularly in connection with night
fighter operations, but by the time the advantages of the
FuGe 25A Erstling had been recognised and the set had been
finally adopted, over 10,000 Zwilling sets had already been
manufactured.
16. The original Freya used a wavelength of 2.40 metres to
which the FuGe 25A Erstling responded on 1.90 metres. To permit
of the universal application of the FuGe 25A a small transmitter
called the Kuh had to be built into other types of early warning
radar in order to interrogate the airborne set. The response was
picked up by the Gemse receiver unit. In this manner a simple
pair of wavelengths were, in effect, set aside for aircraft
I.F.F. purposes.
17. In spite of these achievements the Flak problem had not
been completely solved, as it was not possible to produce a
sufficiently beamed transmission on 2.40 metres to be certain
that a response seen on the recognition tube was that of the
aircraft in the Würzburg beam. Various expedients were tried out
but as mentioned above, the problem still remained unsolved up
to the end of the war and was finally abandoned.

FUGE 25 - ZWILLING.
18. The FuGe 25 Zwilling (= twin) received the Würzburg pulses
on a 50 cm. carrier wave and re-transmitted a morse recognition
signal on the same frequency, but as it did not re-transmit the
pulses received, no range could be obtained by the ground set.
The shortcomings of this system were recognised in 1941 end a
series of attempts was made to overcome them by using responder
technique as detailed below.

HÄUPTLING.
19. In order that the Flak Würzburgs should get a range with
their recognition signal, the FuGe 25 Zwilling was converted so
that the pulses received on 50 cm. were re-transmitted on the
FuGe 25a wavelength of 1.90 m. This conversion was complete by
the autumn of 1942. The new set was called Häuptling. About this
time, however, Allied jamming of Würzburgs commenced and the
Germans were forced to produce Würzburgs on various wavelengths
known as Insel A 53.0-54.2 cm. and Insel B 56.7-58.0 cm. As a
result, the FuGe 25 no longer responded to all Würzburgs and so
the Häuptling did not fulfil its task.

KUCKUCK.
20. When Würzburgs on various frequencies were introduced, the
basic FuGe 25 set was finally given up and the FuGe 25A Erstling
became the standard airborne set.
21. All Würzburg radars were provided with a Kuh type
transmitter on 2.40 m. called the Kuckuck, the aerials for which
were placed in the Würzburg paraboloid. The resultant polar
diagram was extremely wide-angled as compared with the Würzburg
beam and a response at the same range as that of the aircraft
held in the beam was not positive proof of identity if many
aircraft were about.
22. In addition the 2.40 metre transmission spilled over and
could be picked up at distances of as much as 10/15 km. behind
the Würzburg set, so that even aircraft behind the Würzburg were
triggered off. As Flak was only interested in aircraft within
firing range of the Würzburg, this procedure was at its weakest
with the very type of recognition for which it had been
expressly designed, and in consequence Kuckuck was finally
condemned as a failure in 1943.

WOBBELBIENE.
23. With the failure of Kuckuck the Germans decided that the
only solution to the Flak problem was to apply British I.F.F.
technic. The FuGe 225, known as Wobbelbiene, which was designed
to sweep through (Wobbeln) the 50 cm. to 60 cm. band and act as
responder (Biene), was developed for this purpose and was to
have been introduced in the winter of 1943/1944. This, however,
still did not cover the new Würzburg Insel C of 62.3 - 63.8 cm.,
which was being introduced in 1944.
24. Further modifications to Wobbelbiene were considered in
order to cover this waveband but many difficulties, both
mechanical and electrical, had been encountered with the design
despite the fact that the set was said to be a direct copy of
British R.F.3090.
25. The project was ultimately given up before being used
operationally and up to the end of the war no satisfactory
solution to the Flak problem had been found.

B - I.F.F. FOR EARLY-WARNING RADAR.
26. The Kuh and Gemse arrangement in conjunction with the
FuGe 25A whereby two wavelengths, 2.40 m. for interrogation and
1.90 for response, had been set aside for I.F.F., worked
satisfactorily for early-warning radars. MARTINI's staff
considered that this system was superior to the then current
British principle of an I.F.F. set sweeping through the various
early-warning wave bands and responding only intermittently to a
particular frequency.
27. When Allied jamming became serious, it was fully realised
that the use of one special wavelength for recognition purposes,
rendered recognition very vulnerable to Allied countermeasures
although it was considered difficult from a technical point of
view to carry out effective jamming.
28. To anticipate this eventuality, a tactical requirement was
formulated in 1943/1944 calling for a FuGe 25A working on a new
frequency and the Erstling-Grün was designed and manufactured,
but never put into use as the Allies did not employ the expected
counter-measures.
29. With the advent, during the course of 1944, of automatic
sweeping ground radar with a P.P.I. presentation like
Jagdschloss, a new problem for I.F.F. arose. So long as the
recognition signal emitted by the aircraft in responding was a
morse letter there was no guarantee that it would come up
effectively as the beam swept over the target aircraft.
30. The Germans' first solution of this problem, was the
Erstling-Rot, a form of FuGe 25A, which responded with the morse
identifications separated by a six-second dash, thereby ensuring
that response was sufficiently continuous for the ground set to
sweep the aircraft at least once whilst the airborne set was
transmitting the long dash.
31. In 1944 Allied radio countermeasures became more intense
and it was realised by the Germans that the general principle
applied in all their anti-jamming countermeasures must also hold
for I.F.F. This principle was to have a number of alternative
frequencies available for every type of set and a new tactical
requirement embodying this facility was, therefore, formulated.
32. It was decided that the new I.F.F. set must also give
continuous presentation of the recognition response so that
ground controllers could immediately identify friendly aircraft.
At the same time this would solve the identification problem for
panoramic ground equipment of the Jagdschloss type.
33. This requirement led to the development of the Neuling
which, however, had not been used operationally up to the end of
the war. It appears to have been a set with a number of novel
features which are discussed below at some length.
34. In complete contradiction of the principles used in all
earlier sets, the problem of I.F.F. for centimetre radar was to
be solved by using the searching beam to trigger off the I.F.F.
set. A small unit called the Frischling was to convert the
centimetre wavelength to a frequency which would be accepted by
the standard Erstling receiver.

FuGe 25A – ERSTLING.
35. The FuGe 25A is the well known set which has been installed
in every German aircraft since about the beginning of 1942 and
which had also been used for Egon control(see A.D.I.(K)
357/1945). It was often referred to as the Erstling.
36. It was a responding transmitter receiving on 2.40 m.(the
original Freya frequency) and re-transmitting the pulses
received on 1.90 metre. A morse signal repeated roughly every
two seconds was superimposed on the re-transmission, six
alternative codes being available. It was claimed that an
advantage of using a morse letter as recognition was that it
could easily be read by ear through the operator's headphones
and that this was easier than following the recognition C.R.
tube by eye.

ERSTLING-ROT.
37. In the early part of 1945 the G.A.F. began to introduce a
form of FuGe 25A known as the Erstling-Rot. It was designed to
deal with recognition difficulties occurring with ground radar
of the automatic sweeping type such as Jagdschloss.
38. The Erstling-Rot separated the morse signals by a dash of
six seconds duration - a period sufficient to ensure that the
ground radar swept the target. It embodied an improvement in
that it permitted of 18 different morse recognition signals
being superimposed on the re-transmission instead of only six as
in the case of the original Erstling.
39. Originally it was to have a more powerful transmitter but
this requirement was allowed to lapse when it was realised that
the factors limiting range were the sensitivity of the FuGe 25A
receiver or the power of the ground interrogator. A project for
a more powerful ground interrogator called the Gross Kuh was
considered, but as the ranges obtained with the normal Kuh were
thought to be adequate this idea was abandoned.

ERSTLING GRÜN
40. The G.A.F. signals staff realised that the use of a single
frequency for recognition purposes exposed them to the danger of
Allied R.C.M. In view of this a version of the FuGe 25A
operating on a new frequency was produced which was known as the
Erstling-Grün. The wavelengths used were to be 2.52 metres for
interrogation and about 2.00 metres for the response.
41. The small shift in wavelength was dictated by the need to
avoid new ground equipment. With the relatively small frequency
change the Kuh and Gemse were capable of being adjusted to the
new frequencies by the field "S. und I" (maintenance and repair)
teams, and so an economy was effected.
42. Erstling-Grün was never used operationally as Allied
jamming of the original Erstling frequency was never
experienced.

NEULING.
43. The FuGe 226, usually referred to as the Neuling, was to
have been available for installation in operational aircraft by
December 1944, but owing to difficulties encountered during the
trials carried out at Rechlin it was not yet ready at the time
of the capitulation. Lorenz were responsible for its production
and Dr. KRAMAR of that firm was considered the expert on its
technical aspects.
44. The Neuling, which was considered to be a good solution to
the identification problem, was designed to overcome previous
difficulties and to provide new facilities. The tactical
requirement originally called for were:-
(a) Continuous presentation of I.F.F. signals on all types
of early-warning radar including panoramic radars
such as Jagdschloss.
(b) Twelve alternative pairs of frequencies for I.F.F.
(later reduced to six pairs) - each pair to consist
of an interrogating and response frequency.
(c) Air to air recognition between German aircraft.
45. This ambitious programme was not fulfilled when the
FuGe 226 was tried out in the later part of 1944 at Rechlin, but
the experts who carried out the trials believed that the main
requirements could be met by sacrificing half the pairs of
frequencies, thereby limiting the set to six frequency pairs.
46. To meet requirement (a) and provide continuous presentation
of the recognition signal on the ground radar, and at the same
time permit the simultaneous use of a number of different
frequencies, the responder and transmitter were to sweep very
rapidly through the selected band which was believed to be 125 -
167 mc/s.
47. The receiver and transmitter sweeps were synchronised a few
megacycles apart, so that the response was always on a slightly
different frequency to that of the interrogation. This sweep was
to be carried out sufficiently rapidly for the blip on the
recognition tube of a ground set interrogating on one of the
frequencies to appear continuous to the eye of the operator.
48. Presumably, even allowing for after-glow effects, the
frequency of sweep must have been extremely high. It was not
known exactly what repetition rate was used, nor what technical
method was employed to obtain such a high rate of sweep through
the band.
49. Great importance was attached to requirement (a) as it
allowed ground controllers to obtain continuous recognition on
Jagdschloss type P.P.I. tubes and so distinguish between
friendlies and hostiles. It also greatly assisted the control of
friendly fighters by Freya stations.
50. The requirement (a) for continuous presentation of the
recognition signal appeared to have precedence over the
requirement (b) for twelve alternative pairs of frequencies
since in order to meet (a) Rechlin decided that the number of
channels available would have to be cut from twelve to six
pairs. It was found by Rechlin that squeezing twelve separate
frequencies for response (which could not overlap with
interrogation frequencies) into the swept band caused the band
width of the individual responder frequencies to be so narrow
that the recognition blip became too thin and indistinct on the
ground radar recognition tube.
51. It was hoped that requirement (b) - the provision of
alternative frequencies - would prove a safeguard against
possible Allied R.C.M. It was also believed that it would aid in
mitigating clutter on the recognition tubes of Freya etc., since
interrogation would be spread over a number of frequencies.
Wandering blips resulting from neighbouring ground radars which
triggered off other aircraft obscured the tube and caused this
clutter.
52. Efforts had also been made to overcome this trouble by
building an arrangement into ground radars which prevented
interrogation being carried out continuously as was often the
undesirable habit of operators. By means of this arrangement
power was cut off from the Kuh aerials about a minute after the
interrogation switch had been depressed and this device also
prevented interrogation until a further short period had
elapsed.
53. Requirement (c) was only third in importance. The air to
air I.P.F. facility, however, entailed a disadvantage which was
regarded as a serious one, namely that when being used for that
purpose the Neuling was no longer capable of responding to
interrogating by other radar apparatus on the ground.
54. The tactical application of the Neuling must be considered
in relation to the defence problems which the Allied bomber
forces set Germany in 1944. The Germans regarded it as essential
for the defence and more particularly for night defence that
they should be able to obtain an absolutely clear picture of the
air situation and identify Allied bomber streams unequivocally
and at a glance. The P.P.I. presentation of ground radar like
Jagdschloss and Forsthaus was beginning to be appreciated and
attempts were being made to control directly from these
panoramic displays.
55. It will be remembered too that German night fighter Gruppen
operating under the Verbandsflug system flew together in loose
groups or patrolled in the area of a selected beacon. It was,
therefor, considered essential that these aircraft should be
immediately identified as friendly on the P.P.I. tube and not
confused with a bomber stream. It was also held to be of great
value to ground controllers to have a means available for
identifying one Gruppe from another with equal immediacy.
56. To attain these requirement one of the six interrogating
frequencies available was allotted to early-warning radar and
the remaining five were to be given to different night fighter
Gruppen or Geschwader. The Neuling in each aircraft was then so
switched that it could receive and respond to two of the six
Neuling frequency pairs, viz. the early-warning frequency and
the frequency allotted to the Gruppe to which the aircraft
belonged.
57. For Jagdschloss panoramic ground equipment a complete
continuous identification picture divided into friendlies and
hostiles could be obtained by interrogating on the earlywarning
frequency.
58. By simply training a knob the transmitter and receiver
could be switched to the frequency pair of a particular
operational Gruppe and this presented no technical difficulty
with Breitband aerials. Aircraft of that Gruppe could then be
identified immediately in the over-all picture on the P.P.I.
tube. This facility was considered a great advance both from
the point of view of I.F.F. and of ease of ground control of
night fighters.
59. P/W who claimed to have seen a ground P.P.I. display
during the Neuling trials stated that the recognition blip came
up on the tube as an extension of the reflected blip at
slightly greater range and that it subtended a greater angle in
the display. He described it as a "sausage rather longer than
the aircraft blip and sitting on it".
60. Reference has been found in a document to a Neuling
covering the band 1,000-1,500 mc/s. The P/W who was responsible
for the formulation of radar requirements stated that he had
never heard of a Neuling on this frequency, but suggested that
it might be for use in responding directly to the beam of 25
cm. ground radars such as Forsthaus F. This suggestion appears
unlikely, however, as it seems to involve a departure from the
Neuling principle.

FRISCHLING.
61. In view of the introduction of highly beamed 9 cm. ground
radar such as Forsthaus Z and Jagdschloss Z, it had been decided
to depart from the principle of using a separate interrogation
frequency and to employ the search beam to trigger off I.F.F.
For this purpose a special attachment to the airborne Erstling
called Frischling had been planned. This was a receiver on 9 cm.
which converted the frequency to that of the Erstling so that it
responded on 1.90 metres.
62. With the planned introduction of the Neuling, consideration
was given to a modification of the Neuling whereby a Frischling
attachment would be built in for the purpose of converting the
frequency and so trigger off the Neuling in the same manner. P/W
was not clear whether this would only apply to one frequency of
the Neuling, nor did he know what technical method would be used
to accomplish it.
63. Frischling was to be produced by Telefunken but was still
in course of development when the ear came to an end.

AIR-TO-AIR I.F.F.
64. For some reason as yet unexplained, the German interest in
air-to-air recognition only became great enough for suitable
equipment to be designed during the last stages of the war.
During the year preceding the termination of hostilities,
captured night fighter crews consistently maintained that
some improved form of I.F.F. which would allow recognition
of friendly aircraft was expected but no attempt appears to
have been made to adapt the FuGe 25A for this purpose.
65. The present P/W assert that so long as I.F.F. and airto-
air search operated on metric wavelengths and could not
be sharply beamed, the problem of air-to-air recognition
could only be half solved, as a range identification only
was obtained. It was realised that with a dense bomber
stream there would be so many aircraft comparatively near
to the fighter that recognition by range only was not very
valuable. Nevertheless the Neuling FuGe 226, which was
shortly to be introduced, was to have provided air-to-air
I.F.F. facilities.
66. In the beginning of 1945 the Germans tackled this
problem for centimetric search gear and proposed to depart
from their original principle of separating search and I.F.F.
interrogation. The search beam of centimetre equipment was to
be received by the Frischling attachment to the airborne
I.F.F. set and the centimetre frequency so converted that the
I.F.F. net was triggered off.

NEULING.
67. In the Neuling, which has been described above in
detail, it was planned to provide air-to-air I.F.F.
facilities by the use of a special switch which, when
depressed, reversed the roles of the receiver and responding
transmitter. The interrogating aircraft could then trigger
off the I.F.F. set of neighbouring aircraft and receive its
response on the receiver portion of the Neuling.
68. The response was to be fed through to the SN 2 or other
set in use and the presentation of this recognition signal
was to take the same form as in the Freya, i.e. a second
time base carrying the I.F.F. signal was to appear to one
side of the main time base.
69. During this operation no I.F.F. response could be made
to interrogating ground stations, and this caused some
apprehension. To discourage excessive use of air-to-air
interrogation, the switch in the aircraft was to be awkwardly
placed and inconvenient to operate – a typically German solution
to a problem of aircrew training.

FRISCHLING.
70. The night fighter search apparatus – the Berlin N.1.A.
and the Bremen 0 on 9 cm, and later probably the München on
3 cm were to go into service some time in 1945 as will be
discussed in a future report in this series.
71. To provide air-to-air I.F.F. facilities the
Frischling, mentioned in paras. 61-63 above, was to be
attached to the FuGe 25A and later built into the Neuling
as a modification. It was to convert the centimetric beam
transmission of air-to-air search apparatus to the
frequency of the Erstling FuGe 25A so that the latter was
triggered off directly by the searching beam.

FALTER WITH GÄNSEBRUST.
72. As early as 1940, experiments had been made with infrared
homing on to aircraft exhausts using an infra-red
telescope of the Bildwandler type called Spanner. This met
with only limited success on account of restricted range and
the dependency of infrared on clear weather conditions but the
idea was never completely dropped.
73. With the introduction of night fighter commentary and the
Verbandsflug tactics in 1944, it was required that night fighter
units should fly in groups and keep as close together as
possible.
74. It was, therefore, proposed to introduce an aid in the
shape of some form of infra-red navigation lights to be viewed
through an infra-red telescope. The latter, which was a form of
Spanner, was named Falter. As, however, the field of view of
this telescope was confined to about 15° it soon transpired
during trials at Werneuchen that it was not a practical
proposition.
75. In 1944 the idea of using infra-red for recognition
which had long lain dormant was once more evoked by the
discovery that British bombers were carrying en infra-red
recognition light. It was, therefore, proposed that German
night fighters should home on to the infra-red lights by means
of the Falter.
76. For mutual recognition between night fighters an infrared
lamp termed "Gänsebrust" was also planned. It was hoped that
Gänsebrust might not only allow recognition between German
aircraft but possibly afford some protection from British night
fighters which might become uncertain in their recognition of a
German night fighter if the Gänsebrust was flashed intermittently
even though the British code in use for the night were
not known.
A.D.I.(K)and S.D. Felkin
U.S. Air Interrogation. Group Captain
2nd August 1945"
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THE BERLIN GERÄT

"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 188/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

THE BERLIN GERÄT.
1. A recent German Army prisoner, a doctor of Physics of
Vienna University, had worked for fifteen months up to 23rd
October 1944 in the High frequency research laboratory of the
G.E.M.A. G.m.b.H. at Berlin and latterly at Wahlstatt, near
Liegnitz. During that period one of his tasks had been to
determine the characteristics of the transmission lobe from
the aerials of the Berlin Gerät.
2. The Berlin Gerät is a German development of the British
H2S, on a wavelength of 9.1 cm., but employs a totally
different aerial system developed by Siemens. Whilst P/W's
description of the apparatus given in the following
paragraphs, is considered to be reliable, he had no knowledge
of its eventual operational use.
3. Acknowledgements are due to A.D.I.(Science) for their
collaboration in the interrogation.

AERIAL SYSTEM
4. The sketch in the Appendix to this report gives an
impression of the Berlin aerial unit.
5. The four rods forming the aerial array are composed of a
plastic called Trollitul and are of circular cross-section
about 4 to 5 cm. in diameter at their base, tapering somewhat
to a rounded end. The rods lie parallel to the plane of a
circular metal plate of about 1 metre diameter, and about 15
cm, clear of it.
6. The energy to be radiated is led to the aerial rods by a
concentric feeder which forks into too branches where it
enters the metal plate and again fork; making 4 branches to
feed the four aerials. At each of the forks the concentric
feeder widens into a funnel shape called a transformer piece,
the sloping side of which is a half wavelength long, that is,
4,5 cm.
7. A Trollitul dome some 40 cm in depth covers the aerial
array and fits, flush to the edge of the circular metal plate.
8. The whole unit including the aerials can be made to
rotate. This prisoner had never seen the apparatus fitted
either to an aircraft or a ship and he did not know the speed
of rotation; he has an idea however, that the axis of rotation
was at an angle to the geometrical axis of the cylindrical
disc, so that in an aircraft the transmission beam would be
thrown slightly downwards or in a ship, upwards.

TRANSMISSION LOBE
9. The Berlin Gerät has a half-value lobe 10° in width in the
plane of the four aerial rods and 35° to 37° in width at
right-angles to the plane. The lobe was measured by the normal
method; the aerial unit, however, was not resting on a metal
surface as it would have done if built into an aircraft. Under
these conditions the lobe was symmetrical about the axis of
the Aerial array. P/W presumed that if the aerial system were
built under the fuselage of an aircraft shadow effects would
cause the lobe to be asymmetrical or to be deflected.
10. The experiments which P/W had conducted were in the open
air; he had found that when rain covered the Trollitul dome
with a layer of moisture, no transmissions could be detected,
even at a range of 20 metres, along the line of the axis of
the aerial rods. He thought that in these circumstances the
whole lobe was strongly deflected.

PRESENTATION.
11. This P/W had read the regular reports of the "Rotterdam
Sitzungen" - a special committee on centimetre radar - and one
of these reports contained a description of the Berlin
presentation, including photographs taken in an aircraft
flying over Kiel Bay.
12. From this report he could remember that the presentation
was on a circular screen; coast-lines of the mainland and of
islands showed as white ribbon-like stripes and towns appeared
as white areas, whilst individual ships in Kiel bay could be
seen as small elongated white blobs.
13. He had the impression that distant towns, although
slightly distorted in the picture, still retained their
approximate shape. He thought that in the photographs of the
presentation an area of about 60 km. in diameter was
represented; he did not know, however, at what height the
aircraft had flown.

RECEIVER MAGNETRON.
14. It was stated by P/W that a weak point of the Berlin
apparatus was the receiver valve, which frequently broke down.
This valve was a magnetron contained in a glass envelope, with
a solid metal anode in which four or six holes had been
drilled. An impression of the valve, which P/W believed was
called the MD2, appears in the sketch in Appendix I.

USES OF BERLIN GERÄT.
15. Apart from its use in giving a panorama of the ground
over which an aircraft was flying, P/W knew of no other air
uses of the apparatus. He understood, however, that the device
was to be installed in U-boats as an aircraft warning device.

A.D.I.(K) and
U.S. Air Interrogation. S.D. FELKIN
24 February 1945. Wing Commander"

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LUFTWAFFE ELECTRIC ALTIMETERS

"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 362/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.
RADIO AND RADAR EQUIPMENT IN THE LUFTWAFFE – III.

ELECTRIC ALTIMETERS
1. This report in the third of the series dealing with radio
and radar equipment in the Luftwaffe. As in the case of the
previous two reports (A.D.I.(K) 343 and 357/1945), it is based
on interrogation of General Nachrichtenführer MARTINI,
Director General of G.A.F. Signals, and a few important
members of his staff, and has been supported by a number of
relevant documents of recent date which were in the possession
of the General’s Chief of Staff.
2. The development of electric altimeters was probably the
only field of G.A.F. airborne radar technique in which the
Germans approached Allied standards. The FuGe 101 had long
been standard equipment and was an entirely satisfactory
instrument apart from the fact that height readings were
limited to a maximum of 750 meters.
3. Efforts were being made to produce improved and, in
particular, more compact electric altimeters which would give
readings up to great heights, and it was hoped that the FuGe
104, described below, would meet all current requirements.

FuGe 101A.
4. This standard sensitive altimeter which had a range scale
of 0 – 150 meters or 0 – 750 meter, is already familiar. By
the end of the war it was only built into aircraft flying by
night and seems to have been used for checking heights in the
approach.

FuGe 102.
5. The FuGe 102 was an improved electric altimeter giving
height readings ranging from 100 to 15,000 meters. It was
developed at Oberpfaffenhofen in 1942. Presentation was in the
form of a circular trace on a C.R. tube with the zero mark in
the 12 o'clock position.
6. As the aircraft climbed, a break in the continuous trace
occurred extending in a clockwise direction from the zero
position, and this gave the height measurement. The end of the
gap was not clear cut and in consequence accuracy was poor.
The presentation unit was considered too bulky as it occupied
too much space in the Ju.88 and similar twin-engined aircraft.
Only a few were produced and used operationally, chiefly in
the F.W.200’s and He.177’s.

FuGe 103.
7. One P/W, who had made test flights at Werneuchen in the
spring of 1943 with the purpose of testing the FuGe 103, which
was known under the code name "Jena", considered it a most
successful and reliable instrument. It was designed and
developed by Zeiss for use in the He.177 and was tested under
the supervision of Stabs.Ing. Dr. KNOSKE. P/W understood that
it was part of the standard equipment of the series-produced
Ju.188’s.
8. The indicator dial of the instrument was calibrated from
0 – 4,000 meters in a clockwise direction. Height was
indicated by a fine blip about 1 cm long which appeared on the
circumference of the tube, the forward blip being taken for
the reading. The sharpness of the tip was such that height
could be read to within 25 metres, although the tube was only
calibrated to 50 metre intervals.
9. Heights over 4,000 and 8,000 metres were read on the
second and third evolution of the blip, but no "hour-hand" was
incorporated, so that the pilot could only distinguish between
say 5,000, 9,000 or 13,000 metres by using his common sens.
10. The FuGe 103 indicator unit, although only 10 - 12 cm in
diameter and about 35 cm long, was still too bulky and was
never used operationally on a large scale.
FuGe 104.
11. The FuGe 104 was a scaled-down model of the FuGe 103 and
went by the same code name "Jena" and had an identical type of
display. It was to supersede the FuGe 102 in all aircraft
equipped with the latter, as its accuracy and presentation
were as good as the FuGe 103 and better than the FuGe 102, and
it had the advantage of being smaller than either of them. It
was hoped that it could be the final type of altimeter.
12. In the Signals Equipment Emergency Program reproduced as
Appendix II to A.D.I. (K) 343 and 357/1945 it will be seen
that under the heading of "234, bombers" both the FuGe 102 and
the FuGe 104 are shown. P/W thought that in the table there
should either have been an arrow connecting these two sets to
indicate that the FuGe 104 was to replace the FuGe 102, or
alternatively that 102 was a misprint for FuGe 101A.

A.D.I.(K)and S.D. Felkin
U.S. Air Interrogation. Group Captain
27 July 1945
Distribution:- same as for report 357/1945"
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EQUIPMENT OF A Y-SITE

"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 527B/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

EQUIPMENT OF A Y-SITE.
1. The operational procedure in the control of fighters by
the "Y" procedure was described in A.D.I.(K) 525/1944. The
interrogation of the two G.A.F. signals officers, who supplied
the information for that report, has produced a large amount
of information on Y-site and airborne equipment which is of
rather more limited interest. The present report, which
contains that information, is therefore being given a limited
circulation.
2. Captured documents on the "Y" procedure have helped to add
further information, and have provided a further basis for
interrogation; these documents have been forwarded to
A.I.4.(b).

TRANSMITTER HUT.
3. Four types of "Y" ground transmitter are believed to be in
use. Y-Stations in Germany are said to be equipped with a
four-stage transmitter known as Berta I or Berta II, with an
output of 80/100 watts and a range of 400/500 kilometres, when
controlling aircraft at heights of 5,000/7,000 metres.
4. Another transmitter used in Germany is the S16B (Sender 16
Boden), which is a modification of the FuGe 16, and which has
a maximum range of 250 km. when used in conjunction with a
Rechlin range-measuring unit, or a range of 250/350 km. when
used with the more accurate Siemens range-measuring unit.
5. Y-Stations installed in France employed a Sadir 80/100
watt transmitter, usually also in conjunction with a Siemens
range-measuring unit; the ranges achieved by this combination
were of the order of 400/500 kilometres for aircraft operating
at heights of 5,000/7,000 metres.
6. The transmitter S16B (Sketch I) is operated in the
following sequence of steps:-
(i) Main switch (1) first to stop Hzg (Heizung = heating)
then after two minutes to stop "Ein" (on). Lamps
(2) and (3) light up.
(ii) Select frequency to be used. Switch (4). Frequency
indicated in Window (5).
(iii) Switch (6) to stop Test.
(iv) Knob (7) (blip intensity) turned until vertical line
appears on Cathode Ray tube (8).
(v) Definition of line re-adjusted by means of Knob (9).
(vi) In the meantime operator of range-measuring unit has
switched on "Geber" for production of "Messton"
(Modulation tone).
(vii) Knob (10) turned to right until the luminous area
produced in (3) corresponds to 80% modulation.
(viii) Transmitter now ready tuned for transmission to
commence. Switch (6) to right (Load).
(ix) Transmission is automatic when the switch for the
modulation note is depressed by the operator of
the range-measuring unit; or for R/T instruction
when key for R/T circuit is depressed by the
plotter.
7. When taking over a "Y" controlled aircraft from one
station to the next, the following procedure for tuning the
receiver and transmitter is carried out by the station taking
over when using a S16B transmitter.
8. As a first step the receiver of the range-measuring unit
is set to the transmitter frequency given for the aircraft.
The range measurer then tunes his receiver to maximum audible
strength of the modulation tone received ("Hörmaximum").
9. The 80% modulation image on Cathode ray tube (8) then
shows an additional bright vertical line within the area of
the image. By turning frequency stop (4) this vertical line is
displaced to the right.
10. The operator of the transmitter turns the frequency stop
(4) until the line reaches a limiting position, and on further
movement of stop (4) tends to re-trace its path to move again
to the left. This turning point ("Umkehrpunkt") corresponds to
the accurate setting of frequency stop (4), and provides a
visual method of tuning the transmitter accurately to the
receiver frequency of the "Y" aircraft.

D/F'ING CABIN.
11. The D/F'ing cabin consists of an octagonal wooden hut
erected on the platform of the receiver pylon; the latter are
of wooden construction and according to P/W, are either 15 m.
or 25 m. heigh, depending on the location of the site.
12. The present P/W were acquainted with two types of D/F
equipment, known respectively as "Heinrich I" and "Heinrich
III". The latter equipment is of recent origin, and was only
introduced to Y-Stations in France early in 1944.
"Heinrich I" D/F Equipment.
13. The aerial array of this equipment, illustrated in Sketch
II, consists of four quarter-wave vertical dipoles arranged in
pairs at the corners of one side of a horizontal frame about
four metres long. In each pair one dipole is mounted above and
one below the frame. Two half-wave reflectors are mounted on
the opposite corners of the frame. A single quarter-wave
dipole is mounted centrally, and is connected to the rangemeasuring
unit situated at the base of the receiver pylon.
14. The vertical axis of the aerial system can be rotated
about the control axis of the pylon by means of a hand-wheeled
drive operated from the interior of the cabin. The vertical
axis of the aerial is geared to a graduated disc, marked from
0° to 360° in a box placed centrally on the table of the D/F
cabin. Readings are made through a small window carrying a
hair line at the back.
15. To the left of the central box is a receiver E16P; this is
the normal receiver unit of the FuGe.16, from which the A.V.C.
(Regler) has been removed. To the right of the box is a
voltmeter.
16. The D/F operator, who is equipped with headphones, sits in
front of the box. The modulated note or "Messton" reaching the
receiver is audible in these headphones, and having
established the minimum position, the operator checks the
direction as follows.
17. The aerial is turned out of the minimum position by about
30°, and the reading of the output meter is noted. If, on
pressing a switch attached to the output meter, the voltage
falls, the direction in which the bearing has been taken is
correct. If, on pressing the button the voltage increases,
this indicates that the aerial has to be swung by 180° to get
the correct direction.
18. The readings should on the average be correct to within
0.5°, and for distances of under 100 km. to within 0.3°. This
reading is spoken aloud by the D/F operator, and is recorded
by a logbook-keeper (Betriebsbuchführer), who also repeats the
reading on a telephone connected to the range-measuring unit
and from there to the plotting room.
"Heinrich III" D/F Equipment.
19. The Heinrich III, also known as the "Umtastpeiler", is
referred to in documents issued by "Hochfrequenzforschung
Einsatzstab Holland" as having been developed at the "Flug
Funk Forschungsinstitut Oberpfaffenhofen".
20. The Heinrich III differs from the "Heinrich I" in several
respects. The aerial system consists of six quarter-wave
vertical dipoles, four of which are arranged in pairs at the
end of a single horizontal support about 4 metres in length.
The fifth dipole is mounted centrally above the D/F cabin, but
also forms part of the D/F aerial system.
21. The sixth quarter-wave dipole is placed vertically within
the structure of the receiver pylon midway between the D/F’ing
cabin at the top and the range-measuring room at the base, and
is connected to the range-measuring unit.
22. The aerial system rotates horizontally about the central
axis of the pylon, and the vertical axis of the aerial is
geared to the central box in the D/F’ing cabin as with the
Heinrich I.
23. The D/F receiver used is the El6EP, and this operates in
conjunction with an automatic device known to P/W as PUG
(Peilumtastgerät), also referred to in documents an ZVG 16 P
(Zielflugvorsatzgerät 16 P), and finally with a visual
indicator termed AFN 2 (Probably = Anzeiger Frequenzniedrig
2).
24. The PUG is connected to E16EP as well as to a plug
connection on the central box. The AFN 2 device has the
appearance of a mall box, measuring approximately
20 x 10 x 10 cms., connects to the same plug.
25. The dial on the side of the AFN 2 has a pointer which is
directed vertically downwards when the aerial is in the
minimum position. The correct direction is now established by
turning the aerial a few degrees out of the minimum position.
If the pointer deflects in the same direction in which the
degree graduations in the small window have moved, the bearing
has been taken in the correct direction. If the pointer moves
in the opposite direction to the movement of the degree
graduations, then the aerial must be swung by 180°.
26. According to P/W, this device allows the D/F operator to
fix the minimum position by visual means only, eliminating
errors duo to the human factor when aural methods are used.
Secondly, the device is automatic and does not require to be
switched on each time by the D/F operator.
"Heinrich II M" and "Heinrich II U" D/F Equipment.
27. Captured documents make mention of the Heinrich II M.
and II U; these versions were unknown to the present P/W, but
the II M is shown in a document, issued at Arnheim in May 1943
by Staaatsrat Dr. PLENDL, to utilise an aerial array with
three sets of quarter-wave dipoles and reflectors.
28. The II U, mentioned in another document from the same
source, and dated July 1943, is shown to be the forerunner of
the Heinrich III described above, and to embody the same
aerial array as the letter.

RANGE MEASURING CABIN.
29. The range-measuring cabin is situated at the base of the
receiver pylon, and houses a range-measuring unit. Two types
of units are in use, known as Rechlin and Siemens rangemeasuring
units respectively.

"Rechlin" Range-Measuring Unit.
30. The "Rechlin" unit (Sketch III) was designed by Dr. BECKER
of Rechlin, and constructed by a firm named Graetz. It is thus
sometimes referred to as the "Becker Gestell" or the "Graetz
Gestell".
31. The Rechlin, which is used principally on day fighter
"Y" control stations, gives reading accurate to 1 km.; it
measures the time required by the transmitted impulse to reach
the aircraft and return again to the receiver of the rangemeasuring
unit. This time is determined by means of an
invisible point which travels along the graduations of the
Cathode ray tube, and becomes visible at the moment when the
returning impulse reaches the range measuring unit.
32. The tuning and operation of the Rechlin range-measuring
unit are carried out ne follows:-
(i) Main switch (1) to ON. Dial lamp (2): lights up.
(ii) Knob (3) turned to left (Bright), an illuminated area
appears on the face of Cathode tube (4). This area
is usually off-centre and of irregular shape.
(iii) By adjustment of trimmer screws (5) the illuminated
area is moved to the centre of the tube and made
uniformly circular in outline.
(iv) By turning controls (6) the circular area is enlarged
until its circumference coincides with the scale
graduations on the edge of the Cathode ray tube
face.
(v) Knob (3) is turned to the right (Dim). The
illumination of the Cathode ray tube is now
extinguished.
(vi) By means of knob (7) the receiver in now set to the
transmitter frequency of the aircraft which is to be
controlled (that is at 1.9 Mc/s. less than ground
transmitter frequency). The frequency is given by
the plotter.
(vii) Switch (8) is now moved to down position for
transmission of the Modulation Note ("Messton").
(viii) Switch (9) controlling test transmitter is then moved
to the "On" position. This initiates transmissions
from the station transmitter on a frequency
automatically reduced by 1.9 Mc/s. The modulation
note ("Messton") is audible in the operators'
headphones. At the same time a point of light
appears on the graduations of the Cathode ray tube
(4) near the 13.7 km. graduation.
(ix) Fine tubing knob (10) is now turned until the sound
heard in the headphones is at maximum.
Simultaneously with this adjustment the light point
is seen to travel in a clockwise direction, reaching
a turning point from which it retraces its path.
This turning point coincides with the point of
maximum sound reception and provides a visual method
of tuning.
(x) Phase switch (11) is now moved until the light point
accurately coincides with graduation 13.7 km.
(xi) Finally knob (12) (Amplitude width) is used to adjust
the definition and intensity of the light point.
(xii) The range measuring operator can now either switch on
to the transmitter for continuous transmission by
means of switch (13) or select either an automatic
five or ten second transmission by means of switch
(14). The latter system has recently been
discontinued and on some Rechlin measuring units,
switch (14) and the clock above it are not fitted.
(xiii) To test R/T circuit the range-measuring operator
depresses knob (15). Dial lamp (16) lights up. The
operator must now hear his own conversation in his
headphones. Turn knob (17) to adjust for correct
audible strength. The R.M. unit is now tuned ready
for use.
(xiv) To go over to aircraft control, switch (9) (Test
transmitter) moved to OFF position.
(xv) If "Y" aircraft is being controlled then a light
point will appear on the graduation of the Cathode
ray tube. This gives the correct reading for the
last digit. If, for example, the light point
appeared on the 12 km. graduation, the digit "2"
only is noted. When coarse-control knob (18) is
pressed, the light point will spring forward by 10%
of the real distance of the "Y" aircraft. That is,
if the point advanced by 6.2 km., the correct
distance of the "Y" aircraft could be 62 km.
(xvi) The tuning transmitter referred to in (viii) forms
part of the range-measuring apparatus, and
superimposes its own transmission of 1.9 Mc/s. on to
that of the station transmitter. This results
automatically in a reduction of 1.9 Mc/s in the
frequency of the station transmitter.

"Siemens" Range-Measuring Unit.
33. The "Siemens" unit (Sketch IV) is found on "Y" control
stations controlling night fighters. It is said to permit
readings to an accuracy of 200/250 metres, allowing night
fighter aircraft lacking search gear to be directed close
enough to their target to obtain visuals.
34. The tuning and operation of this unit is effected as
follows:-
(i) Main switch (1) to "On" position. Dial lamp (2)
lights up.
(ii) Select frequency by means of knob (3). Instruct
operator of station transmitter to transmit (a
tuning transmitter is not incorporated in the
Siemens unit).
(iii) Switch (4) moved to "On" position.
(iv) Switch (5) to "On" position, modulation note now
being transmitted. Green dial lamp (6) lights up.
(v) Tune for maximum audible signal strength by means of
fine control knob (7).
(vi) Turn knobs (8) and (9) until an image appears in the
Cathode ray tube (10). Knob (8) controls light
intensity and knob (9) controls definition of
image.
(vii) Control (11) now turned until the shape of the
illuminated area in the Cathode ray tube is
approximately circular.
(viii) Using switch (12) (Wechselspannungs Diode) and
switch (13) (Wechselspannung Empfänger) the
approximately circular area now made fully
circular and adjusted to a diameter of 3/4 cm.
(ix) Control (11) now turned until the accurate reading
pointer (14) records 13.7 km. The circle on
Cathode ray tube (10) should now have become a
line approximately at an angle of 45° from left
bottom to right top of the face of the tube. If
the circle shrinks only to an ellipse, trimmer
knob (15) is used to reduce the ellipse to a line.
(x) Switch (17) now moved down to coarse reading
position. Turn knobs (18) (Intensity) and (19)
(Definition) until a sharp image appears in
Cathode ray tube (20).
(xi) The coarse reading pointer (22) is then moved to the
413 km. position by turning control (11). The
image in tube (20) should now be a line. If not,
adjust by means of trimmer screw (21).
(xii) This completes the tuning of the Siemens unit. "Y"
control can commence as soon as the receiver
frequency is lowered by 1.9 Mc/s. to bring the
receiver frequency in line with aircraft
transmission.
(xiii) To take over control of an aircraft the following
procedure is carried out:-
Switch (17) moved to bottom coarse setting
position. Control (11) turned until blip appearing
in left tube (20) forms a diagonal line. If switch
(17) now moved up into up (fine setting) position
the line disappears in left tube and reappears as
a flat ellipse in the right tube (10). On slightly
turning control (11) the ellipse is converted into
a line.
(xiv) Distances can now be read off. The coarse reading
scale is calibrated to read from 0 to 500 km. in 5
km. intervals. The fine reading scale has
calibration readings from 0 to 100 km., which are
divided, according to P/W, in 250 metre
graduations. A very skilled operator is said to be
able to estimate fairly accurately to 100/200
metres.
(xv) As the distance of the aircraft varies, control (11)
has to be used to maintain the blip in the form of
a thin line. After the first setting, the coarse
reading is only taken again at intervals.
(xvi) Adjustment of the fine control knob (7) of the
receiver unit as described under (v) also controls
the "steepness" of the line image in the Cathode
ray tube. The position of maximum steepness
coincides with maximum audible signal strength and
represents the turning point of the line image.
This provides a visual check for tuning correctly.
(xvii) The controls shown at the bottom of a Siemens unit
are not touched by the operator. They are set by
the makers of the instrument initially, using
Deutschlandsender transmissions. (According to one
captured document, a special transmission at 1040
hours daily by Deutschlandsender can be used for
this purpose). The controls are subsequently reset
by special test personnel.

AIRBORNE R/T EQUIPMENT.
35. The R/T set used in Y-controlled aircraft is a
modification of the FuGe 16-Z, in which the receiver unit of
the set is linked to the transmitter unit in such a way that
all signals received on the carrier frequency ("Gemeinschaftswelle")
are automatically re-transmitted on another lower
frequency ("Messwelle"), which is usually 1.9 Mc/s. below the
first.
36. The automatic re-transmission of all signals received
enables the aircraft to be plotted by bearing and range
measurement without any reference to the personnel of the
aircraft.
37. Two modifications of airborne FuGe 16-Z R/T sets are used
in the "Y" procedure.
FuGe 16-ZE.
38. The original modification of the FuGe 16-Z used for
Y-control was the FuGe 16-ZE, which incorporated the
"Zielfluggerät" (Z).
39. This set had the disadvantage that it caused a phase
displacement ("Eigenphasenverschiebung") equal to a reading of
13.7 km., which had to be allowed for in the calibration of
Siemen or Rechlin range-measuring units working in conjunction
with it.
FuGe 16-ZY.
40. In this modification of the FuGe 16-Z, the phase
displacement of the apparatus is eliminated. Hence, when using
Rechlin range-measuring unit, an attachment to this equipment
is used which has the effect of cancelling the calibration
allowance of 13.7 km., and causes the light point on the
Cathode ray tube to start all readings from the zero
graduation on the tube.
41. When the Siemens range-measuring unit is used in
conjunction with FuGe 16-ZY, a second pointer marked "Y" is
fitted in the former apparatus on the fine and coarse reading
dials, in addition to the existing pointer marked "E" on both
dials. The pointer marked "Y" added to the accurate reading
scale is set back (to the left) of the pointer marked "E" by a
number of scale graduations corresponding to the reading of
13.7 km. Therefore, when pointer "E" of the Siemens unit is on
the 13.7 km. mark, the pointer "Y" is opposite the zero
graduation. The additional coarse-reading pointer is similarly
set back to approximately the 413 km. graduation, so far as
P/W can remember.

A.D.I.(K) S. D. Felkin.
25 Sept. 1944. Wing Commander."



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G.A.F. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 402/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE
STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM
SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER
FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR
MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

G.A.F. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR – I.

Organisation.
1. This report is the first of a series of ten comprising a study
of the G.A.F. Signals Intelligence Service from the time of its
inception onwards. Beginning with the broad principles and organisation,
this series will cover the early history, the monitoring of signals and
radar, countermeasures, cryptography, advance warning and route
tracking, and intelligence of callsign and frequency systems. In some
cases the various fronts in the war will be taken separately and dealt
with in greater detail.
2. The information has been obtained mainly from the
interrogation in England of senior staff officers of Abteilung 3,
General Nafü and of Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L.; further evidence from captured
O.K.L. documents has, however, been helpful in supporting these
interrogations.

FOREWORD.
3. One outstanding characteristic of the G.A.F. Signals
Intelligence Service as reflected in P/W statements and captured
documents is its constant improvisation and reorganisation to enable it
to cope firstly with continually expending and later with contracting
but more highly complex theatres of operations. This improvisation was
clearly the natural result of the progress of the war as a whole, and
had its origins in the Germans original calculations that their
Blitzkrieg methods would finish the war quickly; this basic concept of a
lightning war gave birth to a correspondingly short-term Signals
Intelligence organisation.
4. Up to 1940 emphasis was necessarily laid on the tactical
rather than the strategic side of the war, its external manifestation
being the preference given to R/T rather than W/T traffic. The
monitoring of W/T traffic hypothesises the existence of a large and
efficient cryptographic organisation, and despite creditable achieve -
ments by certain sections of the Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L. and the W-Stelle it
is clear that a completely satisfactory central crypto Organisation did
not exist.
5. As the war fronts expanded, the Signals Intelligence Service
tended to become decentralised, so that as much work as possible should
be done near the intercept stations. This of course demonstrated a
considerable degree of elasticity in organisation, but it is obvious
that it was forced on the Germans by sheer geographical necessity and by
the diversity of problems presented by such different enemies as the
Russians and the Western Allies.
6. The activity of the G.A.F. Signals Intelligence on the eastern
front most nearly approximated to the original German concept in so far
as Russian air activity was chiefly in support of the army, and the
Signals Intelligence was able to concentrate on R/T and D/F. Russian
radar was very elementary compared with the centimetre radar of the
Anglo—American allies, hence the chief problems on the eastern front
were those of distance rather than technical complexity.
7. By way of compensation for the inferior cryptographic results,
the degrees of efficiency achieved by the G.A.F. D/F service was
extraordinarily high, many of their best results being obtained by this
means. It is certain that a large proportion of their most valuable
long—term intelligence was obtained from D/F rather than cryptographic
results (cf. Part V). The one is admittedly an inferior substitute for
the other, but it is impossible to over-emphasise the contribution of
the G.A.F. D/F service to strategic intelligence.
8. It will be seen in Part II of this series of reports how the
origin of the German Signals Intelligence Service was due to an accident
occurring, shortly before the battle of Tannenberg in the last war, and
how it was developed in a desultory manner until the collapse in 1918.
But in 1924 a small party of civil servants did their best to salvage
what they could of the former Imperial Army's "Y" Service by studying
current cryptographic problems and evaluation methods.
9. When the G.A.F. was expanded in 1936, it was able to utilise
the signals intelligence and intercept experience gained by its Army
counterpart; the Army's tendency was, however, centrifugal, each theatre
of operations and major unit, such as Army Group, Army, Army Corps staff
and even Divisional staff having its own almost self-contained Signals
Intelligence unit. This army organisation was copied fairly faithfully
by the G.A.F., so that all major units of the G.A.F. had their own
Signals Intelligence organisation, the best-known of these in the first
phase of the war being the Ln. Rgt. Legion Condor Nr. 3 working with
Luftflotte 3.
10. It is almost a truism that Signals Intelligence has its
greatest value when a war is going badly and is of least importance when
all is going well. Thus Germany’s lightning successes were a great
handicap to the future development of its Signals Intelligence, for they
rendered almost superfluous the help which it could have given if duly
appreciated and developed. All that seemed necessary was to listen to
enemy R/T traffic while the German Army and the G.A.F. were hammering
their way forward, so that as late in 1942 Referat B found it very
difficult to induce certain intercept stations, to cover valuable but
not so productive W/T frequencies rather than very productive R/T
frequencies (cf. Part V).
11. Relations between intelligence sections and cryptographic
sections working together appear, according to several of the present
P/W, to have been none too cordial, as the former accused the latter of
not getting the results which they could have done with greater effort
and which they stated were not nearly as good as those achieved by the
army. The real reason was not the incompetence of the individual
cryptographers so much as the fact that they were not supplied with a
sufficient depth of W/T traffic and that the crypto service should have
been centralised; the output of a large centralised crypto service
exceeds the sum total of the contributions of its individuals members
and is higher in quality.
12. It is possible that this centralisation may have been achieved
had the war taken a different course, but when the protraction of the
war carried operations to widely separated fronts, the Signals
Intelligence Service, always closely connected with the operational
commands, began to be diffused. The first unit to move into remote parts
was III/Ln. Rgt. 5, with W-Leit 5 as a nucleus (later Ln. Abteilung 355)
started to operate with Luftflotte 5 at Oslo about the middle of May
1940, and continued to monitor both Anglo-American, and Russian traffic
and radar transmissions in that area until the end of the war. (cf. Part
I.)
13. The opening of the campaign on the eastern front in 1941 made
an expansion of the Signals Intelligence service in that theatre
absolutely necessary to cover the enormous front involved.
14. The front resolved itself into three major sectors - the
Leningrad, Moscow and Southern Sectors. These sectors coincided to a
certain extent with the static intercept stations of Insterburg
(later Kobbelbude), Glindow and Pulsnitz of 1936-1937 and the later I,
II and III Abteilungen respectively of Ln. Rgt. 353. On the southern
sector a considerable volume of information will be found in Part No.
VIII of this series. Very little information is available from P/W’s. on
the central and western Sectors.
15. The war in Italy developed into a war very much on its own
from the Signals Intelligences point of view, excepting from a technical
and equipment aspect, where information obtained in one theatre of
operations was of necessity of value to all theatres. Certain
cryptographic results, as for example the grid system mentioned in
Report V, obtained in this theatre was of value later on the Western
Front.
16. It must be clearly realised that the G.A.F. Signals
Intelligence Service did not resolve itself into a large number of small
self-contained units but that, just as the German armies were spread out
ever more thinly, the expansion of the war compelled the service to
become centrifugal and prevented it from achieving that degree of
centralisation and concentration which would undoubtedly have increased
its efficiency.
17. The technical ingenuity of the Western Allies and development
of radar on the western front continually presented new problems for the
G.A.F. Signals Intelligence, making the setting up of new specialised
units very necessary. As Germany's war situation deteriorated so it
naturally expanded its organisation to cover all forms of Allied radio
and, especially, radar activity. Thus arose the
Funkmessbeobachtungsdienst, which, although carrying out some of its
initial experiments in the East, concentrated on obtaining as much
intelligence as possible from radar transmissions in the West.
18. This side of G.A.F. Signals Intelligence continued to increase
in importance to the end of the war and, because of the tightening of
Allied R/T security especially, became equal in importance to radio
interception. In this respect it is interesting to notice how units of
the Ln. Rgt. Legion Condor No. 3 were gradually adapted to cope with
these new developments as Funkhorch Regiment West, and how eventually towards the end of the war a comprehensive organisation which included all fronts was set up, but much too late to be of real value (cf. Part VIII).
19. When in 1944 deep R.A.F. bomber penetrations into Germany
became possible, they were accompanied by a very complex system of
countermeasures and "spoof" attacks, very largely carried out by
100 Group. Thus the Signals Intelligence Service was further expanded by
the inclusion of specialist radar technicians. Specialisation became the
order of the day and each unit was allocated a specific function. Thus
Ln. Rgt. 351 became responsible for monitoring Allied air activity in
the West - except for heavy bombers, which became the primary task of
two specialist Abteilungen 356 and 357.
20. No aspect of Allied countermeasures was more important than
radar jamming, both passive and active (Window and noise modulation).
This became so important as a potential means of obtaining early warning
and route-tracking that a special Abteilung (359) was set up to deal
with it.
21. The channels of communication varied according to the type of
traffic involved. In the case of low-grade R/T or W/T tactical traffic,
as for example A.S.P. traffic, the work was often done entirely on the
fighter unit as in the case of the Horch Verbindungskommandos (= warning squads) described in Part V. As far as strategic bombing was concerned, a much more complicated system was necessary to coordinate the results of all forms of radio interception, radar observation and
countermeasures. Where the work was being done within the framework of the Signals regiments, results were passed from the intercept units to
the Meldekopf and thence to the competent fighter authorities, usually
the Zentrale Gefechtsauswertung of Jagdkorps I, and ultimately to the
Operations Staff via IC who co-related the results of signals
intelligence with other forms of intelligence (see A.D.I.(K) 394/1945).
22. Always bearing in mind the fact that the picture of the G.A.F.
Signals Intelligence Service was constantly changing in conformity with
the changing war situation, the Appendices to this report set out the
functions, locations and chains of command of the Regiments and
Abteilungen of the Service.
23. Appendix I shows the connection between the component parts of
the regiments and the referats of Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L., and the relations
on a higher level with the Army and Navy Signals Intelligence Services,
the Funkleitstand, the Leitstelle der Funkaufklärung and the G.A.F.
Operations Staff IC.
24. Appendix II illustrates the expansion of Signals Intelligence
in the West from its beginnings in Ln. Rgt. Legion Condor No. 3 in 1941
to the Funkhorch Regiment West in 1942, and then to its final form of
Ln. Rgt. 351 and Ln. Funkaufklärungs Abteilungen 356 and 357 in 1945.
25. The final form of the chain of command in 1945 is shown in
Appendix III. The radar observation service had by this time become so
important under Abteilung 3, General Nafü, that it had to be coordinated
in service matters along with the ordinary radio intelligence by a still
higher authority.

FUNCTION, LOCATION AND COMPOSITION OF UNITS.
Ln. Rgt. 351 (Formerly Funk Horch Rgt. West).
26. The germ or this Regiment lay in the Ln. Rgt. Legion Condor
No. 3 at Paris-St. Cloud in 1940/1941. Its function was to observe the
Allied Air Forces in the West, excepting for the heavy bombers, which
was done by Ln. Funkaufklärungs Abteilung 357 in co-operation with 356.
27. Its chief interest thus lay with the R.A.F. 2nd T.A.F. and
U.S. IX Air Force, whereas R.A.F. Bomber Command and the U.S. 8th Air
Force were dealt with by the specialist Abteilungen (356 and 357). To
all intents and purposes Ln. Rgt. 351 was responsible for monitoring the
combat areas, but it was not always possible in practice to avoid
overlapping on someone else’s territory, especially as work was often
duplicated by the Ln. Rgt. organisation and the evaluation sections of
the Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L.; Referat 5, for example, was housed at Limburg in
the same building as Ln. Rgt. 351. and was also employed in supplying
intelligence directly to the IC of the Operations Staff.
28. Ln. Rgt. 351 consisted of 3 Abteilungen - I/351 at
Limburg II/351 at Heidelberg and III/351 at Burg Schwalbach. I/351 was
composed of an evaluation Company (25/351) a W/T Company (26/351) a
Technical Company and a short-rang intercept company for picking up
A.S.P. traffic, etc. The second and third Abteilungen had 2 - 3 shortwave
reception companies.
29. The tactical R/T, W/T and Fu.M.B. messages were sent at once
either by landline, teleprinter or, where not available, by R/T to the
appropriate H.Q.s of the G.A.F., the Army and the Navy, as well as to
the Zentrale Gefechtsauswertung at Jagdkorps I. This was done by
Meldekopf at 25/351 (The origin of the Meldekopf is discussed in Part V
of the present series).
30. The organisation of Ln. Rgt. 352 (Italy and Yugoslavia),
353 (Eastern Front) and Ln. Rgt. 355 (Norway) will be dealt with
in special reports as they became special problems on their own with
less direct influence on the course of events in the West.
Ln. Abt. 356 (Formerly Funkaufklärungs Abteilung Reich).
31. Abteilung 356, with its H.Q. at Berlin-Wannsee, consisting of
five Kompanien - 1/356 at Wannsee, 2/356 at Hamburg for monitoring
approaches to the North-West and North, 3/356 and 5/351 at Stuttgart-
Böblingen for incursions to the South and 4/356 for watching the U.S.
Fifteenth Air Force. This Abteilung was a pure radar observation unit,
operating within the Reich. Its task was to monitor and evaluate Allied
airborne radar transmissions for the use of the Reich defence
authorities in route-tracking of raids. The individual outstations
transmitted the results of their observations to their Meldekopf for use
in the air situation picture.

Ln. Abteilung 357 (Formerly I/Ln. Fu. H. Rgt. West).
32. Abteilung 357, consisting of six Kompanien with H.Q. at
Heiligenstadt/Harz, was responsible for monitoring the Allied heavy
bomber formations and had to provide early-warning and route-tracking
data for use in the defence of the Reich. The results of observation by
this Abteilung were evaluated by Meldekopf I, who passed them on to the
central report centre at Jagdkorps I.

FINAL ORGANISATION.
33. In the final stages of the war the following radio
intelligence units were in operation:-
West.
(a) Ln. Funkaufkl. Abt. 351 with three Abteilungen.
Task: Observation of Allied Air Forces in the West.
(b) Ln. Funkaufkl. Abt. 357.
Task: Observation of the heavy bombers and route-tracking
in collaboration with Ln. Abt. 356.
Germany.
(a) Ln. Funkaufkl. Abt. 356.
Task: Following routes of enemy formations over Germany
(cf. Ln. Abt. 357).
(b) Ln. Funkaufkl. Abt. 359.
Task: Radar jamming in the West and in Germany.
(c) Ln. Funkaufkl. Abt. 350. (with Chi-Stelle Ob.d.L. and
Funkleitstand Ob.d.L.
Task: Concentration and final evaluation of all radio
intelligence.
(d) Ln. Abt. 358.
Task: Training of replacement personnel for the radio
intelligence units.
South (Balkans and Italy).
Ln. Funkaufkl. Rgt. 352 with 3 Abteilungen (Major FEICHTIER).
Task: Observation of Allied Air Force in the
Mediterranean.

EAST.
Ln. Funkaufkl. Rgt. 353 with 3 Abteilungen (Oberst DICK).
Task: Observation of the Russian Air Force.
North (Norway)
Ln. Funkaufkl. Abt. 355.
Task: (a) Observation of the Allied air forces over
Norway.
(b) Observation of the Russian air force in Northern
Norway.
- - - - -
A.D.I.(K) and S. D. FELKIN.
U.S. Air Interrogation. Group Captain.
25th October 1945"
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General der Nachrichtenführer MARTINI

"A. D. I. (K) Report No. 334/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE
STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF
THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL
COMMUNICATIONS.

THE GAF SIGNALS ORGANISATION IN THE WAR.
1. This report results from the interrogation in England of
General der Nachrichtenführer MARTINI, the Director General of
G.A.F. signals from the time of the formation of the Luftwaffe
until the end of the war. A feature of this interrogation was
General MARTINI's rather surprising lack of detailed knowledge
of signals and radar equipment in use in the Luftwaffe, but
his knowledge on matters of broader policy of the signals
organisation was naturally considerable.
2. The gap in his detailed knowledge has to some extent been
filled by the chiefs of his subordinate formations, and it is
intended in due course to issue a further report dealing with
employment of radio and radar equipment. The present report
confines itself to the main events during the war as they
concerned the signals organisation, and shows that General
MARTINI himself was not free from the intrigues which beset
the whole of the General Staff.
3. The information has been divided into five parts, each of
which is, as far as possible, dealt with in historical
sequence; the parts are:-
1. Expansion of the G.A.F. Signals Organisation.
2. Navigational aids for G.A.F. bombers.
3. Defensive radar.
4. The success of Window.
5. Wireless intelligence and Signals developments.

I - EXPANSION OF G.A.F. SIGNALS ORGANISATION.
4. To meet the growing needs of the G.A.F., General MARTINI
developed the Signals Organisation from a small force with
about 300 active officers at the outset of the war, to an army
of about 350,000 of which 10,000 were officers and 100,000
women.
5. In the early autumn of 1940, GOERING, appreciating the
part played by G.A.F. signals, ordered the force to be
doubled. As Germany conquered fresh territories the Signals
Organisation had to be constantly expanded.
Early Campaigns.
6. General MARTINI was of the opinion that all the early
German campaigns were prepared with great speed. When the
German marched into Austria, he and General Feldmarschall von
REICHEMACH were at a radio conference in Cairo. Neither of
them had the slightest idea that Austria was to be invaded.
They were both informed at Cairo that German troops had
marched into Austria. Similarly, General MARTINI heard only at
the last minute that German troops were to invade
Czechoslovakia.
7. Some days before the Polish Campaign was opened, German
land-air exercises were being carried out on a large scale,
and the G.A.F., signals organisation was assuring interservice
communications, in particular between RICHTHOFEN's
Stukas and the Army. On the outbreak of war considerable
strain was put on G.A.F. Experimental Regiment KOETHEN at the
last minute, so as to ensure satisfactory communications for
the Stukas in Poland. The British declaration of war came as a
general surprise and created great uneasiness.
8. General MARTINI was emphatic in maintaining that he was
informed of the intention to invade Norway only six to eight
days in advance. He doubted whether HITLER had told more than
a very few people of his intentions beforehand and he asserted
that everybody appeared to be taken by surprise as
arrangements were kept "terribly secret".
9. As soon as General MARTINI was informed of the intended
campaign, he flew to his headquarters in Hamburg and selected
his best officers for organising communications. They worked
at high speed day and night for six days. The organisation
proved exceptionally difficult because all the details of the
plan had to be kept secret. It was decided that the Army Navy
and Luftwaffe would all work on the same frequency at the half
dozen points where landings were to be effected.
10. Every Ju.52 which the G.A.F. signals organisation could
lay its hands on was transformed into a signals aircraft, and
communications Trupps were also sent out on all the transport
ships. The success of the G.A.F. communications, the General
considered was largely due to the Ju.52 signals aircraft.
Invasion of Britain.
11. General MARTINI would not commit himself about the time
at which preparations were first made to invade England. Once
the Germans held the Channel ports a plan was evolved under
the cover-word "Seelöwe" by which barges were assembled in the
Channel Ports. The whole plan was so decentralised, however,
that the various departments knew only what directly concerned
them. For a long time General MARTINI had the impression that
the whole plan was a feint. He estimates that the General
Staff worked seriously on the invasion plan for two to three
months.
12. The plan comprised landings in two different places, but
he maintains that he was never told what these places were,
and he is not aware that any date was fixed for the invasion.
He is certain that if the date for the invasion was fixed and
the plan called off, then the High Command deliberately kept
up the fiction that it intended to invade England for months
after the whole thing had been shelved.
Russian Campaign.
13. Support was given to the above contention by the General
when he stated that he was informed at least six months ahead
of the High Command's plan to invade Russia. Since the Germans
wished to avoid fighting on two fronts, the plan to invade
England must have been postponed indefinitely at any rate
before 1941. When he was informed of the Russian invasion
plan, General MARTINI discussed his requirements at a
conference with HITLER.
14. This was one of the two or three occasions on which he
had personally to report to HITLER. He worked out a plan to
build six lines of communication advancing into Russia, each
manned by one signals regiment. This required a considerable
amount of material and transport. Generaloberst JESCHONNEK
appreciated that General MARTINI’s requirements were
justified, but the Army put up objections.
15. At the inter-service conference with HITLER which ensued,
General MARTINI stated his case. "How quickly will you be able
to construct your lines of communication?" HITLER asked him.
MARTINI replied "30 kilometres a day". HITLER interposed;
"That is far too little. Forty kilometres of railway will be
built per day!".
16. MARTINI said that by putting down one telegraph line
instead of two, he could assure the construction of more than
40 kilometres a day. HITLER then sanctioned all his
requirements, telling the other services not to under-estimate
the value of signals communications.
17. A unified method was adopted for signals construction in
the Russian advance; field cables were first laid, then
ordinary telegraph wires. Inter-service and fast communication
such as Met. reports were sent by wireless. The system of
G.A.F. Army Liaison officers used in Russia was modelled on
that worked out by the Germans in the Spanish war.
18. Telegraphic communications were as a rule reserved for
communications between O.K.L. and the Luftflotten, between the
Luftflotten and the Fliegerkorps, and between the Fliegerkorps
and Army Staff.
19. The German land lines were tapped by the Russians.
General MARTINI regretted that the Germans had never succeeded
in making a secure telephone scrambler. Ha said that towards
the end of the war a satisfactory apparatus was found in a
British or American aircraft. He had it tested and found it
good.
20. Land lines in Russia also suffered considerably from
partisan action. They were guarded every 30 to 50 kilometres
by posts of 8 to 12 men, but guard duties were particularly
difficult in forested country. When one line was cut,
communications were switched onto one of the other lines or
put over wireless links. Despite these difficulties, regular
communications were maintained throughout the campaign.

II – NAVIGATIONAL AIDS FOR BOMBERS.
Development of Bombing Beams.
21. At the beginning of the war the G.A.F. tended to neglect
its defensive organisation and concentrated on the offensive,
General MARTINI was not responsible for navigation as such,
but for high frequency radio as an aid to navigation. In 1933
he had calculated that with the navigational aids at his
disposal, mainly D/F and compass, he could obtain an accuracy
of only about 50 kilometres at is distance of 500 kilometres.
22. At the end of 1933, Dr. PLENDL, who had been introduced
to him by the Technisches Amt, told him that if the funds were
placed at his disposal he could in some years' time produce, a
navigational aid with an accuracy of 500 metres at a distance
of 500 kilometres, Feldmarschall MILCH placed the means at his
disposal. After several years PLENDL completed his apparatus,
and experiments were conducted on the X-System by Versuchs
Regiment KOETHEN with the bomber Gruppe which later became
K.G. 100.
23. The first operations of the war with mobile X-Stations
were on two bombing missions against a munitions factory in
Poland. The factory vas foolishly bombed at the same time by
ordinary bombers, so that the experts were unable to determine
whether or not the X-System was a success.
24. The campaign was over so quickly that no other
operational trials with X-beams on Poland could be made.
Knickebein Beams.
25. After the Polish campaign, Knickebein and X Stations were
constructed opposite the German-French frontier in preparation
for the Western offensive. Kampfgruppe 100 was by that time
thoroughly trained in the beam procedure, and many highly
specialised Signals officers had been incorporated in the
Gruppe as navigators.
26. The Norwegian campaign then took place, and Kampfgruppe
100 was thrown into it as an ordinary bomber unit. Most of the
crews were killed, and the Gruppe was wasted. The specialists
were scarcely required for the French campaign, but the Gruppe
had to be re-formed completely with lesser trained crews for
the attack on England.
27. The Knickebein system was used at the outset of the
attack on England. The apparatus on the Channel coast had been
hurriedly set up, however, and there were neither sufficient
technicians nor material to make conclusive tests. Dr. MODEL,
a former Reichspost official who died during the war, was
taken over by the wireless department of the signals
organisation and was chiefly responsible for developing
Knickebein in collaboration with the Technisches Amt and
Telefunken.
28. The crews using Knickebein soon reported that the beam
was being diverted, and that British fighters were being
vectored on to it. Several weeks were required to prove that
the beam was really being diverted. After some weeks,
experienced signals officers were sent out with the bombers
and reported that countermeasures had in effect been taken by
the British.

"X" and Benito Bomber Beams.
29. Dr. PLENDL invented both the "X" and "Y" (Benito)
systems. The "X" beams were developed under the signals
organisation at Köthen by Dr. KÜNHOLD with K.G.100 and General
- then Oberst - ASCHENBRENNER, an old and experienced pilot.
The Benito system, on the other hand, was perfected by Dr.
PLENDL at the Technisches Amt under Feldmarschall MILCH, and
General MARTINI had nothing to do with it.
30. It was intended to train a whole Geschwader to navigate
on the "X" system. After Kampfgruppe 100, acting as
pathfinders for large bomber forces, had been attacking towns
in Great Britain on the "X" system for a short time, however,
Dr. PLENDL wanted to try out Benito in practice, which he
regarded as the better system.
31. At that time Oberst ASCHENBRENNER's younger brother, who
was the Kommandeur of Kampfgruppe 100, was ordered to take
over III/K.G.26 which had been intended to fly also on "X".
Dr. KÜNHOLD always considered the "X" system better than the
Benito, and was annoyed with Dr. PLENDL for introducing and
pushing the Benito system.
32. P/W from III/K.G.26 stated in 1940 that the Benito system
was introduced prematurely because of the countermeasures
which the British had been taking against the "X" beam.
General MARTINI, however, maintains that the causes for the
early introduction of Benito were more complex. He said that
he had been responsible for putting into practice the use of
beams as navigational aids for bombers, and that he had
considerable difficulty in overcoming the objections of the
pilots and their commanders.
33. The pilots maintained that they could obtain better
results by finding the targets themselves, and those who were
obliged to follow the pathfinders felt that they were being
relegated to subsidiary tasks. They reported that K.G.100 had
bombed in the wrong place, and that they had found the right
target by themselves. Despite the good results obtained with
"X", anger against the system remained unabated.
34. The aim of operating two whole Geschwader on beams
against England was not achieved because of initial distrust
and British countermeasures and later because the bombers were
earmarked for the Russian campaign. The Benito system suffered
chiefly from British interference of the R/T.
35. General MARTINI himself realised from the outset that the
beams could be interfered with from Britain, and favoured the
introduction of several systems to make countermeasures more
difficult.
36. Thus, in the light of later experience, the Benito system
was introduced prematurely. The General points out that this
was only the beginning of the high frequency war, and they
lacked experience about the best measures for forestalling
countermeasures.
37. When KG.100 was achieving its successes, GOERING enquired
as to who was responsible for the "X" system. On hearing from
MARTINI during a long talk on navigational aids that PLENDL
had invented it, he said: "Then I shall promote him to
Staatsrat!" (State Councillor). GOERING could not understand
how the system had been jammed. MARTINI spent two hours trying
to explain the procedure of jamming and countermeasures.
GOERING asked a number of questions, but was afterwards
clearly none the wiser. He grew very angry, and accused
MARTINI of fiddling about with patchwork measures.
38. In reading the above statement it must be emphasised that
General MARTINI was sometimes confused in his memory between
the "X" and "Y" systems.

Mobile "X" Stations in Russia.
39. Kampfgruppe 100 later flew in Russia with mobile "X"
stations, which were set up with great speed.

Cyklop System.
40. Towards the end of 1943, the Knickebein system was
developed on a new basis with mobile stations under the cover
name CYKLOP. This system was used extensively by Fliegerkorps
IV, in Russia and was to have been set up on the Channel coast
for attacks on England, but the General was not sure whether
it was actually used.
41. Cyklop had a range of 300 to 350 kilometres as against
the 450 kilometres of Knickebein. It was developed by Dr.
KÜNHOLD at Köthen.

Hitler Demands a Demonstration of the "X" Beam.
42. About the summer of 1942, when General MARTINI was at his
headquarters in South Russia, he was suddenly ordered to fly
over to Hitler’s general headquarters near Kalinovka some 12
miles away. HITLER had heard that the Krupps works had been
hit in an attack at night throw ten-tenths cloud by R.A.F.
bombers flying with navigational aids. He could not believe
it, and said that there must have been a gap in the clouds;
GOERING was troubled, and General JESCHONNEK - his Chief of
Staff, who also had no faith in high frequency aids, was also
sceptical. So HITLER ordered them to call in MARTINI.
43. Asked by HITLER whether such accurate bombing was
possible on beams, MARTINI said it was. GOERING, who saw
trouble ahead for himself, interposed saying: "Yes, my Führer,
but we also have such systems."
44. HITLER asked MARTINI how the "X" system worked. In an
attempt to simplify the explanation, MARTINI spoke about
impulses and echoes. HITLER asked for more and more details,
calculating for himself everything that MARTINI explained. The
General thus found himself thoroughly involved and confused.
45. "Now I want to know", HITLER said with some impatience,
"if you were to attack Munich main railway station from
Leipzig on your system, whether you could hit it?" MARTINI,
taking good care not to commit himself too deeply, said; "I
should estimate that Munich is about 400 kilometres from
Leipzig. If that is correct, and if the station is 1,000
metres long by 300 wide, then I believe that some of the bombs
would hit the target."
46. HITLER replied: "I hope this is correct. I don't trust
high frequency. I went on a flight in South Germany, and ended
up in North Germany by mistake with your high frequency." He
reflected for a moment and said: "I order a demonstration to
be carried out with the "X" System in Germany, just as if it
were an operation, to show me whether these things really can
be done.
47. This was the last that MARTINI heard on the subject from
HITLER himself, but a long time afterwards he was rebuked by
GOERING for taking so long to prepare the demonstration;
preparations actually took about nine months.
48. At the time the "X" apparatus was undergoing trials for
improvements, and the aircrew who had used airborne apparatus
had to be replaced in the aircraft, the "X" stations set up in
the neighbourhood of Vienna, and new pilots trained. General
MARTINI did not know all details of the trials, since they
were put into the hands of Dr. PLENDL and the Air Officer for
Bombers who was also Inspector for Navigation.
49. The actual bombing demonstration flight was from Austria
to an unpopulated spot near Grafenwöhr in the neighbourhood of
Bayreuth, and was a success, but it cost enormous effort.

Disappointment over Erika.
50. Explaining why "Erika" stations had been built on the
Channel coast but had not been used, General MARTINI said that
the system proved far more difficult to perfect than had been
supposed.
51. Moreover it necessitated a large airborne apparatus, and
a very large ground installation, and this took years and
years. In the final stages an inaccuracy was observed which
had been previously overlooked.
52. There was besides the continual danger that it could be
easily jammed. "I worried a great deal over it", the General
said.
53. Professor von HANDEL, whose great passion it was, had
claimed that it would be more accurate than the "X" system. He
worked at it as feverishly as PLENDL worked on his "X" system.
54. The two men fell out and MARTINI went to great pains to
get them to work together, and finally succeeded. He hoped
that they would combine the "X" and "Erika systems, but this
never happened.

Sonne Beacons in Spain.
55. Talking of other air navigation systems, General MARTINI
said that besides using Sonne beacons themselves in Spain, the
Germans made over some Sonne apparatus to the Spaniards.

III - DEFENSIVE RADAR.
First Information on British Radar.
56. Discussing British and German ground radar, General
MARTINI said he was aware before the beginning of the war that
great radar stations had been put up on the coast of England,
and that they had very long range. It was known that the
impulses were 25, 50 and 1000, and that height measurements
could be obtained. It was not known whether the radar could
really determine the number of aircraft approaching.
57. Just before the war the Graf Zeppelin flew along the
coast of England during an experimental flight. The main
object of that flight was to test ultra-short wave receivers.
Incidentally it was thought that British radar stations might
be D/F'd. General MARTINI said he did not know exactly what
experiments were made during the flight, but he had heard that
the high frequency receivers were not satisfactory, and
results were uncertain.

First German Radar.
58. In General MARTINI’s opinion, the two men chiefly
responsible for the invention of radar in Germany were Dr.
RUNGE, of Telefunken, who worked on a 50 to 60 centimetre
wavelength, and Dr. SCHULTES, of GEMA, who worked chiefly with
80 centimetre and 2.4 metre waves.
59. Radar apparatus was first developed in Germany by the
Naval Experimental Institut and GEMA in 1936 or earlier.
General MARTINI was shown a Freya by the Navy, and saw that it
could achieve results over the sea. He hoped that the G.A.F.
would be successful with it over land and foresaw that it
could have a great feature in aircraft reporting, blind
landing and other spheres.
60. Just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia he had a Freya
placed in the Sudeten mountains. "I hoped", he said "that with
our Freya in the mountains we would be able to pick up
aircraft taking off in Czechoslovakia, but we failed to obtain
any results".
61. At about the same time the firm of Telefunken began
trials with Würzburg apparatus. They claimed that it could
pick up aircraft, but their demonstration failed.
62. The General said that he had ordered about 200 Freyas and
800 Würzburgs for the G.A.F. before the war, but he had
obtained only a small number by the time hostilities had
begun. A very few Freyas were set up on the North Sea coast
and these worked satisfactorily, being instrumental in causing
heavy R.A.F. losses over Heligoland in the bombing attacks in
1939.
63. Freyas were not used during the Norwegian campaign, but
were set up after the Luftwaffe had established itself on the
Norwegian coast. The signals organisation was obliged to hand
over all the Würzburgs intended for the aircraft reporting
system to the Flak arm, because the radar apparatus brought
out by Lorenz which was used for Flak aiming had proved a
failure.

Fighter Control.
64. From the reports of his Signals Intelligence Service, the
General concluded that the R.A.F. aircraft reporting system
and radar were used principally to aid the ground control of
fighters. For a long time the Luftwaffe was unable to organise
ground control of day fighters, because of the opposition of
most of the pilots, who insisted on free-lance fighting.
65. The change was introduced very slowly and was influenced
by the discovery by the German Signals Intelligence Service
that the R.A.F. was using Pip-Squeak. The Pip-Squeak aircraft
apparatus was later captured. The procedure seemed a good idea
to the German pilots, who wanted a Pip-Squeak of their own,
and began to realise the advantages of fighter control.
66. Actually, German industry had for a long time been
working on a similar apparatus, but failed to bring out a
satisfactory one. Later the Pip-Squeak apparatus was copied by
the Germans, but it was never used operationally.
67. The organisation of radar for fighter defence suffered
both before and during the war from inter-departmental
difficulties and intrigue.
68. The main reason why radar was not developed earlier for
ground control of fighters, General MARTINI said, was that
until the summer of 1941 the Luftwaffe concentrated on
offensive tactics to the neglect of fighter defence. The
decision to subordinate aircraft reporting and radar to
fighter ground control was reached at a stormy conference in
Russia in the early stages of the campaign. MOELDERS and
GALLAND insisted that the only way to improve fighter
interception and cut down losses was to introduce satisfactory
ground control.

Research, Industry and Intrigue.
69. General MARTINI had a constant struggle to obtain the
technical improvements necessary for carrying on the high
frequency war. Except for a period of less than a year, during
which he was given special responsibilities by GOERING,
General MARTINI had no authority to make demands either from
the scientists or from the industrialists.
70. Until 1937 he and his subordinates had been allowed to
keep in close contact with the wireless industry, and to state
their requirements, but merely for information. After that
time Feldmarschall MILCH strictly forbade these contacts, and
ordered that requests and enquiries should be made by the
signals organisation through the Technisches Amt, of which he
was head. Feldmarschall MILCH knew just as little about high
frequency matters as GOERING.
71. MILCH issued his veto during a scandal in 1937 over the
sale of the FUGe.7 to Switzerland, in connection with which a
number of prominent scientists at Telefunken were arrested.
P/W had the feeling that the scandal was worked up to prevent
free collaboration between industry and the services, and to
place the big firms under the supervision of the Technisches
Amt.
72. Relations between MARTINI and MILCH were strained for
years, even if the two men were outwardly polite to each
other. MILCH was a great opponent of the General Staff, and
particularly of the Tactical Führungsstab. He attempted to
have the whole signals organisation placed under his command,
but MARTINI resisted this strongly.
73. Thwarted in his empire-building, MILCH carried on an
underground war against the signals organisation. On one
occasion, in the presence of MARTINI, he said to GOERING: "It
is a great crime that this signals organisation has been set
up!" MILCH tried to prevent Luftwaffe officers from working
in the Technisches Amt, and made liaison with MARTINI
extremely difficult. For a time MARTINI had a representative
at the Technisches Amt but he requested to be posted back to
the signals organisation, saying that it had room only for
engineers and not for officers.
74. MARTINI had engineers in his Experimental Regiment, the
L.N. Versuchsregiment at Koethen, working together with the
officers, but the engineers in the Technisches Amt refused to
co-operate with them. When the Versuchsregiment brought out
something new and stated its requirements, the Technisches Amt
engineers said that their work was all wrong.
75. Even during the time that UDET was head of the
Technisches Amt, MILCH in P/W’s opinion, really held the reins
because of his position as GOERING's representative.
76. Feldmarschall MILCH made a point of co-operating with the
signals organisation from the summer of 1941 for about nine
months, during which MARTINI had GOERING's backing. Because of
MILCH's opposition, MARTINI was still given no authority over
the scientists or the industrialists, but he was given special
powers to hold conferences with them, and with representatives
of the Technisches Amt.
77. He had GOERING's authority to discuss his requirements in
the utmost detail. When agreement had been reached on which
developments could be carried out by the industry, the General
had to make written requests to the Technisches Amt to put
through the required orders. Thanks to GOERING's backing,
MARTINI was able to force the Technisches Amt to place these
orders.

Role of the Versuchsregiment.
78. The Versuchsregiment had the task of conducting
experiments with signals apparatus, and stating the technical
or tactical requirements of the Luftwaffe with regard to it.
Their reports went to the Technisches Amt. When the apparatus
was delivered to the signals organisations the
Versuchsregiment carried out operational tests with it and
often made improvements.
79. The Versuchsregiment Koethen acted as a fillip to the
wireless industry, sometimes producing new apparatus which the
industrialists were unable to manufacture.
80. For example, the height measuring attachments on the Freya
were built and produced by Koethen. Whenever work of this
nature was handed over to Koethen, MARTINI had to obtain the
sanction of the Technisches Amt. Despite the rivalry with the
Versuchsregiment, this sanction would be given. Feldmarschall
MILCH once or twice indicated that Koethen should be directly
subordinated to him, but never pursued the matter.
81. General MARTINI described Dr. KÜNHOLD, the Technical
Chief of the Versuchsregiment, as exceptionally able and at
the same time very modest scientist. He was responsible for
all the technical work done at Koethen. Oberst LÖWE,
Kommandeur of the Regiment, was responsible for administration
and discipline. He was also a good technician. He had formerly
been a Captain in the Signals section of the Landes Polizei
and had been taken into the Luftwaffe signals organisation in
1934.
82. The work of the Versuchsregiment at Koethen embraced all
branches of the signals organisation; its work on radar was in
practice restricted to ground apparatus.
83. The experimental station at Werneuchen restricted its
research to radar and concentrated on airborne apparatus.
Whereas Koethen, under the signals organisation, trained the
experimental detachments which were incorporated in the
signals regiments, Werneuchen was restricted to engineers and
was subordinated to the Technisches Amt.
84. Oberstleutnant HENTZ, at the end of the war head of
General MARTINI's Radar Section, the VI Abteilung, was
formerly Kommandeur of Werneuchen responsible for its growth.
85. Co-operation between Werneuchen and the signals
organisation was always better than that of the Technisches
Ant itself with the signals organisation.
Industry's need of Technicians.
86. At the end of 1941, it became obvious that the wireless
industry did not have a sufficient number of technicians to
carry out the requirements of the signals organisation.
87. Realising the danger of defeat in the high frequency war,
MARTINI offered the industry up to 15,000 technicians from his
Signals Regiment. He started by having 7000 to 8000 men
transferred to industry, and then persuaded GOERING to
transfer back to the industry and research organisations about
15,000 technicians from both the Army and Luftwaffe.
88. While the transfers were being carried out, the manpower
crisis occurred on the Russian front and the process was
reversed. Thus the best experienced technicians were being
sent from industry to the Russian front, while less capable
men were coming home and required at least a year to be
trained.

Countering of Allied Countermeasures.
89. The very nature of the high frequency war with
countermeasures, measures to overcome countermeasures and
constant changes in the apparatus, led to demands from the
wireless industry which it could not meet. Thus the
Versuchsregiment was frequently called upon by MARTINI to make
the alterations itself.
90. For instance, when Freyas were manufactured with only one
wavelength, MARTINI told the industrialists that it would be
useless without a wave band. The industrialists replied that
such a change would be colossal work which would require a
very long time. "At any rate", MARTINI interposed, "bring out
the next series of Freyas with two wavelengths, the one after
with three, and gradually get a reasonable frequency band".
The industrialists made objections, saying that the work was
too fiddling.
91. MARTINI then ordered the Versuchsregiment to make the
required modifications in the Freyas. Thus, despite British
jamming from high-powered transmitters, the Versuchsregiment
modified a sufficient number of Freyas for some to operate
without being jammed.
92. Gradually all the Freyas were modified at Koethen under
the covername "Voll-Wismar" and the wireless industry finally
produced Freyas with an adequate frequency band.
93. Similar difficulties were experienced with FuG.16. The
signals organisation asked the Technisches Amt for the
apparatus to be constructed with 100 two-way channels, but
through a misunderstanding it was produced with 100 one-way
channels.
94. In the ensuing discussions, the industrialists considered
that they would not be able to produce the apparatus with the
required frequency band for about two years.

FuG.25 and 25A.
95. The failure to organise the mass production of the German
I.F.F., the FuG.25A, at an early date was attributed by the
General to the weakness of his position in relation to the
Technisches Amt. He was first shown the apparatus, which had
been constructed by Dr. SCHULTHES, in September or October
1939. He was delighted with it and requested the production of
two or three thousand.
96. These unfortunately were not produced, the General said,
because too many people had a say in the matter. "Shortly
afterwards a high official at the Technisches Amt told me
quite by chance that 30,000 FuG.25 were already in production.
That was terrible; it was my greatest worry. But
Reichsmarschall GOERING said to me "It is the easiest problem
of all and you haven't even solved that for me!"
Switching on of I.F.F.
97. The General had heard the explanation from British bomber
pilots that they kept their I.F.F. switched on to dowse
searchlights, but he did not believe it.
98. He thought that there must have been some important
reason this procedure which allowed the Germans to pick up the
approach of R.A.F. bombers. He asked whether it was maintained
with the object of eventually being of use to night fighter
escort aircraft. He pointed out that it was of exceedingly
great value to the Germans.

The Panorama Apparatus.
99. About September 1942, somebody, whose name MARTINI never
discovered, told GOERING that the signals organisation had
neglected to develop the Panorama search apparatus. GOERING in
a fit of temper told MARTINI that he had sabotaged the
Panorama apparatus and MARTINI retorted sharply. That same day
GOERING appointed Oberst KNEEMEYER as his Wireless and
Navigation Officer, and put an end to MARTINI’s special
functions in high frequency developments.
100. MARTINI continued to hold conferences with the
scientists and industrialists on behalf of the Chief of the
General Staff, but without GOERING’s authority he laboured
under great difficulties.
101. The production of a German Panorama apparatus was
delayed largely because at the beginning of the war tests were
unsuccessful, and afterwards the wireless industry neglected
it to try and satisfy other demands regarded as more urgent.
The first Panorama, which was put up to the West of Berlin,
could not be made to work and its development was shelved.
102. At the beginning of 1943, General MARTINI insisted that
he should be shown what the apparatus was worth. He was told
that the apparatus, which worked on one of the Freya
frequencies, had not yet been perfected. He sent two members
of his staff to try and overcome the technical difficulties
and three months later he was asked to inspect the apparatus
as it was at last working. He spent two hours looking at it,
but the demonstration failed.
103. A second prototype, which worked on decimetre waves, was
burnt out just after being completed.
Centimetre Wave Research.
104. The failure to develop radar on centimetre waves was
due, General MARTINI said, partly to Feldmarschall MILCH’s
lack of understanding of the problem, and partly because the
wireless industry could not cope. He himself had demanded in
1937 that research should be carried out on centimetre waves.
105. Staatsrat ESAU made experiments with ultra-short waves
at first with a milliwatt, which he later increased to a watt.
The scientist said that it was not his business, but that of
the industrialists to continue the work with higher power. The
industry, however, had too many other orders on hand, and
Feldmarschall MILCH, who could have put the research in the
hands of the Technische Amt, did not realise the implications
of the high frequency war.
106. In the summer of 1942, GOERING suddenly decided to
replace Dr. ESAU by Dr. PLENDL, whom he promoted to the rank
of Oberst Ingenieur, saying: "I appoint you chief of all high
frequency research in Germany". Dr. ESAU complained to General
MARTINI of being cold shouldered, but the General had not even
been informed of GOERING's decision beforehand.
107. General MARTINI made about 60 closely inter-connected
requests for research on high frequency matters to Dr. PLENDL.
He said that PLENDL's work as Chief of high frequency
investigations was somewhat disappointing, and criticised him
for spending too much time on organising, to the neglect of
research. He did not put the same energy into this work as he
had done in the development of the "X" and "Y" systems.
However, the General did not agree with those critics who
accused Dr. PLENDL of combatting the protagonists of the Egon
system.
108. In 1944 GOERING became dissatisfied with PLENDL, and
reinstated ESAU in his place. The old collaboration between
ESAU and MARTINI was then resumed.

The Egon System.
109. Dr. SCHULTHES, who first worked with GEMA for the Navy
and later with Siemens, had reported early on that the Egon
system promised great possibilities. At one of the General's
conferences in 1941, he said that exact location up to 350
kilometres could be attained with Egon, but could not give a
date for the perfection of the system. Nevertheless those
scientists who were opposed to Dr. PLENDL advocated the
immediate scrapping of the Benito fighter control system and
the introduction of Egon.
110. MARTINI intervened, stating: "The problem is not so
simple. We have built up the whole organisation for the Benito
system which has definite advantages; it can be used not only
for bombers but for fighters with very good results. We must
develop Egon with all possible speed, but before it is ready
to be used operationally it would be madness to do away with
Benito. We must have both systems operating at the same time".
111. In General MARTINI's view, time has justified his point
of view. The Benito system had proved itself thoroughly
efficient for fighter control, and in the later stages of the
war those controllers who used both systems were glad to check
up one on the other. With the small fighter force to which the
Luftwaffe was reduced, a small error in ground control was
fatal.

Capture of the British "Gee" Apparatus.
112. GOERING, who was in the habit of cursing the signals
organisation, was particularly vehement when he heard that a
British bomber had been captured with a fine apparatus on
board which was an improvement on anything brought out in
Germany. This was the "Gee" apparatus which the Germans named
Hyperbel.
113. General MARTINI said that he learned a long time
afterwards that the firm of Telefunken had actually worked out
a similar system to "Gee" on long waves in 1939. Telefunken
which had given the apparatus the cover name "Ingolstadt", had
proposed developing it, but the Technisches Amt had turned it
down because of an order previously issued forbidding work on
any developments which could not be completed by the end of
1940.
114. The "Gee" apparatus was handed over to Koethen for
examination and copies. The reason why Gee" was not jammed
earlier, the General thought, was because of the German lack
of ultra-short wave transmitters. It required a good nine
months to construct apparatus, once the prototype had been
completed. For a time, he said, the Germans considered that
they were successful in jamming both "Gee" and "Oboe", but
when these systems were used by the Allies with many
wavelengths, the only answer was to build up a great system of
jamming throughout Germany. This system was never completed.
Jamming – The Feldberg Project.
115. The General recalled an attempt in 1945 to jam Allied
airborne radar which ended in disaster. The first new highpowered
German ground jamming plant, which was manufactured
with great difficulty because of Allied bombing attacks, was
finally all assembled inside a tower on the Feldberg with the
object of jamming all wavelengths from the one place.
116. The work was carried out by the Reichspost "just as it
were peacetime" without a thought to passible consequences of
bombing. No sooner had all the apparatus been completed than
the tower was destroyed by a fighter bomber attack. The case
was brought before a court-martial.

H2S Countermeasures.
117. The Germans were not successful in their ground
countermeasures against H2S, because they were unable to get
such apparatus as they had captured intact to work properly.
The apparatus was technically in order, but despite repeated
trials the navigators were unable to achieve results with it.
Results were finally with a F.W.200 which was fitted with both
the H2S and the "Berlin". When flying over the Mark
Brandenburg in the spring of 1944, the aircraft crashed for
some unknown reason.

"Berlin" for Night Fighting.
118. It would have taken a long time, the General said,
before "Berlin" could have been put into operational use for
bombing on the same lines as H2S for which it was originally
constructed. As the Germans were not carrying out bombing
raids it was no longer important. It was therefor proposed to
adapt the "Berlin" for night fighting, and as such it would
have been used operationally within a comparatively short
while.
119. The Germans had great difficulty towards the end of the
war in constructing airborne apparatus such as "Berlin" small
enough to fit into their aircraft. They had scarcely any fourengined
aircraft, and the Ju.88 was not roomy enough. In the
final stages the wireless industry had to concentrate on
apparatus sufficiently small to fit into the Me.262.

Me.262 Radar.
120. No Me.262 had flown operationally with radar, but a few
successful trial flights had been carried out, using Neptun
apparatus which was small to go into the aircraft without
being unwieldy.
121. The type used was the forward-looking Neptun. The test
aircraft crashed and the observer was killed, but the pilot
reported that good blips had been obtained.

Me.163.
122. No attempt had been made to operate the Me.163 with
ground control.

Kammhuber’s Night Fighter Belt.
123. Speaking of the development of German night fighter
defences, General MARTINI said that General KAMMHUBER did not
at first appreciate the value of radar. Before the latter had
taken over the night fighter defences, he had distinguished
himself as a good blind flying pilot, but he had no technical
knowledge of radar. For that reason he organised the wellknown
searchlight belt defending the western approaches to the
Reich.
124. About two and a half months after KAMMHUBER had begun to
work on the night fighter belt, MARTINI sent him six reporting
companies which were then equipped with Würzburgs, because
MARTINI considered that this would be the best way of
organising night fighter defences.
125. The reason why the night fighter defence sectors were
worked out in a perfect pattern was that KAMMHUBER, being a
keen organiser, considered that he would benefit by their
being all exactly alike.
126. Asked why KAMMHUBER did not organise his night fighter
belt to rely on Würzburgs from the outset, General MARTINI
said that he himself had not been consulted when the work
began. GOERING had ordered KAMMHUBER to organise night
fighting, without referring him to MARTINI. KAMMHUBER did not
even know what to do with the aircraft reporting companies
which MARTINI sent him; however, he studied the whole question
of high frequency with much vigour, and soon reorganised the
night fighter defences to depend on ground radar.
127. The reason why so many radars were put up on the
Kammhuber belt was that the Germans at that time were using
the old Würzburgs which could obtain satisfactory results only
up to a radius of 35 kilometres. When the Würzburg Riesen were
introduced, General KAMMHUBER kept the other Würzburgs for a
time so as to maintain the pattern of his organisation
throughout the night fighter belt.
128. KAMMHUBER preferred the Seeburg Tisch method of plotting
to the Freya-AN system, because he said that the former method
of control could be understood by all but the latter could be
managed successfully only by special gifted officers. MARTINI
was disappointed because he considered that there were enough
capable young officers in his organisation to have worked with
the Freya-AN.

The Removal of Kammhuber.
129. The General said that he did not know exactly why
KAMMHUBER was removed to Luftflotte 5. In his own words, taken
from shorthand notes during interrogation: "It was a sudden
decision of the Reichsmarschall and I imagine that he must
have reached it after one of the officers had told him
something or other. It happened during a big conference at
Deelen during which the Reichsmarschall attacked me sharply
because he was determined not to understand why I wanted to
maintain the visual and oral aircraft reporting system as well
as the radar organisation. I explained that it was important
to know what types of aircraft were approaching when there
were low-flying attacks. He would have nothing of it and was
in a very bad temper.
130. "The next day he took General KAMMHUBER aside, and then
came back saying that he was to be A.O.C.-in-C. of the
Luftflotte in Norway. Possibly the reason for this was that
the night fighters were not gaining so many victories.
Outwardly the new post meant a great promotion, for he was a
young officer, and as A.O.C.-in-C. he attained the rank of a
General-Feldmarschall.
131. "I did not ask him what he personally thought about it.
Perhaps he had expected to control all the fighter forces in
Germany, and to have become an A.O.C.-in-C. like that.
132. "The change took place at the time of the appointment of
a new General Staff. I was to have been thrown out also. They
wanted to divide up my work, and I had made it a hard and fast
rule that my organisation must not be split up, whatever
happened. I had to insist on this several times, and each time
said that if the organisation were split up, I should ask for
another post. Finally on that occasion too, it was decided
that I should.....
133. The Reichsmarschall did not understand the principles of
night fighting, but discussed them a great deal with General
KAMMHUBER just as he did with me. When I held a different
opinion, I told him so quite openly. For a long time he
listened to me, and then one day he refused to listen to me at
all. It was roughly the same with General KAMMHUBER. He too
used to state his opinion openly".

IV - SUCCESS OF WINDOW.
Not a Surprise.
134. The dropping of Window by Bomber Command over Hamburg in
the summer of 1943 did not come as a complete surprise to the
German signals organisation. For about a year engineers at the
Technisches Amt had studied the question. The scientists had a
suspicion of the danger to German defensive radar but said
nothing because they did not wish to bring them-selves into
disrepute.
135. Six months before the Hamburg raid their experiments had
proved conclusively what a menace the metal strips
represented. The information was passed to MARTINI, who handed
GOERING a two-page report on the subject, pointing out what a
terrible danger they might be. GOERING was so upset that he
ordered MARTINI to destroy the document at once, and take the
utmost precautions to prevent the enemy from learning of the
discovery.
136. "It was thus extremely difficult", the General said, "to
work out countermeasures because we dared not experiment with
the little beasts for fear of their being discovered. Had the
wind blown when we dropped the metal strips, people would have
picked then up, talked about them, and the secret would have
been betrayed".
137. When the Hamburg raid came there was great excitement
because the signals organisation had not discovered any
countermeasures. GOERING blamed MARTINI again, saying: "The
British have now gone and used the metal strips, so they have
surely got countermeasures against them and you haven't!"

Window Countermeasures.
138. A few days after the Hamburg raid, two scientists
independently worked out countermeasures to Window and the
result was the Würzlaus attachment to the Würzburg and the
Freyalaus attachment to the Freya. When considerable
quantities of Window were dropped, the Würzlaus was swamped,
however, but the Freyalaus still gave results. Finally a
combination of the two, the "K-Laus", was tried out but was
found difficult to handle.
139. The General admitted that no really satisfactory answer
to Window had been found, and doubted whether there could be
one if the strips were dropped in sufficient quantities and
places. The Flak batteries never succeeded in using their own
radar instruments when the Allied air force used sufficient
Window or Chaff, but the aircraft reporting system was at
least able to provide them with rough data on height end
direction.
140. With Koethen Grau apparatus they managed for some months
to get a rough picture despite Window. German night fighters
were on the whole not too much affected by Window and at first
it frequently even gave them a rough idea of where to find the
bomber stream. Their task was then complicated by the
countermeasures of 100 Group, R.A.F. Bomber Command, which
General MARTINI described as outstandingly good.
141. Explaining the lines on which the Germans developed
their radar defences, General MARTINI said that in order to
obtain as early a warning as possible. They built bigger and
bigger apparatus, as the range of the Allied bombers
increased. The Germans thus gradually increased their warning
range from 100 kilometres with the Freya to 300 kilometres
with the Wassermann, the Mammut and the Elefant. The danger of
jamming and bombing was fully realised but the Germans were
glad to have the latter types of apparatus when the British
introduced Window and airborne jamming,
142. Elefant proved particularly useful as it was not jammed
for a long time. Results with Klein-Heidelberg were also good
General MARTINI believed that the apparatus had been invented
by Oberpostrat SCHOLZ, who had the chief merit for jamming
British radar when the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau passed
through the Channel. The General attributed the success of
this operation to the fact that it was started with very
slight jamming which was gradually and almost imperceptibly
increased until it became effective.

Wilde Sau Night-Fighting.
143. The fact that the Germans began to develop Wilde Sau
free-lance night fighting at the very time that the R.A.F.
introduced Window was largely fortuitous. Oberst HERRMANN was
mainly responsible. He said that the night fighter had to take
risks in German Flak areas and shoot down bombers caught by
the searchlights or in the glow of the blazing target. He said
he was quite prepared to do free-lance night fighting of this
nature himself, and did so.
144. GOERING, seeing that far fewer bombers were being shot
down because of Window, encouraged the younger night fighters
to go up over the targets and fight.

V - SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE AND SIGNALS DEVELOPMENTS.
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE.
Work of the Intercept Service.
145. The German Signals Intelligence Service (Luft
Aufklärungs Dienst) was under the operational command of
Oberstleutnant FRIEDRICH, who was subordinate to MARTINI
through Oberst MORGENSTERN; the officer responsible for
discipline and administration of the service was Generalmajor
KLEMME. Coverage of Allied signals was determined by the
Intelligence of the Luftflotten in which the signals units
operated.
146. GOERING himself was interested in the service and
occasionally gave personal orders for some particular activity
to be covered.
l47. Results from the German Signals Intelligence had,
according to General MARTINI, given high satisfaction to
everyone until the last phase of the war, when the service, no
longer able to cope with the enormous number of Allied raids
or to keep track of the continually changing basings of Allied
aircraft, also came in for its share of GOERING's displeasure.
148. Up to this point it had never failed to provide, from
the Battle of Britain onwards, a current and exact Order of
Battle of the British and later of U.S.A.A.F. formations,
including subordinations, the number of squadrons operating in
each sector, and their dispositions and strength.
149. Valuable information on Allied fighters was given by the
interpreters, who were sent up with reconnaissance crews
operating from Norwegian and Mediterranean bases. They were
briefed beforehand in the locations of Allied fighter units in
the operational area, and the frequencies on which the latter
were likely to work. The low number of suitable men available,
however, had confined their employment to reconnaissance
aircraft. The General thought they would have continued to be
valuable as long as air to air and ground communication
remained insecure.
150. The Germans were able to recognise Allied preparations
for taking off, not so much through the pilots' talk as by
observation of small details in point to point traffic. The
slightest carelessness in procedure between two ground
stations, for instance, might suffice to reveal which networks
were active. Then, even though the traffic itself remained
unbroken, time and time again it became possible to draw
definite conclusions concerning the operations involved by the
comparison of traffics occurring in similar form.
151. The General admitted that sometimes the German intercept
service was tricked by British spoof traffic.
152. The very high standard of R/T discipline shown by
British pilots was held up by General MARTINI as a model for
German pilots, who, as a result of the example began to show
marked improvement in the later stages. He considered American
pilots to be about the equal of the German pilots in this
respect.

Employment of Signal Aircraft.
153. General MARTINI thought that experiments with Signals
Ju.52’s had begun in the Spanish war, but in any case
exercises with them shortly afterwards had proved their worth,
and they were used with success in considerable numbers in the
Polish Campaign.
154. Later on, with fighter units being constantly switched
from one area to another out of range of their home stations,
the signals Ju.52's were used to pass information from
Aircraft Reporting Station and ground radar to airborne
fighter formations.
155. As the scale of Allied attacks increased, it became
impossible to protect these signals aircraft on the airfields.
Their signals equipment was therefor made portable, taken out
on arrival at the airfield at which it was desired to operate,
and set up some distance away.
156. Allied bombing was thus responsible for the abolishing
of the signals aircraft, which was used in the later stages of
the war as a transport aircraft.

Liaison with German Navy.
158. All intercepted signals that concerned shipping were
passed immediately to the German Navy, who controlled the
costal observation posts. In general, liaison with the German
Navy in signals matters was very close indeed, key personnel
of both services and the Army often working together on the
same problems.

High Grade Cyphers.
159. The General did not think that Allied high grad Cyphers
had ever been broken, although since he was only concerned
with what came cut he could not speak with certainty. Allied
Cyphers in general were very secure.
160. Prior to the North African Campaign the Germans
themselves introduced the "Sägefisch" for communication over
great distances in the event of cable being rendered
unserviceable.
161. "Sägefisch" comprised a short-wave transmitter operating
in conjunction with an automatic cyphering Machine; it was
efficient only over distances of 250 miles or more. Messages
were typed into the machine in clear, automatically encyphered
and then transmitted. At the other end they were automatically
received, decyphered and typed out by the machine also in
clear, the entire operation taking only a few minutes.
162. Continual watch had been kept by the Germans on their
Sägefisch traffic, and whenever possibilities of the Allies
breaking down the cypher were observed, countermeasures were
immediately taken to render it more secure.

Defensive Measures.
163. Towards the end of the war, with the overwhelming
superiority of the Allied air forces, special efforts were
made to obtain the maximum efficiency from the German
Intercept Service, which was accordingly brought into much
closer co-operation with the Aircraft Reporting Service,
employing visual and radar means for aircraft detection.
164. Radar stations and intercept stations finally worked
together, both at Divisional and Sector Battle H.Q.'s. By
comparison of the intelligence produced by both services, it
was possible to obtain a more accurate picture of the air
situation. In this connection, the General said that Allied
bomber formations could be D/F's to within 1° of accuracy.
165. To ensure that German signals traffic could not help an
eventual enemy to D/F German airfields, General MARTINI laid
it down from the outset that transmitters must not be situated
in their vicinity. Throughout Germany, therefore, the wireless
transmitters were built at least 10 kilometres away from the
airfields. One transmitter station was usually built to serve
several airfields. To maintain land communications during
bombing attacks the decimetre wave point-to-point system,
Richtverbindung, for telephonic and/or telegraphic
communications was extensively developed.
166. In Italy, Allied bombing frequently made it impossible
for the Germans to move along the roads, and telegraphic
communications were wrecked. The Luftwaffe, however, was able
to help the Army out with its Richtverbindungen.

Point-to-Point Communication.
167. The General said that a number of conversations on
Richtverbindungen were held which should not have taken place,
since this method of communications was not secure.
168. Another difficulty with the Richtverbindung system was
that it could be seriously jammed. He believed that the
jamming which actually took place was by chance, and that it
came from airborne transmitters intended to jam the German
ground radars. He even considered organising a raid warning
system on the basis of this jamming.

Spoof before D-Day.
169. Before D-Day the Germans were tricked by a spoof
operation which gave them the impression that a big force was
making for Fécamp.
170. Although many aircraft reporting radars along the coast
had been put out of action by Allied bombing, the General
claimed that there were still sufficient left to maintain the
service. (He said that he was not responsible for the Naval
Radar Service). •
171. During the last few days before the invasion, the radar
operators were often misled to report that something was
coming when nothing was there at all. This was partly due to
the atmosphere, and the radar operators were accordingly
warned to caution when reporting.
172. As a considerable number of jamming transmitters on the
French coast had been destroyed by Allied attacks, the Germans
had to achieve results with mobile ones which were to jam
ground-to-air R/T. They were never used, having possibly been
destroyed on the way to the coast or on their arrival.

SIGNALS DEVELOPMENT.
Allied Bombing.
173. The signals organisation suffered most through the
Allied bombing of wireless valve factories; on the other hand
the General did not think that decisive results could have
been achieved, had the Allies made a concerted campaign
exclusively against the valve industry.
174. The Germans started dispersing stocks after Telefunken
and Lorenz had been severely damaged. A marked shortage of
valves resulted, but according to the General the situation
was never critical. The General admitted, however, that during
the Mediterranean campaign, for a time fighter aircraft were
delivered to Sicily without wireless apparatus.
Low Quality of Radar Operators.
175. It was mentioned to General MARTINI that earlier in the
war, when the Würzburg was captured on the French coast at
Bruneval, the prisoners who were taken with the apparatus were
found to have remarkably little technical knowledge.
176. The General ascribed this to the crisis in manpower
among wireless technicians, which forced him to use unskilled
men and later women as radar assistants.
177. Wireless technicians had to be trained within the
signals organisation, because before the war there were no
radio amateurs as in Britain and the United States. The
activities of all amateurs had been suppressed in Germany "at
the time of the Communist danger".

Failure of HS.293.
176. Lack of success with the Hs.293 radio-controlled glider
bomb was attributed by the General largely to two factors.
Firstly, the Technisches Amt, which was responsible for its
development and production, kept the weapon entirely for
itself. Only when it was realised that there were not enough
frequencies on the radio control of the bomb to make it immune
from jamming, did the Technisches Amt feel obliged to bring
the signals organisation into the picture. General MARTINI
insisted on a number of alterations, but the Hs.293 was
brought out before the radio control had been perfected to
make it free from jamming.
179. Secondly, the Germans had not sufficient numbers of
suitable aircraft from which the bomb could be operated. The
Do.217 with which it was mainly employed was, moreover,
extremely limited in range.
180. The high vulnerability of the Hs.293 to jamming was
accepted by the Germans, who decided that it had best be used
in a heavy surprise attack in an area where immediate
observation by the Allies would be difficult. Norway was
considered to offer best chances of success, and it was
therefore a very unpleasant surprise to the General to learn
that the bomb had been used in the Mediterranean theatre
shortly afterwards.
181. Nevertheless, to render Allied countermeasures as
difficult as possible and in order to camouflage tuning, radio
stations were set up whenever the bombs were being used, and
aircraft were employed with the bombers to transmit on other
wavelengths while the bombs were being armed.
182. In spite of these precautions the General thought that
the Allies might have succeeded in jamming the bomb, owing to
the extreme simplicity of the wireless control.
183. Radio-controlled bombs had been conceived solely as an
anti-shipping weapon, the HS.293 against large transport, the
FX against battleships and armoured vessels of all sorts. They
were afterwards relegated to uses for which they were never
intended - against bridges and other land targets.

Collaboration with Japan.
184. The extent to which the Germans gave their secrets to
the Japanese was not known by the General. He said that early
in 1945 HITLER ordered that all German technical secrets of
short and medium term value should be given to the Japanese.
185. He said that no members of the signals organisation had
left for Japan apart from those who were presumably in the Uboat
which was intercepted by the U.S. Navy in the Atlantic.
186. From a visit to Germany paid by a delegation of Japanese
officers. General MARTINI gained the impression that they were
behind-hand in radar. A Japanese told him that they had
apparatus with centimetre waves, but he could not remember the
details. He regarded the Jagi aerial as very good, but did not
know whether or not the Technisches Amt had received it from
Japan. He was sure that the Japanese had received at least
documents and photographs of German ground radar.

A.D.I.(K)&
U.S. Air Interrogation. S.D. Felkin
21st June 1945. Group Captain"
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G.A.F. INTELLIGENCE

"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 393/1945
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W AS THE
STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO MENTION OF THEM
SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

G.A.F. INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR.

Abteilung Ic (Chief of Intelligence).
1. The present report is the first of a series of three dealing with
some aspects of G.A.F. Intelligence during the War and in the series of
European incidents which preceded it. Whilst this report covers the
vicissitudes of the two Chiefs of Intelligence during the major part of
the War, Generalleutnant Josef ("Beppo") SCHMID and Oberst WODARG, the second and third reports will deal respectively with details of sources
of intelligence and their value to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, and
with the working of Intelligence during the main incidents preceding the
War and in the main campaigns of the War Itself.
2. The information has been supplied by Generalleutnant SCHMID, the
Chef Ic from 1938 to 1942, Oberst WODARG, the Chef Ic from 1942 until
February 1945 and Oberstleutnant KIEMITZ, who worked under both SCHMID and WODARG and finally took over the latter's post. Some additional information was supplied by Hauptmann ZETZSCHE, chief of one of the Groups in the Ic department of Foreign Air Forces West and from
Oberstleutnant OHLETZ who, from January 1941 until March 1943, was
Ic of Luftflotte 6 on the Russian front.
3. The main impression gained from these interrogations is one of two
distinct phases in the fortunes of G.A.F. Intelligence, each the direct
result of the War situation at the time. These two phases fall roughly
into the periods of office of "Beppo" SCHMID and Oberst WODARG.
4. The handling of Ic by SCHMID for the furtherance of personal ends
and as an obliging and gratulatory adjunct to the G.A.F. General Staff
could find no impediment in the rising tide of German success. With the
reversal of fortunes and the ever-widening gap between the wishful
thinking or the General Staff and insistent reality at the fronts,
however, the broad and easy path of SCHMID became a tightrope from which he inevitably fell.
5. It is noteworthy that SCHMID, the close friend of GOERING, departed
to the command of Jagdkorps I with undiminished prestige, whilst WODARG, eclipsed by the glow of a former spurious glory, was left to struggle in evil times to obtain recognition of an unpleasant war situation. At times he was forced to the employment of amazing expedients in order to achieve this end. Since the acceptance of defeat could find no place in
Nazi philosophy it was never possible for the German Intelligence, which
had foreseen defeat as early as 1943, to achieve the prestige,
facilities and effectiveness enjoyed by its Allied counterpart.

THE FIRST CHEF IC - 1938 to 1942.
6. The 5th Abteilung was established as part of the G.A.F. General
Staff on first January 1938 and was to collect information on foreign
air forces and to build up target data for appreciation in air warfare.
The new department was to combine and systematise functions previously
the responsibility of a target data unit and of R.L.M. departments of
foreign air forces.
7. Those two organisations were already known respectively as Gruppe
II of the first Abteilung and the 5th Abteilung, and were manned by
civilians and reserve officers who had large quantities of information
from the foreign press and literature at their disposal, but worked with
no clearly defined aims; their main policy seemed to be deliberate
exaggeration of the strength of foreign countries it order to justify
German armament.
8. An appreciation by Generalleutnant SCHMID of the achievements of
these two organisations up to January 1938 will be found in Appendix I
to this report.
9. The new 5th Abteilung was to be under the command of
Generalleutnant, - then Major, - SCHMID, who since 1935 had been
employed in a ministerial capacity and had no knowledge of foreign
languages. He had, however, been recommended to GOERING by
Oberstleutnant JESCHONNEK, at that time Chief of the 1st Abteilung of
the General Staff.
10. The first task which SCHMID set himself was to replace his staff by
younger and more suitably qualified officers, although these were
difficult to obtain. The organisation of the 5th Abteilung, or
department Ic of the Ops. Staff as it now became, is shown in Appendix
II to this report. After the dismissal of SCHMID in 1944 the department
was reorganised by Oberst WODARG to the form in which it remained until
the closing stages of the war. This aspect is discussed later in this
report and the new organisation appears in Appendix IV.
11. The main departments of SCHMID’s new organisation were set up as a
first echelon at the Wildpark headquarters, and other departments as a
second echelon at the R.L.M. in Berlin. For 21/2 years SCHMID and his
staff lived and worked in the command train which was the "Robinson"
headquarters.
12. By the outbreak of war intelligence departments had also been set
up in the subordinate commands of the G.A.F., but choice and training of
staffs were far from satisfactory, and it was not until 1942 that Ic
(Intelligence) officers were appointed down to Geschwader and Gruppe
levels. Even then the type of officers chosen reflected a lack of
appreciation of the needs of Intelligence.
13. According to Oberstleutnant OHLETZ, the entire Ic service suffered
from lack of experience when the war broke out, since the apparatus to
meet the demands of war was not brought into being, until that time;
from the technical point of view, however, Intelligence had played its
part well up to that time, as, for instance, in that the target indices
available at the outset were good, as were the political and
geographical studies produced.
14. In spite of SCHMID's efforts to introduce younger men into
Intelligence at the time when he took office, his specialist staff was
still mainly composed of older reserve officers, the majority of whom
were lacking in both physical and mental agility. His officers were
blindly devoted to him and appeared uncritical of the course he gave
them to pursue.
15. Actually there was much disagreement in the G.A.F. concerning the
personality of SCHMID. His self-confidence was enormous and his enmity
was feared. By virtue of his double office as Chef Ic and GOERING’s
personal General Staff Officer, he exerted an influence over GOERING
outweighing even that of JESCHONNEK when the latter was Chief of Staff.
The strong tension later existing between SCHMID and JESCHONNEK was
openly discussed. It was also accepted that SCHMID would not tolerate
any officer about him who could become potentially dangerous to his
position.
16. The composition of his staff certainly appeared to bear out this
conviction. By dint bribery, a persuasive tongue and his proverbial
conviviality - was a heavy drinker – he had created about himself a
circle of officers who were completely under his thumb.
17. It is only in the light of this state of affairs that the
discrepancies between the information from intelligence formations at
the front and its dissemination by the Chef Ic to be discussed later in
this series of reports can, to some extent, be understood.

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCES.
18. It was impossible for the 5th Abteilung to achieve the ideal
solution for the collection of intelligence, namely, the subordination
to it of all agencies concerned with the procuring of information.
SCHMID’s suggestion to set up an inter-service department of O.K.W,
which would build up a complete picture of the military, naval, and
industrial potentialities of the enemy met with no more success. The
result was that each service produced a partial appreciation from
available sources, whilst the S.S. maintained a separate agent and
foreign service.
19. The 5th Abteilung sought to administer its own press and attaché
service, the technical study of foreign aircraft and the interrogation
of prisoners. It also claimed that it should be the channel for liaison
with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Propaganda, should have the
right to control sales of German aircraft abroad, and finally that it
should have the sole responsibility for a day-to-day appreciation of the
situation in war. From SCHMID's point of view, however, few of these
matters were arranged satisfactorily.
20. In the spring of 1939 he was able to obtain control of the R.L.M.
press department following upon certain blunders in the censorship, and
in the few months remaining before the War introduced a tighter
discipline.
21. The aims of the press department were to glean information from the
foreign press as well as to conduct propaganda for the G.A.F. in press
articles, pictures and films whilst maintaining a control of the
security aspect and, after outbreak of War, to organise the G.A.F. press
publicity units. The wartime organisation was never clearly defined,
however, being complicated by the rival intervention of the Propaganda
Ministry.
22. Liaison with the Propaganda Ministry produced good results only in
the form of films and other comforts for the troops, but in the
favourable periods of the War the difficulties of propaganda and
censorship were not important. Later, however, WODARG found himself
blamed by GOERING or the Chief of Staff for errors in publication over
which it was impossible to keep a control – a situation which led to
much personal friction.
23. The provision of foreign newspapers was in the hands of the
Sicherheitsdienst and the supply of daily papers for intelligence
purposes was therefore irregular, although periodicals could be obtained
without much difficulty. Liaison with foreign scientific institutes was
forbidden and could only be conducted through the Abwehr.
24. The G.A.F. Attaché Service abroad was subordinate to the Chef Ic,
and was also responsible for securing the confidence of German-allied
and neutral air attachés in Germany. Although the Attaché Service was
regarded as a valuable potential source of information, its
subordination to the 5th Abteilung was not brought about until the
spring of 1939.
25. Its contribution to the information on foreign air forces was very
small both in peace and war. Before 1939, when the Attaché Service had
been subordinated to the central office at the R.L.M., its chief, Major
CRAMON, had refused to regard the obtaining of information as part of
his task, added to which GOERING's attitude had always been to send illqualified officers abroad as air attachés.
26. The importance attached by the head of Ic to the Attaché Service
did not meet with official approval and the Attaché conferences held at
Berlin at which was expressed the dissatisfaction of Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary and Turkey with the lack of German support, were finally
forbidden on account of their political character.
27. The Foreign Office declined to pass on military or air information
via its officials, and only after outbreak of war was closer liaison
effected by setting up a representative (Ic/Pol) who, however, only
covered the rather restricted questions of violations of the frontier,
exchange of prisoners, free passage of ships and listening to enemy
radio.
28. Intelligence officers of all departments had at first been allowed
to listen to the enemy radio, but this was restricted in summer 1942 to
Ob.d.L. and the heads of the Luftflotten and a list had to be sent to
the Propaganda Ministry of all persons to whom this authority was
delegated.
29. SCHMID considered the Abwehr department to be the worst
functioning institution of O.K.W. and stated that whatever material was
supplied by it could not be appreciated at its true value because there
was no way of judging the reliability of the agents. The Abwehr was a
huge and expensive organization but, according to SCHMID, it was manned by the worst and most unsuitable officers in the services. It achieved very little in peace and only occasional chance results in war. At the beginning of the war it had undeserved larols thrust upon it by the
attention paid in enemy countries to the fifth column. SCHMID did not
find it surprising that the S.S. took over the whole organisation with
apparent ease.
30. At the outbreak of war the special photo-reconnaissance Staffel
formerly subordinated to the office of O.K.W. was put under the control
of the 5th Abteilung and became the Ob.d.L. Gruppe. SCHMID praised the
outstanding reconnaissance work of this unit in all theatres of war, as
well as pioneer technical achievements in high altitude flying. The main
sources of intelligence were, however, the wireless interception service
and the interrogation of prisoners of war although the latter did not
produce any outstanding results until towards the closing stages of
SCHMID's period of office.
31. The wireless interception service was developed in peace-time by
General MARTINI and was still controlled by him during the whole of the
war. SCHMID recognised the valuable nature of the work done by this
department, but depreciated the tendency of the Signals Staff to issue
independent appreciations which were necessarily incomplete and
unbalanced. In his opinion much more could have been achieved by its
subordination to an organisation with a wider horizon and more
penetrating aims. This deficiency became even more apparent to SCHMID
when later in the war he became the Chief of Jagdkorps I and was
concerned with defence of the Reich.
32. An appreciation by Generalleutnant SCHMID from memory, and unaided by documents, of Intelligence covered by the organisations mentioned above appears in Appendices III A to C of the present report.

DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE
33. In the early stages of the war the 5th Abteilung was responsible
for drawing up situation reports under the headings of air attacks, air
defence and the sea and land situation. These reports were based upon
those received twice daily from the fronts by the Ic Report Centre and
often had to correct hasty and exaggerated reports which had reached
GOERING through In (Operational channels). When Germany began to suffer reverses in the War the distribution of these Intelligence reports was
restricted and in the spring of 1942 GOERING forbad their publication
altogether.
34. Chef Ic had other tasks which were not purely concerned with the
G.A.F. direction in that he passed Intelligence to interested specialist
ministers and general staffs of German-allied countries whenever it
seemed necessary or opportune, being thereby drawn into conferences
outside the G.A.F.
35. At certain intervals reports were issued by Chef Ic containing a
survey of the position on individual fronts. There were, however, other
bodies which trespassed upon the functions of the 5th Abteilung or
overlapped in the issue of intelligence appreciations. UDET's technical
office under Oberst Ing. TSCHERSICH (GL/Rü) appeared to consider that
its task was to prove that all foreign equipment was inferior to German.
His reports on the excellence of German Intelligence, bombs, and weapons
were preferred by GOERING, and enjoyed great popularity in the period
after the French campaign. This organisation was finally linked up with
the Chef Ic in 1940 and was reorganised with good effect under Oberst
Ing. SCHWEPKE.
36. The head of the O.K.W. Wirtschaftsstab had announced at a
conference in the summer of 1939 that his task in War would include the
conduct of strategic air war-fare. This body did in fact issue reports
on the sensitivity of foreign countries to air attack. A Ic
Wirtschaftsstab was later formed under WODARG, but according to the
staff of Oberstleutnant KILLINGER of Dulag Luft the opportunity of
interrogation of Allied prisoners on industrial subjects was almost
completely neglected; the interrogators could never obtain the necessary
briefing or outside interest for such work.
37. An example of the worth of the Ic Wirtschaftsstab in January 1943
in the form of appreciation of British synthetic oil production and
Russian oil production has recently come to light in a captured document
now in the hands of A.D.I.(K) Document Section (List No.93).
38. In the opinions of KIENITZ, OHLETZ and ZETZSCHE the Ic Service
itself suffered from the fact that its Chief did not present with
sufficient obduracy a plain unvarnished picture of the situation which
was to be concluded from practical experience at the front, and from
indubitable facts photographic reconnaissance and captured material,
underlined by P/Ws’ statements, outside intelligence and above all by
evidence from the wireless interception service.
39. One result of this was that the total numbers of British bombers
engaged in night attacks on Germany was not believed, and when the Chief of Ic confirmed the accuracy of CHURCHIL's figure for the 1000-bomber raid on Cologne in May 1942, he laid himself open to charges of
defeatism and theorising. His reports acquired the reputation of
"Lügenmeldungen" (lies) among members of the Operations Staff, and the
Chief of Air Staff finally ordered that the Ic staff should be cut down
to lessen the output of unpleasant nonsense.
40. In another instance of this kind, which is described more fully in
the final report of this series, disagreement of Luftflotte 6's figures
of Russian strength became so acute that JESCHONNEK ordered an enquiry into the methods of appreciation by Oberstleutnant OHLETZ, the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Luftflotte.
41. The strength postulated by Chief Ic for the Russian Air Force was
but a fraction of the enemy strength actually encountered at the front
and so increasingly worthless did the appreciations become that at the
instance of von GREIM, OHLETZ refrained from handing them down to the
operational units in order that their faith in the Higher Command should
not be further shaken. There were days on which over 100 aircraft were
shot down in the area of Luftflotte 6 alone, whilst Chef Ic was
estimating the total Russian effort as 150 to 200 aircraft on the entire
Eastern front.
42. In order to cover his intelligence officers, von GREIM himself flew
immediately to headquarters to put the case personally. On his return he
informed OHLEZ that JESCHONNEK had recognised the accuracy of the
Luftflotte reports and wished the fact to be conveyed to him; he added
that Oberst SCHMID would not remain in office much longer.

DISMISSAL OF SCHMID
43. Matters were brought to a hold as far as SCHMID was concerned when
in August 1942 an Ic officer of the Attaché Gruppe, Oberstleutnant
SCHULZT-BOYSEF, was arrested by the Gestapo, in agreement with GOERING, on a charge of espionage for Russia. A number of other members of Ic were questioned and altogether at least 100 persons were arrested in Berlin in what became known as the "Rote Kapelle affair".
44. It was established that SCHULZT-BOYSEF, had had sources of
information in the G.A.F. Technical Office, in the Foreign Office and
the O.K.W. although he had not received secret information of any kind
from Ic. Nevertheless, SCHMID was reproached by GOERING and the Chief of Staff for having protected SCHULZE-BOYSEF in 1938 and at the beginning of the war against the suspicions of the Gestapo.
45. In October 1942 SCHMID was relieved of his post, officially because
of the Rote Kapelle affair; in the G.A.F., however, it was considered
that his departure was due to events at the front not having conformed
with his predictions.
46. After SCHMID, the task of taking up the reins of Ic was allotted to
Oberstleutnant KOEGL who, however, was not suited to his duties and
handed them over shortly afterwards to Major WODARG. KOEGL’s short
tenure had one good effect in that it brought Oberstleutnant KIENITZ
more into the picture. According to OHLUTZ that officer was a very
accurate worker, but unfortunately, although undeniably the most
valuable of the officers in responsible positions, did not possess the
particular gifts necessary to make a successful Chef Ic.

WODARG's TENURE OF OFFICE - 1942 to 1945
47. Major WODARG had been deputy head of Ic under Oberst SCHMID and he was also involved in the Rote Kapelle affair and was dismissed at the
same time on a charge of failing to maintain adequate supervision. He
was saved from further punishment only because it was maintained that
meticulous secrecy had been carried so far in the Gruppe Ost and the
Operations Staff that supervision by WODARG had been impossible.
However, 5 months after the dismissal of SCHMID, WODARG succeeded KOEGL as Head of Ic.
48. He took up his duties with remarkable energy and he soon rid
himself completely of the superannuated personal staff of Ic, apart from
a small number of experts, and introduced young and highly ambitious
General Staff officers. By this means he diffused considerably more
energy into the department. Oberstleutnant KIENITZ was available to
facilitate the smooth change-over from the SCHMID regime, and with his
complete mastery of the methods of the past provided a good liaison with
the new generation.
49. A table showing the Ic staff after its reorganisation by WODARG
appears in Appendix IV and may be compared with the organisation under
SCHMID given in Appendix II.
50. According to KIENITZ, WODARG undoubtedly brought the required ideas and breadth of vision to Intelligence. His methods of evaluating the
War situation were completely revolutionary and his appreciations were
built up on the basis of front Intelligence, being given out unvarnished
and untainted by the methods which had played such a big part with his
predecessor. For protection against attempts to oust him from the saddle
he relied on a very close relationship with the ministry of Dr. GOEBBELS
and the Reichssicherheits Hauptamt (security police headquarter).
51. His work was much hampered by his one outstanding peculiarity,
which stamped his department with a certain character. His mind was
imbued with a morbid distrust of the whole world and he suffered from a
form of spy mania which could almost be described as pathological. This
made life very unpleasant both for himself and for those about him. He
had his officers watched continually and he checked every possible
method and procedure with Amt IV of the Sicherheitsdienst in order to be
in a position to cope immediately with any possible threat to himself or
his department.
52. In his relations with GOERING Oberst WODARG was made to feel that
he was an imperfect substitute for Oberst SCHMID the founder and
architect of the Ic Service. WODARG never attended a Führer’s
conference, nor was he allowed in HITLER’s presence because of his
Jewish appearance - he had Jewish connections in both his own and his
wife's family. In the O.K.L. he was the least important personality of
the staff and he himself did not consider that he was the right man,
especially in view of his ill health, to have played an active part in
the shaping of policy and the raising of Ic from its subordinate role in
the councils of O.K.L.
53. In spite of the drive which WODARG brought to Ic and in spite of
his many ideas the work of Ic was doomed to failure in that it had to be
performed at a time when the G.A.F. was at its lowest ebb, when through
lack of air reconnaissance and liaison with Mi1itary Intelligence
services, the enemy dispositions were becoming increasingly difficult to
arrive at. Ides might burst from WODARG in an unfailing flow, but no
sooner did some new factor crop up than the situation grew out of hand
again. That the department functioned with any regularity at all WOGARD
felt was due to Oberstleutnant KIENITZ, who as WODARG’s permanent deputy provided the one stable focal point in the entire organisation.

INTERNAL INTRIGUE.
54. From the time of his own implication in the Russian spy affair,
WOGARD maintained more or less friendly relations with officials of the
S.D. in the Reichssicherheitsdienst Hauptamt, relations which were
fostered by the judicious distribution of delicacies from G.A.F. stores.
Apart from the confession that these occasional visits provided him with
an excuse vis-à-vis the O.K.L. Staff for leisure hours in Berlin or
otherwise unauthorised journeys, WODARG gave three examples of his
exploitation of these contacts.
55. He passed on as a precaution any reports on officers who seemed to
him to arouse suspicion, but often without any further action to be
taken as the investigating authorities were too overburdened. In return
the S.D. sometimes passed to Ic reports of corruption inside the G.A.F.
which were dealt with internally by the O.K.L. without BORMANN being
drawn into the matter.
56. After the bomb explosion in HITLER’s headquarter WODARG shortcircuited the S.D.'s investigations into the General Staffs by himself
undertaking to watch over O.K.L. by means of GOERING’s Forschungsamt.
This telephone eavesdropping was reduced to a farce since there was only
one possibility of listening-in on six exchanges with a daily average of
12-18,000 telephone conversations. Discreet personal warnings were
passed by WODARG to the Air Staff, and a few weeks later the control was
dropped after WODARG had reported to GOERING and so to HIMMLER that the task had been carried out with negative result.
57. In autumn 1944 the Sicherheitsdienst office at Frankfurt charged
Oberstleutnant KILLINGER and his interrogation officers with anglophile
tendencies, defeatism and transgression of service rules. The S.S.
demanded punishment of the offenders and subordination to the S.S. of
the prisoner of war interrogation centre, which WODARG interpreted as a
move by Amt IV of the R.S.H.A. to steal a march on Amt VI. WODARG claims the credit for having taken successful steps to get the matter settled by G.A.F. court martial instead of in the People’s Court.
58. Through his former activity as G.A.F. censor, he was on good
relations with Dr. GOEBBELS, about whom he records the admittedly quite
new point of view that he was personally in favour of coming to terms
with the Allies long before the catastrophic effects of Allied air
supremacy. He had a wholesome respect for Allied statesmen, and warned
against the error of underestimating the enemy. WODARG used his contacts in the Propaganda Ministry, the personnel of which was mainly G.A.F. officers, to play off one government clique against another and to
secure private information which he claims to have used to protect
O.K.L. against the S.S. - until the latter took over all the key
positions in the Propaganda Ministry.

OBERSTLEUTNANT KIENITZ
59. In February 1945 Oberstleutnant KIENITZ was put in charge of Ic,
although he was never appointed Chef Ic. After service as a
Gruppenkommandeur with J.G.3 in the early part of the war he held office
successively under SCHMID, KOEGL and WODARG, being responsible for Order of Battle first on the eastern front and later in the West. From
November 1944 onwards he was WODARG's deputy and right hand man.
60. After taking over from WODARG, KIENITZ very soon came to the
conclusion that the G.A.F. had become a purely ground support air force,
and he therefore directed all his efforts towards the determination of
Allied intentions first in the East, later in the West — as indicated by
the position of new airfields, ammunition and fuel dumps, unit
movements, etc. For this information he relied mainly on the W/T
listening service; the results of his findings he embodied in as air
situation report.

GERMAN INTELLIGENCE – CONCLUSIONS.
61. The mentality of the German rulers, who had risen to power in
internal political strife and were fanatical to the point of despising
the intelligence of the so-called "Intellektuellen", was such that they
were incapable of appreciating an intelligence service of their own
fashioning or of respecting the intelligence service of the enemy.
Otherwise according to WODARG, they would have avoided the War in the
first place, or having recognised the absolute superiority of the enemy,
would have concluded peace earlier - about the beginning of 1942.
62. The General Staff of the G.A.F., in common with the other branches
of the armed forces, was in WODARG's opinion too small and untrained to
assume effective leadership even if the Chief of Staff had recognised
the value of the intelligence service in general or appreciated its work
in detail. Since this recognition was lacking, Ic was inadequately
staffed in comparison with Ia, the operations department. Moreover, the
lack of co-ordination between the sources of information and Ic limited
considerably the latter's ability to draw up a complete intelligence
picture.
63. The activity of the General Staff and particularly the Ic
department was further crippled by HIMMLER's assumption of power over
the State and armed forces, and from spring 1944 onwards the General
Staff had to struggle for existence against the encroachments of the
S.S.
64. Hauptmann ZETZSCHE has summed up the main weaknesses of German
Intelligence during the War in the following main points:-
A) Within the State.
i) There was no hard and fast Ic organisation within the
Wehrmacht with boundaries clearly demarcated from those
of similar civil bodies.
ii) Wehrmachtführungsstab Ic did not co-ordinate the work of
the Heeres-, Marine- and Luftwaffenführungsstäbe Ic, but
was merely a distributing agency for the Ic reports of
the individual Wehrmacht components, exercising
practically no authority over them.
iii) The large number of intelligence organisations in Germany
without clearly defined tasks, including O.K.W./
Amtsgr.Ausland, R.S.H.A. (Mil.Amt), R.S.H.A. (Hauptamt
IV) and Reichsministerium Speer (1. Abtlg). (The
Propaganda Ministry and the Foreign Office also partly
covered the same territory).
iv) The lack of a Ministry of Economic Warfare. Military
Commands were obliged to cope with the problems without
expert knowledge or guidance, (e.g. in the Battle of
Britain). With so many independent intelligence
organisations and no centrally co-ordinated hand the
Germans consequently never saw the enemy picture as a
whole.
B) Within the G.A.F.
i) Again innumerable bodies working over the same ground as
G.A.F. Ops. Staff Ic, TLR Rü, Gen. Nafü, Waffengeneräle,
Forschungsamt, etc. These departments were not
responsible to Ic and on grounds of personal ambition
worked by and far for themselves. All this was due to the
lack of a “man of stature” as chef Ic (GOERING’s phrase).
ii) The not altogether happy organisation of G.A.F. Ops.
Staff Ic (Luftwesen, Ic/See, Ic/Bild).
iii) The subordination of Ic to Chief of G.A.F., whose
decisions were too often swayed by In considerations.
iv) Ic was kept as ill-informed on the subject of German
weapons, apparatus, etc. that it was incapable of
offering suggestions which would otherwise undoubtedly
have arisen from Ic knowledge of Allied material.
v) Ic's tactical suggestions were mainly ignored owing to
the jealousy of the Training Abteilung which again was in
no position to evaluate enemy information since in the
sphere of training too, there were many figures in the
pie (principally those of the Waffengeneräle and Forward
Commands).
vi) Ic was unable to have its wishes carried out by Forward
Commands. It could not order but only request.
vii) The poor quality of Ic personnel. Many officers who were
not wanted by other branches of the service found their
way into the various departments of Ic.
viii) Ic was considerably understaffed. Moreover, such staff
as it had was unevenly distributed in relation to the
tasks.
ix) There were no Ic officers with the flying units, so that
valuable lessons which might have been drawn from battle
experience were lost.
x) The lack of intelligence courses for officers
xi) The insufficient support of Ic in every sphere, e.g. no
aircraft, no cars, no money or additional comforts and
drinks (the latter for P/W interrogation centre,
Oberursel), insufficient communications with Oberursel.
65. Ironically, the sole organisation to recognise the worth of Ic was
the S.S. (since most personnel had connections with foreign countries
and were therefor already under suspicion). Hence the efforts of the
S.S. (by means of agents) to keep a watch on the entire Ic organisation
in Germany and finally even to take it over.

A.D.I.(K) and Walter A. Frank
U.S. Air Interrogation. for:- S.D. Felkin
Group Captain."
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Fighter defence of germany: Control of fighters

"SECRET A.D.I.(K) Report No.525/1944
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION HAS BEEN OBTAINED FROM P/W
AS THE STATEMENTS HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN VERIFIED, NO
MENTION OF THEM SHOULD BE MADE IN INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARIES OF COMMANDS OR LOWER FORMATIONS, NOR SHOULD
THEY BE ACCEPTED UNTIL COMMENTED ON AIR MINISTRY
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES OR SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS.

FIGHTER DEFENCE OF GERMANY

CONTROL OF FIGHTERS BY THE "Y" PROCEDURE.
1. The Interrogation of G.A.F. fighter pilots in the past has
made it possible to form a picture of German tactics against
U.S.A.A.F. bomber formations from the point of view of fighter
interception force. Knowledge by P/W of the raid tracking
organisation on the ground, however, has up to the present
been lacking, and many gaps have remained in the picture,
particularly where the Fühlungshalter (shadowing aircraft) and
the "Y" controlled fighters are concerned.
2. Two G.A.F. Signals Officers, who had been directly
concerned with "Y" control sites - one man was a plotting
officer - have now described in some detail the method of
ground control at present being used in the operation of
fighter interception forces and of the shadowing aircraft;
their knowledge was chiefly confined to methods practised in
France, but they state that the same principles also apply to
operations in Germany.
3. Some of the information is of a semi-technical nature, and
the present report is therefore divided into two parts; the
first part concerns the operational aspect of fighter control,
and the second part deals with the equipment and method of
operation of the unit of control - the "Y" site.

I. CONTROL OF FIGHTER INTERCEPTION.
OPERATIONAL CONTROL.
4. In Allied attacks on Germany, the Jagd Division receives
and plots all Radar information on the movements of the bomber
formations, together with direct reports from the
Fühlungshalter aircraft shadowing those formations and the
plotting reports from the fighter "Y" control sites. It is
primarily on this information that the Divisional commentary
and the control of a whole interception action are based.
5. The sole medium for transmission of the Divisional
commentary is the "Y" site; the latter is connected by
landline to the Divisional plotting centre so that the
plotting of an operation is carried out at both those centres
simultaneously.
6. An interception can therefore be directed either from
Divisional Headquarters or from the "Y" site, but it is
normally the plotting officer at the "Y" site who puts out the
R/T commentary.
7. The area of control ("Führungsraum") of a "Y" site is
limited by the range of the transmitters used, and according
to P/W the average range may be taken as 250 to 300
kilometres; the Division therefore controls an operation over
its territory by making use of a chain of "Y" sites.
8. The area of R/T control of a "Y" site may be increased by
additional ground relay transmitters, known as "Brummer", so
that R/T communications with fighters can be continued outside
normal range. These stations and their operation are discussed
in Part II of this report.
9. The present P/W stated that the Central Operational
Headquarters ("Zentral Gefechtsstand"), situated in the Berlin
area, receives simultaneous information from each Divisional
plotting centre and makes its own plots on that basis; the
fighter commentary on the "Reichsjägerwelle" or such orders as
are put out on the broadcaster "Annemarie" emanate from that
centre, but according to the present P/W are only utilised by
fighter interception forces in case of failure of the
Divisional commentary, or the breaking up of an interception
formation.

"Y" CONTROL OF FIGHTERS.
General Principls.
10. The principles of "Y" fighter control, whereby the range
and bearing of friendly fighter are determined by a "Y" ground
station, are already well known.
11. In operations in Germany, the "Y" site, known as a
"Stellung", usually consists of five separate stations
("Stationen"), each of which comprises a transmitter hut and
mast, and a receiver pylon incorporating a D/F, and rangemeasuring
unit. All five stations are connected to a plotting
room situated on the site.
12. Each station of the site is allotted a separate W/T
channel, known as "Linie", consisting of a transmitter and a
receiver carrier frequency; thus a number of individual
aircraft can be controlled simultaneously within a given area.
13. In order to extend the control of a single aircraft, such
as a night-fighter, to that of a number of aircraft, such as a
day fighter interception force, it is only necessary to
include a "Y" controlled aircraft amongst the fighters of the
formation.
14. In this case the receivers of all aircraft in the
formation wi11 be tuned to the ground transmitter frequency to
receive R/T instructions from the plotting centre as well as
from the fighter formation leader.
15. In this manner up to five separate interception formations
can be controlled, each on a different frequency form a single
"Y" site. If necessary, all five formations can be brought
together to intercept a single bomber formation, or
alternatively, each of the five formations can be despatched
separately to meet the bombers or their fighter cover at
various points.
16. The ground transmitter carrier frequencies, known as the
"Gemeinschaftswelle", are distributed over the 40.4 to 42.3
mc/s. band at intervals of .05 mc/s. and the ground receiver
carrier frequencies, known as the "Messwelle", are distributed
over the 38.5 to 40.4 mc/s. band at the same intervals. A list
of such frequencies numbered 1 to 40, appeared in a recently
captured Signals Order (A.D.I.(K) 4.68/1944, paras.41-42).
17. In operation, the ground transmitter carrier frequency is
modulated by a continuous note of 300 or 3,000 cycles; the
receiver/transmitter in the "Y" aircraft (known in J.G.3 as
the "Lotse" aircraft) receives its modulation and
automatically re-transmits it on another frequency in the 38.4
to 40.4 mc/s. band; the aircraft transmitter frequency is
normally 1.9 mc/s. lower than the ground transmitter
frequency.
18. The re-transmission from the aircraft is picked up at the
"Y" station by the D/F receiver, by which the bearing of the
aircraft is than determined. The same transmission is also
received by the range-measuring unit, and the distance of the
aircraft from the station is determined by measuring the phase
difference of the modulation received.
19. The height of the aircraft under control is not measured
by the "Y" station, but is obtained over the R/T channel from
readings taken in the aircraft, thus all the data required for
the plotting of a controlled aircraft, viz. bearing, distance
and height, are obtained.
20. There are two methods of controlling aircraft formations
by means of the "Y" procedure, and these are illustrated
diagrammatically in Sketch I.
21. The first method, known as the "Begleiter", has now
dropped out of use, but is repeated here as a matter of
interest. By this method, the leading aircraft of a formation,
known as the "Führer" aircraft, also acted as the "Y"
aircraft, whilst the accompanying aircraft of the formation
were known as "Begleiter".
22. In the Führer aircraft the receiver was linked with the
transmitter and the receiver frequency was tuned to the ground
transmitter frequency, whilst the aircraft transmitter was set
to the frequency of the ground receiver.
23. In all other aircraft of the formation the receiver was
tuned to the transmitter frequency of the leader, and in none
of them was the receiver linked to the transmitter. The
formation was thus plotted solely by the position of the
Führer aircraft.
24. The Begleiter method has, according to P/W, now been
replaced by a newer method known as the "Gemeinschaftswelle",
in which the receivers of all aircraft of a fighter formation,
including that of the leader, are set to the ground
transmitter frequency ("Gemeinschaftswelle"). In this method
the aircraft is not the leader of the formation but he flies
as N°2 to the leader, with one or more similar aircraft as
reserves.
25. Upon referring to the Sketch, it will be seen that the
formation leader's instructions are not heard directly by the
"Y" station; they are picked up by the receiver of the "Y"
aircraft (in this case on 41 mc/s.) and automatically retransmitted
(on 39.1 mc/s.) to the ground station.
26. On the other hand, should the pilot of the "Y" aircraft
wish to speak to his own formation leader, he must pass his
message to the ground station on 39.1, mc/s., and the plotting
officer will repeat the message on the Gemeinschaftswelle.
Transmission of Commentary.
27. A plotting officer on the "Y" site, or his counterpart on
the extended line to the Divisions, is provided with
headphones connected to the receiver of the range-measuring
unit, and with a microphone which is connected to the
transmitter.
28. By depressing a key he can link the microphone with the
ground transmitter and can impose R/T speech on the already
modulated carrier frequency which it sends out. It is not
necessary to discontinue the modulating note, so that D/F’ing
and range measuring can therefore proceed at the same time as
the commentary.
29. In practice, the fighter interception force is led by the
"Y" control officer as far as within sight of the bomber
formation, at which point R/T control ceases to allow the
formation leader to direct the combat, and is only taken up
after combat when the fighters have re-formed for a second
interception, and the "Y" aircraft has made fresh contact with
ground control. During this time, however, the ground station
continues to plot the formation through the "Y" aircraft.

Fühlungshalter Aircraft.
30. It will be remembered that when a U.S. bomber force is
reported to be entering German territory a special shadowing
aircraft, the Fühlungshalter, wi11 be sent to meet and follow
that force and report its movements and position.
31. The Fühlungshalter aircraft operates under the control of
the "Y" plotting officer in the manner described above. In the
opening stages of an operation, the Fühlungshalter is directed
to the penetrating formation on the basis of Radar plots, and
upon making contacts it takes up a position usually above and
to the rear of the enemy formation.
32. The Fühlungshalter then reports strength, type of
formation, direction, height and fighter cover of the
penetrating force. After the initial report, further
information is only sent in the event of major changes in the
composition or movements of the U.S. formations.
33. As soon as the Fühlungshalter has made contact with the
bomber formation, all R/T control by the "Y" site ceases; the
Fühlungshalter aircraft communicates directly with Divisional
Headquarters through the receiver of the "Y" station and the
"Y" control officer stands by and listens to the R/T traffic
whilst maintaining a plotting control by the "Y" procedure.
31. According to P/W, the Divisional Plotting Centre at this
stage relies on Radar data for following the formations, and
only depends upon the Fühlungshalter aircraft to supply
immediate details of such circumstances as withdrawal of
fighter cover.

II. "Y" CONTROL SITE, AND IT’S OPERATION.
"Y" CONTROL SITE.
Manning.
35. A "Y" control station requires nine men per shift, or
27/30 men per 24 hour, for its operation and a site consisting
of nine stations is normally occupied by a company of 150/160
operators and 50/60 maintenance personnel. The personnel of
the "Y" control station is distributed as follows:
Transmitter hut: One operator.
D/F Cabin: D/F Operator and log-book
keeper.
Range-Measuring
Cabin:
A Supervisor, range-measurer
and log-book keeper.
Plotting Room: Plotter (friendly plots),
plotter (enemy-plots)
and plotting officer.
Communications.
36. Internal: The standard layout of the internal system of
commutations in a "Y" site is shown diagramatically in Sketch
II. In this Sketch "Station A" shows the general layout
applicable to all five stations, while "Station B" shows a
diagram of the internal communications which are in reality
repeated in all five stations.
37. The internal lines which are shown in the Sketch have the
following names and functions:
(a) Plotting line (Werteleitung): A telephone connecting
the log-book keeper in the D/F cabin to the range-measuring
cabin and "Y" plotting room for transmission of bearing
readings. (R in Sketch).
(b) Telephone (Ringleitung): Connects the D/F cabin, the
range measuring room and the transmitter hut for the passing
of internal instructions. (I in Sketch).
(c) Modulation line (Modulationsleitung): Connects the
range-measuring unit to the transmitter for carrying the
modulation note. (M in Sketch).
(d) Diode line (Diodenleitung): Connects the rangmeasuring
room to the transmitter hut; required only when a
Siemens range-measuring unit is used. (D in Sketch).
(e) Receiving line (Hörleitung): Open line which connects
the receiver and the range-measuring unit to the control desk
in the plotting room; a parallel line also runs to the
Division. (H in Sketch).
(f) Transmitter Circuit (Besprechungsleitung): Open line
which connects the Division and the plotting room to the
range-measuring unit. This can be used as a closed line for
internal speech or as an open line for transmission of R/T
instructions to the aircraft from the Division or the "Y"
plotting officer. (B in Sketch).
(g) Keying circuit (Tastleitung): Open line which
connects the Division and the "Y" plotting officer to the
range-measuring unit and transmitter. Depression of a key at
Divisional Headquarters or on the "Y" plotting officer's
control desk operates relays to the transmitter and modulation
line of the range-measuring unit, allowing R/T instructions
from the Division to be transmitted on the carrier wave to the
aircraft under control. (K in Sketch).
38. According to P/W, the twenty Channels connecting the five
stations of the site to the Division may be carried on two
single lines utilising a multi-channel carrier frequency
equipment.
39. External W/T Channels: The number of external W/T channels
varies, depending on the location of the control site, but
usually consists of the following:-
(a) Command network star (Befehlsstern d. Ln. Regt.) for
reception of tactical orders and general administrative
business from and to the headquarters of the Ln. Regt. to
which the company operating the "Y" site belongs - a Saram or
FuGe.3 set is used for this traffic.
(b) Divisional signals star (Divisionsbefehlsstern), used
for operational orders and transmissions of range values in
the event of failure of the ground lines to the Division. This
traffic is also usually conducted on Saram or FuGe.3 sets.
(c) Aircraft reporting frequency (Frontflugmeldewelle, or
more recently Gerätemeldewelle). On this channel W/T
transmissions are received from all Radar search sites giving
briefly the important data relating to aircraft activity
taking place within the area of the site. This transmission
takes place by day and night and supplements and confirms
information on enemy activity received from the Divisional
Headquarters; messages are written out and handed to the "Y"
plotting officer. A pack type W/T set is used for reception of
this traffic.

Brummer Relay Stations.
40. According to P/W, Brummer relay stations are placed
throughout German territory and are employed for relaying R/T
speech in cases where aircraft have flown beyond the normal
R/T range of the "Y" site.
41. The Brummer stations are connected to the Division H.Q. by
landline and are controlled by the Division; should a "Y"
plotting officer find that an aircraft under his control is
nearing the limit of R/T range, he will request the Division
H.Q., to connect with a Brummer station in the relevant area.
42. Whilst making this request, the "Y" plotting officer
states the frequency on which the "Y" station is operating,
and the Brummer will transmit at that frequency. According to
P/W, the R/T traffic on Brummer stations is usually confined
to directional and homing instructions, although "Y" control
can sometimes continue after the limit of R/T range of the "Y"
site has been reached.

Plotting Hut and Operational Procedure.
43. The plotting rooms of the five stations belonging to "Y"
sites are grouped, in a single hut known as the "Auswertung"
(plotting centre). According to P/W there are two types of hut
at present in use and a plan view of both these types is shown
in Sketch III.
44. The older type of hut contains a separate plotting room
and table for each of the five stations, but this type of
control contra is said to have offered no satisfactory method
of centralised supervision of plots and each plotter had to
act on his own responsibility.
45. The improved type of plotting hut has been developed by
the Flugmeldedienst (aircraft reporting service) and is
believed by P/W now to be widely in use in Germany. In this
type of hut a series of six tables is arranged on one side of
a rectangular room and each table is fitted with the normal
control point and is occupied by an M.C.O. plotter. The chief
plotting officer's table and control point are placed behind
the row of tables in such a position that he has a view of all
proceedings.
46. The reason, for the six plotting tables is that on some
"Y" sites the "Egon" method of fighter control is practised in
addition to the normal "Y" control and an extra plotting table
is set aside for this purpose.
47. According to P/W the Seeburg table has been withdrawn from
the majority of "Y" sites in favour of the present simple
method of plotting. In front of each group of three tables is
a vertical glass screen marked with the German fighter grid
and the main outlines of a 1:300,000 map of the area of
control.
48. Behind each screen are four plotters, three of whom
receive and plot friendly bearing and range values on the
reverse side of the glass screen. Plots are compiled from
range and bearing data in the range-measuring room of each
station and are passed through to these plotters in terms of
the fighter grid; the fourth plotter is responsible for
receiving and marking enemy plots.
49. All plots are numbered and in addition the courses drawn
on the glass screens during each operation are copied on to a
sheet of paper for record and reference purposes.
50. The extremely close and continuous contact with the "Y"
controlled aircraft enables the plotting control officer
immediately to detect any deviation of the aircraft from the
correct course and to rectify the error by ordering a slight
correction of course when necessary.
51. The plotting officer bases his instructions to the
controlled aircraft on the estimated position of the friendly
and enemy aircraft; in doing this an allowance is made for a
delay varying from five to ten seconds between the times of
the observations of enemy aircraft when originally made and
when finally received and plotted. By experience, specific
allowances are made for the extent of the delay from the
various stations supplying enemy plots.
52. When the fighters are nearing the limit of the range of
the "Y" site, the "Y" plotting officer is responsible for
handing the aircraft over to the next station; he must advise
that station, through Divisional Headquarters of the receiver
and transmitter frequencies in use, since the new station may
have been operating on other frequency channels. This step is
taken sufficiently early to allow the new station taking over
control to tune in on the R/T traffic of the controlling
station.
53. The "Y" plotting officer's task ceases for the time being
when the control aircraft or accompanying formation is brought
in sight of the enemy or, in the case of night-fighters, when
the aircraft is sufficiently close to its target to be able to
make an attack with the aid of search equipment.
54. Plotting by the "Y" station continues throughout the
sortie and combat of a fighter interception force, and does
not cease until the aircraft return to base after combat.

A.D.I.(K) S.D. Felkin
23 Sept.’44. Wing Commander"

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