FAA Role in the Pacific.?

[Smudger Smith]

Gents

Had the pleasure this weekend of being introduced to a former US Hellcat pilot who served in the Pacific.


Unlike most Americans, he played down his wartime exploits and was fascinating to listen to. Over a number of pints in our local RAFA Club I began to warm to our American friend and his not so humble son.



However the subject was raised about our own FAA and it’s supporting role in the Pacific and Indian Ocean campaign. I was somewhat taken aback when the same mild mannered Hellcat pilot stated that our FAA was badly lead, used inferior tactics against the Japs and our pilot’s training left a lot to be desired. The most critical remarks we left for the Seafire.



Being a humble RAF Bomber Command researcher I kept silent.



The Hellcats pilots remarks were not said to offend but given in a honest matter-of-fact way.



I would like to know more about this, was our FAA that bad in this theatre of operations. I don’t want a US v FAA debate just some simple answers.



A confused Limey. !!!!



Smudger

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by Smudger Smith

Gents


However the subject was raised about our own FAA and it’s supporting role in the Pacific and Indian Ocean campaign. I was somewhat taken aback when the same mild mannered Hellcat pilot stated that our FAA was badly lead, used inferior tactics against the Japs and our pilot’s training left a lot to be desired. The most critical remarks we left for the Seafire.

I think you mainly have to take that for a piece of oral history from a real participant, for what it's worth. Do you doubt an FAA vet would disagree?
I assume from a fighter pilot these were mainly fighter capability comments.

The FAA didn't operate against the Japanese in prolonged large scale combat before the British Pacific Fleet ops in 1945, only a bit more action before that in real combat than USN non-jeep carriers saw in the Atlantic. Anyway I'm guessing this period is the likely point of reference of this pilot's personal experience.

Most of the BPF carriers had Hellcat or Corsair fighter contingents. Usually it was Indefatigable w/ Seafires and 3-4 others F6F/F4U. So Seafire not a central issue. It was an inferior offensive carrier fighter to the US types because of short legs, but a potentially useful one for defence.

The lower vulnerability of the BPF carriers themselves to kamikaze hits is often remarked on, but I don't know an objective assessment saying the BPF fighter/radar teams were better or worse than USN ones on defence. On offense, the BPF carriers didn't meet much Japanese fighter opposition, especially in the last stage of ops when they operated with the USN off Japan proper in the last weeks of the war. Brown's "Carrier Operations of WWII" mentions only 2 real fighter scraps by the BPF, over Palembang in Jan '45 and one over Japan right at the end of the war. FAA claimed victory in both, but even with benefit of real Japanese losses in each (I don't know them) it seems way too small a sample to analyze v. hundreds of air battles by USN fighters in 44-45.

Generally late WWII USN pilots had more hours upon entering combat than other air arms, often 450hours. I've seen personal accounts of pilots who had 700. I don't think it means FAA pilots were "poorly trained". I don't know the cross section of experience levels in the BPF air groups. I'm going to guess they were generally similar to new US carrier wings at that time, mostly new men, leavening of returning multitour men. But as far as returning men the USN had many more and a much higher % who had seen heavy fighter-fighter combat by 1945 than the FAA had, especially against the Japanese which the FAA had encountered only a handful of times before 1945. Plus other US air groups around when the BPF joined up with the US fleet had seen months of furious combat and were ready to rotate home; I don't doubt those seasoned groups were much more effective than BPF groups, or green US ones (except again the "green" US groups had the benefit of a much larger pool of men who'd seen extensive air combat against the same adversary).

Joe

[Franek Grabowski]

Just to add to what Joe has written, please note that FAA pilots flew Corsairs from carriers much earlier than their US colleagues did. Apparently someone forget to tell them it is not suitable to do so.
The real question is, however, what was the basis of your's vet opinion. Where did he met British sailors, who they were, had he served in combat with them, etc. Various factors mixed with high elan and espirit de corpse could have contributed to such and no different opinion.
PS The bible has quite interesting comments on Seafire IIRC.

[Jim Oxley]

There isn't much written material out there on either the FAA or the BPF's involvement in the Pacific War.

But what is out there is a real eye-opener.

Three books that are a 'Must Have' for anyone who is interested in this subject are:

They gave Me A Seafire, by Mike Crosley. Excellent book that covers his service from the Malta convoys, Torch and through to wars end in the Pacific. He is very critical of the tactics employed by the BSP commanders, in particular Admiral Vain (of Cossack fame) who was Carrier Fleet Commander. His descriptions of combat against the Japanese is rivetting.

Barracuda Pilot, by Dunstan Hadley. Trained on the ungainly Barracuda Hadley formed a very strong attachment to this plane - warts and all. His tour of duty was mostly confined to the Pacific, and his vivid recounting of raids on Sumatra and Sigli are great reading. Interestingly Hadley too is very critical of the use Britiah Admirals made of the FAA in the Theatre, and draws several cutting comparisons between how the FAA was utilised and how the USN applied their aircraft.

Grave Of A Dozen Schemes - British Naval Planning and the War Against Japan, 1943-1945, by H. P. Wilmont. Definitely read the other two books first, at least that way you will enjoy them. Because after reading this book you will be far to amazed and frustrated by how inept the planning staff and admirals were in trying to conduct an offensive war against the Japanese, and their total lack of understanding on the proper utilisation of air power (FAA).

The history of the RN in the Med and Atlantic is rich and glorious. But in the Pacific in the late war years it was plagued by poor leadership, outmoded planning, political manoeuvering and downright ego posturing. The last in trying to compete against the far better equipped and more experienced USN.

[JoeB]

Originally Posted by Jim Oxley

There isn't much written material out there on either the FAA or the BPF's involvement in the Pacific War.

He is very critical of the tactics employed by the BSP commanders, in particular Admiral Vain (of Cossack fame) who was Carrier Fleet Commander. His descriptions of combat against the Japanese is rivetting.

Interestingly Hadley too is very critical of the use Britiah Admirals made of the FAA in the Theatre, and draws several cutting comparisons between how the FAA was utilised and how the USN applied their aircraft.

..after reading this book you will be far to amazed and frustrated by how inept the planning staff and admirals were in trying to conduct an offensive war against the Japanese, and their total lack of understanding on the proper utilisation of air power (FAA).

The history of the RN in the Med and Atlantic is rich and glorious. But in the Pacific in the late war years it was plagued by poor leadership, outmoded planning, political manoeuvering and downright ego posturing.

I'll have to add those books to the list. But it seems the criticisms you mention tend to be on the level of strategic/operational employment of the FAA, perhaps the fact that by any account it had a minor role in the Pac War when perhaps it could have played a bigger one. But I assumed from the opening post a USN vet would be criticizing on a more tactical level (but maybe a well read vet criticizing on a higher level). For example "poor leadership" I took to mean perhaps sdn CO's or even division leaders as opposed to admirals. Here's where it seemed to me the limited action the FAA saw, which itself might be criticized in terms of its potential, especially in offensive fighter ops (the truly devastating forte of the USN air groups v. the Japanese), would make it hard to assess that. Beside the obvious disparity in cumulative experience in that regard by 1945. As mentioned the FAA had glorious achievements in Europe but relatively little offensive fighter or really much of any fighter v fighter action in WWII (some incidents but tiny fraction as many as USN, carrier war in ETO/MTO a very different one than PTO).

Unless he was commenting on defensive actions against air attacks on the carriers, where as I said I've never seen a comparison. Ca. 1942 Med convoys the RN was ahead of the USN in fighter/ship radar intercept, in 1945 the USN generally had better radars and a lot more cumulative volume of experience, perhaps this reversed.

Again maybe I'm jumping to a narrow conclusion what the F6F pilot meant.

Joe

[Smudger Smith]

Gents,



In fairness to the F4F pilot (who’s name I am withholding for obvious reasons) his main criticism was directed at the attitude of the RN / BPF admirals and their rather snobbish and opinionated attitude. ( Nothing new there )



His opinions were formed I believe from a joint British / American operation in July / August 1945. I have no other details.



We did not discuss the attributes of the FAA over the Atlantic or in Europe.

From what I have read of the posts, there is some truth in his opinion.

A question if the BPF were operating similar aircraft types as the Yanks, on similar operations, against similar targets, why was our tactics so very different. Did we not take advice from our American Allies, it would not be the first time after all. ?

[Jim Oxley]

Originally Posted by Smudger Smith

A question if the BPF were operating similar aircraft types as the Yanks, on similar operations, against similar targets, why was our tactics so very different. Did we not take advice from our American Allies, it would not be the first time after all. ?

The whole set-up of the BSP was totally at odds with the highly sophiscated and extremely advanced USN operation.

The RN, although they had lead the way of carrier development in WWI and the early 20's, fell well behind in design and tactical application from the early 30's, and never regained that prominance. By the start of WWII both Japan and the US were streets ahead in all areas.

The RN used, poorly, it's carriers in penny packet operations. A Malta convoy containing 2 carriers was considered a very large task force. There was no Fleet practice, or Task Force. It's aircraft were of short range, were poorly designed, it had almost no radar control defence system and the powers that be held the belief that in anti-aircraft defence the AA gun was superior to using it's own aircraft. Hence RN carriers had a preponderence of strike aircraft as opposed to fighters on board. And it's aircraft carrying capacity was limited to aproximately half that of IJN or USN Fleet carriers. In addition RN carriers were of limited range, and relied on replenishment from bases on shore. there was no fleet replenishment, and no fleet train. Also RN carriers had no provision for air-conditioning, of which both the IJN and USN did.

Even at the start of the war both the IJN and the USN were more advanced in the use of carriers - the IJN especially so. The USN quickly caught up tactically. More importantly the USN, operating in the Pacific over vast differences, had two years to develop a very sophiscated supply chain that could replenish carriers well away from base, could replace aircraft and crews at the front (wherever it may be), carry out minor repairs and maintain the fleet.

The BSP had no such organisation, worse it had made no effort to develop one. Given that the BSP had been based in the Indian Ocean since 1942, and was fully aware of the trend of carrier application as used by the USN, makes this oversight all the more glaring. Admittedly the BSP had to fight London for any resource allocation of ships and material, being lowest on the priority list. Nevertheless it was a failiure by RN staff.

After June 1944 the Admiralty could allocate many ships to the BSP, and did so. The FAA was finally receiving dedicated naval aircraft in quantity eg F6F, F4U, TBM etc. Spitfires were still retained, as were the Barracuda. When the BSP finally started major offensive operations in 1944 against the Japanese it still had some many problems.

Logistics remained the major limitation. A patchwork quilt of ships was put together for supply, drawing on basically an free merchantman in the pacific under British control. Sydney was the closed major base for the RN, thousands of milse from the front by late 1944. Aircraft carrying capacity remained a bugbear, and the AAA capability of a RN carrier was well below that of a USN carrier. In several instances it was the armoured decking of the RN carriers that saved them when confronted by kamikaze in '45.

And only one carrier captain was a flyer. All other, including commanding admirals, were not carrier qualified. And this often led to a lack of appreciation of the problems of aircraft operation from carrier decks, affecting tactic's, comditions of operation and most importantly por co-operation when involved with USN carriers.

Yet despite all this the FAA did achieve many great things in the Pacific. And developed a record it can be justly proud of. It is understandable though that in American eyes the BSP is seen as rather ineffective.

After all the USN by 1945 was fielding a navy of almost 600 ships at the front (well over a thousand if supply ships are counted), including 30 odd carriers of various sizes. By comparion the BSP had 6 carriers and less 100 ships (including supply) under it's control. Barely a Task Force by USN standards.

Phew! A bit long winded. This is just touching on the subject. Read the books mentioned for a far greater appreciation of the trials and tribulations of the BSP. Additional to those are a few more.

The Aircraft Carrier Story 1908 - 1945, by Guy Robbins

Sunburst - The Rise Of Japanese Naval Airpower 1909 - 1941, by Mark Peattie.

[klemen]

Maybe you will find this rather long article/report interesting from London Gazzette. It is a report by Admiral Sir Arthur J. Power, K.C.B. , C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, written on 14th March 1945. The article/report describes the British carrier attack on Palembang, Pladjoe and some other targets on Sumatra in January - February 1945.

URL: The carrier-borne aircraft attacks on oil refineries in the Palembang (Sumatra) area in January 1945

Hope this helps to answer some questions.

lp,

Klemen

[JeffK]

Picked up an interesting Magazine/Book a few years back.

"The British Pacific & East Indies Fleets-The Forgotten Fleets" 50th Anniversary

It has a number of articles by various contributors, plus a lengthy list of vessels involved.

One major thread is that the RN Carriers had short endurance and the Fleets Train to support the BPF was hastily cobbled together.

[KEEP_FALKLANDS_BRITISH]

Sorry But I’m about to have a massive rant.And I Can’t Stop when I get going.

In my opinion the FAA in the Pacific went pretty well.Considering the fact that
They weren't in the "Pacific War"in the actual Pacific Ocean for as long as their US counterparts(or contributed as much).The FAA aircraft managed to shoot out of the skies 112.5 Japanese aircraft.And the FAA in the invasion of Okinawa subduing Japanese air activity from the airfields located on Okinawa Itself.And the SeaFire proved itself as a fighter when it shot down 12 Japanese aircraft with the loss of only one Seafire.TAnd the BPF possessed better armoured carriers than the Americans, The BPF carriers had armoured decks which helped against the kamikaze attacks whereas the Americans had lightly armoured decks which proved critical later on.he FAA were also involved in the attacks on Sumatran Oil Fields.The Picture shows an attack of the FAA on the Sumatran Oil Fields.
This Picture Shows F4u Corsairs of The Royal Navy In British Pacific FLeet markings.There were 42 FAA squadrons serving in the Pacific aboard 17 aircraft carriers.They FAA did a whole lot more in the Pacific but I don't have time to type up stuff about them because I'm late for a School Function.

HMS Formidabble going through the Anti- Submarine boom in Sydney Harbour.

The Carrier HMS Collossus Which served in the BPF.


HMS Indefatigable In Sydney Harbour.



The deck of a British Carrier off the Shore of Japan.

So you see the FAA Served well in the Pacific and Gave a great much of assistance and help to the Americans by using their own[FAA] aircraft to
take out other targets while the US took out other targets without having to stretch themselves to thin.And The FAA also provided invaluable air cover over the allied fleet.