Any dispute about interpreting the BofB?

[Juha]

Hello CJE
in fact there is lot of info on Seelöwe plans, also one find info on planning conferences from Halder's memoirs. The interesting point is that there were not many combined planning sessions but Heer, KM (which tried activitely torpedo the operation for well known reasons) and LW mostly worked out separately their plans.

Juha

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

iirc

Didn't high octane fuel and new props (from the USA) have a direct impact for fighter command in the summer of 1940?

Surely the point is that even if they had come from the USA, they would have been paid for in dollars/gold on the barrel-head (like the German machine tools, if there were any, used in Spitfire and Hurricane production).

Ponting categorises August 22, 1940 as "one of the most significant yet least famous in British history", because on that date the War Cabinet was given the Most Secret 7-page Treasury Paper 'Gold and Exchange Resources' (CAB 66/11, WP (40) 324). This paper predicted that in 3 to 4 months Britain would run out of foreign exchange and gold, leaving two options; become a dependency of the USA, or make peace with Hitler. Of course we chose the first.

I am trying to work out whether Britain's appalling choice (not appalling but rather interesting to Churchill) was inevitable. It would seem not necessarily to have been so.

If, as we appear to agree, the BofB was not a close run thing, then Britain could have avoided invasion without incurring all of the bankrupting costs associated with making FC a world-leader. With the money saved, Britain would have had enough time to make itself secure in North Africa and Singapore. It would have done this by going on to Tunis instead of to Greece after the victory of Wavell and O'Connor in Operation Compass. The elimination of an Italian presence in North Africa would have removed the possibility of Rommel's arrival, and infinitely simplified and cheapened Britain's strategic task.

Hitler would then have invaded Russia, and Japan would have attacked the USA, leaving Britain to negotiate from strength with the USA and/or with whichever side won the Russo-German war (hopefully neither). If Germany had succeeded in taking Moscow, Leningrad and the Baku oilfields before winter 1941 (a development that would have been more likely given the time and resources saved by avoiding the Balkan and North African diversions), and if Germany had threatened the Persian oilfields in 1942, then the USA would probably have decided to engage in the Middle East to save itself.

In this scenario Britain would have retained its independence, and still been on the winning side. That is my line of thinking.

Tony

[Bill Walker]

We may think the BoB was a "slam dunk" today, but British leaders at the time had to consider the possibility of Germany prevailing in the air and then launching an invasion. American money and goods were needed for more than Fighter Command - you needed convoy escorts in order to feed Britain and to re-equip the British Army brought back from the continent, and there was a war in the Middle East to consider, plus probably other concerns. Read any of Churchill's correspondence to Roosevelt during this time, and you will see he was much more worried about convoys than he was about the Luftwaffe.

I think one of your statements may be a gross over-simplification: "With the money saved, Britain would have had enough time to make itself secure in North Africa and Singapore." How much would have been saved? How much was needed to secure North Africa and Singapore? How much of the saved money would be spent in the US to secure North Africa and Singapore? Do we have numbers?

[tcolvin]

You forget the war in the ME would have been shut down by taking Tunis (which would have happened if Churchill had refrained from his bizarre idea of ordering Wavell to send the army to Greece).

Building up the RCN would have saved the convoys, which is what actually happened, while building up the Indian Army and Indian industry would have saved the far East.

These were the options proposed at the time by the Chiefs of Staff, but overruled by Churchill who insisted on a) Balkan intervention b) building up Bomber Command at enormous cost and c) creation of Commandos and SOE "to set Europe ablaze". All three Churchillian strategies were failures, and he was told at the time not to go there.

Tony

[Kutscha]

Incurring all of the bankrupting costs associated with making FC a world-leader assured the defeat of the Luftwaffe and thus no chance of a German invasion of GB.

- 7 February: Italian Tenth Army surrenders
- 9 February: Churchill orders halt to British and Australian advance at El Agheila to allow withdrawal of troops to Greece
- 14 February: First units of the under Erwin Rommel start to arrive in during Operation Sonnenblume

Do you really think the British forces could have traveled the ~800 miles from El Agheila to Tunis in time to stop Rommel unloading his troops?

[Kutscha]

Of coarse, all that money could have been spent on American dive bombers instead of fighters and level bombers. But then, there would have been no fighters to protect the dive bombers and and German industry would be able to produce war material unimpeded from RAF BC. Then there is the resources Germany could have used elsewhere that were drawn off to combat BC.

Building up the RCN would have saved the convoys

How would that have been done. British shipyards were full of construction and Canada didn't have the shipyards. Maybe American shipyards could have helped with building up the RCN, at least before Dec 7 1941.

[tcolvin]

Kutscha, you're being unduly pessimistic.

There was more time to get to Tunis than you give credit.
Only Recce troops and anti-tank guns arrived on 14 February.
The 5th Light Division's tank regiment did not arrive for nearly a month after that - March 8 and 10. They would have had to fight their way ashore against dug-in Matilda IIs and anti-tank guns

The first Canadian built Flower Class corvettes were commissioned in November 1940, and they did actually save the convoys.
see http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/canada/ww2/flower/
The USA contributed the square root of FA to the early battle of the Atlantic - few of the 50 rust-bucket four-stackers that were sent in exchange for bases were actually used, and only after they had been refitted at great expense.

Dive-bombers would have been needed when the British Army eventually met the Germans, if ever - which is the point you're overlooking.

Tony

[Kutscha]

There was 13 Flowers commissioned in Canada in 1940. Only 9 of these could be used in convoy escort after finishing training since the others were land locked by ice or on the west coast.

In the later part of 1941, there were so many corvettes alongside at St John's for repairs that senior British and American officers wondered if the RCN could maintain its commitment to ocean escort convoys. This was mainly do to mill scale due to hasty wartime construction.The RCN had expanded so rapidly, proper training was lacking and most of the sailers had never been on a ship before setting foot on the deck of the ship they had been assigned to. The telephone pole gun is no myth.

You should read 'Corvettes of the RCN, 1939-1945' ISBN 0-90277-83-7

How reliable were British tanks?
How many Matildas would have been waiting after a dusty 800 mile road trip?
Not all of the Italians had surrendered.

Pessimistic. Not at all Tony. More of a practical realist not prone to fits of fantasy.

Wasn't it a British politician that said 'peace in our time'?

[tcolvin]

You originally said, incorrectly, that Canada hadn't got shipyards so could not have built up its anti-submarine capability. Now you're saying correctly that the RCN had teething problems when building up its capability.

Have a look at the Wikipedia conclusion, which correctly states that Britain and Canada sorted out the convoy problems without significant US help;
"The disastrous convoy battles of October 1940 forced a change in British tactics. The most important of these was the introduction of permanent escort groups to improve the co-ordination and effectiveness of ships and men in battle. British efforts were helped by a gradual increase in the number of escort vessels available as the old ex-American destroyers and the new British- and Canadian-built Flower class corvettes were now coming into service in numbers. Many of these ships became part of the huge expansion of the Royal Canadian Navy, which grew from a handful of destroyers at the outbreak of war to take an increasing share of convoy escort duty. Others of the new ships were manned by Free French, Norwegian and Dutch crews, but these were a tiny minority of the total number, and directly under British command. By 1941 American public opinion had begun to swing against Germany, but the war was still essentially Great Britain and the Empire against Germany."

Matilda IIs were reliable, and would have been moved up on tank transporters and/or by sea before the Stukas arrived in Sicily. Note what the Russians said;

"In the USSR, the first Matilda arrived in autumn 1941 – just in time for the beginning of the battle for Moscow – and come at an opportune moment. During the 1941-1943 period of the Red Army received 1,084 tanks of this type. The Soviet tank crews appreciated the heavy armor (same as in Soviet KV) and high reliability of the power plant “Matilda.” British 2-pound cannon to armor penetration in no way inferior to the national 45-mm and up to mid-1942 could affect all types of German tanks".
source: http://socyberty.com/military/infantry-tank-mk-ii-matilda-ii-a12/

I don't think you have yet justified your accusations of "fits of fantasy". The British Army was on its way to Tunis to kick the Italians out of North Africa when Churchill ordered it to Greece. The Army and the Chiefs of Staff were sure they could do it, and no one has questioned this judgment, before your posting here that is. The British Army had just destroyed the Italians in Egypt in a clear demonstration of their complete superiority, and the Italians saw the writing on the wall - hence their desperate appeal to Hitler to come and save them. But if the British had gone straight to Tunis, Hitler would surely have "missed the bus" (which is, by the way, what the same British 'peace in our time' politician said about Hitler in the Norway campaign).

Tony

[Juha]

Hello Tony
I were surprised on your quote on Russian oppinion on Matilda, because it was contrary to what I have learn earlier, but looking your link, straight after your quote are the normal Russian complains on Matilda:

The main complaint of the Soviet tank crews arrived on the chassis. The smooth solid surface, it behaved perfectly on the roads as quickly broke down. In Russia, revealed a more specific one drawback: the fall and spring mud, which clogs day between the bulwarks and hull at night at low temperatures froze and deprived tank able to move. In fairness it should be noted that the tank was created without considering the peculiarities of Russia’s climate, to another army, and not for the Russian ( “barbarian” from the standpoint of the British) the operating conditions . However, the low reliability of the chassis and complained about the British tankers. Assign the same to the shortcomings of a small speed “Matilda” is impossible – a tank designed to accompany the infantry and in that capacity should have been applied. All cases of “Matilda” for other purposes (which is very often occurred on the Soviet-front) led to unnecessarily high losses.

Read more: http://socyberty.com/military/infant...#ixzz10P9P5imb

In fact the reliabilty of Matilda II was also problem in France 1940. The only British tank which Russians liked and demanded more was Valentine. But we are now quite far away from BoB.

Juha