356th FG: A 'hard luck group'?

[NickM]

Guys:

Going over my old copy of Mighty Eighth & came across the somewhat less well known Fighter Group, the 356th; supposedly the 8th AF Fighter Group with the worst vic to loss ratio in air to air combat...so(since I sort of like 'underdog/underachiever' stories) I have to ask the following questions:

Was it just because they had trouble coming to grips with the Luftwaffe or did they actually get outfought or did they end up getting 'shut out' by more aggressive groups? Or did they simply have bad luck?

Could anybody recommend any bios for any 356th Men?

Finally: Are there any 9th AF FGs or 2TAF squadrons that were in the same category?
Thx

NM

[Alain57]

Hello ,

Here some info on the 356 Fg over Belgium :

10/01/1944
Maaseik
P-47D-5-RE
Flak / Escorte
42-8639 / 356FG/359FS
1st Lt Brown William.F. ( KIA ) 0-796657 Pensylvania
MACR 1736
First buried St-Trond airfield , later Ardennes cemetery D/5/37


20/03/1944
Beauvechain
P-47D-6-RE
Flak and bailed out / Escorte Lissendorf
42-74662 / 356FG/360FS
Martelsham Heath
1st Lt Mc Cullough Philip E ( WIA- POW ) 0-796002 Massachusetts Luft 3
Wounded on his foot and brought to the St-Gilles hospital in Brussels
MACR 3397


20/03/1944
Wemmel
P-47D-6-RE
Hit by Flak from St-Trond airfield / Escorte
42-74646
356FG/361FS
QI-I
Cpt Porter Jr Frederick S (POW) 0-025502 Connecticut Luft 1 MACR 3396










20/03/1944
Loksbergen
P-47D-6-RE
Hit by flak from St-Trond airfield / Escorte
42-74638 / 356FG/360FS
Bessie /Nashville Belle
1st Lt Garvey Charley J. Jr. (POW) 0-797664 04/11/1920 North Carolina Luft 3
MACR 3395 / Died in march 1980 at Seymour Tenessee

22/03/1944
Neerwinden
P-47D-2-RA
Hit by flakk from St-Trond airfield
42-22535 / 356FG/360FS
F/O Maupin Howard P. (EVD) 0-122889
MACR 3394
05/05/1918 Bradford Illinois - 27/02/1980 Galva Illinois

22/03/1944
Machelen
P-47D-11-RE
42-75553 / 356FG/361FS
1st Lt Bell DeWitt T Jr (KIA) 0-810461 Georgia 10/
First buried at Evere on 24 march 44 later Ardennes cemetery, then to the US / MACR 3398

14/06/1944
Tessenderlo -Engsbergen
P-47D-11-RE
Mechanical problems - Bailed out
42-75273 / 356FG/ 360FS
PI-P
1st Lt Phillips Fred C.Jr ( POW ) 0-818419 North Carolina Stalag 2B MACR 5752 - Call sign Vortex Green 4





30/06/1944
Zemst
P-47D-21-RE
Flak / Escort area patrol
42-25508 / 356FG/359FS
OC-O
1st Lt Earnhart Charles B. (EVD) 0-2045074
MACR 6551
15/05/1918 Rock Hill North Carolina / 01/09/2004 Hohenwald Tennessee , buried

01/09/1944
Hove-Marcq
P-47D-22-RE
Emergencylanding after strafing enemy convoy
42-26141 / 356FG/359FS
OC-I
Fearless Fosdick
1st Lt Forsyth Frank A. (EVD)
MACR 8549

21/09/1944
Mons
P-47
Flak / Escorte Bielefeld
44-15354
356FG/361FS
QI-Y
1st Lt Higginbotham Merrion "Sim"(OK) Regards

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by NickM

Guys:

Going over my old copy of Mighty Eighth & came across the somewhat less well known Fighter Group, the 356th; supposedly the 8th AF Fighter Group with the worst vic to loss ratio in air to air combat...so(since I sort of like 'underdog/underachiever' stories) I have to ask the following questions:

Was it just because they had trouble coming to grips with the Luftwaffe or did they actually get outfought or did they end up getting 'shut out' by more aggressive groups? Or did they simply have bad luck?

Could anybody recommend any bios for any 356th Men?

Finally: Are there any 9th AF FGs or 2TAF squadrons that were in the same category?
Thx

NM

First, Kent Miller wrote an excellent history of the 356th FG so look to his book first.

Second, The 8th AF FC had a variety of leadership styles ranging from Zemke/Blakeslee who were very aggressive about going after the Luftwaffe - early before the Doolittle 'set 'em loose' memo in January 1944. When they engaged, they pursued and stayed engaged..

Others were more reserved about responsibility to protect the bombers... and frequently the squadron leaders were positioned within the group with the same attitude. When opportunities to bounce occurred, these leaders would drive the German fighters away but often not pursue. IMO The 356th fit this profile with Rau and Malstrom.

One other wild card factor - the arrival of the Mustang and replacement of the Jug. With the exception of the 56th FG, which had a huge lead over the 357th, the 4th, the 352nd and 355th FG, the P-47 equipped groups were relegated to Penetration and Withdrawal support. Because of the range the 56th Jugs were also doing the Penetration support, but mostly in the lead of the lead Task Force - and got more chances at scoring than the other Jug groups.

Four of the top five air to air scoring groups were groups that converted by April, 1944 and engaged in the big air battles far out of range of the P-47s.

Of the top five air to air groups, the 355th was closer in leadership under Col Cummings to the 356th - namely drive 'em off and return - but he had squadron commanders that were more aggressive (IMO) than the 356th FG.

The 356th dramatically improved when it received the P-51 in November of 1944 but at that time only the big battles of November and December were available.

[Graham Boak]

I have long felt that Doolittle's "freeing the fighters" rule was only possible because of the increase in the numbers of fighters available. Groups could go "freehunting" because others were available to stay with the bombers. Unescorted bomber groups suffered.

There's a similar logic in the Atlantic convoy battles. Success came to the Killer groups that went away to fight the U-boats, but they could only do that because there were enough other escorts to stay with the convoy. That and the code-breaking successes that told them where to go to find the U-boats, but I can't find an analogue to that in the air battles!

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

I have long felt that Doolittle's "freeing the fighters" rule was only possible because of the increase in the numbers of fighters available. Groups could go "freehunting" because others were available to stay with the bombers. Unescorted bomber groups suffered.

There's a similar logic in the Atlantic convoy battles. Success came to the Killer groups that went away to fight the U-boats, but they could only do that because there were enough other escorts to stay with the convoy. That and the code-breaking successes that told them where to go to find the U-boats, but I can't find an analogue to that in the air battles!

Graham - I just wrote a much lengthier reply but the damned thing is lost in the ether.

Restated, Doolittle did not have critical mass in escorts. To prosecute his directive he needed fighters over the targets where the LW was waiting. He needed them on the deck on the way home shooting up airfields and catching the LW taking off and landing or refueling.

Unescorted bombers suffered all the way to the end even though the instances were far fewer than during the big battles of the winter/spring 1944.

What was different for Doolittle was a.) the promise of long range capability of the Mustang combined with superior performance and reliability over the P-38, b.) the mandate that the LW had to be defeated prior to D-Day no matter the cost, c.) an acknowledgment that his orders to 'destroy the LW in the air and on the ground' accompanied by his encouragement of the Fighter commanders to seek out the LW - would cost his bomber command higher casualties.

Remember that when Doolittle assumed command of the 8th AF, there were only two P-38 groups operational - to escort 30+ bomber groups over a widely dispersed target selection for every Field Order. The newly arrived 354th FG belonged to the 9th AF and the soon to arrive 357th FG also belonged to the 9th. He swapped the soon to be operational 358FG for the 357th, agreed with 9th AF to 'trade' P-47s in 8th AF to 9th in exchange for P-51s and planned the conversion of 4th, 355th and 352nd FG to the now re-allocated Mustangs and did so in last week of February through mid April.

So, Operational target escorts in January - 354FG Mustangs, 20th and 55th P-38s
February - 354 and 363rd (9AF) and 357FG (4th received in last several days of Feb) P-51s, 20th and 55th P-38s
March - 354, 357, 4th plus 355th second week P-51s, 20th, 55th and 364th (second week) P-38s
April - add the 352nd FG and remove 363rd FG.

So to escort bomber stream from western GY to furthest reach of the Reich miles to many different targets (80 mile stream for 200-400 miles)
Jan - ~ 120 escorts - effectives about 60-70% of forces dispatched
Feb - ~ 200- 220 - effectives about 70%
March ~ 320-360 - effectives about 75%
April ~ 360+

What this means is that usually there were approximately 100 escort fighters per bomb division to cover a 20+ mile bomber stream - and be prepared to meet a well executed interception by LW in stronger force.

The U-Boat/Hunter analogy only works if one group of convoy escorts take their convoy to Mid Atlantic and turn back, while the new escorst pick them up for remainder of trip and dispatch Hunter units while main escorts remain with convoy?

[Graham Boak]

Thanks for the information.

We shouldn't push analogies too far. No, I don't think the changeover freed any escorts for hunter-killer groups. There were simply a lot more escorts available. A group could be detached to keep a U-boat down long enough to force it up again: an under-escorted convoy could not spare the escorts long enough. This can be seen in the number of kills awarded to the later faster later Captain class (US DEs) rather than the earlier ones, which being slower could not be spared away for as long because of the extra time they would take to catch up. Which isn't quite the same as dedicated h-k groups, but makes similar points. And doesn't read across at all....

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

Thanks for the information.

We shouldn't push analogies too far. No, I don't think the changeover freed any escorts for hunter-killer groups. There were simply a lot more escorts available.

I agree - I was just trying to extend the 8th AF escort tactics of short range fighters (along with RAF and 9th AF P-47s) to overload Penetration and Withdrawal to your Destroyer escort analogy... and show the difficulty in contrasting the two.

A group could be detached to keep a U-boat down long enough to force it up again: an under-escorted convoy could not spare the escorts long enough. This can be seen in the number of kills awarded to the later faster later Captain class (US DEs) rather than the earlier ones, which being slower could not be spared away for as long because of the extra time they would take to catch up. Which isn't quite the same as dedicated h-k groups, but makes similar points. And doesn't read across at all....

Graham - now the analogy withers away completely. In fact if the LW overloaded the escorts then it was an all out battle with substantial LW assets breaking through and causing heavy damage.

The November 26, 1944 battle around Misburg/Hannover was a prime example of one fighter group (the 355th) cleverly 'parceling out' flights and sections to meet successive large LW gaggles from JG 2/6/301 but 40 Mustangs were not enough to deflect 200+ Fw 190s plus me 109 escorts and the 491st BG was severely punished. The 355th and 2SF shot down 26 with no losses - but the 491st lost 15 B-24s in two to three minutes, and then the 445th lost five more.

This would be equivalent to a wolfpack of 10+ subs attacking a large convoy with 4-6 escorts..in the middle of the Atlantic with no other assets to deflect the attack.

November 1944 was a great example of the LW having enough assets to overpower US escorts in alocal area causing great damage to isolated bomb groups - but paid a terrible price.