The momentous cost of Bomber Command.

[Jan Gazda]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

Jan, I admire your wish to keep the mood of this board amicable. I am less impressed by your throwing out an intemperate accusation which you then completely fail to justify, preferring instead to withdraw from further discussion. I can only hope that this is because you now regret what you wrote although it is difficult to see how "We are talking history here and it will be always open to different interpretations" could suffice either as an explanation or an apology.

Nick,

It was not meant to be apology of any sort but merely an acknowledgement of the fact that we will probably never reach an agreement on this topic. I am comfortable with that. History is not algebra which has a unique and correct answer for each problem. There is no “true story” hidden and waiting to be found in historical events. All we can do is take the data we have and proven or assumed relations between the agents in play and put them together in more or less coherent hypothesis or interpretation.

Your premise here, I suppose, is that Britain stood under-manned and ill-equipped against a stronger opponent and that more than three long years were needed to overcome this. For my part, I can not endorse with this picture. As in 1940, the population of UK was 48,2 million with total GDP (in 1985 international dollars) of 236,8 bn.$ and per capita GDP 4 910 $. For Germany, respective numbers were 69,8 millions, 273,1 bn.$ and 3 910 $. From 1941 on some two thirds of German war effort was vectored to the East, so corresponding portions of German figures for population and GDP should be subtracted. Thus UK was significantly wealthier, more productive and had an advantage in manpower over its opponent and yet it was unable or unwilling to wage a full scale war against Germany until mid-1944.

Now my interpretation of its low activity is that it was geopolitically-driven strategy behind it. Letting Soviets and Germans bleed to death in intense and bitter fighting in the East meant to improve Britain’s position after the end of hostilities. I’m sure you will have quite a different interpretation of the events and that you have compelling arguments to support it. For reasons stated above I can fully accept that you’ll adhere to your viewpoint and I will hold mine.

As for the Lend-Lease I am fully aware of it but you may have overlooked the reciprocity of the problem summed up candidly by Truman. Lend-Lease dollars were aimed at saving American lives: every Russian, British or Australian soldier who went into battle equipped by means of American aid reduced the danger to young Americans.

As for the efficiency of the bombing, the average GDP growth of UK between 1940 and 1944 was 2,75% per year, while in case of Germany it was 3% per year. Throughout this period Germany´s defense outlays as the percentage of national income increased from less than 50% to around 70%. It wasn’t until 1945 that German GDP decreased in year-to-year comparison. Strategic bombing campaign might have reduced productive capacity of Germany by a slight margin but it seems it was far from what was being expected.


Jan

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

I'm not "denying" anything, I am disputing an assumption. Specifically that extrapolation from the case of a particular city yields a valid result for the entire campaign any more that extrapolating from the Great War reliably predicted casualties in the Blitz.

You would have to show that the case of Wilhelmshaven was in some sense average or typical and that could be difficult.

I see the problem; you are using the word 'extrapolation' statistically while I am using it evidentially.

I have quantified, rightly or wrongly, the effect of aiming 19,000 tons of bombs onto an area of 0.72 sq kms (the equivalent of 67,000 tons/sq mile).
BC & 8USAAF never put the shipyard out of action and never killed any of the workers, although much repair work was needed, because they were notoriously inaccurate.
They destroyed only two military targets of significance (U-boats on the stocks) in the shipyard. Significantly, this was done by 8USAAF operating in daylight and using their Norden sights.

Wilhelmshaven's shipyard was not egregious, but typical of what strategic bombing could achieve in 1939-45, or the LW in Birmingham, Hull and Coventry.
Pictures showed the roofs off the buildings and general dereliction.
Harris showed Zuckerman his famous Blue Book that was filled with such pictures of destruction, but both Zuckerman and Harris knew that reports coming out of Germany showed that all the while production was increasing despite the apparent devastation.

This effect is now quantified, as Fahey has quantified BC's costs.
BC's effectiveness was not static, and did improve over time.
But in Wilhelmshaven's case, as in most others except a virgin target like Dresden, BC's nightly visitations just made the ruins in the city centres bounce once more.
If you think Darmstadt was different, then there's nothing to stop you doing the analysis.
I'll warrant you'll find no difference.
BC knew their dossier was dodgy, but continued because they were convinced Germans couldn't take it and their morale was about to crack. Ditto the USA failing in their effort to bomb the Vietnamese to the negotiating table.

Tony

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Ditto the USA failing in their effort to bomb the Vietnamese to the negotiating table.

Tony

Tony - you probably should be more reserved in this 'analysis'.

When PACAF was finally unleashed in 1972 during Linebacker II and destroyed strategic targets in Hanoi brick by brick, the North Vietnamese did come to the bargaining table - making one wonder what would have happened if all the Joint Chiefs of Staff and McNamara had died in an auto accident in 1967 - and quit acting as Wing Operations Officer for every Navy and USAF Wing.

Regards,

Bill

[tcolvin]

Thanks for the correction, Bill.
In future I'll stick to what I think I know something about.

BTW, would you agree there's a disconnect between BC's and modern munitions?
If so, then Vietnamese-era munitions were presumably in the transition period.

Tony

[SES]

Tony,
You are missing the point. The success and strategic effect of Linebacker II was a question of targeting, hitting the enemy where it hurt the most. Much of the ordnance used was no more advanced than that used during WW II, but the ability to find and hit the target had increased by orders of magnitude since WW II.
By mid 1944 RAF BC had the capability to actually hit specific factory areas and even pin-point target using Obee, this capability was not exploited due to the strategic guidance, which was partly beyond BC influence.
bregds
SES

[drgondog]

Tony - SES correct - the Linebacker II results were far more dictated by a.) 'correct' targeting of key industrial targets and b.) much better bombsight/flight control systems in the B-52.

Additionally, and somewhat important is that the bombs used were the low drag Mk 82 (500lb), 83 (1000lb), 84(2000lb) and 118's(3000). They are a better munition aerodynamically speaking than the GP types used during WWII.

Regards,

Bill

[tcolvin]

Ses, a free-flight bomb is inherently inaccurate, and they were still being used in Vietnam.
Theoretically BC hit pin-point targets using Oboe, but in practice BC continued to rain down thousands of bombs onto a single target in 1944.

The US/UK Pointblank Directive was implemented by the USAAF making precision day attacks on specified German aircraft plants and airfields, while BC made 'area-attacks' by night on German towns immediately concerned in aircraft production. (From Apes to Warlords page 222).

In the preparations for Overlord, Zuckerman calculated from the photocover of the precision attacks on V1 sites, that "on average as many as fifteen hundred bombs would have to be aimed at a single coastal battery to give a reasonable chance of it being significantly damaged..... I was emphatic that visual daylight bombing would not be adequate, and that if the attacks on the critical batteries were to succeed, the bombing aid called Oboe would have to be used at night, and then only by the specially trained 617 Squadron known as the Dam Busters....I find it extraordinary when I am reminded today (1978) that on the night before D-Day each of ten batteries in the assault area was bombed by more than 100 aircraft of BC, and that this single operation involved the whole of the Command's effort for the night, at an expenditure of some 6,000 tons of bombs" (ibid page 260).

Tony

[mhuxt]

Maybe Zuckerman knows more than I do, but I was under the impression 617 never had Oboe.

[SES]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

Ses, a free-flight bomb is inherently inaccurate, and they were still being used in Vietnam.


I find it extraordinary when I am reminded today (1978) that on the night before D-Day each of ten batteries in the assault area was bombed by more than 100 aircraft of BC, and that this single operation involved the whole of the Command's effort for the night, at an expenditure of some 6,000 tons of bombs" (ibid page 260).

Tony

But those free fall bombs still had the effect desired, because they were droped against the right targets.

Not until the advent of laser and GPS guided bombs was it possible to take out a gun in a bunker, which will withstand an overpressure of 6,000 psi. So if those batteries were to be taken out, there was no other option than to turn the entire battery area into a moonscape and hope that some guns would be damaged.
bregds
SES

[tcolvin]

mhuxt, Dave Wallace on this board implied that 617 Squadron might have had Oboe in Post No. 28 here; http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?p=90002

"617 Squadron Lancasters that carried tallboys could not be equipped with H2S. I have correspondence from Harris, Cochrane, Bennett, Saundby and others discussing this and also equipping Lancasters with Oboe, which also could not be fitted on a Lancaster with H2S.
While Oboe equipped aircraft could drop bombs or target indicators with the same accuracy in any type of cloud (the Oboe crews never used any visual references on a bombing run), the main force aircraft bombing the Oboe TIs were greatly affected by cloud. Sky marking was much less accurrate than groundmarking and the winter season Oboe attacks were on the whole less successful due to the weather. "

This makes sense. To achieve accurate aiming of large bombs, 617 Squadron would need to bomb with Oboe rather than bomb the markers dropped by Oboe Mosquitos.

Tony