US Strategic Bombing Survey No59 - a questionable statement about 1-seat fighters production

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Thank you, Ed!

Unfortunately, they write about USSBS: "not digitized".
Since a more or less normal copy is available online, it makes no sense to order a microfilm.

Best regards,
Andrey

[lritger]

Gentlemen,

This is a question I'm currently digging into as part of the work going into my forthcoming book covering the origins and development of the Bf 109. Without giving away the farm, so to speak, there have been an awful lot of interesting things which have surfaced regarding wartime Bf 109 production in the course of reviewing/tabulating all the primary source documents I can lay my hands on, including RL 2-VI/202, the USSBS "accepted aircraft" production summary, USSBS reports for WNF/Erla/Messerschmitt, Rüstungsinsepektion KTBs, meeting notes from the Rüstungsamt and Jägerstab, and a very, VERY curious document from the Hauptausschuß Flugzeugbau found in a collection of Speer's notes at R 3/1926, page 0088.

I'm mentioning that particular page here because Oberst Littman's accusation of lies being circulated regarding aircraft production may be closer to mark than we know. The report states that no fewer than 2,300 Bf 109s were produced in Nov and 2,360 produced in Dec 1944... this is not a mix of Neubau and Reparatur figures, these figures are intended to reflect "accepted deliveries". This exceeds the highest credible numbers for those months by almost 1,500 fighters. And more interestingly, the numbers for July through October align perfectly with the overall accepted numbers reported in the USSBS summary grid.

I can tell you that I have not found a single document - not ONE - which has anything close to what this document is claiming in terms of Bf 109 production in Nov and Dec 1944. In fact, based on all available evidence, I would go so far as to state these figures are outright fabrications. The numbers for Fw 190 production in those months are also similarly exaggerated, but I am not knowledgeable enough about 190 production to offer an informed opinion as to whether they're factual or not.

Link to the aforementioned document (scroll to page 0088):

https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/inve...-eb1e853a2ad4/

Best regards,

Lynn

[edwest2]

Hello,

On this forum, I have seen detailed lists of manufacturers broken down by werknummern blocks assigned to them. Taken together, this could be another source of comparison for determining total production numbers for the Bf 109.

[lritger]

Originally Posted by edwest2

Hello,

On this forum, I have seen detailed lists of manufacturers broken down by werknummern blocks assigned to them. Taken together, this could be another source of comparison for determining total production numbers for the Bf 109.

Yes, the Aenderungs-Anweisung of 1 Jul 43 has proven very helpful in that regard. As mentioned, my forthcoming book will have extensive coverage of production across all facilities, including a detailed look into the Frontreparaturbetriebe involved in rebuilding damaged 109s.

Lynn

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Hello Lynn,

thank you for the pointing on R3/1926!

Originally Posted by lritger

The report states that no fewer than 2,300 Bf 109s were produced in Nov and 2,360 produced in Dec 1944 ... the numbers for July through October align perfectly with the overall accepted numbers reported in the USSBS summary grid.

The date of the document is unclear. Maybe the numbers for November-December are planned, not actual?

Also, judging by the table header, these are Zellen = airframes, not finished planes. If there was a shortage of motors (for example), some of these Zellen may have become finished planes later or never at all.

Reading Speer's memoirs, one realises that he and other actors theoretically had reasons to lie about the number of aircraft produced. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that the lie was not revealed immediately.

Best regards,
Andrey

[lritger]

Hi Andrey,

Yes, agreed, they're "Zellen"... but again, the numbers for July, Aug, and Sept match *exactly* with the quoted "accepted" figures in the USSBS report, so either the USSBS report was tabulated with incorrect data, or false data was used in this report.

But wait, it gets better... the USSBS "accepted" figures do NOT match with the "Durch Gen.Qu.6 verfügt" numbers quoted in RL 2-VI/202... the USSBS numbers are around 300-400 aircraft lower each month than that quoted in the BA-MA document.

The actual, honest answer to the question of "how many Bf 109s were built during the war" seems to be "who the hell knows", LOL. One can make a very well informed, educated guess... but there is just too much variance in the numbers reported by the Germans themselves to state a firm production number with 100% certainty.

Cheers,

Lynn

[edwest2]

Lynn,

I have been doing research for a long time. And it is time consuming. There is no way around that. In cases where two sources differ, it is important to convey the facts to the reader. Example: Source A gives this number while Source B gives another. Just reading what you wrote, the German supply system has to be taken into account. Aircraft components would have been shipped by train. Allocating the right number of train cars and scheduling pick-up and delivery would have occurred. In other words, if there was a discrepancy, there would be other ways to find out. Any falsehoods between airframe orders and actual deliveries would have been recorded. Messages from Luftwaffe units waiting on their aircraft would have been sent. Yes, transfer flights occurred, but the entire "supply chain" would have been affected. It is easy to assign bad motives to the enemy, but I suggest giving them a fair trial in the interest of historical accuracy. In other words, if there is no available evidence then no firm conclusion can be drawn.

Best,
Ed West

[lritger]

Originally Posted by edwest2

Lynn,

I have been doing research for a long time. And it is time consuming. There is no way around that. In cases where two sources differ, it is important to convey the facts to the reader. Example: Source A gives this number while Source B gives another. Just reading what you wrote, the German supply system has to be taken into account. Aircraft components would have been shipped by train. Allocating the right number of train cars and scheduling pick-up and delivery would have occurred. In other words, if there was a discrepancy, there would be other ways to find out. Any falsehoods between airframe orders and actual deliveries would have been recorded. Messages from Luftwaffe units waiting on their aircraft would have been sent. Yes, transfer flights occurred, but the entire "supply chain" would have been affected. It is easy to assign bad motives to the enemy, but I suggest giving them a fair trial in the interest of historical accuracy. In other words, if there is no available evidence then no firm conclusion can be drawn.

Best,
Ed West

I went to click "like" on your post, then remembered where I was...

You are of course correct on all counts - the Nachschub system is also coming in for some examination in the book, particularly as subcontractor supplies were so important to the overall production picture for all manufacturers. And I've got a fairly massive spreadsheet on which I'm tracking every instance of a monthly 109 production count that I find in various documents... the numbers are fairly consistent and within what I'd describe as a reasonable margin of error up through the end of 1943. The wider discrepancies start to appear after the introduction of the Jägerstab in March 44, but even then, they're not THAT bad (relatively speaking), considering how frantic the production effort became... variances around 30-50 aircraft between reports aren't uncommon, and one could make a solid case that those might have been in the Einflug process and therefore didn't get counted on one report versus another. On the whole, everything seems to line up more or less between all the reports... except for Nov and Dec 44 in R 3/1926. We know that Saur was absolutely intolerant of any perceived failures on the part of the factory leadership; on 22 Aug 44, we find the following in the Jägerstab Sammelberichte:

"The works representative WNF, Dusl, is relieved of his post by order of HDL Saur with shame and disgrace. Likewise the work deployment engineer WNF."

You're right that we have no way to prove WHY the numbers were so inflated - guesses, no matter how educated, are not evidence - but we also know there was an ever-increasing atmosphere of fear at this point in the war. The theory that factories might have padded their production numbers in order to tell the Rüstungsstab what they wanted to hear, preferring to risk later punishment to avoid certain immediate punishment, is not entirely unfounded. But again, we cannot PROVE that.

What we CAN prove, though, through the recollections of the increasingly disillusioned men at the front, is the perception that the production numbers they were hearing were considered to be complete fantasy - witness the Major's comments in the USSBS report, or the oft-repeated joke about aircraft identification: "If it's shiny, it's American, if it's camouflaged, it's British, and if it's invisible, it's German." So, apologies for the long-winded reply here, but that's really all I'm trying to say - that those observations may not have been ENTIRELY baseless, based on the Bf 109 Neubau numbers reported to the Hauptausschuss Zellen for Nov/Dec 1944.

Cheers,

Lynn

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Hi Lynn,

Yes, in January-October 1944 the difference between the number of Bf109 (J + NA) according to RL2-VI/202 and Zellen according to R3/1926 was from minus 3.5% to plus 18.3% in favour of Zellen. This can well be explained without resorting to the hypothesis of deliberate lying.

In November and December, this difference increased to 54.9% and 116.5%. It seems to me that this can be explained (besides lies) by two reasons:

1. It is possible that planned numbers are given for November and December, and not actual ones. We do not know the date of this document.

2. Increasing logistical problems may have prevented the timely transformation of Zellen into fully completed Bf109s to a greater extent than it was prior to November.

Cheers,
Andrey

[edwest2]

Gentlemen,


The use of terms like "logistical problems" should be avoided and replaced with what can be shown in contemporary documents. After the RAF raid on Peenemünde in August 1943, construction of underground facilities began. SS General Hans Kammler was tasked with moving V-2 (A-4) production underground. By March 1944, the SS was involved in creating underground installations for the production of fighter aircraft, and in August, 1944, took over operational control for launching the V-2. The Allies realized the Germans were moving men and equipment at night and developed photo-flash bombs designed to work with a camera mounted on an aircraft. Final assembly of fighters also occurred inside unused railroad tunnels. I have seen an unpublished photo of several Fw 190s just outside a tunnel opening.


Best,
Ed