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Luftwaffe and Axis Air Forces Please use this forum to discuss the German Luftwaffe and the Air Forces of its Allies. |
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#21
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Re: ULTRA doc of September 1943
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Ed |
#22
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Re: ULTRA doc of September 1943
Bruce, Did you mention the extensive card files used as helping aid?
I have seen these notes, you need no further proof. |
#23
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Re: ULTRA doc of September 1943
Ed, yes the card index was the source of much detail in these and other reports, and cards had information from any and all sources. One of the most common 'notes' within the reports was to say that a message was 'almost certainly' or 'highly likely' to have come from a particular source: this usually means that T/A (Traffic Analysis) has identified the source but verification is lacking.
Bruce
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http://www.filephotoservice.co.uk/ RESEARCH AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES & OTHER UK INSTITUTIONS |
#24
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Re: ULTRA doc of September 1943
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The files you’ve cited, I’m not familiar with (I’ve barely touched 1943 in HW 5) so I don’t know the TO series. In 1942, where I’ve done some limited work, any naval messages included were given a different form of serial and don’t seem to differ significantly from the naval ULTRA in DEFE 3 in my limited experience. Perhaps more to the point is that in 1940 there is correspondence from BP to service ministries asking to be kept abreast of other intelligence as an aid to interpreting decrypts and thus getting the most out of them. Apparently there was a school of thought that Enigma decryption should be kept “pure” and not influenced by other material. They had to explain that they deciphered first, interpreted afterward. However where you really get composite material, pulling all sources together are e.g. the SALU (Saltmarsh/Lucas) and Operational Watch reports in other HW series. |
#25
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Re: ULTRA doc of September 1943
Which cards are we talking about? Bletchely Park maintained a huge card index but the story was that it was burned after the war. TNA when I first went used to have card indexes including a very useful one of codenames of operations etc.
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#26
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Re: ULTRA doc of September 1943
Mr. Beale, are we talking?
Short while ago I asked and demanded removal of MY own comment. But no response. Why? |
#27
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Re: ULTRA doc of September 1943
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But let’s try and stay on topic, please. |
#28
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Re: ULTRA doc of September 1943
(d) You some time try be nice, right?
(d2) Item I regret acting in good faith on. http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showth...t=51472&page=2 Poster gave false ID for the photos, code posted does NOT show there at all, therefore skewing my answer immensely, and I ask you to remove it. (e) Politely. (f) For all´s benefit, remove incorrect "conclution", only cirkumstatial and in hindsight likely wrong. Question also hints at asker likely knowing answer and fishing for other views. (g) Please. Last edited by edNorth; 18th July 2018 at 02:02. Reason: typos |
#29
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Re: ULTRA doc of September 1943
My comment concerning HW5 not being 100% ULTRA has lead to some debate. It was intended to help Byron, who you may remember started this thread with a question about potential information in an unspecified ULTRA document.
I feel vaguely responsible, therefore, for having introduced the drift to how 'pure' is the content of the series of files at Kew containing reports based on Axis decrypted high grade machine traffic. So, I hope Byron has found a path to follow to get the information he seeks and that all others get something from the observations of the contents of HW5. I humbly apologise to all those who are distressed to find that the HW5 series of files includes tidbits of information from other sources, but it is no big deal. They were reports: they were intended to pass on information from one source but when the writer needed to add context or cast further light on the subject he did so and chose his language accordingly. The original intercepts, then the broken texts and eventually the translations were each handled with discipline. The ‘notes’ from Allied intelligence officers could appear at the first stage of the process, below the original German text, adding extra information for the benefit of everyone further down the chain. At some point, if a message was to be kept, typical practice was to cut it out and paste it into a ledger. If it was not to be kept, it went in the bin. Every day a report was compiled by the duty officer(s) from the intercepts processed during the day at the end of the process described above. These reports are now held at Kew under the series name HW5. It should be clear from this that the reports contain excerpts from messages and were not intended to do anything beyond pass on the useful facts. The practice of adding notes was part of making these reports: the object was to pass on whatever would be useful from ULTRA and the notes were immediately recognisable as notes and not to be confused with message content. And, to be pedantic, the notes could be based on any source as long as it was reliable. Bruce
__________________
http://www.filephotoservice.co.uk/ RESEARCH AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES & OTHER UK INSTITUTIONS |
#30
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Re: ULTRA doc of September 1943
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Attached is the note I mentioned about "contamination" (from HW 14/8). |
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