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Old 30th October 2018, 00:55
Bruce Dennis Bruce Dennis is offline
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Bruce Dennis is on a distinguished road
Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations

"SECRET A.D.I.(K) Report No.160/1944
Further Report on Ju.88 S-1, Z6+IN, of 5/K.G.66, brought
down in the sea off Brighton on 25th March 1944.
(Previous A.D.I.(K) Report No.141/1944).
1. The present report may be taken as the third of a series -
the first two in which were A.D.I.(K) Reports Nos. 64 and
108/1944 - dealing with the most recent G.A.F. pathfinder
2. The principal subject of interest which has emerged from
the interrogation of the one survivor of the Z6+IN is the
employment by his Staffel of a method of target pinpointing
known as the Egon procedure.
3. Since the issue of the last pathfinder report, the pilot
of the Z6+HK, who was wounded when shot down on February 24th,
has become available for interrogation and he has also
contributed to the information which this report contains on
the activities of I/K.G.66.
4. On the night of 24th/25th March, the Z6+IN of 5/K.G. 66
was engaged in pathfinding for the attack on London; the
petrol tanks were holed by A.A. fire and on the way home the
aircraft came down in the sea through lack of fuel after the
crew had baled out.
5. The Z6+IN, which was equipped with the FUG.25a, FUGe.10,
FUGe.16, PeilGe.6 and the FUGe.216 ("Neptun") tail warning
device - the latter out of order - had laid its flares by
means of course and pinpointing data supplied by its own
ground control.
6. This system of controlling aircraft from the ground is
known as the "Egon Verfahren" (Egon Procedure) and in
operation depends upon response radiated by the FUGe.25a in
the aircraft being picked up and D/F'd by two Freyas.
7. During flight, the position of the aircraft is
continuously plotted by means of data supplied by the Freya
and necessary course corrections are passed to the aircraft by
ground control in the form of coded W/T and R/T signals.
8. Orders for flare or bomb release are similarly
transmitted, allowances for drift being taking into account by
the plotting centre; an accuracy to within 0.3° - or according
to P/W about 200 metres - is claimed for the placing of the
flares. (It should be noted that 0.3° at a distance of as
little as 150 km. is nearer 900 m.)
9. The Egon Procedure at present being used, relying as it
does on course and bomb-release signals passed by W/T and
R/T, is as yet only in an extemporised form. A new attachment
to the FUGe.25a in the aircraft will shortly provide for
visual signals appearing on a Cathode Ray Tube and will
eliminate all W/T and R/T course and bombing signals without
basically altering the present procedure.
10. This attachment is now being tried out by 4/K.G.66 at
Strausberg and according to P/W it is about to be introduced
into operational use; the apparatus and its method of
operation are described in a later section of this report.
Operation of Egon Procedure.
11. At the briefing for a pathfinder operation, crews are
given a course to the target and a height at which the flares
or bombs are to be released.
12. After take-off, the FuGe.25a in the aircraft is switched
on and Freya No. 1 plots the aircraft; the FuGe.25a radiations
giving the single-letter recognition characteristic of the
aircraft are received by the Freya and range and bearing data
are passed from the Freya to the plotting room.
13. The Egon plotting table is similar to the night-fighter
Seeburg Tisch; a transparent map of the area of operations is
laid on a glass table and the aircraft is represented by a red
spot of light which is thrown on the underside of the glass by
an automatic projector connected directly to the Freyas. The
course of the pathfinder aircraft can thus be followed
visually and any corrections necessary are given by Control.
14. In the vicinity of the target Freya No.2 takes the
aircraft over from Freya No.1 and thereafter no further course
corrections, but only the flare or bomb release instructions,
are given.
15. The height of the aircraft cannot be checked by the ground
Control and it remains with the pilot to see that his height
at the time of release conforms with the instruction given at
the briefing.
16. When marking targets over London the aircraft were usually
briefed to fly over southern England at 9,500 metres, reducing
height to 8,500 metres to release the flares. The height of
flight given at the briefing for Egon-controlled aircraft was
never less than 6,000 meters over London.
Communication with Aircraft.
17. The whole of the Egon procedure depends in its operation
on a short series of code-words used in communication between
Control and aircraft; these code-words are already familiar,
having been borrowed from the G.A.F. controlled nightfighters.
18. It, was stated by P/W that recently the R/T channels of
communication had been seriously disturbed by British
countermeasures and to combat such interference it has
recently been the practice to transmit all traffic passing
from Control to the aircraft in R/T and W/T simultaneously,
the latter in two different channels.
19. The R/T traffic passes on the frequency band of the
FuGe.16 whilst both the W/T channels are within that of the
FuGe.10 and PeilGe.6. One of these two W/T channels is
received by the aircraft on the PeilGe.6; this is on a
frequency of 563 kc/s., the signals being superimposed on the
broadcasting programme of Calais I - the familiar vehicle for
the outpourings of one William Joyce. The other is received on
another frequency on the FuGe.10,
20. The series of signal code-words, their equivalents in the
morse channels and their significant in the procedure are as
W/T R/T Meaning
(Preceded by a/c call-sign)
KKK Kommen You are being plotted.
AAA Autobahn Change bearing to.....
RRR Rolf Bearing 5° right.
2 RRR Zweimal Rolf Bearing 10°right.
LLL Lisa Bearing 5° left.
UUU Kirchturm Height
CCC Caruso Fly straight and level cours.
ZZZ Pauke Pauke Open bomb doors.
-(dash) -(W/T dash) Pre-release signal of 3-4 secs.
.(dot) .(W/T dot) Bomb or flare release signal.
? Kurfürst Acknowledge that signal is
understood,(reply on FuGe.25a)
AAA HHH Autobahn Mat Set course for base.
21. In operations the first signal which passes from Control
to the aircraft is the information that Freya No.1 has engaged
the aircraft and plotting has commenced. This signal opens
with the aircraft call-sign, e.g. CA1, followed by KKK or
Kommen; in subsequent signals the two letters of the aircraft
call-sign are omitted and the number only given.
22. The aircraft has no communication with its control but
replies to this and other signal, by manipulation of the
FUGe.25a - switching off for 3-4 seconds signifying that the
signal has been received and understood and repeated switching
off and on signifying the contrary.
23. Course corrections are passed to the aircraft in units of
5°, represented by the code-words Rolf or Lisa or their morse
equivalents; thus Rolf or Lisa = 5° and three times Rolf or
Lisa = 15°, In passing such instructions, Control signals the
aircraft's call-sign followed by the following type of
R/T: Autobahn dreimal Rolf.
W/T: AAA - 3 - RRR.
24. Whilst the aircraft is being followed by Freya No.1, any
necessary corrections in course continue up to the point where
the order is given to fly on a straight and level course after
which no further course corrections are made and orders for
release of flares follow.
25. When the aircraft is in a position to commence the bombing
run the order "Pauke Pauke" (open bomb doors) is given, at
which point Freya No.2 takes over and a pre-release signal of
a single dash is given, followed by a release sign of a single
26. The aircraft then signals "Quitting" (operation completed)
by manipulation of the FUGe.25a switch, Control gives the
order to return, and the aircraft is vectored back to base.
27. It is noteworthy that for this purpose again the
subterfuge of Calais I has been resorted to; on the last
flight of the Z6+IN the crew was briefed to return to
Montdidier unless the march "Kommt zurück" ("come back") was
played by Calais; on hearing this tune a landing was to be
made at Soesterberg. "Kommt zurück" was duly played and the
Z6+IN was on its way to Soesterberg when it came to grief off
28. It was stated that with the Egon procedure it was possible
for the ground control to direct one aircraft every ten
minutes; it is the practice, however for the flare dropping
aircraft to orbit the target after release of one cluster of
flares and to be controlled in a second run over the target
after an interval of six minutes to renew the concentration
before the first flares have burned out.
29. The introduction of the attachment to the PuGe.25a,
consisting of a Cathode Ray Tube presentation unit, will
dispense with all W/T and R/T signals as navigational aids in
the Egon Procedure.
30. The attachment, which was invented and tried out at
Rechlin by one Stabsingenieur BENES, consists of a unit placed
in the fuselage of the aircraft and a presentation unit,
placed between the pilot and observer, embodying a Cathode Rey
Tube of about the same diameter as that of the Lichtenstein.
31. The attachment was thought by P/W to have a common aerial
array with the FUGe.25a, the latter aerial being a rod about
35 om. in length.
32. The scale of the Cathode Ray Tube consists of a circle
divided into equal segments, each of which represents, and is
marked with, one of the code-words used in the Egon Procedure.
The circle is surrounded by an outer circle which is marked
clockwise from 0 to 9, the 0 being at 12 o'clock in the
circle, so that the whole scale has much the appearance of a
33. In operation, the Egon Procedure will be followed in the
manner already described, but the visual signal on the tube
will replace the aural signals at present in use.
34. A short blip, radiating from the centre of the tube, first
appears in the segment representing the appropriate signal,
such as "Autobahn". Bearings are than given in the same way by
a long blip, also from the centre, appearing opposite a
succession of figures in the outer circle, for instance 3
followed by 5 and 5 repeated represents 355°.
35. Course corrections can similarly be given by a short blip
appearing for example, in the "Rolf" segment followed by a
long blip opposite 3 in the outer circle, which would mean '3
times Rolf' or a correction of 15° right.
36. Height can similarly be given by indicating "Kirchturm",
followed by the necessary figures.
37. According to the pilot of the Z6 + HK, which was shot down
on 24th February 1944, the Verbandsführer - Master of
Ceremonies - is being employed in target marking procedure;
this was denied by the P/W from the Z6+ IN, who was in another
Staffel, but the pilot of the Z6 + HK claims to have acted as
Verbandsführer on his last operation.
38. It was stated that the first pathfinder aircraft and the
Verbandsführer arrive simultaneously over the target and when
the pathfinder aircraft lays the first flares their position
is checked by the Verbandsführer from a higher altitude.
39. If the flares have not been correctly laid, the
Verbandsführer drops a single red flare, which he places above
the false cluster as a sighn to the attacking force; by then
himself proceeds to place flare in what he considered to be
the correct position. If by now the attacking force to nearing
the target, he is said to inform the formation leaders by R/T
in clear of the change in marking and that the false cluster
is to be ignored.
40. It is noteworthy that both of the present P/W were
convinced that decoy flares have been dropped on several
occasions during attacks; P/W stated that this would be
countered by the Verbandsführer announcing this by R/T and/or
dropping a flare of a different colour.
41. The burning time of the normally used single candle flare,
the Mark.C.50, is given as seven minutes and these are renewed
by the pathfinder aircraft, with the help of navigational
aids, in their sixth minute of burning.
42. The normal load of flares carried by the pathfinder
aircraft is eighteen Mark.C.50's; these are dropped in three
runs with six on each run, or alternatively in two runs of
Order of Battle.
43. According to the most recently captured P/W, I/K.G.66,
although it has for some time had a strength of five Staffeln,
is still nominally one Gruppe. Up to 25th March 1944 the
disposition and equipment of these Staffeln were as follows:-
Staffel Equipment Base
1&2/K.G.66 Ju.88 S-1 Avord, forward base
Ju.188 Montdidier.
3/K.G.66 Ju.88 S-1 Cormeille-en-Vexin.
4/K.G.66 Ju.88. Strausberg
5/K.G.66 JU.88 S-1 Avord and Montdidier.
44. Up to about the first week in March the 1st, 2nd and 5th
Staffeln were based at Montdidier but continued attention from
Allied aircraft, including a fighter-bomber attack in which
three aircraft were destroyed, forced a move further back to
Avord, K.G.40 being ousted from that airfield in the process.
45. Aircraft of all three Staffeln still used Montdidier
operationally, however, and fuelling facilities were available
there; it was usual to fly from Avord to this airfield
immediately before starting off on operations.
46. Major SCHMIDT is still Kommandeur of I/K.G.66, he just
escaped being written off recently, however, when his aircraft
was shot down by Mosquitoes between Avord and Montdidier. His
crew was killed.
47. Hauptmann SCHMIDT, the Staffelkapitän of the 2nd Staffel,
was lost in the attack on Hull on 19th March; his successor is
not known.
48. Oberleutnant de MILDE, a signal officer formally at Halle
is Staffelkapitän of the 3rd Staffel and Oberleutnant BÖHMANN
now commands the 5th Staffel.
49. The 5th Staffel has sixteen officers on its strength, most
of whom are signal officers. Two of these are Leutnant
50. It must be emphasised that recent P/W of K.G.66 have had
small knowledge of the activities of other Staffeln of the
Gruppe beyond their own; the W/T operator of the Z6+IN,
although he claimed a knowledge above the average, must be
classed with the other P/W since his information was mainly
from hearsay. He, like the others, can only be relied upon
where his own Staffel is concerned.
51. The 5th Staffel was formed in about May 1943 from
personnel of the 3rd Staffel, with the addition of some crews
from K.G.6. Losses, which have been heavy, have since been
replaced with crews from the other Staffeln of K.G.66 as well
as from K.G.54 and K.G.2.
52. This Staffel commenced operations with target marking by
D/R but in about December 1943.
December 1943 the Egon Procedure was practised at Rechlin and
later on from Montdidier.
53. According to this P/W the activities of the Staffeln of
I/K.G.66 are at present divided as follows:-
1st Staffel....
thought to be engaged as backers-up.
Navigational aid used uncertain.
2nd Staffel.... Pathfinding, using "Gee" (see A.D.I.(K)
3rd Staffel....
Known as the Störstaffel (jamming Staffel).
Radar investigation and jamming flights.
4th Staffel.... Non-operational: perfecting new Egon
apparatus as well as trying out a "Queen
Bee" aircraft.
5th Staffel....
Known as the "E" Staffel: pathfinding using
the Egon Procedure.
54. The Störstaffel - the 3rd - is said to have commenced
operating in August 1943 in the fields of the anticipation and
attempted diversion of Bomber Command night attacks.
55. A few Ju.88 S-1's of this Staffel are variously equipped
with the Hyperbel Gerät, the "Naxos" search receiver such as
is used in U-boots for the detection of Radar transmission,
and a set known as the "Viktor 1" for jamming R/T.
56. In operations, an extra member of the crew is carried - an
English speaking signals officer - sometimes the aircraft may
be fitted with drop tanks.
57. When making investigation flights with the object of
anticipating Bomber Command's targets, the aircraft are
allotted specific areas of operation - the area off the North
Sea coast between Boulogne and Denmark has the code-word
"Rodelbahn" - and the first duty of the special W/T operator
is to discover any British navigational aids which may be in
58. The frequencies and bearings of such transmissions are
passed to a plotting centre which, using data from several
investigating aircraft, instigates counter-measures to the
navigational aids and the laying of decoy flares short of the
conjectured target.
59. Should the British navigational aids in use be discovered
in the earlier stages of an attack, the practice is said to be
to withhold any countermeasures until the later stages, to
ensure that no intermediate evasion of these countermeasures
can take place.
60. It was stated that the Staffel was at present only making
these investigational flights as far as Western Germany but
that they had already claimed some successes in their efforts
to divert attacks.
61. It was stated that the, F.W.190's of S.K.G. 10 which use
Rosières and an airfield in Holland as their bases are now
equipped with FuGe.25a and controlled by the Egon Procedure.
62. Several pilots of the F.W.190's are said to have reported
wonderful bombing results before the installation of the
FuGe.25a took place, whereas they in reality merely made a
pleasant flight over some innocuous area and jettisoned their
bomb. With the introduction of the FuGe.25a many of the pilots
who did not understand its functions are said to have found
themselves facing a court martial.
63. The signal to the F.W.190’s to remain over the target was
stated to be "Walzer" and the homing signals the words
A.D.I.(K) S.D.Felkin
5th Apl.44. Wing Commander
Paragraph 27: Delete and substitute:-
"27. It is noteworthy that for this purpose again the
subterfuge of Calais I has been resorted to. In the last
flight of the Z6 + IN the signal for the crew to return to
Montdidier was to be the tune "Komm' zurück, ich warte auf
dich" (well known in this country under the title of
"J'attendrai") played every three minutes by Calais; if this
tune was not played, the crew was to land at Soesterberg.
"Komm' zurück" was duly played and the Z6 + IN was on its way
to Montdidier when it came to grief off Brighton. The pilot of
the Z6+HK also referred to a procedure of this nature. He
stated that the playing of a waltz was the signal to remain
over the target and the Radetzky March the signal to return to
base. No doubt the tunes played and their significance would
be varied from sortie to sortie."
Paragraph 63: Delete."

then in a second file this ...

"Further Report on the Crew of the Ju.88 8-3 Z6 + FH of
1/K.G.66) shot down by A.A. 5 miles N.W. of Alost, on 23rd
January 1945.
(Previous A.D.I.(K) Report No.142/1945)
1. It will be remembered that this aircraft was brought down
while acting as pathfinder to a minelaying operation in the
Scheldt Estuary. The flight was described in detail in the
previous report and there is only one point of interest to
add; that after marking the minelaying point at the mouth of
the Scheldt, the Z6 + FH was to go on to attack the night
fighter airfield at Knocke/Le Zoute, for which purpose 18 x 50
kg. S.D. bombs were carried. If the lighting at Knocke
airfield was not on when the crew reached it they were to use
their bombs on A.A. batteries as targets of opportunity.
2. It is confirmed that 1/K.G.66 based at Dedolstorf has
reverted to its old duties as a specialised pathfinder unit.
It is organised in the same way as when it operated against
England in the spring of 1944, that is to say with the 1st
Staffel using the "Y" procedure, the 2nd the "Truhe". (the
German equivalent of Gee), and the 3rd the EGON procedure.
There is, however, one important innovation; the lst Staffel
has been receiving instruction in a new navigational method, a
combination of the "Y" and Egon procedures, which will be
described in a later section of the present report.
3. P/Ws' knowledge of the Gruppe's activities was confined to
their own Staffel; they knew that the 2nd Staffel used "Truhe"
and that there were a number of German Gee stations, but they
did not know the locations of the latter and could give no
further details.
4. Shortly before the crew of the Z6 + FH was shot down, the
1st Staffel had received three new crews, bringing their
strength up to 12. Aircraft for these new crews, however, had
not yet arrived.
5. The present crew had joined 1/K.G.66 at Dedolstorf in May
1944, having previously been with 4/K.G.54, with which unit
they had flown 7 operations in Italy and 10 against this
6. At Dedolstorf they did little or nothing during the summer
of 1944 beyond some very scanty training and they did not make
their first operational sortie until December 4th; this was a
weather reconnaissance over an area of the North See East of
the Thames estuary in preparation for a mining sortie in the
Scheldt that same night.
7. In about October or November it had been known in K.G.66
that the Germans believed the Allies to be planning a largescale
landing in the Bay of Venice, suit that K.G.66 was to be
moved South to take part in a "Total Einsatz" (full-scale
operation) against it. The landing did not, however,
8. At the beginning of VON RUNDSTEDT's offensive a number of
aircraft of K.G.66 were detailed to mark an area near Eupen
where paratroops were to be dropped. The operation was kept a
close secret and members of the unit were forbidden to write
home until the flight had been completed. Some of the
paratroops were dropped from Ju.52's of T.G.30; about 100
aircraft in all took part in the mission.
9. A few days later 4-5 aircraft of 1/K.G.66 took off from
Dedolstorf to act as pathfinders for a bomber force in an
attack on some woods to the North of Bastogne which were
stated to conceal a concentration of artillery. They were
accompanied by 3-4 Ju.88 A-4's of K.G.200, the crews of which
were receiving pathfinder instruction from K.G.66.
10. When the K.G.66 aircraft arrived over the target the
weather was very bad with low cloud and poor ground visibility
and as the crews could not identify the target they returned
home with their markers. The crews of K.G.200, however, being
new to this kind of operation, decided to drop their markers
rather than return with them, the result being that the wrong
target was marked.
11. The Kommandeur of I4.1.66 made a complaint to Generalmajor
PELZ and soon afterwards the aircraft of K.G.200 were
withdrawn from Dedolstorf.
12. At about Christmastime some 12 aircraft of 1/K.G.66, six
of them acting as pathfinders and illuminators and the
remainder as normal bombers, flew another sortie to the
Bastogne area. They flew on a course Dedolstorf - Hanover -
Paderborn - Bonn/Mangelar airfield (marked by a searchlight
dome) a light beacon at Trier - a point immediately behind the
German lines, where the starting point of the target marking
run was indicated by Flak star shells. From the latter point
the present crew flew by D/R for about two minutes on a given
course and at a given height before releasing their flares and
ground markers.
13. The flight to the Bastogne pocket described above gives a
typical instance of the method of navigation used by those
aircraft of K.G.66 which did not employ special navigational
aids. The target marking run was flown on D/R and just before
the target was reached the aircraft began dropping their
flares. Ten of these were dropped in a straight line at tensecond
intervals - i.e. about 1000 metres apart - and laid so
that the centre of the line was over the target. The aircraft
then made a 180° turn, identified the target by the light of
the flares and then dropped coloured ground markers, usually
green, on the target itself.
14. The normal load carried was ten flares and two A.B.250's
containing ground markers. The flares were released from a
height of 2000 metres; they illuminated at about 1200 metres
and burned down to 200 metres above ground.
15. The Lux buoys used by K.G.66 for minelaying operations
and, as stated in the previous report, used by certain
aircraft of the Gruppe whilst pathfinding for at least one V.1
launching operation, are carried in A.B.250 containers. The
containers can, of course, be released from any height but
they must be fused to open, releasing the Lux buoys, at a
minimum height of 200 metres.
16. P/W said that in very clear weather the Lux buoys could be
seen at a distance of about 20 km. from an aircraft flying at
a height of 2000 metres.
17. As befits a pathfinder unit, K.G.66 treats the question of
navigation as of primary importance during briefing. Full
details of W/T and visual beacons, Sonne, and other
navigational aids are given to the crews at least two hours
before take-off to allow ample time for study, and the
observer of the present crew states that with these aids it is
very difficult to go wrong unless the radio apparatus refuses
to function.
18. If the flight has gone according to plan the operation is
not examined in detail at the subsequent interrogation, but if
anything has gone wrong the latter is investigated very
thoroughly and the observer had to make a full report.
19. It was stated in the previous report that a detachment of
K.G.66, consisting of three crews of the 1st Staffel and four
crews of the 3rd Staffel, was sent about the middle of
November 1944 to Zwischenahn where they were told that they
would have to fly sorties under Egon control in conjunction
with He.111's carrying V.1's.
20. During the first fortnight in December the crews carried
out a certain number of Egon practice flights but the weather
was so bad that the present P/W, who were members of the
party, made only one flight. This was to Texel and the
aircraft experienced severe icing conditions both on the
outward and homeward routes. Possibly as a result of the
aerials icing up they received no instructions from the
ground; on returning to base they were told that the Freya had
plotted them the whole way to Texel and back and had sent them
instruction, but had received no response.
21. The observer states that the usual operational height for
the Egon procedure is up to 4000/5000 metres, at which height
the maximum control range is about 350 km.
"Y" Procedure.
22. The present crew returned from Zwischenahn to Dedolstorf
about the middle of December. Up to this time none of them had
received more than theoretical instruction in the "Y"
procedure, but about a week later on December 20th/21st, the
W/T operator made one flight as a member of another crew
undergoing "Y" training.
23. This flight was from Dedolstorf to Wittenberg, about 100
km. to the E.N.E. The aircraft was controlled from a "Y"
installation at Dedolstorf consisting of one single mast with
a small aerial array at its head of which P/W could give no
exact description. Instructions were passed to the aircraft
over the FuGe 17 and when the ground control wanted to fix the
aircraft the W/T operator of the crew depressed the "Y" key on
his FuGe 17 for five seconds on request.
24. The flight was a failure. The "Y" beam became bent owing,
P/W thinks, to variations in the electric main current, which
fluctuated between 220 and 180 volts, and when the bombing
signal was received the aircraft, although still on the beam,
was at Magdeburg, some 95 km to the South of Wittenberg.
25. The next day the Staffelkapitän of 1/K.G.66 undertook a
similar flight, which was more successful. When he received
his bombing signal he was over Seehausen, only a few km. S.W.
of Wittenberge.
The New "X" Procedure.
26. This new procedure is basically a combination of the "Y"
beam and the Egon procedure. A "Y" beam - referred to by P/W
as "Oskar"; the code name known to have been applied to the
original "Y" beam used in 1940 - is employed in conjunction
with the FuGe 28, the FuGe 25a and a clock which P/W called
the "Y" clock, but which appears from their description to be
similar in principle to, if not identical with, the "clock"
reported in April 1944 as having been devised for the Egon
procedure. (A.D.I.(K) 160/1944).
27. The knowledge of the present P/W on the new procedure was
only derived from theoretical instruction. They had heard
whilst at Zwischenahn in December 1944 that the system was to
be introduced in their Staffel, but there was some delay in
obtaining the necessary apparatus, notably the "Y" clock, and
at the time when P/W were captured on January 23rd, only two
or three aircraft of the Staffel were equipped.
28. P/W themselves had received a certain amount of
theoretical instruction during January but only one of them -
the W/T operator - had seen the "Y" clock. They were to have
received airborne instruction on January 25th and 26th flying
over the North Sea one northerly course from Leeuwarden; it
was thought that the necessary airborne instruction could last
about 8-10 days in all and that early in March aircraft of the
Staffel would be ready to use the new procedure operationally
over the front line areas.
29. The type of "Y" beam station used is described by P/W as a
number of main aerial masts about 10-12 metres high
interspaced with smaller vertical dipoles which radiate one
main beam and a series of about six secondary beams on each
side of it at diminishing intervals, the first being at 13°
from the main beam. The array is located on a large turntable
for directional purposes. P/W stated that two of these "Y"
stations were at Leeuwarden and on the mainland near Den
Helder respectively.
30. For the reception of the "Y" beam the aircraft carries a
FuGe 28, the visual indicator of which is referred to
according to circumstances as "Kommando" or "Anzeiger". When
the aircraft is flying along the main beam to the target the
pointer on the dial gives "Kommando", that is to say when the
pointer indicates left it "commands" that a correction to the
left must be made to return to the beams. When the aircraft is
flying on a secondary beam, however, the pointer is referred
to as "Anzeiger" and "indicates" the position of the aircraft
in relation to the beams. When the pointer indicates left for
instance, the aircraft is to the left of the secondary beam
and a correction to the right must be made to bring it back to
that beam.
31. The reverse holds good when flying back from the target to
base but for convenience the visual indicator can be switched
over for the return flight to indicate in the same way as on
the outward flight.
32. The continuous tone of the secondary beam is undulating
while that of the main beam is level and the difference can be
readily distinguished by the W/T operator. It is usual for the
aircraft to fly along o secondary beam until instructions are
received over the "Y" clock or the FuGe 17 to fly on the main
33. The "Y" clock indicates by means of radio impulses from
the ground station a previously-arranged series of code
instructions similar to those used in the Egon procedure. Its
great advantage is that it dispenses with almost all R/T or
W/T signals between ground central and aircraft.
34. P/W did not know the FuGe number of this instrument and
none of them, with the exception of the W/T operator, had
heard any other name for it than the "Y" clock; the latter had
once or twice heard it referred to as the SNK-Gerät, but he
had no idea what these initials denoted.
35. The description given by P/W is strikingly similar to that
contained in A.D.I.(K) 160/1944 paras. 29-36. Basically the
clock consists of a cathode ray tube screen about 20 cm. in
diameter with numbers from 0 to 9 spaced at intervals round
its circumference. Each of these numbers denotes a code
instruction, the significance of which is given on the W/T
briefing sheet for each operation and is varied from sortie to
36. Numbers 1 to 3 or 4 are reserved for the individual
aircraft and in explanation of this P/W says that at the most
four aircraft would be used as pathfinders proper, whilst
other aircraft in the unit would be used to renew the markers
and flares laid by these four aircraft, flying probably on
Egon or even on D/R to bring them near enough to the original
marking to enable them to correct their course themselves.
37. The remaining numbers, i.e. 0 and 4 or 5 to 9, are
allocated to the respective code instructions, such as
"distance from ground station to aircraft", "distance from
aircraft to target", "height", "change course left", "change
course right", and bomb release warning.
38. The "hand" of the look appears as a wedge-shaped blip on
the screen of the Cathode ray tube about two-thirds out from
its centre. It rests at a neutral position at twelve o'clock
and is moved to the various figures by means of impulses from
the ground station lasting only 1/100th of a second, and
therefore calculated by the Germans to be unjammable by us.
39. There is an aerial in a shallow perspex-covered bola in
the centre of the underside of the fuselage, but P/W could not
describe this array or say whether it was for the "Y" beam
reception or for the SNK-Gerät.
40. During its flight the aircraft keeps its FuGe 25a switched
on and is plotted by ground Radar, which gives any necessary
instructions over the "clock". According to P/W the positions
1 and 2 on the FuGe 25A indicate "Grob-Messung" (coarse fix)
and "Fein-Messung" (fine fix) respectively.
41. The method of working with the new "Y" procedure is as
The aircraft flies by D/R from its base until it picks up the
secondary beam of the "Y" station, along which it then flies
until instructions are received to move over to the main beam.
The W/T operator has his FuGe 17 switched on ready to receive
any instructions, and the FuGe 25A is switched on in position
42. From time to time signals are received from the ground,
the warning to the W/T operator being a continuous tone of
about 2 - 3 seconds on the FuGe 17 indicating to him that he
is to stand by to receive instructions over the clock. Shortly
afterwards a small white indicator an the top of the clock
lights up and the blip moves round from the neutral position
at 12 o'clock to one of the numbers between 1 and 4 indicating
the particular aircraft being called. After stopping at the
number for a second or two only, the blip returns to the
neutral position.
43. The message for the particular aircraft called then
begins. If the instruction, for instance, is "change course to
the right by 15°", the blip will first move to the number
allotted to "Change course right" and then in turn to the
numbers 0, 1, 5, indicating 015°, returning to the neutral
position after each individual number, Acknowledgment of the
message is made by switching the FuGe 25A off and on again. If
this is done instructions are continued if necessary, but if
no acknowledgment is received by the ground control, the
instruction is repeated until acknowledged with the FuGe 25A.
44. Should the aircraft wander owing, for example, to
disturbance of the beam, fresh instructions are sent from time
to time by means of the clock. Shortly before the target is
reached, instructions are received via the "clock" to switch
over to position 2 on the FuGe 25A for a fine fix on the last
run to the target.
45. One minute before the actual target is reached the W/T
operator receives his standby warning on the FuGe 17 followed
by the appropriate code number on the clock denoting that the
markers or flares must be released in 60 seconds time. The W/T
operator or the observer then "stops" this time on his watch,
but the flares or markers are not-released until a red lamp
lights up above the clock; this may be a little short of 60
seconds or a little longer.
46. The bomb release signal could also be given over the FuGe
17 instead of over the clock. The method in this case would be
that at the beginning of the 60 seconds a morse signal such as
-. would be given and then when the time of release was
reached a further -. , the flares being released on the final
47. The clock is usually placed in front of the observer so
that he can acknowledge signals with the FuGe 25A, which is
also situated within his reach.
48. Although two or three aircraft of 1/K.G.66 are at present
fitted with SNK, it is the intention to fit all aircraft of
the Staffel with this new apparatus. The aircraft retains,
however, its normal radio equipment, so that it can operate
with either Egon or the new "Y" procedure as required. The
aircraft were flown from Dedolstorf to Celle for the fitting
of the SNK.
FuGe 217. (Radar).
49. The Z6 + FH was fitted with a FuGe 217. The crew had
little practical experience with it - they had used it on only
one sortie, in the course of which nothing was picked up - and
they appear to have had rather inadequate instruction in its
function, but they were able to give the following description
of the apparatus.
50. The FuGe 217 differs from the FuGe 216 in both the display
and the aerials. In the FuGe 217 the display is horizontal
across the middle of the screen and through the centre of it
runs a vertical white line which represents zero. The return
from the aircraft itself shows on both sides of this middle
white line, whilst the blip from the enemy aircraft shows on
one side or the other.
51. The range runs to both left and right, with an extreme on
either side of 8 km. The exact object of ranging from the
middle is not known to P/W and they can only suggest that it
may be to indicate whether the aircraft approaching from the
rear is to the left or right.
52. The W/T operator states that the crew had had this
apparatus explained to them merely as equipment for searching
to the rear and had never heard of it in connection with
D/F'ing, although having a vertical line in the centre of the
screen with display on both sides of it would indicate that
perhaps it could be used for this purpose.
53. Although the screen is calibrated up to 8 km, the actual
maximum range at K.G.66's normal operational height - some
2000 metres - is only about 4 km, as this is the distance on
the display between the return from the parent aircraft and
the ground return; the observer assumes that the minimum range
at which an aircraft can be identified is about 500 metres,
but it may be a little less.
54. Below the screen are three control knobs for focus,
brilliance and range; the latter has two positions, one for a
coarse setting giving the 8 km, range, and the other a fine
setting for a range of 4 km.
55. There is an aerial array above each wing surface; that on
the starboard wing, P/W believes, is the transmitter, and that
on the port wing the receiver. The main support for each array
protrudes rearward from the wing surface at an angle of about
35° from the horizontal, at a point about a quarter of the way
inboard from the wingtip and just forward of the aileron.
56. Running upwards from the main support, at a slight angle
to the vertical, are three feeders, each with a horizontal
dipole at its tip, extending about 15 cm. to either side of
the feeder. The feeders are staggered in length, the forward
one being highest and the aft one lowest; the latter is almost
directly over the trailing edge of the wing.
57. During lectures on FuGe 217, the instructor had drawn the
lobe of search and P/W says that whereas in the FuGe 216 this
was to the rear and downwards, in the FuGe 217 it was to the
rear and above the aircraft, with the deepest point only some
400 metres below the aircraft itself.
58. The explanation of this may be that the operations carried
out by K.G.66 were mainly those entailing a low flying height
- anything from ground level up to 2000 metres - and therefore
any contact by night fighters would be free the rear above
rather than below. The angle of search is about 30° from the
centre on each side, and there is a small lobe of search,
probably about 1 km, to the front of the aircraft.
59. Crews are not enthusiastic about the FuGe 217 and the
present one, although it had been flying several months with
it, had only once used it on one sortie, mainly because when
they switched it on it disturbed the whole of the radio
equipment in the aircraft. Not only the intercom, but also
ground signals over the FuGe 17 or FuGe 10 are upset, and it
also makes D/F'ing extremely difficult. Apart from this, P/W
also believe that the radiations facilitate the work of our
airborne search equipment.
JU.88 S-3.
60. The Z6 + FH, a Ju.88 S-3, was fitted with Jumo 213
engines. The crew are very enthusiastic about this aircraft
and state that with the Jumo 213's it has the following speeds
at about 2000 metres:-
2300 r.p.m............ 380 k.p.h. A.S.I. without bombs.
370 k.p.h. " with bombs.
2400 r.p.m............ 390 k.p.h. " without bombs.
380 k.p.h. " with bombs.
2700 r.p.m.(highest... 440 k.p.h. " without bombs.
cruising speed) 430 k.p.h. " with bombs
61. They themselves had never exceeded 440 k.p.h. and in fast
they usually flew with 2300 r.p.m. The rate of climb was
stated to be 8 metres per second with bombs at 270-280 k.p.h.
A.S.I. and 15 metres per second without bombs at 240-250
62. Oberleutnant HANSEN is Technical Officer of the Gruppe.
63. 1st Staffel.
Staffelkapitän Oberleutnant PIOTA.
Ia.(Operations Officer) Oberleutnant HEBERSTREIT.
N.O.(Signals Officer) Leutnant KUBLER.
64. The following are crews in the 1st Staffel:-
Pilot: Oberleutnant PIOTA. Leutnant ALTROGGER.
Observer: Unteroffizier SEMPF. Feldwebel HERMANN.
W/T: Unteroffizier KONNER. Oberfähnrich GRAUENHORST.
Pilot: Leutnant KUBLER. Oberleutnant TRAUBER.
Observer: Feldwebel MALLY. Fähnrich SCHNEIDER.
W/T: Unteroffizier SCHMIDT. Feldwebel BEHRENS.
Pilot: Stabsfeldwebel FISCHER. Feldwebel HOFSTELLER.
Observer: Oberleutnant HEBERSTREIT. Unteroffizier VOGEL.
W/T: Stabsfeldwebel BACHMANN. Feldwebel NIED,
Pilot: Oberfeldwebel JACOBS. Unteroffizier KELLER.
Observer: Oberfeldwebel JAGLA. Unteroffizier SCHONFELD.
W/T: Unteroffizier BINGEL. Unteroffizier SILKE.
65. Stabsfeldwebel FISCHER, who pilots Oberleutnant
HEBERSTREIT the IA of the Gruppe, is in the Stabstaffel but is
attached to the 1st Staffel.
66. Oberfeldwebel LEHR, a pilot in the Staffel, has gone off
to the Luftkriegschule and will shortly be returning as a
Leutnant. His W/T operator Feldwebel TOMASCHEK is at present
without a crew.
67. Oberfeldwebel SIEMER has left the 1st Staffel and is now
in the Kriegsschule; it is not known if he will return to the
68. Apart from the above, three new crews with an
Oberleutnant, an Oberfeldwebel and an Unteroffizier as pilots,
names unknown, arrived a few days before the present crew was
shot down.
2nd Staffel.
69. The following are pilots in the 2nd Staffel:-
Oberleutnant GUSZ.
Oberleutnant MADETZKI.
Unteroffizier ROTGANGEL.
Feldwebel ROTH.
70. Oberleutnant GUSZ is the Staffelkapitän; his observer is
Unteroffizier ULLRICH.
3rd Staffel.
71. The following are members of the 3rd Staffel:-
Pilot: Leutnant BERCHTOLD.
Observer: Unteroffizier GRUNEL.
W/T: Oberfeldwebel KURZ.
Pilot: Oberleutnant MEHLS.
" Leutnant HINZ.
" Gefreiter KANDZORA.
72. The following were lost during the operations over the
Bastogne pocket:—
1st Staffel - Oberfeldwebel SCHMALZBAUER.
3rd Staffel - Fähnrich TULLNER.
Oberfeldwebel MOTZ.
Leutnant SCHUBERT.
73. The W/T Operator of the last named was Feldwebel LABINSKI.
K. G. 54.
74. It has been stated earlier in this report that prior to
joining K.G.66 this crew, had been in II/K.G.54. In December
1944 one of them met a friend from his old unit who told him
that II/K.G.54 was in process of converting to the Ar.234.
Unfortunately, no further details were available.
U.S. Air Interrogation. S.D. Felkin,
19th February 1945. Wing Commander."

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Old 30th October 2018, 01:02
Bruce Dennis Bruce Dennis is offline
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Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe

"SECRET A.D.I.(K) Report No.187/1944
1. Since the issue of A.D.I.(K) Report N°160/151,4, "A G.A.F.
Pathfinder Unit", the two P/W concerned have added some
further details of the Egon procedure. This information,
together with some notes on other navigational aids, is
summarised in the present report.
2. It was stated to be usual for five or six aircraft from
5/K.G.66, using the Egon procedure, to take part in a
pathfinder operation. Whilst some of these would be engaged in
laying the turning point markers, others, all controlled on
one and the same frequency, would be flying at intervals to
the target to place and renew the target marking.
3. According to P/W, although one Freya would suffice for the
Egon procedure, two plotting Freyas are employed so that the
second can give undivided attention to the aircraft which is
near and over the target, whilst the first Freya plots the
aircraft up to that point.
4. When a pathfinder aircraft has released its first flares
it is usual for it to make a 180° left-hand turn and fly away
from the target, leaving its bomb-doors open and maintaining
the same height as at the time of flare release; a further
turn of 180° then brings the aircraft back to its original
course for the second run-in.
5. Freya control is maintained during this manoeuvre and
course corrections are given if necessary; should the aircraft
be in the correct position for the bombing run, the only
signals from control are those for pre-release (dash) and for
release (dot). It is stated that the latter signal may consist
of either one or three dots.
6. It frequently occurs that aircraft which have placed the
turning-point markers also proceed to the target area to help
in renewing the marker flares. In such cases the aircraft are
given new courses by control immediately after completion of
the turning-point marking; the initial new course is indicated
in this case in degrees, e.g.: "Autobahn 128".
7. Freya control of any aircraft ceases immediately after the
completion of the task of that particular aircraft.
Range and Accuracy
8. The present Egon procedure is operable up to a range of
approximately 270 km. P/W amplified his previous statement on
the accuracy of the present Egon procedure and stated that he
had been told it was accurate to 0.3 degrees in bearing and
200/250 metres in range.
Communication with Aircraft
9. The P/W from the Z6+IN was able to add further code words
and their meanings to the list given is paragraph 20 of
A.D.I.(K) 160/1944.-
W/T R/T Meaning
3 letter code group Zeppelin
Originally (Rübezahl)
Codes used for
...--... Frage Question (precedes a
codeword if a
question is asked
MAR Marie Your distance in min-
(followed by a number) utes from base is ...
NTE Ente Your distance from
(followed by a number) the target is ...
SNK Schnecke (=snail) decrease speed
EXP Express increase speed
KRS Karussel (=merry-goround)
Fly in circle
REI Reise Reise Fly on as at
NAL 1 Kanal 1
NAL 2 Kanal 2
(The keyed (morse
(recognition) and un-
(Keyed signals
(respectively of the
(FuGe 25A.
CCC Caruso No more evasive
action to be taken
from now (prior to
bomb release signal)
AAAMAT+/+ Autobahn+/+
Set course for base
VVV Victor understood
SAL Trübsal Have you enough fuel
(followed by a number) for....minutes flying
KKK Ich besuche Sie
Ich besuche Sie nicht
mehr, bitte kommen
you are being plotted
control finished,
please confirm
+/+ = amendment to previous list.
10. The signals "Schnecke" and "Express" are given by control
when the aircraft in ahead of or behind schedule. When control
sees that the aircraft will arrive too early, "Schnecke",
followed by a number is signalled, meaning "at your present
speed you will arrive...... minutes too soon over the target".
"Express" is given for the opposite condition.
11. Before the pathfinder aircraft has been released by
control the only communication from the aircraft to control is
normally by manipulation of the FuGe 25A switch, although if
specially requested the aircraft will resort to R/T or W/T.
Control frames questions to the aircraft in such a way that
they only require an acknowledgement and can therefore be
answered by means of the FuGe 25A.
12. The FuGe 25A is switched to Kanal 1 to transmit the morse
recognition signal and to Kanal 2 for the unkeyed tone signal.
Kanal 1 is employed until the aircraft is within 50 km of the
target, Kanal 2 being used whilst the aircraft is near and
over the target and under control of Freya No.2. The latter
Kanal enables the bearing of the aircraft to be read more
13. Each signal passed by control to the aircraft must be
acknowledged on the FuGe 25A, either on Kanal 1 or 2. In
practice, however, crews often forget to acknowledge signals
and control therefore requests "Kanal Quittung" and awaits the
appropriate reply.
14. When control of an aircraft is being withdrawn, control
signals "Ich besuche Sie nicht mehr, bitte kommen" (I have
finished with you, please confirm).
Communication Frequencies
15. As an example of R/T and W/T frequencies employed on a
pathfinder operation, P/W quoted those used on the night of
24/25th March 1944. These were 40.5 mc/s on FuGe 16 and 4848
kc/s on FuGe 10, besides the 583 kcs of the broadcasting
station Calais I.
New Egon Procedure
16. It was stated that certain crews of 5/K.G. 66 had been
sent to Königsberg/Neumark for practice with the new Egon
17. whilst P/W had little to add to his original description
of the Egon attachment which will be introduced into
operations at some future date, he believed that the
presentation apparatus of the ground-control equipment is
divided up into sectors in a similar manner to the airborne
18. He did not know details of the frequency, other than that
it is V.H.F. and crystal controlled.
19. The present P/W were able to add a few small details on
this subject to those given in A.D I.(K) 108/1944 paragraphs
37 - 39.
20. In October 1943, 5/K.G. 66 had a Do. 217M equipped with
the Bernhardiner Gerät, manufactured by Telefunken.
Oberleutnant Grotz and a civilian technician named Menzel or
Wenzel conducted some experiments but came to the conclusion
that the apparatus was not sufficiently accurate for
pathfinder work. It was thought to be accurate enough for the
use of bomber units, however, and at that time it was proposed
to pass the equipment over to K.G. 6.
21. P/W later overheard the Gruppenkommandeur saying that the
project might have been abandoned as work on the ground
installations had ceased.
22. One Bernhard (ground station) was known to P/W near
Chartres; the apparatus was about 30 metres high and was
mounted on a turntable some 40 metres in diameter. Each ground
transmitter was to work on a different frequency so that dross
bearings could be taken.
23. The aircraft equipment included a Hellschreiber
(teleprinter) some 40 cm. square. A paper tape appeared in a
window of about 30 cm. in length in the front panel, and every
30 to 60 seconds the true bearing of the aircraft and the time
of the bearing appeared on the tape. This equipment, which was
thought by P/W to work through the E.B.L.3., is remarkably
reminiscent of the Drehelektra described by P/W of the old
Gruppe 106 in May 1942 (A.D.I.(K) 104/1942 paragraphs 8 - 15)
and later by other P/W of the same unit (A.D.I.(K) 244/1942
paragraphs 11 - 16).
24. The range of the Bernhard was said to have been about 400
km. under ideal conditions.
Erika Gerät
25. Experiments in this navigational aid were conducted in
K.G. 66 under the direction of a civilian technician by the
name of Voss. The system was abandoned as being too open to
enemy countermeasure, and the instruments were withdrawn from
the unit. P/W knew no details of how the Erika Gerät
26. P/W stated that 1/K.G. 66 used the 'Y' system as a
navigational aid; he had seen the switch for the FuGe. 28A in
one of the aircraft of that Staffel.
"X" Clock
27. Early in 1943 P/W saw a number of "X" clocks, of both the
larger and the new smaller types, in the technical section of
the Staffel. He understood that these were to be employed in
conjunction with Hohentwiel for attacking ships. He had heard
nothing more of this, however, and recently the "X" clocks
were no not to be seen.
Jamming of Knickebein
28. One of the present P/W stated that it was possible for an
experienced operator to read through British jamming of
Knickebein; he said that the genuine dots and dashes were more
pronounced than those produced by the countermeasures.
29. Another type of interference which P/W had experienced
with Knickebein took the form of rising and falling wail.
German Jamming of R/T
30. P/W could not enlarge on his previous account of the
activities of 3/K.G.66, to which he was attached for six
months at Cormeilles-en-Vexin, since during that period the
Staffel was still only under training for investigation and
countermeasure flights. He stated, however, that the aircraft
were equipped with a fixed wire aerial about 1.20 metres in
length fitted under the fuselage, and he believed that this
aerial was used in conjunction with the Viktor R/T jamming
A.D.I.(K) S. D. Felkin
25/Apr/44 Wing Commander"
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Old 30th October 2018, 02:44
Dan O'Connell Dan O'Connell is offline
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Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe

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Old 30th October 2018, 10:29
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Nick Beale Nick Beale is online now
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Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe

Originally Posted by Dan O'Connell View Post
Agreed, would people like a dedicated "Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations" thread?

Other thoughts: (1) Bruce has done me a great service, at least — my microfilm print-out of No. 160/1944 is almost impossible to read, now I finally know what it says!

(2) If you're interested in the last flight of Z6+FH, on what was a busy night over Holland and Belgium, there's this and this
Nick Beale
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Old 30th October 2018, 10:58
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SES SES is offline
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Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe

[quote=Nick Beale;259922]Agreed, would people like a dedicated "Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations" thread?

Hi Nick,
Yes what a wonderful idea.
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Old 30th October 2018, 11:00
Marcel van Heijkop Marcel van Heijkop is offline
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Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe

Originally Posted by Nick Beale View Post
Agreed, would people like a dedicated "Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations" thread?

(2) If you're interested in the last flight of Z6+FH, on what was a busy night over Holland and Belgium, there's this and this
Absolutely! Count me in, Nick!

PS: Is your website down at the moment? I tried to read the info from the links you provided, but couldn't get on your site.

Best regards,

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Old 30th October 2018, 19:06
Nick Beale's Avatar
Nick Beale Nick Beale is online now
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Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe

Originally Posted by Marcel van Heijkop View Post
Absolutely! Count me in, Nick!

PS: Is your website down at the moment? I tried to read the info from the links you provided, but couldn't get on your site.

Best regards,

Hi Marcel,
My website is still alive (I just checked) and both those links work for me.

Another site with a selection of transcribed ADI(K) reports is: The emphasis there is on radar and communications systems.
Nick Beale
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Old 30th October 2018, 20:56
Bruce Dennis Bruce Dennis is offline
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NJ developments

"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 125/1945

1. Between the opening of the Rundstedt offensive on 17
December 1944 and the night of 1st January 1945, fifty-nine
German night fighter aircrew captured on the Western Front
were brought to England for interrogation by A.D.I.(K). Of
these prisoners, ten were selected as being suitable for
special interrogation with the object of investigating current
German tactics, and the extent of their deviation from methods
employed up to the end of November and reported in A.D.I.(K)
508, 599, 620 and 700/1944.
2. The present report is based on the interrogation of these
ten prisoners, who came from III/N.J.G.1, II and III/N.J.G.2
and II, III and IV/N.J.G.3, and of whom one had recently spent
some time at the G.A.F. radar experimental station at
Werneuchen. In addition, there was one prisoner who had spent
one year as a ground radar mechanic with I/N.J.G.4 and had
then transferred to the Schulstaffel of the same unit to train
as a radar operator. The Schulstaffel had been dissolved at
the end of October 1944 and its personnel posted to the
infantry; this P/W fell into Allied hands as an unwilling
member of the Waffen SS.
3. From interrogation of previous night fighter prisoners -
captured between September and the end of November 1944 - it
has been amply proved that the German night fighter force has
been at a loss to overcome the successful Bomber Command
spoofery and radio countermeasures and as yet has made no
progress in its efforts to overcome this disadvantage.
4. From the present interrogations there are signs that the
Germans, not content to let the matter rest as it is, are
striving to gain the upper hand over Bomber Command by the
introduction of at least two new measures. One of these,
discussed in the following paragraphs, is the employment of
Bernhardine beacons for the dual purpose commentary and
navigation, and the other - as yet in its early stages - the
probable introduction of a new type of search equipment, the
SN 3. Details of the latter are at present lacking, but
evidence suggests that it may be of the nature of centimetre

Earlier Vicissitudes.
5. As far as G.A.F. prisoners are concerned, Bernhardine is
no innovation, as early as May 1942 hazy allusions to this
form of navigational aid were made by prisoners, but the first
mention of Bernhardine by name was made by an officer of
1(F)/121 captured in October 1943 (A.D.I.(K) 498/1943;
thereafter nothing further was heard until K.G.66 opened its
pathfinder operations over England early in 1944.
6. A prisoner from 5/K.G.66 captured in England on 25th March
1944 gave an account of Bernhardine which, in the light of the
present interrogation proves to have been remarkably accurate
(A.D.I.(K) 187/1944, paras.19 – 24)
7. In October 1943, 5/K.G.66 had had 1 Do.217-M equipped with
Bernhardine, but after some experiments the experts had come
to the conclusion that the apparatus was not sufficiently
accurate for pathfinder operations; the P/W concerned had
heard later that work on the ground installations had ceased.
8. In spite of continued interrogation of subsequent
prisoners, nothing more was heard of Bernhardine until late in
December 1944. The capture of a prisoner from III/N.J.G.1 on
17th December 1944 and other prisoners from II and III/N.J.G.3
later in the same month has now revealed that Bernhardine is
being seriously considered - if not already used - not only as
an aid to night fighter navigation but as a source of the
Introduction of Bernhardine to Night Fighting.
9. Some time in October 1944, crews of 8/N.J.G.1 were given a
preliminary lecture on Bernhardine in which its principles
were explained, they were told that it was no new discovery
but would shortly be introduced to night fighting. In
III/N.J.G.3 crews had also been given frequent lectures and by
November some of the aircraft of that Gruppe already had the
necessary apparatus installed.
10. According to prisoners who attended these lectures, the
transmissions from the ground station take the form of a
conventional twin lobe polar diagram with an equisignal area
and with a very small amount of rearward radiation. A signal
transmitted from the ground station once every minute is
translated by the airborne apparatus into a teleprint message
on a paper tape giving the QTE (true bearing) of the aircraft
from the ground transmitter followed by a further image in
figures and letters which is a Divisional commentary of the
type at present broadcast by the high powered W/T beacons.
11. It was explained that the Bernhardine transmitters would
operate on 32 frequencies between 30.0 and 33.1 mc/s, and that
the signal would be received through the normal E.Bl.3 in the
aircraft. Thus the first 32 of the 34 spot frequencies of the
E.Bl.3 would be used for Bernhardine whilst the remaining two,
33.2 and 33.3 mc/s, would be retained for blind landing
12. It is claimed by P/W that Bernhardine signals are
unjammable and that transmissions have a range of 400 - 500
13. A captured night fighter map, recovered from a recent
crash in Belgium and issued by the signals officer of N.J.G.3,
was marked with Bernhardine transmitters at approximately the
following pinpoints;-
N° 0(?) Berlin 52°13'N;13°6'E
N° 8 Alkmaar, Holland. 52°42'N;4°38'E
N° 9(?) Leck 54°41'N;9° 2'E
N° 10 Thisted, Denmark. 56°42'N;8°33’E
N° 11 Breslau 51°25'N;17°5’E
N° 12 Pilsen 49°45'N;13°15’E
14. A further indication that Bernhardine may already be in
operational use was found in a file of signals orders from an
aircraft of II/N.J.G.1 shot down on December 31st. On the same
page as the usual numbering of the Y-line frequencies was
another column headed "Kanäle" (= channels); the channels were
numbered from 1 to 32 and to each number was appended a
frequency, commencing with 30.0 at No.1 and rising by .1 mc.
to 33.1 mc/s at No.32.
15. Both of the above documents have been forwarded to

Airborne Apparatus.
16. The Bernhardine apparatus in the aircraft is contained in
a box measuring some 60 cm in width, 30 cm in height and 20 cm
in depth, placed in the JU.88 in some cases to the right of
the W/T operator on the lower port wall of the fuselage and in
others to the left of the W/T operator or in the forward
instrument panel.
17. The front of the box has a wide glass-covered slot about
40 cm. in length and 12 cm. in depth along which the paper
tape travels from right to left after the necessary data have
been printed upon it by a teleprinter contained in the box.
The on-off switch for the apparatus, marked FuGe.120, is
placed on the R/T operator's switch panel, and is used in
conjunction with the click-stop frequency selector for the
18. From evidence supplied by the present P/W it is possible
to give a description of the Bernhardine display and of the
exact data which it supplies. An impression of the Bernhardine
display is given below; it will be seen that the printed tape
is divided into three horizontal sections, on the uppermost of
which appears a series of close vertical lines shortening at
intervals to a "V", on the central section a reading in
degrees, and on the lower a coded image which is the
commentary. One simultaneous printing of these sections takes
place during ten seconds of every minute, the tape remaining
stationary for the remaining fifty seconds, after which the
process is repeated.
19. In the lectures on Bernhardine it was stated that the
ground transmitter makes one full revolution of 360° in sixty
seconds; a section of the pattern of the ground transmission
is repeated on the tape in the form of the series of vertical
lines, the equisignal zone being represented by the apex of
the "V".
20. In each printing lasting ten seconds a sector of 60°
appears on the tape and in every case it contains a repetition
of the equisignal zone. The reading in degrees appears in the
central section of the tape in numbers representing 10's of
degrees, and the point opposite to which the apex of the "V"
is printed represents the bearing in degrees of the aircraft
from the transmitter. Accuracy of bearings was stated to be
within 0.5°.
21. A recognition letter is allotted to each transmitter and
is repeated on the tape at every 20° on the scale; in the
sketch the letter X - the recognition for the Leck transmitter
is shown.
22. The commentary in the lowest section appears in each 10-
second printing as a group of a maximum of ten letters and
numerals, inclusive of two crosses denoting the beginning and
end of a message. Should a message be of more than ten
characters it wi11 be continued in the succeeding printing, a
cross appearing at the end of the message.
23. Thus, the commentary message shown in the sketch, + 40 KA
27 100, just falls within the ten-character limit if the final
+ denoting the end of the message is omitted. The latter is
therefore carried forward and appears at the commencement of
the next printing; it denotes simultaneously the end of the
one message and the beginning of the next. It was stated that
a single message could be continued over three or four
24. The commentary always appears in a standard order;
analysis of the typical message shown in the sketch is as
25. It will be noted that the form of this commentary is
exactly the same as that at present put out by the Divisions
on the high powered W/T beacons (see A.D.I.(K) 599/1944 para.
26. The present P/W had been told that, in addition to the
Divisional commentary, instructions to individual formations
of night fighters would be transmitted by the Bernhardine and
printed on the lowest section of the tape. How, in such a
case, the aircraft would be tracked or how the orders by the
subordinate units would be coded, they did not know.

Operational Use.
27. The aircraft set is switched on soon after take-off, so
that the bearing transmitter can be constantly watched. If the
+ = beginning of message
40 = height of head of bomber stream in 100’s of metres
KA = fighter-grid position of head of stream
27 = course of formation in tens of degrees
100 = estimated number of aircraft
W/T operator wants the fix, he switches over to the
transmission of a second Bernhardine station for a gross
bearing; it was stated, however, that quicker and more
favoured method was to obtain a simultaneous cross bearing
from a high powered beacon through the PeilGe 6.
28. As far as these prisoners knew, only the Bernhardine
stations at Berlin and Leck are so far capable of transmitting
a commentary and flying instructions; the latter station was
only modified in this way at the beginning of November 1944
and aircraft of 9/N.J.G.3 made several test flights, usually
taking off from Uetersen at about 0230 hours and remaining
airborne for some four hours.
29. The present P/W of 9/N.J.G.3 had not taken part in these
flights, but after the tests he had seen the tape, which he
described as being printed on white paper in red letter,
4 - 6 mm. high as clearly as with a typewriter. He was told
that there was sufficient tape to allow of continuous
operation for 4 hours 20 minutes.

German Spoof Signals.
30. An aircraft of 7/N.J.G.3 shot down in Belgium on January
1st carried a signal order on which appeared the word
"Orgelpfeife" (= organ pipe). Interrogation of all the present
P/W elicited the fact that Orgelpfeife is the codeword for
spoof R/T and W/T traffic passed between small numbers of
aircraft and the ground with the object of simulating large
numbers of night fighters in operation.
31. According to a P/W of 9/N.J.G.2 Orgelpfeife was
introduced in that unit, in mid-November; one crew in the
Staffel had received special briefing and usually operated the
spoof traffic. In operating R/T spoof, this crew’s duty was to
imitate a large number of night fighters operating by the
simple expedient of all four members of the crew taking turns
to speak, each using different callsigns.
32. It was said that the pilot of the crew in question,
Oberfeldwebel GELLNER was something of an actor and was able
to imitate various German dialects and different voices; P/W
claimed that the single Aircraft could simulate as many as
twelve night fighters.
33. The Orgelpfeife aircraft operated under Y control, since
such importance was attached to its position in relation to
the raiding force; the spoof aircraft patrolled an area near
the estimated target and as the raiding force was approaching
the target, the simulation of night fighters operating
34. According to P/W the spoof aircraft carried large
quantities of Düppel (Window).
35. It seems that only one aircraft in a Staffel operates
Orgelpfeife; this was certainly the case in III/N.J.G.2, and
another P/W of III/N.J.G.3 stated that similar conditions
prevailed in that Gruppe.
36. None of the present P/W could give any useful information
on the method of coding the Orgelpfeife traffic, but it was
stated that the briefing usually gave two codewords or groups,
according to whether the spoof was R/T or W/T, and the crew
was to ignore all orders from the ground except those preceded
by the operative Orgelpfeife codewords or group.
37. In the captured briefing sheet mentioned above, the
codewords for 7/N.J.G.3 on the night of December 31st were
"Elfenbein" for the aircraft and "Hallore" for the ground.
38. A P/W of 9/N.J.G.3 stated that early in December R/T
silence had been enforced amongst the normally operating night
fighters of that Staffel.

Defence of the Ruhr by N.J.G.1.
39. The four Gruppen of N.J.G.1 have been allotted the
special task of defending the Ruhr in night attacks by R.A.F.
Bomber Command, and to achieve this aim all the Gruppen are
based strategically at airfields in that area.
40. In operations over the Ruhr the Gruppen are not
controlled separately as would normally be the case, but
operate under the central control of a special Geschwader
commentary put out on a M/F and an alternative V.H.F.
frequency; the latter, however, is almost invariably jammed.
41. This commentary consists of tactical instructions to the
aircraft as well as reports on the general situation;
according to P/W, the latter are not based on a Divisional
picture of events, but on data supplied by the Ruhr Flak
42. When a Mosquito force is reported over the Ruhr area, and
providing that flying conditions are suitable, all aircraft of
N.J.G.1 are put up and ordered to orbit any of the beacons
Börse, Bruno, Achmed, Gemse, Heide, Schnake, Paule, Ratte and
Drossel to await further events.
43. In case of jamming of both channels of Geschwader
control, two of these beacons, Achmed and Paule, are set aside
for transmission of the Geschwader commentary. P/W also heard
that a further alternative H.F commentary is to be put out on
a 20 kW transmitter whose signals will be superimposed on a
Cologne broadcast programme.
44. The aircraft of N.J.G.1 usually orbit the beacons for
about an hour, and if by then no attack by four-engined
bombers has materialised they are recalled; upon returning to
base, the aircraft are immediately refuelled so that should a
further attack be made a fresh sortie can be initiated
45. In the middle of December some 50% of the aircraft in
N.J.G.1 were equipped with two white LC.50 flares carried
externally under the outer rings, and in the event of a major
bombing attack on a Ruhr objective these aircraft were to make
for the target and lay the flares at the operative height of
the bombers, so that the remainder of the night fighters could
quickly close in the area for visual attack.
46. The flare-carrying aircraft were to be given an X-time
for arrival over the target to coincide with the arrival of
the bomber stream; at this time the Flak would have orders to
cease fire, the flares would be laid and the night fighters
would go in to attack.
47. Importance was attached to the flare-carrying aircraft
arriving exactly at X-time, since a previous arrival would put
them and the remainder of the night fighters in danger of
being shot down by the Flak, and a late arrival would
jeopardise the operation.
48. In such a case where the aircraft of N.J.G.1 had been put
up against a spoof attack of Mosquitos and a four-engined
attack developed against targets outside the Ruhr, the
Geschwader commentary would transmit the codeword "Diogenes",
at which the aircraft would revert to their respective Gruppe
commentaries and would operate against the new attack in the
normal manner.
49. Crews of the flare-carrying aircraft were instructed that
in defending targets outside the Ruhr they could use their
flares, but only if they were certain of the true target.
Jamming of Commentaries.
50. Prisoners of II and III/N.J.G.3 stated that the Gruppe
commentaries were not seriously jammed in the Hamburg area;
although R/T could occasionally be heard, however, crews
relied mostly on the morse commentaries.
51. They stated that intensity of jamming varied considerably
from night to night. They could not understand the reason for
this since they had been officially told that the jamming had
been D/F’d and traced to the London area.
Verbandsführer (Formation Leader).
52. From the present P/W there are again conflicting reports
on the success or failure of the system of flying in formation
with a leader aircraft (A.D.I.(K) 700/1944, paras.34 – 49).
53. Whilst one P/W of N.J.G.3 stated that the system had been
working well in that Gruppe up to mid-December and that leader
aircraft operated under Y control, another prisoner, of
8/N.J.G.1, stated that in his unit the system had proved
unworkable and had been dropped in October. He gave as one
reason the dislike by the more experienced crews who flew as
formation leaders of acting as flying beacons, with the
attendant danger of being homed on by Mosquitoes.

54. Much has already been said about the FuGe.25a in recent
A.D.I.(K) reports but nevertheless interrogation has continued
as to the conditions under which the apparatus is or is not
switched on during operations. One P/W of 8/N.J.G.1, based at
Düsseldorf, stated that if no intruders were reported at the
time the night fighters were ordered up for an operation, he
would switch on the FuGe.25a at take-off and keep it operating
until well clear of the airfield.
55. During operations he would have the instrument turned
off, but on returning to base would again switch it on shortly
before reaching the airfield - provided no warning of
intruders was in force.
56. A P/W of 9/N.J.G.3 knew of the British air-to-air I.F.F.
and knew that R.A.F. A.I. included a button which, upon being
pressed, identified the friendly aircraft on the A.I. picture.
57. Crews in this Staffel were told that a German air-to-air
I.F.F. was shortly coming into operation, but no further
details were given.
58. A prisoner of 11/N.J.G.3 remembered having seen a note in
a G.A.F. intelligence summary stating that the R.A.F. was
using infra red air-to-air recognition.

Hermine Beacons.
59. One of the present P/W had first heard of Hermine V.H.F.
beacons in March 1944, and at the time had learned that these
were radio beacons of new type from which pilots of singleengined
aircraft could obtain bearings.
60. He stated that the beacon, which has an effective range
of 200 – 300 kilometres, rotates through 360° in about three
minutes. The beacon transmits a continuous tone over about
359° with a silence zone of 1° which sweeps through 360° as
the beacon rotates; additionally a "speaking clock" counts
continuously from 1 to 360 and the continuous tone is
superimposed over this speech.
61. The pilot in the aircraft hears the continuous tone and
the counting on the FuGe.16Z, but hears the bearing spoken
clearly when in a line with the silence zone; he thus hears
his bearing to the beacon.
62. It will be remembered that prisoners of the Wilde Sau
single-engined night fighter unit I/J.G.301, captured in July
1944, had made mention of these radio beacons, albeit not by
name. The Kommodore of a single-engined day fighter Geschwader
had suggested that "Hermine" is derived from Oberst HERMANN,
founder of Wilde Sau night fighting.

Spot frequencies of SN.2.
63. The word "Streuwelle" in conjunction with SN 2 has been
mentioned for the first time by the present batch of
prisoners. Although none was able to define the word
Streuwelle or its origins, one suggested an alternative word
"Frequenz"; A.D.I.(Sc.) has supplied an agreed translation of
"Streuwelle" in the term "Spot frequency".
64. It has already been reported that in I/N.J.G.2 an attempt
had been made to reduce the effects of electrical jamming by
mounting the SN 2 aerial arrays diagonally instead of
vertically. These prisoners confirmed that this had also been
the case in other units, but the present interrogations have
established that this arrangement of aerials has no connection
with the spot frequency of the SN 2. In many cases prisoners
have known the differing aerial arrangements to exist in
several aircraft all equipped with SN 2's of the same spot
65. These prisoners knew of three Streuwellen at present in
operational use, namely 4, 5 and 6; in two units, 8/N.J.G.1
and IV/N.J.G.3 some of the aircraft carried No.6, and other
prisoners stated that aircraft of their units were equipped
with 4 or 5 or a mixture of both. In 5/N.J.G.3, for example,
Streuwelle 5 had superseded 4, whilst 8/N.J.G.1 was equipped
with a mixture of 4 and 6, the latter having been delivered in
66. It is worth noting that aircraft equipped with
Streuwellen 5 or 6 are forbidden to fly over enemy territory
unless the boxes have previously been removed; no such
security measures, however, exist with Streuwelle 4.
67. One prisoner had heard that a JU.88 equipped with SN 2
and Flensburg had landed at an airfield in East Anglia last
summer and that the British were therefore in possession of an
SN 2. He naturally assumed that the latter apparatus was of
Streuwelle 4. Upon being asked how it was known that a German
night fighter had landed in England he replied that the
information had been given by British prisoners in Germany.
68. Not one of the present P/W could supply the respective
frequencies of Streuwellen 4, 5 and 6, but the radar servicing
mechanic P/W, who had been with N.J.G.4 up to the end of
October, was able to give a few details of 4 and 5; up the
time when he left the unit he had not encountered No.6.
69. He was certain that the frequency of 5 was slightly
higher than that of 4; No.5 has one more induction coil and
has a range exceeding No.4 by 5 kilometres, being provided
with an extra switch giving two range pictures, one at 5 km.
and one at 10 km.
70. He and other prisoners stated that no matter which
Streuwelle, 4, 5 or 6, is installed in an aircraft, the aerial
array remains unchanged and in all cases the same CRT's and
the same electrical length of connecting cables are employed.
71. The ground radar mechanic stated that outwardly there is
little difference between the three Streuwellen, and to avoid
confusion by the ground staff all boxes have the appropriate
number painted on the back; the boxes of different Streuwellen
are not interchangeable.
72. An example of the effects of jamming on the differing
Streuwellen was given by one of the present prisoners. In May
1944 all aircraft of his unit were equipped with Streuwelle 4
with provision for the alternative frequency. In July 1944,
however, Window jamming made the set useless.
73. In October 1944 Streuwelle 5 and then 6 were delivered,
both with the alternative frequency; these, however, were
seriously jammed by the so-called Rauschsender (electrical
jammer). It was found, however, that the remaining SN 2's of
Streuwelle 4 were not so seriously upset by electrical
jamming, and the result was that many crews asked for No.4
back again and their wish was granted.
74. According to the radar mechanic, the C.R.T's used in the
SN 2 are manufactured by both Lorenz and Siemens Nürnberg; the
latter are the more satisfactory in service.
75. One P/W had spent six months up to May 1944 installing
SN 2's in Me.110’s at Werl; he stated that installation work
for Ju.88’s was carried out at Gütersloh.
Serviceability of SN 2.
76. Considerable trouble in the servicing of the SN 2 was
experienced in misty or wet weather; the chief source of
trouble was rain water percolating into the pulse distributor
at the base of the antennae and was the cause of squints and
the blowing of valves.
77. In units recently examined, night flying tests are no
longer made; in the experience of one P/W of II/N.J.G.1 some
30% of the SN 2's were found to be u/s if the unit had been
stood down for more than three or four days.
78. Should radar equipment be found to be u/s after an
aircraft has taken off on an operation, the order is that the
sortie must be completed. This is a state of affairs which
rattles the crews, particularly if the SN 2 is not working and
they are robbed of backward cover.

SN 3.
79. As compared with prisoners captured up to the end of
November 1944, the present P/W gave the impression that
developments in the SN 3 have reached a further stage.
80. No prisoner has yet been encountered who has seen an
SN 3, but several had heard some scraps of information. It was
stated that the aerial array for this set is carried inside
the aircraft, and that Major SCHMAUFER, Kommodore of N.J.G.4,
is already flying an aircraft with this new search equipment.
81. There is no doubt that the Germans are in possession of
details of British centimetre A.I. and it has recently been
freely discussed by G.A.F. aircrew under the name "Grille"
(= grid).

SN 2 Tail Warning.
82. The present P/W were able to add considerably to
information obtained on night fighter tail warning equipment
and set out in A.D.I.(K) 700, paras.13-16. The present
interrogations, leave no doubt that the tail warners now
extensively fitted to German night fighter aircraft are a part
of the SN 2 equipment and that the picture appears on the SN 2
azimuth tube.
83. No height or bearing, but only a range reading can be
obtained from the backward aerial; forward and backward
displays do not appear simultaneously on the SN 2 tube, but
the set is provided with a switch which can select one or the
other. The method employed by the radar operator is therefore
to search for contacts with the forward aerials whilst
occasionally switching over to rearward aerial to see if an
enemy night fighter is following.
84. A tail warning tactic recommended to crews of III/N.J.G.1
is one of not taking immediate action when a rearward contact
is picked up, but of waiting until the range begins to close
in. When this occurs, the pilot increases speed and if the
blip closes in to 600 metres the pilot then takes evasive
85. In the above-mentioned unit evasive action has been
ordered to take the form of a 180° hard turn to port or
starboard. If the pursuing aircraft has been seen by the crew,
the turn will be made according to its position; when the
pursuer is to port, the pilot of the night fighter will turn
in to port, or vice versa.
86. Previously, the tactics of the night fighter in those
circumstances was to peel off towards the pursuing aircraft,
but this resulted in losing 1500 to 2000 metres in height
which took about ten minutes to regain.
87. The newer tactic described above was ordered in
III/N.J.G.1 late in November to obviate this loss of height
and time and in that unit at least, the tactic of peeling off
is now forbidden except in extreme urgency.
88. A number of P/W knew the SN 2 tail warning as the D (or
Dora) Zusatzgerät (= the Dora attachment).
Fu.Bl.2 as Warning Device.
89. Yet another piece of German Airborne radio equipment, the
Fu.Bl.2 has been added to the list of sets that are capable of
giving a warning of approach of an aircraft.
90. Three P/W had heard that if the Fu.Bl.2 is switched on,
the red marker beacon warning lamp lights up when a radarequipped
aircraft is in the immediate vicinity.

Naxos as Tail Warning.
91. Crews of 8/N.J.G.2 had recently been told officially that
Naxos is capable of acting as a warning of the presence of
enemy A.I.–equipped aircraft. No such information had been
given to any of the other units examined during the present
interrogations, and none of the other prisoners knew that
Naxos had such capabilities.
92. It was pointed out by the one P/W concerned that Naxos
can do no more than give warning of A.I. radiation on a given
bearing, and range of the source of the radiation cannot be
measured; a bearing reading would, however, at least indicate
the probability of an enemy night fighter in pursuit.
The Naxos as an A.I. Instrument.
93. Since the first mention of Naxos by a prisoner in July
1944 (A.D.I.(K) 407/1944) and in the subsequent fuller account
of other aspects of Naxos and its tactical use (A.D.I.(K) 508
and 620/1944) it has frequently been reported how some night
fighter pilots have claimed to have used Naxos as an A.I.
instrument. There have been frequent claims usually by
lecturers at Werneuchen, that night fighter crews have shot
down four-engined bombers with their upward armament without
having used SN 2 at any time during the pursuit, but no
prisoner has been encountered with first-hand knowledge of
this fact.
94. Amongst the present P/W was a crew of 4/N.J.G.2 who had
six victories, each with the help of Naxos to a greater or
lesser extent. On five occasions they had located the bomber
stream with Naxos and had made the final approach with SN 2.
On the sixth occasion, however, they had shot down a fourengined
bomber with upward armament after an approach with the
sole use of Naxos.
95. In an attack on Berlin in March or April 1944, this crew
took off from Twente and flew towards the Baltic coast. At
about 54° 30' N; 11° 30' E some eight H2S contacts were
obtained from a height of 4,500 metres; one of these was
selected by manipulation of the Naxos brilliancy knob and
followed to about 13° E and then southward over Berlin.
96. The contact was held and followed from Berlin towards
Leipzig whilst the night fighter gradually approached its
target by making contact with the edge of the H2S cone,
throttling back to avoid penetrating too far and being
detected, then climbing and again making contact with the cone
in horizontal flight; a visual of the R.A.F. bomber was
obtained near Frankfurt-am-Main when the night fighter was at
a height of 7,800 metres.
97. The pilot closed in to make the attack but missed the
bomber; after a second unsuccessful attempt, the rear gunner
of the bomber fired a burst but missed. On the third attempt
by the night fighter the bomber was hit and was claimed as a
victory by this crew.
98. Early in October H2S contacts in the Naxos began to be
fewer, and such contacts as were made invariably disappeared
abruptly. The pilot who, incidentally, had a very high opinion
of his own capabilities, put this down to his radar operator
and blamed him for inefficiency; the result was that the crew
was continually quarrelling and was engaged in heated argument
when shot down.

The Naxos Aerial.
99. The radar mechanic had been with I/N.J.G.4 had attended a
Naxos course at Werneuchen in May 1944 and subsequently had
had some experience in servicing the apparatus. The
interrogation of this P/W on the subject of Naxos was carried
out with the co-operation A.I.2(g), with the result that he
was able to add some useful details to the substance of
A.I.2(g) Report No.1734.
100. In August 1944, Naxos began to be delivered to
1/N.J.G.4. The Naxos-equipped Ju.88’s first delivered to the
unit had the aerials installed on the after part of the
fuselage, but in later deliveries, the plexiglass dome
containing the aerials was fitted to the jettisonable hood of
the cabin – a position known as "Ausführung A". It was feared,
however, that the hood would be difficult to jettison and in
some aircraft the original position of the aerials was again
101. When this P/W left I/N.J.G.4 in October 1944 the display
unit in use was the Naxos-Post, but he did not know which type
of aerial array was associated with this display, and he knew
of no further designation of any part of the equipment.
102. When Naxos was first introduced to the unit, the aerials
consisted of two plastic rods, of a material known as
Trollitul, of square cross-section with rounded ends and
measuring some 40 cm. in length and 5/6 cm in thickness. This
type of rod was, however later superseded by one of circular
cross-section with a diameter of 3-4 cm. and of the same
103. These aerials were fixed parallel to one another and
about 3 - 4 cm, apart, being held in position at their central
points by a bakelite clamp made in two halves. Rotation of the
aerials was in a clockwise direction about an axis which was
vertical when the aircraft was in flying position, the aerials
cleared the aircraft skin by about 5 cm. Speed of rotation was
estimated by P/W at about 3000 r.p.m.
104. The aerials were mounted on a vertical axle running in a
ball Bearing flush with the aircraft skin and driven directly
from an electric motor which P/W recognised as being similar
to that illustrated in A.I.2(g)1734.
105. A copper lead came away from each plastic aerial rod and
joined the axle on which the aerial rotated; between the ball
bearing and the electric motor, a right-angle plug led the
signals received by aerial out of the axle and through a length
of single 1 mm. copper high tension wire to the Abgleichkasten
(cable matching box). P/W had also heard the term "Hochpass
Einrichtung" in connection with this box.
106. The cable matching box was shaped in cross-section like
a half ellipse and measured about 25 x 8 x 8 cm. The screws
securing the lids were sealed, and if any fault developed, the
box had to be sent away to the Gruppe repair and servicing
depot; the Staffel servicing staff were forbidden to break the
107. This P/W had seen a box open at the Gruppe at the
servicing depot and remembered that it contained a special
type of coil and detector of a type similar to that shown in
the A.I.2(g) Report. He was under the impression that there
were six such detectors.

Daily Inspection of Naxos.
108. The daily inspection of Naxos consisted of running up
the aerial array on ground batteries and using an ordinary
buzzer working from a torch battery as the transmitter. The
oblong box containing the buzzer had to be held so that one of
its ends, called the Strahlenseite (radiating end) pointed
towards the aerial and was in their plane of rotation. A
lightening of the appropriate part of the Naxos trace showed
that Naxos was in order.

109. In the autumn of 1942 one at the present P/W had taken
part in some flying trials of a television device which was
being tried out at Werneuchen. For the purpose of the trials a
television receiver which was to repeat an 18 cm. square
picture of the Seeburg Tisch of a night fighter box, was
installed in a He.111.
110. In the trials reception was remarkably good and a clear
definition was obtained, the two spots of light representing
the friendly and enemy aircraft could be seen, but the only
means of distinguishing between the two was by the insertion
of a cardboard arrow on the Seeburg Tisch. In a similar way
cards bearing written vector instructions were placed on the
plotting table in view of the camera.
111. At that time the Germans were experiencing no
difficulties with box-control of night fighters and since
continual troubles were experienced with the television
transmitter the trials were discontinued toward the end of

112. The same prisoner had heard of a German version of the
H2S called "Berlin" which he understood, was an improvement on
the British apparatus.

113. In lectures on night fighting given to 8/N.J.G.1,
7/N.J.G.2 and 9/N.J.G.3 in October and November 1944, crews
had been given some details of the activities by 100 Group
R.A.F. which gave them the impression that the German Higher
Command has the greatest respect for the efficiency of those
responsible for planning that unit's activities. Some details
of these lecturers which prisoners from the above units could
remember show that the Germans are now accumulating
considerable knowledge of the equipment and tactics of 100
114. At recent briefings to 8/N.J.G.1 great importance had
been attached to the part played by 100 Group, and the many
occasions when warning of an impending attack had been given
and the aircraft had been airborne only to find the advertised
raid melt away, were now ascribed to the wizardry of that same
115. It was stated that the Group is equipped with Mosquitoes
and Lancasters - amongst whose crews were some expert bombers
- and that both these aircraft types carry the jamming
equipment which together with ground jammers upset the
commentaries and the SN 2. Long range intruders were also
ascribed to the same unit.
116. In a lecture on 100 Group given to 7/N.J.G.2 early in
November 1944, crews were told of so-called 'D' aircraft which
has the duty of putting out spoof R/T and W/T instructions to
German night fighters; one instance was related in which a
whole night fighter Gruppe had returned to base as a result of
spoof orders by one of these D aircraft. The W/T operators at
the 1ecture were advised that if they paid sharp attention to
their R/T and W/T signals they would be able to distinguish
between the false and genuine instructions.
117. It is now widely known by G.A.F. night fighter aircrew
that Mosquitos are equipped with a search equipment, the
Grille (= grid), that has a range of 15 kilometres (about 10
miles) and is said to work on a frequency of 3 cm. An
interesting extra piece of information given in these lectures
was that Grille was capable of homing on SN 2 transmissions, a
point that was noted by crews with some consternation.
A.D.I.(K) and S.D. Felkin
U.S. Air Interrogation. Wing Commander
27th January 1945"
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Old 30th October 2018, 11:46
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Re: Using Ultra to research the Luftwaffe

Originally Posted by Nick Beale View Post
Agreed, would people like a dedicated "Researching the Luftwaffe through Prisoner Interrogations" thread?

Nick, I look forward to following whatever course you decide on.

For the record, within these P/W reports are references to 'captured documents': I hope everyone recognizes that this meant ULTRA or another sensitive source that could not be named at the time, hence my choice of the 'Using ULTRA...' thread for posting.

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Old 30th October 2018, 11:50
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Kg40 in item 37

"SECRET A. D. I. (K) Report No. 357/1945.
Navigational Aids.
1. This report is the second of the series dealing with radio and radar equipment in the
2. As in the case of the first of the series (A.D.I.(K) 343/1945) dealing with Blind Landing
and Airborne Communications Equipment, it is based on interrogation of General
Nachrichtenführer MARTINI, Director General of G.A.F. Signals, and a few important
members of his staff, and has been supported by a file of current papers which were in the
possession of the General’s Chief of Staff.
3. An index of the numerical designations of the navigational equipment mentioned in this
report appears in Appendix I.
4. For convenient reference, a translation of the document entitled "Funkausrüstung der
Flugzeugmuster, Notprogramm" (signal Equipment in the G.A.F. - Emergency Program) - item
45/99 ff in A.D.I.(K) Documents List 45/9 - which has also appeared as an Appendix to
A.D.I.(K) 343/1945, is reproduced as Appendix II to the present report but the list of equipment
contained in that document has been omitted as Appendix I gives a fuller list.
5. Throughout the course of the war, the general standard of German navigational training was
undoubtedly inferior to that of the Allies. A simple form of navigation was taught but
navigators track plotted only and relied on W/T aids and in particular positioning by means of
loop fixes as the main basis for their navigation.
6. During the early part of the war extensive use was made of Knickebein and other beam
systems, but later this form of navigational aid gave way to the "Y" control system (better
known by the Allied codeword Benito) and "Egon".
7. Sonne was universally accepted as an outstanding success and from the time of its inception
in 1942 research was continuously directed towards overcoming its imperfection, in particular
the range limitation. Komet was a typical example, of attempted improvement on these lines
8. The Germans were patently backward in the field of pulse systems and the majority - if not
all - of their navigational aids of this type were copied from Allied methods.
9. The fear of the Allied countermeasures was much to the fore during the last two years and
considerable research and efforts was devoted to offsetting such interference and to perfecting
systems which would reduce and if possible preclude the danger of jamming. Another factor
always present in the minds of those responsible for tactical navigational requirements was that
the apparatus must be as light and small as possible because of the limited space available in
German aircraft.
10. During the last stages of the war, and as a natural consequence of German air policy, being
forced to concentrate on the defensive, thereby involving almost exclusive use of fighter power,
a great deal of attention was devoted to the development of simple navigational aids suitable
for single-engine aircraft of which Rübezahl was a typical example.
PeGe (Peil Gerät) 6.
11. PeGe 6 was the successor of PeGe 5, the standard loop D/F, set in use at the beginning of
the war, and. operated on 150 - 1200 kc/s (2000-250 meters). It provided automatic D/F
facilities, the W/T operator merely having to tune to the signal and the "answer" being produced
on a course indicator.
12. In the opinion of P/W, who was responsible for operational requirements in the
navigational field and who had had fairly extensive navigational experience with K.G.40,
PeGe 6 was less reliable than the manually-operated PeGe 5 as the automatic D/F facilities
could not distinguish between the true signal and jamming and were apt to record bearing midway
between the two if they were near together. The human ear was much more acute and
could distinguish the minimum of the real signal from that of the "phoney” one. It had the
further disadvantage that it was a heavier piece of equipment than the manually operated set.
FuGe 141
13. The FuGe 141 operating on a frequency band of 58.0 - 59.2 mc/s was a receiver with a D/F
loop fitted to Air Rescue aircraft used for homing on to the NS 4 emergency radio set carried on
the chest by pilots.
14. The NS 4 had a flexible steel tape aerial and batteries which gave it an endurance of 2 to
2,5 hours.
FuGe 142.
15. The FuGe 142 using the 2000 - 250 metre band was a small D/F battery set for use in
emergency in the event of failure of the aircraft' s electricity supply.
16. The FuGe 142 had a manually-operated loop and its accuracy was only 10° to 15°.
17. When the P/W who, in October 1944, took over the navigational tactical requirements first
made its acquaintance, he discovered that the designer of the emergency set, while having the
laudable object of assisting a crew in dire emergency when they where probably well and truly
lost, had omitted to include any sensing arrangement. The set was, therefore, quickly scrapped
as being as much of a danger as an aid.
FuGe 145
18. The FuGe 145 was a simple type of D/F set in development for use in single-seater aircraft.
It was for use with M/F beacons and was designed for use by coastal reconnaissance aircraft, as
for example the Do.335, so that they could obtain a bearing when flying at low level.
19. It was much lighter than the PeGe 6 and had no automatic facilities, but was very easy to
operate. P/W had thought that it might ultimately supersede the PeGe 6 for other types of
Suggested loop for fighter aircraft
20. The research centre at Rechlin had been asked to examine a rough type of loop for singleseater
fighter aircraft, which would consist of a loop built into the pilot' s helmet. It was thought
that this would enable the pilot to establish the general direction of a beacon by movements of
his head and without recourse to the use of a compass.
21. This idea was tried out and seemed promising, but was never fully developed.
22. The Schwanboje was a waterborne V.H.F. beacon dropped by parachute and originally
used by K.G.40 for marking convoys or submarines. In the autumn of 1944 a 1ine of Schwan
buoys was used to aid the He.111's when launching V-1’s from the North Sea against this
23. The beacon consisted of a frame aerial and transmitted on a wavelength which could be
homed on by the FuGe 17, the standard equipment of K.G.40 in 1942 when the Schwanboje
came into use.
24. The set was powered by accumulators and had a live of five hours; by the means of a
clockwork device it could be pre-set before release so that it ran for a testing period
immediately on release and later started up again after a prescribed interval governed by the
expected time of arrival of the homing aircraft. The buoy was fitted with a self-destroying
charge operated automatically.
25. A later type of Schwanboje operated on the 38 - 42 mc/s waveband so that aircraft
equipped with the FuGe 162 could also use the system.
26. Biene is the code word for a responder beacon. The idea of responder beacons for homing
purposes had only been hit on in 1944 and Bienen to respond to the different airborne radar sets
were still under development in 1945. The FuGe 243 - Hohentwiel Biene – had been used by
coastal units in Norway, in February or March 1945.
27. Responder beacons were also being developed for use in the Baldur method of navigation
(see paragraphs 79, 82 of this report).
28. This was the latest form of the well-known Knickebein working on 30 - 33,3 mc/s and
received by E.B.L.3 in the aircraft. It was a mobile station which could be fully erected into
operation within a week.
29. A still more mobile unit known as the Bock-Zyklop had been introduced. This could be set
up in three days and could be adapted for use on the FuGe 16 frequency although as yet,
according to documents, no visual indicator for the FuGe 16 had been developed.
30. The 120 W ground transmitter was called the ???? which gave a beam 0.5° wide and a
range of 300 km. at a height of 5,000 meters. The Zyklop systems had been made use of on the
Russian front up to the end of the hostilities.
31. The Sonne beacon system which worked on a frequency of 270 - 480 kc/s was received in
the aircraft on the FuGe 10. It was considered an extremely effective daylight system but the
range limitation was a disadvantage. Fixes could be obtained from ranges up to 1,000 - 1,200
km. Sonne 6 at Quimper which was the most efficient of the Sonne beacons, had been used on
an occasion at a distance of 1,400 km.
32. The sectors served by Sonne covered, an angle of 120 – 150°. The beacon was very reliable
over the centre sector of 100°, but the error increased progressively towards the edges of the
beam in conformity with the sine law.
33. At night errors up to 4° were liable to occur even in the centre of the sector of the beacon
and no real use could be made of it.
34. To improve the Sonne beacons both in range, and accuracy, an experimental system
working on the same principle, but on 3000/6000 kc/s was tried out in 1942. The shorter wave
transmission did not prove very reliable and was given up about the end of 1943.
35. Finally a beacon of the Sonne type under the name "Stern" was designed for use on a V.H.
frequency. It, not unnaturally, only gave optical range and was, therefore, of no practical value
and was not developed.
36. One P/W had seen documentary mention of Dora which he believed was a navigational aid
system and a precursor of Komet. He did not know whether it worked on the same principle but
the Komet experimental site at Kolby was on the former Dora site.
37. In 1942 the question of navigation over the Atlantic stood in the limelight . As the He 177
was supposed to be coming into service shortly to enable K.G.40 to reach further West, the
need for navigational equipment of longer range became acute.
38. A year or so earlier Professor von HANDEL had categorically stated in a lecture that a
long-range navigational system based on pulse would inevitably be extremely inaccurate.
In view of Professor von HANDEL's views on pulse systems, an improved form of Sonne
which would give much greater ranges and be less susceptible to night effect was given high
39. The system evolved was called "Komet" and experimental stations were erected at
Bordeaux and Kolby (see A.D.I.(K) 364/1944). The ground station called for an array of no less
than 127 masts and 19 control huts in order to cover a 90° sector. It worked admirably provided
a 10° sector only was covered, but as soon as the planned 90° sector was put into operation,
mutual interference between the masts arose and the various lobes radiated were no longer of
symmetrical pattern, with the result that large errors crept in.
40. Research on this delayed the project considerably. After the invasion when long distance
reconnaissance in the Atlantic was no longer practical politics, the Komet system was given up
without ever having been effectively used. The development people were the more pleased to
dispense with it since it left the German radio research and industry free to deal with other more
urgent matters.
41. The beacon was to operate on frequencies of 5000, 9000 or 12,000 kc/s received on the
FuGe 10K, and it was estimated that ranges up to 3000 km would be obtained. The system
employed was to be similar to that used in the Sonne but instead of obtaining one reading per
minute, oscillation of the beam was to be speeded up to give 100 readings par minute.
42. The true bearing of the aircraft was automatically recorded by the FuGe 124 which was
known as the Kometschreiber. The recording took the form of a series of vertical lines, one for
each reading, printed on a strip of paper. At the same time as the lines were printed the
Kometschreiber recorded the section of the swept area in which the aircraft was flying, thus
giving what amounted to a rough position.
43. The fine reading was obtained from the length of the recorded lines. Any inaccuracies due
to night effect could be easily eliminated by averaging the length of the lines, as recorded, on
the paper strip, by eye.
44. Erika was a navigation system (see A.D.I.(K) 364 and 409/1944.) which had already
reached the development stage in 1942 but its operational employment was of brief duration
and it was soon discarded in favour of Bernhard.
45. Erika was based on the principle of a V.H.F. (30 - 33 mc/s) beam oscillating rapidly over a
segment of about 60 – 90°. The beam was phased, a different phase being picked up in different
sections of the segment and read off in relation to a standard phase producer in the aircraft. In
order to obtain a fix, two such Erika stations had to be received and to receive each station no
less than two E.B.L.3's were necessary making a total of four receivers.
46. The range presentation unit in the aircraft, FuGe 121, took the form of a clock-face with a
needle indicator and calibrated, P/W thought, from 0 -100. A specially prepared map was
required to establish bearing.
47. A disadvantage of Erika was the vulnerability to jamming, interference signals modifying
the phase and thereby giving inaccurate readings. The great weight, carried and the bulk of the
four receivers, which were particularly cumbersome in the relatively small aircraft in use in the
G.A.F. made its widespread use impracticable.
48. This system was first introduced in 1942 for use by bomber aircraft, but was later dropped
in favour of the Benito and Egon control systems. With the increasing British jamming during
night raids it was reintroduced for use in night fighter commentary (see A.D.I.(K) 125/1945,
paras.5 to 29), which it was thought could only be jammed with great difficulty.
49. The term “Bernhard” was used for the ground stations whilst the airborne recording
equipment was called Bernhardine or FuGe 120. The latter made use of the E.B.L.3. receiver as
the transmissions lay in the 30-33 mc/s band.
50. At the time of the German capitulation, the following three transmitting stations were in
operation, the first two, of which could transmit commentary.-
-Thisted, on N.W. coast of Denmark.
-Bretstedt, N. of Husum, Germany.
-Trebbin, S.E. of Berlin.
51. A further station near Breslau had been almost completed when it had to be dismantled on
account of the Russian advance. Additional stations were in the course of construction near
Kassel, Munich, Pilsen and Vienna.
52. The Bernhardine system was looked upon as a considerable improvement on Erika. It gave
360° coverage as compared to 60/90° with Erika and, whereas from the jamming aspect stray
signals could disturb the phase of Erika causing false indication, in the case of Bernhardine,
interference merely resulted in no reading being possible, and furthermore to attain this through
360° a very powerful jamming transmitter flying near the ground station would be needed.
53. The Bernhardine system was not regarded as unjammable but it was thought that use of
high power and aerial gain would render jamming by airborne means impracticable.
54. In addition to the E.B.L.3 receiver, the airborne Hellschreiber FuGe 120, also called the
Bernhardine, which gave both bearing and commentary was employed. According to P/W the
FuGe 120 was large and weighty and the first improvement aimed at was to reduce the weight
and provide a set which occupied less space in the aircraft. To this end an attempt was made to
eliminate the use of paper strip for the Hellschreiber and a rotating "Folienschreiber" a
cellophane paper moving over a sticky carbon surface which constituted a self-eraser - was
employed. This projected recording method proved a failure and the use of paper strip had to
be reverted to. According to documents the type using paper strip was known as FuGe 120a,
and the self-erasing recorder FuGe 120b.
55. A smaller model, the FuGe 120k, to operate on the paper strip principle which constituted
the latest improvement, was still in the development stage at the conclusion of hostilities.
Previously the ground transmitter broadcast simultaneously from the upper and lower aerial
arrays on two frequencies close enough to one another for them both to be received on one
channel of the E.B.L.3. One lobe was used for coarse D/F, the other for fine. The two
frequencies were then separated by a filter before being fed into the Hellschreiber. The FuGe
120k was designed for use with a ground transmitter operating only on the coarse D/F
frequency. The filter could therefore be dispensed with and considerable weight saved in the
airborne set at the expense of some accuracy in D/F.
56. With the loss of D/F accuracy the sharp “V” in the vertical printing indicating the reading
(see diagram A.D.I.(K) 125/1945 para.18) became a gap about 4° wide. To facilitate the
reading of the centre of the gap by eye, and to reduce the size and weight of the apparatus, the
vertical lines referred to above were superimposed on the scale which could then only be read
in the gap. This allowed the paper strip to be considerably narrower.
57. The FuGe 120k was designed primarily for use in single seat jet aircraft but was also to be
embodied in the Ju.88 where space was at a premium, as soon as sufficient numbers of this set
were available.
58. The Hermine system was originally developed, in response to a tactical requirement
formulated during the second part of 1942, as a navigational aid for the purpose of giving an
approximate bearing to single-engine night fighters engaged on “Wilde Sau” operations.
59. By the time the initial difficulties in development had been overcome Wilde Sau night
fighting had almost ceased; it was found however that Hermine could be used to advantage by
day fighters, and it came into operational use.
60. An accuracy of ±5° was assumed, but it was found in practice that this could be improved
upon to ±3° by experienced pilots.
61. Thirteen or fourteen ground stations were in operation by Easter 1945 which, P/W claimed,
gave complete coverage of the Reich. It was intended to fit two Schlechtwetter (bad weather)
Fighter Geschwader with the necessary airborne equipment, and this program had been onethird
completed by May 1945. One P/W had heard that ten to fifteen Me.262's of K.G.51 were
amongst the aircraft so equipped.
62. The following may be added in modification of the description of the Hermine system
given in A.D.I.(K) 125/1945, paras.59 to 62. The Hermine rotating beacon transmits a
continuous tone on which is superimposed a speaking clock which counts from 1 to 35, each
figure representing tens of degree. Over an angle of about 15° the continuous tone falls to a
minimum and rises again. During this period the voice appears to become more audible and the
pilot can estimate where the minimum of continuous tone occurs, and so obtain his bearing
from the beacon.
63. The beacon recognition is given by means of a self-evident code name for example,
"Berolina” for Berlin – which is spoken by the voice in place of 000°.
64. The airborne equipment is the FuGe 125 consisting of the E.B.L.3 with the Tzg
(Telephoniezusatzgerät) which enables the 30.0 - 33.3 mc/s transmission picked up on the
E.B.L.3 receiver to be heard in the pilot's headphones. Though the Hermine beacons were fully
operational there was a scarcity of FuGe 125 sets, as a result of which practical experience of
this system was too limited to judge of its efficiency or to lead to further improved tactical
requirements been formulated.
65. All the P/W had heard reference to Ingolstadt and agreed that it was a long-range
navigational system.
66. One P/W thought that Ingolstadt was the cover name for a pulse navigation system using
hyperbolic curves and similar to British Gee; it was originated by Telefunken in 1938 but was
then turned down by the R.L.M. In his recollection the original Telefunken idea derived from
theoretical discussions at an international conference before the war.
67. As mentioned earlier under the heading of Komet, Professor von HANDEL maintained that
owing to the incidence of mutual interference between direct and reflected waves the system
was impracticable at long range. In consequence of von HANDEL’s view the system was
68. Much consternation and annoyance was occasioned in 1944, when it was found that the
Allies were successfully operating a similar system.
69. Truhe is the cover name used to describe navigational aid system, using ground stations,
similar to those of British Gee. In effect the British Gee stations were also used, the airborne
sets being almost identical with the British Gee boxes.
70. There is no very distinct difference between "Truhe" and "Hyperbel". The latter term was
originally coined to denote our Gee. It was also used when German aircraft equipped with
British Gee sets made use of British ground stations.
71. The British Gee chain was used successfully but it was realised that so soon as the
Germans lost an aircraft, over England, a change would be made. The German "Y" service
monitored the British ground stations to follow any change in Gee phasing and passed advice of
such change to their aircraft by W/T.
72. Truhe referred to the German system which was ultimately to cover the 20 to 100 mc/s
band and employed various types of ground transmitters including Feuerhilfe, Feuerstein,
Feuerzange and Feuerland. All these transmitters could also be used to jam our own Gee,
further details of which will appear in a subsequent report on German Radio Countermeasures.
The original 46 to 50 mc/s system was known as Truhe I and the new 30 to 60 mc/s system as
Truhe II.
73. A chain of Truhe stations was built around Berlin, primarily for training purposes and there
were in addition groups of ground stations in the Schwarzwald and in Pomerania. The last
named was intended for operations against Russia and it is not known if the stations were
destroyed before their capture.
74. The airborne sets which were known as FuGe 122 covering 46-50 mc/s and FuGe 123
covering 25-75 mc/s were replicas of the British Gee boxes and according to P/W were
equivalent to British R.1324 and R.1355. These German sets were slightly smaller and more
compact than the British sets.
75. Truhe was used by F.A.G.2 and K.G.66, but up to the time of capitulation only a few
FuGe 122 and FuGe 123 sets had been produced and only one R.F. box for the latter set.
76. The Baldur range-measuring system is comparable to the British G.H. and appears to have
been imitated from it. It was referred to by P/W as “Egon in reverse" and was the only
navigational system developed by the German by means of which an aircraft could measure
distance from a known source as opposed to fixing itself by a position line. As the G.A.F. staff
were still thinking in terms of a grandiose bomber policy as late as June 1944, it was intended
for use by bomber aircraft for pinpointing targets and for accurate blind bombing.
77. The wavelength employed was in the neighbourhood of 2-4 meters and fell in the SN 2
78. Only two experimental transmitters, both located in Lower Silesia, were erected and one
P/W maintained that this system never progressed beyond experimental trials by the
manufacturers. It was eventually relegated to low priority owing to the virtual cessation of
German bomber operations and the pressure of more urgent demands on radio research and the
radio industry.
79. The airborne equipment was known as the FuGe 126 which was made up of a transmitter to
interrogate a ground responder beacon, a receiver and a presentation unit. The receiver and
transmitter were SN 2 units, though P/W thought they might have been slightly modified for
use with Baldur.
80. From documents, the presentation unit appears to have been a modification of the
Würzburg range measurement tube, and the accuracy is given as ± 100 meters at all ranges, but
this was thought to be purely theoretical and P/W doubted whether it would have been possible
to achieve this accuracy in actual practice.
81. A smaller airborne set, the FuGe 126k (k = klein = small) was built for use by single-seat
aircraft. In reducing the size and weight of the set, and making it pilot-operated, accuracy had
to be sacrificed. P/W, who was responsible for putting up the tactical requirements, considered
a clock-face presentation to be the ideal solution. It was expected that the accuracy of the
FuGe 126k would then be of the order of 500 meters independent of range.
Baldur - Truhe
82. It was planned to experiment on a combination of Baldur and Truhe (Gee) for use by
bombers. The intention was to use a hyperbolic grid line of Truhe for the target approach. This
could be pre-set, and the pilot could fly along it by keeping the blip centralised, and could
ascertain his exact position along the line by measuring his distance from a Baldur beacon. This
system was considered simpler particularly for a single-seater aircraft, than the method of using
two hyperbolic grid lines or two distances from Baldur beacons. The first experimental sets
were to be ready in the autumn of this year.
Baldur - Bernhardine
83. A further project was a combination of Baldur and Bernhardine to give simultaneous
bearing and range. The range indication was to be obtained by the pilot pressing a knob when
the range would appear in kilometres on a dial. This system was suggested for use by both day
fighters and bombers.
84. The Benito system of control using FuGe 16, known to the Germans as "Y", is too well
known to warrant description. The following paragraphs deal with recent developments.
85. When operating the bomber Benito procedure with the narrow beam. (0.3°) essential for
azimuth accuracy, it was easy for the bomber pilot to get on to one of the side lobes in error
since these were only about 3° from the main beam.
86. In order to minimise the possibility of mistake and to relieve the pilot of the strain of flying
on a beam, an automatic device, the FuGe 28a, was in use which was the improved and final
form of the old Y-Gerät of 1941. Documents dated about June 1944 show that it was used in
conjunction with FuGe 17, but P/W thought that it had been modified for use with FuGe 16ZY
as well.
87. The procedure was that the bomber pilot flew on instructions conveyed over the FuGe 17
until it had been established by ground D/F stations that he was on the true beam, when the
code word "Bako" would be given whereupon the pilot would switch on the FuGe 28a which
took over control of the automatic pilot and kept him on the beam.
88. P/W gave the accuracy of range measurement with the Bomber Benito procedure as only
± 1 km. at maximum range.
89. The original Egon procedure which involved the use of two Freyas, the one for rough
positioning and the other for fine positioning - later became known as "Egon Einstand" (One
location) to differentiate from an improved system termed “Egon Zweistand”
90. Egon Zweistand was evolved to offset the inaccuracies in azimuth D/F, and cash in on the
range accuracy of radar. With Zweistand a third Freya was introduced, placed some
considerable distance from the other two Freyas in order to give a distance cut. It was intended
for use by bomber aircraft operating over England or on long range sea missions.
91. The original Zweistand system, which was first tried out in Italy by a Schlacht unit, was
somewhat primitive in that the readings from the extra Freya were telephoned through to the
plotting centre and worked out before being plotted on the Seeburg table.
92. To eliminate the delay thereby involved a landline connection was introduced to feed the
Freya pulse to the C.R.T., which then had two blips showing ranges from the two Freya sites.
The vulnerability of landline to disturbance and destruction later led to the development of a
W/T transmitter and this method was employed successfully in operations.
93. Since the Freya pulse was not strong enough to trigger off the FuGe 25A at ranges
exceeding 250 kilometres, it was planned to supplant the Freya by extra powerful
Wassermanns, and thereby increase the effective range of Egon Zweistand to 350 kilometres.
94. A further line of development was the provision of a new type of control table giving the
exactitude of plotting necessary for pinpoint bombing. This control table, which was under
development at Rechlin, made use of complicated mechanical apparatus for accurate projection
of the position of the bomber. One of these tables was destroyed in the course of a daylight air
attack on Rechlin in February 1945; two other tables were in existence at the time of the
capitulation, and were located somewhere in Western Germany.
95. Egon when first introduced was received with some scepticism by the crews, as it was felt
that it was too vulnerable to jamming. After it had been used operationally without being
jammed in the attacks on London in March 1944, the procedure was adopted with greater
confidence, and it gained a good reputation. As recounted in A.D.I.(K) 343/1945, Egon was
always favoured by the R.L.M. technical development section in preference to Benito control.
96. A drawback of the system was its restricted range at low altitude, which according to P/W
was the reason why it was not used in conjunction with V.1 operations.
97. The Nachtlicht system was the first method of control not using R/T speech to be
improvised by the Germans, and had been tried out during the raids on London in the spring of
98. It had been observed that the red signal lamp of the FuGe 25A was illuminated when the
aircraft was being swept by a Freya, and it was suggested that use could be made of this as a
means of transmitting morse signals from the ground. A Freya operating on a special
wavelength, which P/W thought was 2.55 meters, was set up on the Channel coast and was used
to send simple instructions to the aircraft attacking London by means of visual morse
indications on the lamp of the FuGe 25A.
99. The primitive method of giving distant control indications was the forerunner of
"Nachtfee", "Barbara" and "Barbarossa".
100. Luftkurier was the first development of the Nachtlicht idea. It was primitive device
intended to give visual indication to the pilot by means of a pointer which was started and
stopped by the reception of pulses.
101. P/W thought that Luftkurier was first tried out by K.G.66 on the Freya band, but it was so
easy to jam by the addition of extra pulses that it was never developed.
102. Nachtfee was the term used to describe a system for the transmission of control
instructions to a pilot in the beam of the controlling Freya through the medium of a C.R.T.
indicator similar to the Lichtenstein range tube. The airborne equipment used was known as
FuGe 136 and weighed 12 kg.
103. The original purpose of Nachtfee was, to provide a solution to the jamming of R/T control
systems, and it had been used operationally by the Pathfinders of K.G.66 for mines in the
Scheldt estuary. It was to be adapted for use by night fighters to overcome our jamming of the
night fighter commentary.
104. Nachtfee was a system using the FuGe 25A as receiver.
105. The presentation screen in the aircraft was inscribed with various commands both on the
inside and outside of a circular time trace. There was a stationary zero blip in the 12 o'clock
position, and when an instruction was radiated the pulses received caused a second blip to
emerge from the first and travel round the C.R. tube in a clock-wise direction, presumably by a
slight change in p.r.f. This blip came to a stop and the command corresponding to its position
could be read off on the inside of the time trace where a total of about eight different
instructions were inscribed. It took from one to two second, for the blip to travel round the
106. It was thought that the further eight commands inscribed on the outside of the time trace
were denoted by the blip making a complete circle starting round a second time before coming
to rest at any one of the eight sectors. In this way a total of sixteen different orders could be
given. For night fighters such instructions as "turn left/right", "climb", "dive”, etc. appeared on
the inner side and figures for transmitting bearing on the outer side of the trace.
107. This system was used operationally, but it was found that, apart from the susceptibility to
jamming, other pulse transmissions could interfere by unlocking the system and thereby cause
wrong positioning of the indicator blip.
108. Another pronounced objection to the Nachtfee lay in the fact that it was necessary for a
member of the crew to watch the C.R.T. indicator uninterruptedly for missing one blip
indication might give the message a false value. It was not therefore possible to use it in singleseater
109. This apparatus, also called FuGe 138, consisted of an attachment to the FuGe 25A
receiver and only weighed 2 kg. This unit contained an audio filter which allowed the pilot to
hear morse signals superimposed on the Freya interrogator transmission if they were emitted on
a suitable audio frequency usually about 800 cycles. By keying other morse signals on different
audio frequencies and equipping aircraft with suitable filters, more than one aircraft could be
controlled by a single Freya.
110. Barbara was to be used for Egon control of ground-strafing aircraft and bombers but not
for night fighters.
111. In the Germans' opinion there were three disadvantages, namely that the Allies could
intercept and make use of signals so transmitted, that the aircraft had to be in the beam of the
Freya if it were to receive, and so an aircraft "lost" by the Freya owing to jamming could not be
communicated with and finally that, though intended for single-engined aircraft, fighter pilots
rarely had sufficient command of morse to be able to use this type of control.
112. Barbarossa was a set designed to meet the same requirements as Barbara but to remedy
two of the drawback mentioned in the last paragraph.
113. The instructions to the aircraft were to be transmitted by code pulse modulations which
were passed through a "pulse filter" in the airborne set and a written indication obtained on a
Hellschreiber. The pulse filter and Hellschreiber unit were attachments to the FuGe 25A and
were known as the FuGe 139. This apparatus was in development at Rechlin under the
supervision of Stabs.Ing. von HAUTEVILLE.
114. With this arrangement pulse modulations could not be read by the Allies, and for spoof
purposes in order to produce a wrong indication we would have had to know the exact type of
modulation accepted by it. Visual indication was also quicker and did not depend on knowledge
of morse.
115. This scheme was only in a very early stage of development and P/W were unable to give
details. It was hoped that in due course it would be possible to develop matters a stage further
and find a means of transmitting scrambled speech instead of morse, but P/W understood that
the question of pulse modulation for speech transmission had not been solved.
116. Consideration had been given in 1945 to the introduction of a crude system of navigation
which could be only used within the boundaries of the Reich. This was to go under the code
name of Rübezahl, and the fact that it was seriously considered and actively supported by the
P/W responsible for Navigational Aids on the G.A.F. signals staff is an interesting reflection of
the depths to which a combination of Allied jamming under-trained fighter had forced German
117. It was expected that in the course of the summer of 1945 thousands of 162 Volksjäger
would be available for the protection of the Fatherland. They were to be equipped with
FuGe 24, which was to become the standard G.A.F. R/T set as described in A.D.I.(K)
343/1945. This set did not for the present give Benito control facilities and indeed as they were
short-range, high speed, fair-weather aircraft it was not certain that Benito control would be
essentially needed.
118. It was essential that their relatively inexperienced pilots should have a simple means by
which they could locate their approximate position without any additional navigation
equipment having either to be manufactured or carried in the aircraft. It was therefore decided
to develop a system which could be used with FuGe 24.
119. In order to direct the Volksjäger pilots to their target, recourse was to be had to the night
fighter system of broadcasting a commentary, and this commentary was to be combined with
the primitive navigation system Rübezahl.
120. It was therefore planned to set up ground transmitters over Germany at 30 km intervals.
The transmitters were to be beamed upwards, so that at 6,000 meters the polar diagram was
about 40 km in diameter and lobes from neighbouring transmitters just overlapped, thus
covering the whole area. Each transmitter emitted a plain language recognition signal in the
form of the name of its district, e.g. Halle, Magdeburg, etc.
121. All transmitters were to be operated on the same frequency so that to locate himself the
pilot merely tuned his FuGe 24 to the frequency for the day. The ground transmitters were to be
adapted from the FuGe 15 transmitters which had been manufactured in quantity as described
in paras. 23-39 of A.D.I.(K) 343/1945 before it was found that the FuGe 15 was unsuitable as
an airborne R/T set. They were renamed Bs.15 (Bodensender).
122. Later it was believed that the night fighters which were also to carry FuGe 24 (see
appendix 1) would also use the Rübezahl commentary as yet another alternative source for
vectoring themselves to the bomber stream."

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