German success against the Nijmegen and Remagen bridges.

[tcolvin]

Can anyone please throw light on the equipment and tactics used by the GAF when attempting to destroy the Nijmegen road and rail bridges and the Remagen rail bridge.

This follows from a discussion in the Allied section about USAAF and RAF failure against the Wesel road and rail bridges in Feb/March 1945.

Ellis states that the GAF made a sharp attack after dark on September 26 and followed this with some further 200 aircraft primarily directed against the Nijmegen bridges next day. 2 TAF defended the bridges and claimed 46 planes shot down. The GAF failed to hit the bridge, but what tactics and equipment did they use in the attempt?
The rail bridge and 80 feet of roadway from the road bridge was brought down on September 28 using frogmen.
I would be particularly interested to know whether the GAF used dive bombers against these bridges.

The Remagen rail bridge was attacked on March 15 by 21 GAF bombers, including Arado 234, but apparently without success. Again, does anyone know how these were used, and in particular, was dive bombing attempted?
Efforts by frogmen failed because that technique lacked surprise after Nijmegen.
The bridge collapsed on March 17 after being attacked by 11 V-2 rockets. Hitler claimed the rockets brought down the bridge, but I believe the Americans dispute this.

Tony

[Graham Boak]

The V-2 did not have the accuracy to aim at a bridge, or even a river. Any such success would have been by chance. The V-2 was aimed at cities, mainly London and Antwerp.

I've not heard of dedicated dive bombers (Ju.87s) being used on the Western Front. The Ju 88 may be a possible contender. Most of the references to attacks at Remagen I've seen involve the jets.

Vol 2 of the recent Shores/Thomas 2 TAF series describes the actions of the 27th over Nijmegen: 45 of the claims are for fighters (41 identified as being from JG units) and one Me 410. Four Ju 88s were observed but escaped. It seems likely that the majority of any attacks on the bridges will have been carried out by Jabos - mainly Fw 190s I suspect. These would have been identified as fighters in the claims, but the book does not mention jabos as such. The descriptions are all of combats over the area, not interceptions of bombing aircraft. The Luftwaffe lacked a significant bomber force and such were not survivable in daylight on the Western front.

Perhaps you could explain why your heading refers to non-existent success against the Nijmegen bridges? Shouldn't it read German "failures"?

[Khorat]

Remagen was attacked by JG2 , JG 53, NSGr. 1, KG 76, so FW 190´s , Bf 109´s, Ju 87´s and Ar 234´s some wanna see Me 262 - and mabey other groups too, also V2 rockets shot at the bridge - but missed ....

khorat

[tcolvin]

I use the word success because the Germans actually destroyed the Nijmegen rail bridge with frogmen, and claimed the destruction of the Remagen rail bridge with the V-2s - a claim disputed by the Americans who said the collapse was coincidental.
Frogmen damaged the Nijmegen road bridge but it was repaired.

I know all GAF records were destroyed.
But is there anything written by participants of the attacks on the Nijmegen bridge?
And have the participating units been identified?

As for Ju-87s not being used on the Western Front, I seem to remember mention of a night-bombing unit that was so equipped. It was a night-bombing unit that attacked the Nijmegen bridges after dark on September 26.

And I wonder if there is anything in the literature about German methods of attacking bridges - perhaps in the Allied debriefing reports? Attacks on bridges must have been high on German priorities.
Any information about sources would be greatly appreciated.

Tony

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Khorat

Remagen was attacked by JG2 , JG 53, NSGr. 1, KG 76, so FW 190´s , Bf 109´s, Ju 87´s and Ar 234´s some wanna see Me 262 - and mabey other groups too, also V2 rockets shot at the bridge - but missed ....

khorat

Thank you very much for this information.

Tony

[tcolvin]

The following suggests that the GAF had lost confidence in their ability to destroy bridges from the air, and even believed that the Allies had surpassed them technically in this regard. However, the inability of the RAF/USAAF to destroy the Wesel bridges would imply that this conclusion was unfounded.
The right conclusion seems to be to that GAF/RAF/USAAF air power lacked the means of reliably destroying bridges in 1945.
It remains to be seen whether this was true of the Red Air Force.

"In the campaigns in Poland and France the destruction of bridges contributed largely to the success achieved in operations on the ground. In the opening stages of the Russian campaign this was also true.
However, events were to prove as early as 1941 that the growing strength of the defences at bridges was to make their destruction increasingly difficult with the means then available, and that even large bridges could be repaired within an astonishingly short time.
Thus, the destruction of bridges did not represent a decisive factor for the German side as the war continued. The unsuccessful efforts of the German Command in 1945 to destroy the Vistula River bridges by air attack, in which even the most modern means were employed, was nothing short of tragic.
Since the Western Allies in 1944 did succeed through the destruction of bridges in France - and this applies particularly to the bridges across the Seine River – in preventing the timely forward movement of German reinforcements against the invading Allied forces, it must be assumed that the failure of the Luftwaffe to accomplish similar missions must have been due to inadequate technological developments on the German side, quite apart from the general inferiority of German airpower at the time."
Source: German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army, by Paul Deichmann.
Numbered USAF Studies Number 163.
http://www.afhra.af.mil/studies/numb...ies151-200.asp

Tony

[Nick Beale]

Where do I start?

OK, Nijmegen. The bulk of the daylight attacks were made by Fw 190s and Bf 109s of regular fighter units. Me 262s were active in the area but I don't recall if they went for the bridge specifically.

"Daily report 27 September 1944:

19 Ju 87 of NSG 2 in attacks on bridges and roads leading into Nijmegen from the south. Two bombed secondary targets, a further three attacked Eindhoven. Bombs were observed to fall near troop movements.

42 a/c of III./KG 51 in two formations set out to attack bridges leading into Eindhoven from the south: 5 broke off for technical reasons and 1 missing.

4 Mistel and 8 Ju 88 of Einsatzgruppe 101 took off to attack bridges in Nijmegen. 1 Mistel and 2 Ju 88 broke off for technical reasons. 1 aircraft (Ju 88S) missing."

(National Archives AIR20/7704) No. VII/89 "War Diary of Luftflotte 3 (Western Front) September 1944"

On 28 September, the Fw 190 F-8s of Sonderverband Einhorn were also used and did bomb from a dive. This from Flt. Lt. Lapp of 411 Squadron RCAF:

While leading 411 Squadron on a low patrol over Nijmegen, several F.W. 190's were spotted coming from South East at approximately 12,000' we climbed and turned toward them. The 190's dived through us at high speed in an attempt to dive bomb the bridge. I took after the leading aircraft which dropped its bomb near the target, but was unable to get within 700 yds ...

According to the dairy of No. 100 AA Brigade, the Germans hit the rail bridge with a 500 kg bomb, putting it temporarily out of action, and slightly damaged part of the other bridge's roadway.

At Remagen, aside from the units already mentioned, NSG 2 and KG 51 were involved, as was 11./KG 200. Anything the Germans could get within range, really.

German lack of success against bridges in 1944–45 is at least in part attributable to the inadequacy of the means at their disposal. They couldn't send over formations of medium bombers in daylight to carpet the target like the USAAF could. Their medium bomber units were largely stood down in September 1944 and only reactivated for the one attack on Eindhoven during MARKET-GARDEN. At Remagen, the weather was terrible most of the time and the jets were often bombing under EGON guidance.

[edwest]

Here is a book excerpt that I think may be helpful:


http://books.google.com/books?id=TXo...201944&f=false



Usual disclaimer,
Ed

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by edwest

Here is a book excerpt that I think may be helpful:

Usual disclaimer,
Ed

Thank you.

The author does not identify which of the three attack modes was actually used on the Remagen bridge;
1) high altitude horizontal attacks using autopilot with target held in crosshairs of Lotfe 7K bombsight and bomb released automatically
2) low level horizontal flight with pilot calculating when to release
3) shallow dive attacks from 5,000m to under 1,500m while aiming bomb through the periscopic sight.
I believe it was most likely 3).
The bomb load was 3,000 lb.

Tony

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

German lack of success against bridges in 1944–45 is at least in part attributable to the inadequacy of the means at their disposal. They couldn't send over formations of medium bombers in daylight to carpet the target like the USAAF could. Their medium bomber units were largely stood down in September 1944 and only reactivated for the one attack on Eindhoven during MARKET-GARDEN. At Remagen, the weather was terrible most of the time and the jets were often bombing under EGON guidance.

Thank you for the information, Nick; much appreciated.

I would also appreciate information about how the German jets bombed under EGON guidance, and the accuracy obtainable by their version of Oboe/GEE-H?

Tony