Did Ultra have wind of Operation Bodenplate in 1945...

[bassamnamani]

and thus withdrew most of the fighters and fighter bombers from the forward airfields?

[Graham Boak]

No fighters were withdrawn - all the units were at their operational bases. If Ultra had word, it wasn't passed on.

[ChrisS]

I believe I'm correct in saying that by this stage of the war Enigma was little used. With the Germans fighting on their own territory landlines became the prefered method of communiction.CheersChris

[SMF144]

I am away from my hoard of reference material but I'll take a look as soon as I get home and hopefully have an answer for you. Have you tried Hinsley's books?

Stephen

[John Beaman]

Originally Posted by ChrisS

I believe I'm correct in saying that by this stage of the war Enigma was little used. With the Germans fighting on their own territory landlines became the prefered method of communiction.CheersChris

Chris, I must disagree with you. ULTRA intercepts were used extensively until the end of the war. The Luftwaffe continued to use "wireless" far more than landlines, quite a bit. While Bodenplatte was not specifically picked up, as to its actual date, lots of indications were there. Read John Manrho's book Bodenplatte published by Hikkoki. John is a regular contributer to this forum.

As for ULTRA and "The Bulge", the USA did a late 1945 analysis of ULTRA traffic to see if there were warnings. The USA National Archives has quite a report and file on this. The report's conclusion was that there were extensive "flags" and warnings about a German counterattack, but they were ignored by those in command, both British and Americans. Hey, the war was over, right?

I will repeat what many others have said, here, including, John Manrho, Nick Beale, and Jim Kitchens: you cannot write a history about anything with WWII in Western Europe or the Med without looking at and referencing ULTRA intercept files. What was known by Britain and the US is simply amazing.

[SES]

The Luftwaffe frequently sent the same messages via landlines and W/T. I agree with John, the indicators were there, but they were ignored.
bregds
SES

[bassamnamani]

Read for example Oblt. Dortenmann's account of his attack on an airport near Brussels in Jerry Crandall's The Focke-Wulf Fw 190 Dora (pp. 62-65):
"But instead of the many hundreds of aircraft that were visible on the reconaissance picture, only a few Mustangs and Viermots are scattered all around the field."

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by ChrisS

I believe I'm correct in saying that by this stage of the war Enigma was little used. With the Germans fighting on their own territory landlines became the prefered method of communiction.CheersChris

Quite the reverse Chris. There are masses of decrypts from this period. Probably the telephone system was severely disrupted by bombing and units were often dispersed to improvised air strips with no facilities.

There are many Ultra indications of a major fighter operation being planned in December 1944: units concentrating in forward bases, commanders being called to conferences, pairs of night fighters being assigned to fighter units etc. But of course the start of the Ardennes offensive "explained" all of that. I don't recall anything specifically warning of an operation on 1 January (which of course was later than the Germans had intended).

[SES]

The still developing night fighter air defence system was closely monitored and reported upon thanks to ULTRA.

And as I said, even with a complete intact telephone system like in Denmark, much communication of operational and tactical nature was still conducted via landlines and W/T simultaneously.

In the last weeks of the war some operational HQs were more or less constantly on the move and albeit they endeavoured to move to a location with good landline connectivity, W/T was still used to a large extent.
bregds
SES