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  #21  
Old 17th April 2017, 22:29
Bruce Dennis Bruce Dennis is offline
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Re: I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

Dan,
Just so there is no confusion about it, I believe your paper includes a number of well-presented studies of matters that are vital to understanding the supply and logistics history of the air war. I also believe the paper is going to be useful to many people and thank you for putting it online. My issue, and apparently that of some others as well, is the confusion within your conclusions. Rather than go through the matter again from scratch, suffice it to say that despite all that has been said I find your paper readable and I will consult some of your cited sources in the future.

I won't validate your conclusions but I will use your research: I suppose that is a positive message, so keep on researching.

Regards,
Bruce
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  #22  
Old 18th April 2017, 02:59
edwest2 edwest2 is offline
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Re: I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

Dan,


A few more books you may want to consider as your research continues.


https://www.amazon.com/War-Economy-T...P4RPWW46P345SW

https://www.amazon.com/Arming-Luftwa.../dp/0786465212



Usual disclaimer,
Ed
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  #23  
Old 18th April 2017, 08:02
Dan History Dan History is offline
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Re: I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

Gentlemen, for I see that no ladies have participated in the discussion until the present time, thank you for a spirited reaction to my work. However, it is disappointing that serious researchers like you are not making an attempt to engage more deeply with my work and are in some cases giving reactions based only on reading the introduction or a small part of the work itself. I am loath to engage in self-aggrandizement, but the research for this work took substantially more than a year and the evidence within it was extracted with great effort from a variety of sources, several if not most of which have not been seen before by the members here. I would be glad if members deployed the information that they had accumulated during their own research in order to provide informed support or criticism of my conclusions. The private opinions of members are of interest in and of themselves, of course, but so far there has been an excess of heat and a deficit of light in the discussion, as happens often on online forums.

Since the working week has begun, I have less time to respond for the time being, so I will seek to respond to the latest postings first, to keep up with the discussion. I would encourage members to respond to each other’s points too, as FalkeEins did with Rémi’s post above. I am very happy to be at the centre of attention, but it would be equally interesting to see what members think of each other’s contributions.

Ed, as you have made the latest contribution for the time being, below is my response:

Quote:
Originally Posted by edwest2 View Post
Thank you very much for bringing more information
First of all, thank you for your words of encouragement in the first of three posts that you wrote. To address the points that you made, I am surprised that you think I took a narrow view. I have very rarely seen anyone in the field attempt to combine an analysis of the Luftwaffe’s flying units with its air defence forces, let alone bring in issues like fuel and ammunition. It would be helpful if you clarified this particular comment here.

I did not ignore the issue of radar, instead I wrote, on page 20: “It is regrettable that information about the distribution of gun-laying radar is unavailable, but sound detectors area good proxy indicator, for these were used as a partial substitute for radar (Westermann: 203).” If you have information on the distribution of Luftwaffe radar between different operational theatres, I would be glad if you shared it. A substantial motivation for my involvement in this discussion is to obtain new information. I trust you will agree that any information about the distribution of radar will support my overall argument, since there is overwhelming indirect evidence that the majority of Germany’s radar network was sited in the West and Mediterranean, for example on http://gyges.dk/ , the excellent website put together by SES. Does the Radarkrieg book by Bukowski contain data about the production of radar and the distribution of radar installations between fronts? I am concerned, based on the title, that it only discusses radar units in the Berlin area.

I have the Neulen book about Luftwaffe allies, which is superficial in places. The issue of Axis allies can be put to one side in a work such as this, because the scale of the operations and losses of these air forces was so much smaller than that of the Luftwaffe. Dénes Bérnad, György Punka, HGabor and so many others have written many interesting pieces about the actions of these air forces, and I will include some of this work in an expanded version of my study. However, these air forces were too small to materially change the balance of forces in the air war. Furthermore, any review of the activities of Axis allies must of necessity devote much attention to the Regia Aeronautica, which fought almost exclusively in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the inclusion of Axis allies will shift the balance of attention further away from events on the Eastern front.

Since you wrote “based on my research”, may I ask for more details of what research you performed, what evidence you presented and the conclusions that you reached? Allied resource superiority did provide the foundation for ultimate Allied victory, but the analysis in my work is deeper than this one observation. I emphasise that Western air power was decisive in the air war, for reasons of its technological superiority as much if not more than its numerical strength. Furthermore, since air power consumed resources far in excess of those allocated to other forms of military power, it is not possible to place air power on the same level as the ground forces. Even well-equipped and well-trained ground forces fared very badly in the face of enemy air superiority, which was the key change from the First World War, although signs of this could already be observed in the campaigns of 1918.

Do you have the Kahn book? I am not sure that it contains information worth a price in excess of $100 . The other two books that you mentioned, Overy’s War and Economy and Uziel’s Arming the Luftwaffe, are useful and interesting, but they focus on issues of resource mobilisation, rather than the distribution of resources and the destruction of these resources at the front. I will add here that I find your various links to book purchase websites slightly frustrating, in the sense that they obscure the point that you are attempting to make. I am grateful for the work that you do in publicising various new books, but what is your view of the matter at hand?

Kind regards,

Dan

Last edited by Dan History; 18th April 2017 at 08:54. Reason: Formatted the post to aid reading
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  #24  
Old 18th April 2017, 08:26
Dan History Dan History is offline
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Re: I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bruce Dennis View Post
I will be brief.
Bruce, brevity is a virtue, but I suggest you have been too brief in your response. I note that you disagree with my conclusions, but may I ask why that is the case and what conclusions of alternative sources do you find more convincing?

I must emphasise that you are in error when you seek to describe the USSR as an Allied power. The USSR signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939 and then invaded Poland following Germany’s own invasion. Up until the German attack on the USSR, the Soviet Union was a de facto ally of Nazi Germany and provided a large volume of raw materials necessary for the German war economy. Once Germany invaded, the USSR did join the Allies out of necessity, but it pursued fundamentally different objectives during the war. Soviet domination of Eastern Europe led to a very rapid breakdown in relations after the end of the war in Europe, with Churchill being invited by Truman to make the observation that “an iron curtain has descended across the Continent” less than a year after Germany’s surrender.

I am surprised that you write of the “confusion within [my] conclusions”, since you criticised my conclusions on the basis that you understood them clearly, even if you had not had the time to follow my reasoning. I hope that labelling my paper “readable” was not intended as a back-handed compliment. I am most interested to know which of my sources you would like to consult in the future. As I indicated to Ed above, I consulted many other sources which I did not have space to use in the study, so I would be glad to comment futher.

Your use of the word “validate” is not entirely clear. The Oxford English Dictionary tells us that the most common modern usage of validate is “To examine for incorrectness or bias; to confirm or check the correctness of.” Do you mean that you will not spend time examining the correctness of my conclusions, or rather that you will not confirm the validity of my conclusions? The two are not the same, of course. Since you would like to use the fruits of my research, I would suggest it would be most appropriate if you spent some time considering my reasoning.

Kind regards,

Dan

Last edited by Dan History; 18th April 2017 at 08:47. Reason: Put question in bold font
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  #25  
Old 18th April 2017, 13:12
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Alfred.MONZAT Alfred.MONZAT is offline
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Re: I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

I've read Dan's study and found it very interesting, comprehensive and worth reading. It look like to be a very hard work and the people who accepted to publish it on their website would not have accepted if it was wrong or twisted, so I encourage people to read it. As far as I know nobody worked on that subject since Murray. I still disagree with his statement on this forum but in the study there's not such exagerated claims but true things based on facts and datas, such as that the extent of the air war in the Westfront and Südfront in 1941-1942 is too often downplayed and Dan's study give justice to this fact.

I urge people with better knowledge than me to read it to confirm or infirm I am right in my feeling about this what looks to me to be a milestone in that area.

Regards

Alfred
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  #26  
Old 18th April 2017, 19:45
edwest2 edwest2 is offline
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Re: I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

Dan,


In order to avoid any confusion or further frustration, I will bow out of this thread.



Best,

Ed
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  #27  
Old 18th April 2017, 20:45
Bruce Dennis Bruce Dennis is offline
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Re: I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

Dan,
I'm with Ed.

Bruce
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  #28  
Old 18th April 2017, 21:22
Dan History Dan History is offline
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Re: I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

Quote:
Originally Posted by edwest2 View Post
I will bow out of this thread.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Bruce Dennis View Post
I'm with Ed.
Ed and Bruce, I have sent each of you a private message, with a simple message - I would be glad if you stayed!

I shall take a moment to respond to kalender1973, because he asked a short question which drives to the heart of the matter:
Quote:
Originally Posted by kalender1973 View Post
How you come to the conlusion: "Western air power defeated the Luftwaffe and therefore enabled the USSR to survive"?
Kalender, thank you for your praise and let me outline my reasoning:

1. The Luftwaffe suffered considerable losses of aircraft and personnel before the German invasion of the USSR. See Table 10 on Page 23 for details. This materially eased the burden on Soviet defenders in 1941.

2. Even when the Luftwaffe had concentrated most of its resources in the East, in the second half of 1941, the RAF and Commonwealth air forces inflicted substantial losses on the Luftwaffe. In consequence, the Eastern front accounted for just 25% of total German aircraft losses from the outbreak of the war in Europe until the end of 1941. See Table 11 for the details. Thank you for drawing attention to the fact that the Commonwealth air forces were involved.

3. You made the observation that I wanted people to make, that German losses were quite evenly divided between East and West from mid-1941 to the end of 1943. This is not the whole story, of course. Table 13 shows that three-fifths of the single-engine fighters were destroyed in the West, and almost all night fighters. The German war effort was very precariously balanced and its central component was air superiority, which was maintained by the fighter force. Therefore, the defeat of the German fighter force in the West was of critical importance to the survival of the USSR, relieving the pressure of German air power on the Soviet armed forces. Take a look at Table C-2 on page 51 as well, when the non-operational losses are included, the importance of the fighting in the West is drawn into even sharper focus. I believe that this measure of losses, including non-operational ones, is the most useful, because non-operational losses were a consequence of combat. Without the pressure of combat operations, non-operational losses would have been much lower, so it is eminently reasonable to add non-operational losses to operational ones.

Kind regards,

Dan

Last edited by Dan History; 18th April 2017 at 21:23. Reason: Corrected spelling
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  #29  
Old 19th April 2017, 00:08
Laurent Rizzotti Laurent Rizzotti is offline
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Re: I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

Hello,

I have finally finished reading your thesis tonight, I did not want to reply before. Even if your initial comment seemed wrong to me.

I admit that I am surprised by your losses figures for the West for the second half of 1941 and 1942. I have searched WWII air war losses for more than ten years, and would have excepted lower figures. I also found the ammunition figures very interesting.

But in my humble opinion I see two main problems in your thesis:

1) the importance of the Luftwaffe is overestimated. You pointed a true and surprising fact that the Luftwaffe suffered roughly equal losses between West and East from June 1941 to end 1943. But the figures for the whole German war machine are far more unbalanced between West and East. And the main reason for victory or defeat on the East front was on the ground, not in the air (the Luftwaffe decimated repeatedly the Soviet air units in Stalingrad area for example, but the town still held for months).

2) a part of your comparisons seem to imply that the air war in the West and in the East was similar. So the absence of heavy AA guns, guided bombs, nightfighters, searchlights, etc... in the East is often cited by you as a proof of the Allied pressure. My opinion is that they were not in the East because they were not needed. Guided bombs were useful against ships and the only places in the whole eastern front there were some was Leningrad. You talk of them twice as important, but I check the number of guns available in the area for the Soviet and I disagree. Most of the battles in the are were fought east of the city, out of range of the guns and the ships never left port once the battle has begun. As for heavy guns, heavy searchlights and nightfighters, they are useful against aircraft flying at high altitude, not tactical aircraft flying as low as possible. I will say the same for gunpods and rocket launchers for fighters: both are useful against well-defended heavy bombers, something that was not present on the Eastern front. And the Il-2 was tough but not invulnerable, as is proven by the losses of Soviet units using it. Well-used small guns were enough to shot them down, and from 1941 to 1943 there were plenty of German experienced pilots in the East to do it (the Luftwaffe fighter units then were composed of between 25 and 50% of aces. As they will fight in pair, the pair leader (the one who did the shooting) will almost always be an ace... as shown by Prien books). I don't remember reading about German fighters in the East asking for Fw 190s, while it is easy to find stories of British pilots in Africa, Malta and Burma asking for Spitfires.
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Old 19th April 2017, 00:20
kalender1973 kalender1973 is offline
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Re: I have just written a new analysis of Luftwaffe resource distribution - it is on Michael Holm's website

Quote:
Originally Posted by Dan History View Post

Kalender, thank you for your praise and let me outline my reasoning:

1. The Luftwaffe suffered considerable losses of aircraft and personnel before the German invasion of the USSR. See Table 10 on Page 23 for details. This materially eased the burden on Soviet defenders in 1941.

On the other hand the Luftwaffe cumulate so huge experience in 1939-40, what allow quite to eliminate the huge soviet air force in first weeks of Barbarossa. E.g. "nobody" Barkhorn has more than 100 mission against France and England.

By the way, the losses are not the problem, the problem is the ability to replace the losses. After some missions of 8 AF in 1944 the some 1500 flying personl was lost. On the next day the new 1500 man were ready for duty.

And the LW was able to replace the losses .

Quote:
Originally Posted by Dan History View Post
2. Even when the Luftwaffe had concentrated most of its resources in the East, in the second half of 1941, the RAF and Commonwealth air forces inflicted substantial losses on the Luftwaffe. In consequence, the Eastern front accounted for just 25% of total German aircraft losses from the outbreak of the war in Europe until the end of 1941. See Table 11 for the details. Thank you for drawing attention to the fact that the Commonwealth air forces were involved.
25% for so short time interval is outstanding performance in my eyes

Quote:
Originally Posted by Dan History View Post
3. You made the observation that I wanted people to make, that German losses were quite evenly divided between East and West from mid-1941 to the end of 1943. This is not the whole story, of course. Table 13 shows that three-fifths of the single-engine fighters were destroyed in the West, and almost all night fighters. The German war effort was very precariously balanced and its central component was air superiority, which was maintained by the fighter force. Therefore, the defeat of the German fighter force in the West was of critical importance to the survival of the USSR, relieving the pressure of German air power on the Soviet armed forces.
Why you speak the whole tme about fighters? Fascinateted from air combat? Do you understand the fighters play in german plans more supporting role und main decisive force which have much more attention of LW leadership was bomber fleet? Why do you think, the Kampfflieger in the WW I was the fighter pilot and in the WW II was the bomber pilot? Because the bomber fleet was in the LW definition "Haupträger des Kampfes" - decisive fighting force. which in cooperation with ground forces allow the reach the key target in german offensive operations. Do you think 100-200 figther does play any role, especialy in battle in Moscow or Stalingrad? Do you imagine, what for climatical condition was in november-december 1941, 42? How long is the day light in winter? I would say two hundred more german figthers in Stalingrad and 200 fewer Transport planes would be allowed the end the war may be one year earlier as real happened

Quote:
Originally Posted by Dan History View Post
Take a look at Table C-2 on page 51 as well, when the non-operational losses are included, the importance of the fighting in the West is drawn into even sharper focus. I believe that this measure of losses, including non-operational ones, is the most useful, because non-operational losses were a consequence of combat. Without the pressure of combat operations, non-operational losses would have been much lower, so it is eminently reasonable to add non-operational losses to operational ones.

Kind regards,
Dan
Why do you believe, the non-operational losses are result of combat?
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