Need assistance: Role of the Luftwaffe/Germany in the Battle of Britain?

[Heuser]

Gents,

I recommend a study of "Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg" Part 2, only available in German laguage, published by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, Freiburg, via DVA. There you'll find a lot of informations (military and political ones) regarding Seelöwe, including links to primary sources.

Some thoughts from my side: the are a lot of publishers around, which had no thought about German language, but publishing about GAF during the BoB. IMHO, sounds like writing something about the RAF during this period without understanding any English...

[John Vasco]

Originally Posted by Heuser

Gents,
Some thoughts from my side: the are a lot of publishers around, which had no thought about German language, but publishing about GAF during the BoB. IMHO, sounds like writing something about the RAF during this period without understanding any English...

So who are they? Please name them.

[Kurfürst]

IMHO its very much worth to read the following at the numbered usaf historical studies page:

Operation SEA LION and the Role of the Luftwaffe in the Planned Invasion of England, by Karl Klee (1955).

http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/numbered_studies/468155.pdf
http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/numbered_studies/468156.pdf

Its a lot of text, but the German decisionmaking progress is very throughly covered, and during all the time the reluctance and hesitation is quite clear in the HC, especially that of Hitlers. One particularly interesting part from very early in the Battle, IIRC in July, where the records already show that perhaps it would be the best to prepeare the whole Seelöwe stuff in spring 1941. And, even during August, there was quite clearly no useable and detailed plan for an invasion, the navy and army still could not agree on the basic details.

Much has been written in the past nearly 70 years about the Battle, about the intents the progress made, but IMHO the real thing is how the German HC saw the matter back in the summer of 1940. And this is very well detailed in this study.

[Ruy Horta]

Originally Posted by John Vasco

So who are they? Please name them.

Prepare for a long list...

[F19Gladiator]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

IMHO its very much worth to read the following at the numbered usaf historical studies page:

Operation SEA LION and the Role of the Luftwaffe in the Planned Invasion of England, by Karl Klee (1955).

http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/numbered_studies/468155.pdf
http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/numbered_studies/468156.pdf

Its a lot of text, but the German decisionmaking progress is very throughly covered, and during all the time the reluctance and hesitation is quite clear in the HC, especially that of Hitlers. One particularly interesting part from very early in the Battle, IIRC in July, where the records already show that perhaps it would be the best to prepeare the whole Seelöwe stuff in spring 1941. And, even during August, there was quite clearly no useable and detailed plan for an invasion, the navy and army still could not agree on the basic details.

Much has been written in the past nearly 70 years about the Battle, about the intents the progress made, but IMHO the real thing is how the German HC saw the matter back in the summer of 1940. And this is very well detailed in this study.

Thanks Kurfürst!
This material is of great interest to me. Thank you for posting the links as a very useful contribution to the discussion regarding the matter.
Some other parts of the discussion here I do on the other hand not enjoy as it is not focused on the matter presented in the first posting.
Cheers
Göran Larsson

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Kutscha

... the 109 was relatively easy to land ... but the problem was when the wheels touched the ground ...

Even the worst landings go well up to that point!

[wh0whatwhere]

Wow awesome material so far guys. Great way to start.

Much thanks and much appreciated!

If I have any more questions or concerns I'll be sure to drop in a few lines, you all seem to really know your stuff, or at least know of people who know their stuff.

[FalkeEins]

..have a look at Tooze ('Wages of Destruction - the making and breaking of the Nazi economy') while you're about it...it's cropped up a few times in recent dicussions here.

his basic premise (roughly summarised) is that Hitler launched world war because Germany was economically weak both in production & resources, and while he was able to over-run militarily weak neighbours, when it came to crossing the Channel , " the basic preconditions for the defeat of Britain were never met...the task of assembling the naval & aerial forces necessary to subdue the British ..were beyond Germany's industrial resources.."

" In Churchill's high flown rhetoric the clash between the Luftwaffe and the RAF took on a decisive turning-point in the war..in reality it was an extremely one-sided affair.."

of course the fact that the British couldn't be eliminated was crucial for the outcome of the war (in the West) since it gave the US somewhere to park their bomber & fighter fleets & provided a springboard for the re-occupation of Europe...therein lies the prime importance of the 'so-called' Battle of Britain - the same outcome whether it was ever fought or not...

[Kurfürst]

I am rapidly loosing any faith in Mr. Tooze's book when I see quotes likes this - I cannot help but to note that he has some sort of pre-conception, and a bit of nationalism as well. I mean, 'militarily weak neighbours' - like France..? And what was 'extremely one sided' when the defender's losses practically matched that of the attackers (ie. ca 1600 RAF planes vs ca 1700 LW planes lost to all causes in the Battle)

It is beyond discussion of course that Germany did not have the naval resources in 1940 that would be required to for an invasion - and such cannot be created in a couple of months. As for the air forces, its debatable, but what now begins to appear to me as the standard Tooze nonsense about some sort of 'agricultural Germany' in the 1930s that lacks the industrial resources.. the political decision certainly was not taken to ramp up production - probably it was a mistake and would be needed to be made, not waiting until 1943 - still it seems it was sufficient to cover the losses. What amazes me that Tooze manages to ignore the political decisions and the plain industrial capacity at the time. As far as military matters, I don't think he has much weight in this subject - simply not being his field of study - as some comments about the 'heavy cruiser' Scharnhorst reveal..

[Brian Bines]

In 2009 terms the ''Battle of Britain'' may seem over the top since no German troops invaded this country, those whoes own countries were occupied may also find the description too dramatic. But to those of my fathers generation they remember post Dunkirk as a time when Britain was on its knees. The Press had built up the German war machine as unbeatable, and people had visions of thousands of German paratroopers landing, being quickly supported by thousands of troops and tanks from an invasion fleet. Amongst all this the voice of Churchill and his speeches were a major part of keeping morale high, plus the visible actions of Fighter Command albeit with the Press hyping up claims of Luftwaffe losses. In one article a soldier in training noted in his barracks there were posters of a German paratrooper looking like superman loaded with weapons with the caption 'Make Sure He Dies For His Country'. The guy said rather than inspiring confidece it was demoralising to think he could be facing such a foe.
Had the Air battle Over Britain ended in an outright victory for the Luftwaffe their would have been no subsequent bases for the US forces to operate from. Whatever is now seen as the outcome of summer 1940 ie victory of Fighter command, defeat of the Luftwaffe or a stalemate the events laid the basis for the chain of events leading to the ultimate Allied victory.