Withdrawal of Stuka Force - Channel Coast, post 18 August 1940.

[Andy Saunders]

I am seeking primary source evidence (rather than anecdotal or published sources) that the Ju 87 Stuka force was withdrawn from operational use against targets on mainland Britain post 18 August 1940 due to heavy losses.

After that date the Stuka force was moved and concentrated in the Pas-de-Calais area. However, was this exclusively related to unacceptable attrition rates? Could it have been, however, that the 'withdrawl' and transfer/concentration in the Pas de Calais may have been due to other considerations in addition to just losses? Namely; (a) the likely impending invasion of Britain, and, (b) the drawn-down of attacks on airfields, radar and port installations etc during the mid to late August period as LW targetting swung towards major targets such as London, particularly from 7 September onwards. (Indeed, in their post war analysis, this is what RAF Intelligence seemed to believe - see below.) In short, there were no pin-point airfield or military targets to attack that could have usefully employed the Ju 87, and the aircraft was not suited to the bombing attacks being undertaken, for example, against London. What I am looking for is the evidence that the withdrawal was purely due to losses, rather than just anecdotal 'evidence' that this was so.

In "The Rise and Fall of The German Air Force" (Air Ministry Pamphlet No.248, 1948) it is held that:

"On 19 August, Fligerkorps VIII, which possessed 220 of the total 280 Ju 87s engaged was withdrawn from the Cherbourg area and put under the control of Luftflotte 2 in the Pas de Calais area. The move, besides pointing to the realisation by the Germans that the dive bomber had been a failure in attacks on shipping, was in effect a new disposal of forces in preparation for the invasion itself. The dive bombers were now placed in a tactical position for army support in the coming invasion operations in a similar manner to other continental camapaigns."

There is no indication here, by the Assistant Chief of The Air Staff (Intelligence), that the withdrawal was primarily due to unacceptable losses. However, that said, and even if the withdrawal was primarily for tactical reasons, it was a fact that losses of Ju87s and aircrews at the rate sustained up until 18 August was depleting by a significant level the available Stuka force to support any invasion and this may well have influenced the decision. After all, the ACIS(I) states that the establishment strength of the Ju 87 force stood at 456 aircraft, but owing to previous losses in the WC, and then the BofB, only 280 remained.

Can anyone point me in the direction of any documents that support the often repeated view that the withdrawal was purely on account of losses? And are there any extant operational orders or documents relating to this?

I'd welcome comments!