Luftwaffe radar aircraft over the Black Sea

[James A Pratt III]

I think I read a post or article on this site dealing with Luftwaffe aircraft with radar operating over the Black Sea. Can anyone help me find it?

[Adriano Baumgartner]

James, good evening.
Erich Sommer, on his biography do mention using a Ju 88 with radar on night sorties in the search of Russian ships.
Am not sure if this is what you are looking for and do not remember by heart if they had success (remember something about at least one attack and some kind of problems with the radar).
https://www.amazon.com.br/Luftwaffe-.../dp/1910690546

Humbly yours,

A.

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Hello James,

Originally Posted by James A Pratt III

I think I read a post or article on this site dealing with Luftwaffe aircraft with radar operating over the Black Sea. Can anyone help me find it?

https://tacticmedia.ru/news/likhtens...morem-chast-1/

https://tacticmedia.ru/news/likhtens...morem-chast-2/

The article is in two parts. Russian and German archives, as well as Ultra, were used.
In Russian, but with modern online translators, this is not too much of a problem.

Best regards,
Andrey

[James A Pratt III]

A Fine and well researched article Andrey. Do you have any else on the 6 October 1943 Naval disaster where 3 destroyers were sunk? One wonders what BCRS vol6 has on it?

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Thank you, James!

This was the first attempt to investigate the problem. I don't know about other theaters of war, but no one has explored this in the Black Sea before. As often happens, the result of the study was not quite what I expected at first. Some of the questions remained unanswered, but this is almost always the case. I hope to find answers to some of these questions when get to the necessary documents.

Originally Posted by James A Pratt III

Do you have any else on the 6 October 1943 Naval disaster where 3 destroyers were sunk?

There are contemporary articles where this event has been researched in detail. But they are probably all in Russian. I'll see if any of these are available online.
I assumed that the reader is familiar with this event, so I only added in the article what was not known before.

Originally Posted by James A Pratt III

One wonders what BCRS vol6 has on it?

Alas, I don't know.

Best regards,
Andrey

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Originally Posted by Andrey Kuznetsov

I'll see if any of these are available online

For those who are completely unfamiliar with this event, here is a short description from the chronicle of the prominent West German historian Jürgen Rohwer:

5.– 6.10.1943
Schwarzes Meer
Vorstoß einer sowj. Zerstörergruppe (Kpt. 2. Rg. Negoda) gegen dt. Räumungstransporte an der Krim-Küste. Der Flottillenführer Kharkov beschießt in der Nacht Jalta und Alusta, die beiden Zerstörer Besposhchadny und Sposobny treffen beim Anmarsch auf Feodosia auf Boote der 1. S-Flottille (KKpt Büchting)und führen mit S 45, S 28 und S 42, später mit S 51 und S 52 beiderseits ergebnislose Gefechte. Am Morgen durch einen dt. Aufklärer erfaßt, wird der inzwischen vereinigte Verband tagsüber in 4 Einsätzen von Ju 87 der III./StG.3 (Maj. Hamester) angegriffen. Beim ersten Angriff wird Kharkov (Kpt. 2.Rg. Sevchenko) getroffen und von Sposobny in Schlepp genommen. Beim zweiten Angriff erhalten alle 3 Schiffe Treffer, Sposobny (Kpt. 3.Rg. Gorshenin) versucht abwechselnd die beiden anderen Zerstörer zu schleppen. Beim dritten Angriff wird die Besposhchadny (Kpt. 3.Rg. Parkhomenko) versenkt, wenig später auch die Kharkov. Zuletzt wird Sposobny, die noch Überlebende zu retten versucht, versenkt. Nach diesem Verlust verbietet Stalin den Einsatz der Überwasserschiffe vom Zerstörer aufwärts ohne seine Genehmigung.

[This description may have been slightly updated on the website]

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Originally Posted by Andrey Kuznetsov

I'll see if any of these are available online

I was surprised to find that all the detailed descriptions of the tragedy of 6.Oct.43 are out of date - a little or a lot. This mainly concerns the use of German data.

For a long time it seemed to me that everything was already known about this event, and I had not tried to study it myself. Just starting to write an article on German airborne radars in the Black Sea, I found that some things do not look as they had seemed before.

It had long been noticed that the Ju87 had previously failed to sunk any warship from destroyer and upwards on the Black Sea at high speed on the high seas. Ju88 sunk the destroyer Bezuprechny on the high seas on 26.6.42, but I have not now found descriptions that would allow to draw conclusions.

In general, according to the experience of the previous 2.5 years of the war, by 6.10.43 the probability of the catastrophe occurring seemed negligible. This was largely the reason for errors in planning.

Negoda (naval squadron commander) made many tactical errors, but it was always believed that the main culprits were higher ranks. Stalin, who closely followed the investigation, clearly shared this view. Negoda suffered not very much - was demoted in rank and position, but by 1951 he had reached the rank of Rear Admiral.


Question about III./StG3. This Gruppe used to operate against ships in the Mediterranean before. On 14.9.42 they damaged AA-cruiser Coventry and destroyer Zulu, both ships eventually sunk. The speed of the ships at the time of the hits and other circumstances can probably be found.

The easiest thing to say is that by October 1943 the pilots already had experience in attacks against fast ships. But in what exactly was it expressed? Did III./StG3 do something unusual on 6.10.43 that the Soviet Navy had not seen before? Or the first hits were the lucky shots?

Another explanation is that the Soviet ships at the time of the 1st hit on the leader Kharkov did not yet have high speed. It is usually written that after rescuing the aviators from the downed BV138, the ships departed at a speed of 28 knots. But the documents perished with the ships, and the testimony of survivors is partly contradictory and not entirely reliable. What is known is that the ships only detected the bombers when they were already diving. Before that, the observers' attention was diverted to the rescue of the BV138’s survivors. That is, it happened immediately after the rescue of the airmen, and it is unclear whether the ships could have had time to fulfil the 28-knot speed order.

If the ships were actually still running at slow speed, there is nothing surprising about the first hits. And what happened afterwards was caused by Negoda's mistakes and poor organisation of air cover. Navy headquarters could not adequately react to the abrupt and absolutely unexpected changes.

On III./StG3 I found only the number of sorties against Negoda's squadron and fragments of some logbooks. These data do not answer the questions. Are there any detailed descriptions from the German side, how the 1st raid was carried out?

Best regards,
Andrey

[James A Pratt III]

did any of the Russian destroyers have radar?

[edwest2]

General information about Soviet naval radar.

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNRu...Radar_WWII.php

[Andrey Kuznetsov]

Hello James,

Originally Posted by James A Pratt III

did any of the Russian destroyers have radar?

The three ships lost on 6.Oct.43 didn't have radars. In the Black Sea Fleet, the first Redut-K ship radar was installed on the cruiser Molotov in 1940. It was a navalized version of a good Redut radar, and it also performed well. By June 1941, the Black Sea Fleet also had 4 ground-based radars - 2 Redut and 2 obsolete Reven. After the start of the war, air defense and then the air armies became the priority in equipping radars. The Navy also received ground-based radars for base defense. Only in the 1st half of 1944, 4 destroyers of the Black Sea Fleet received Lend-Lease radars.
By May 1945, the Black Sea Fleet had a lot of radars, but it did not play any role, because in the Black Sea the war actually ended in September 1944.

Best regards,
Andrey