Small B17 bomb bay and bomb load

[RodM]

Originally Posted by George Hopp

....who caused greater damage and production loss to German industry, Bomber Command by burning down cities, or the USAAF by destroying factories and refineries?

Sorry, George, but this is a rather weak and black & white statement that seems to get thrown around all too often these days. Bomber Command was not always area bombing cities (especially from 1944 onwards) and the Eighth Air Force was not always achieving precision attacks on factories and refineries...

In 1945, for example, only 36% of the Bomber Command effort was (mis)directed against area targets.

Although it is true that the Mighty Eighth lead the way, Bomber Command, for example, had a major effect on the attack against oil. Between May 1944 and May 1945, the USAAF mounted more attacks on oil (170 versus 82) but Bomber Command dropped a higher tonnage of bombs (63,674 versus 45,617). Without arguing the respective accuracy and effectiveness of these attacks (both air forces had their successes and failures), it should be noted that, at times, the higher capacity blast bombs of Bomber Command could cause more destruction, if the target was hit, than the 500-2000lb bombs or incendiary devices used by both air forces.

As for the discussion that seems to have developed regarding the B17 and the Lancaster, simply put, both were outstanding aircraft that reflected more than anything the differing philosophies of their respective air forces.

It should be stated that as fine as the B17 was, in daylight it was mince-meat without the benefit of the air superiority gained by the escort fighters. This was not a failure of the aircraft, but of the "self-defending bomber" brigade.

On the same token, the Lancaster burned easily and it's poor downward defensive qualities, allied with the overloading to increase bomb tonnage and the venerability of it's fuel and oxygen systems, was exploited by the Nachtjagd. Without the benefit of the weakening of the Nachtjagd, due to a number of different factors, I think that the loss rates of early 1944 could have prevailed.

The the point I am trying to make (sorry, 'cause it is a 'what if' question) is how would have both aircraft performed if:

(a) the B17 lost some armour and defensive firepower in order to increase bomb load (with a corresponding increase in the size of the bomb bay)?

(b) the Lancaster increased armour and the calibre of defensive armament at the expense of bomb load?

To me, only then can true comparisions be made - when the aircraft have equal capabilities (bomb load, defensive armament and armour) - otherwise the argument is actually about the validity of the differing philosophies of the USAAF and Bomber Command....

Cheers

RodM

[Ruy Horta]

When I look at the bomber campaign against the Reich I tend to ignore 1945 when it comes to accuracy, tonneage and targets. The Luftwaffe had lost control of german airspace and even the quality of heavy Flak units had deteriorated.

With little or no opposition over much of the target areas, it does not surprise that accuracy increased dramatically, nor tonneage on target, nor the fact that RAF Bomber Command flew more daylight missions (proof itself that the opposition had deteriorated significantly).

Some may argue that this was a culmination of many factors, I'd even agree, but it was not IMHO the fruits of the bomber campaign itself - the culmination of strategic air warfare.

However it does not surprise me that supporters of strategic bombing focus on the last 6-12 months to proof their point (anyone who has seen tonneage stats can see the dramatic increase in 1945).

Perhaps USSBS wasn't that far of the mark, nor politically orientated, when it didn't support bomber claims out of hand.

One may also wonder if the war might have been shortened if part of the strategic bomber force had been deployed against the German army instead - the tactical role (as it did impact the Normandy invasion).

To me it appears like the generals behind strategic bombing were eager to proof their point before the war ended, that they had a war winning capability of their own.

[RodM]

Hi Ruy,


I tend to agree and although one can look back with hindsight and state that if this or that was done differently then the war may have ended sooner, in a way the supporters of strategic bombing were, in part, theoretically right for although they did not have the means to deliver a quick and decisive knockout blow in Europe, the advent of the atomic bomb, in the hands of only one side or another, made such a decisive blow by air power alone possible....(with all the horrible consequences).

Cheers

Rod

[Ruy Horta]

Sure Rod, I agree completely.

Although the advent of ICBMs and perhaps more importantly SLICBMs, have again changed the role of strategic air warfare. The last decades have seen a clear shift towards the tactical role of aircraft, but there is of course an overlap into the strategic (especially since the capability of a modern fighter(-bomber) is greatly enhanced).

Personally I see today's tactical role of aircraft as good proof that aircraft are often best used in support of battlefield (not only direct support), instead of waging a separate war.

Shortly after WW2 - still being parrotted today - the Luftwaffe was criticized because they failed to put up a strategic air arm, or failed to understand the importance of air power in a strategic role, yet it seems that their idea of operational air war was more balanced (especially if circumstances dictate the choices you can make).

The keyword may be flexible versus doctrinal use of air power.

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

Re Mosquitoes: I admit I was thinking of the modified Mk.IVs rather than the Mk.XIVs, but 400 is still a small number - and how many of those were dedicated to the 4000lb rather than just being replacements for the older machines?

All but the first 12 of the 402 B XVIs could carry the 4000lb "cookie". This is ~100 more than the B IV, not counting Canadian production of B XXs - 245. For comparison, built during the same time as the B XVI were 526 NF 30s.

[RodM]

Hi Ruy,

With the American use of air power in the Gulf, most of the targeting as aimed at objectives that would support, directly and indirectly, a ground war. Even then, it is the improved (but not perfect by a long shot) accuracy of delivery systems that make this possible.

When thinking back to the tactical use of strategic air power around D-Day, some usage just plain failed to achieve it's goals (such as the bombing that Monty always insisted upon in support of his ground forces while trying to break out). Maybe, the four-engined bomber was just unsuited to the task (oh, how the Allies would have loved an aircraft like the F-16/F-18 back then!).

And, yes, from re-reading some of the official histories, it seems that some of the main inhibiting factors on the conduct of the airwar resulted from the commanders themselves and the schools of thought they dogmatically aligned themselves with, causing mis-application or a dilution of effort.

However, the Second World War was THE testing ground of air power. To me, the only benefit of having so many advocates of different doctrines during the air war in Europe is that least the 'field was covered' - although we can theorise in hindsight how strategic air power could or should have been more effectively used, obviously the defeat of the Axis forces was a combination of many factors, one of which was strategic air power and in the application of that strategic air power, the effects of many different doctrines helped bring about the collapse of Germany. If, a single air commander had been appointed and they had aligned themselves with a particular target system, would have this have brought about the same result?

Myself, I tend to get annoyed at the some of the modern arguments made about the Strategic air offensive that seem to have more to do to nationalistic pride than honest assessment (it is from this that many black-and-white half-truths develop).

As you say, the flexible application of air power, both strategic and tactical, allied to more effective targeting and more efficient and accurate delivery systems, is the key. Where would the effective use of air power today be without the lessons learnt 60 years ago?

I guess that the first Gulf War finally saw a maturing of the use of air power, reapplying many lessons learnt in the North African campaign, under one unified battle-plan for all forces....and the acknowledgement that air power cannot win a conventional war alone without soldiers on the ground.

Cheers

Rod

[Smudger Smith]

Hi,

For what it’s worth I’m in total agreement with RodM, however as per normal the contribution of the Short Stirling is forgotten.



Regarding accuracy, Bomber Command’s accuracy steadily improved throughout the war, from mid 1944 onwards Bomber Commands major contribution towards the destruction of Germany’s synthetic oil plants and railway facilities are unfortunately overlooked in favour of the attacks upon German cities. Perhaps we should have copied the Yanks with better press covered and built up our contribution in the same way they did. !



No.3 Group RAF Bomber Command in particular played a prominent role in attacking Hitler’s oil and transport targets, equipped with G-H the group carried out a number of highly effective and destructive attacks from October 1944 onwards.



I personally feel that Harris should have been replaced mid 1944, Bomber Command could have and perhaps should have played a more prominent role in attacking selective targets, Bomber Command had the men, aircraft and the bombing and navigational aids to destroy any target in Germany, the only thing it lacked was a commander willing to explore and develop a selective bombing policy. Commanders such as Cochrane (5 Group) or Bennett (8 Group) both of whom explored new bombing and target locating techniques should have been given the chance. ( I await the flak )

Of course in hindsight it is easy to have an opinion.

Regards


Smudger

[Juha]

Hello Smudger

You'll not get any flak from me because I totally agreed with You, well said.

Juha

[Vinman]

Hello Gentlemen,

Statistics and figures can sometimes be wrong and misleading.
First, even though the Halifax and Lancaster had a max bomb capacity of 13,0000-140000 lbs, the planes that flew the missions hardly ever had their planes to full bomb capacity.
I have some references with accurate stats:
Key raids against Germany by the RAF:
1943, July 24/25: RAF Raid on Hamburg.
791 Planes (Mostly Lancaster, the rest Halifax and Sterling) dropped 2,200 tons of bombs, which works out to about 5,560 lbs per A/C.
1943, November 18/19: RAF Raid on Berlin.
444 Planes (Lancaster, Halifax and Sterling) dropped 1,500 tons of bombs, which works out to about 6,700 lbs per A/C.
1944, March 30/31: RAF Raid on Nuremberg ( Black night for Bomber Command and heaviest defeat suffered by the RAF in a bombing mission. Of the 795 A/C dispatched, 108 were lost, 70 damaged, casualties 545 men killed, 159 shot down but evaded capture)
795 Planes (mostly Lancaster and Halifax) dropped 2,500 tons of bombs, which works out to about 6,200 lbs per A/C.
So, as one can see by these three key examples, the bomb capacity was no way near the 13,000 to 14,000 range.
If the B17 had an average of 5,000 to 7,000 lb load, the Lancaster( with the exception of the B.1 special) and Halifax were not too far off.
Years ago at a hobby show here in Calgary, I talked to a Lancaster pilot, who was visiting from Saskatoon. He told me that he never flew a mission with a max bomb load on his plane, everything depended on the target and the range.
Facts and Stats: The bombing of Europe in WW2
Sorties flown by RAF Bomber Command: 1940-1945: 391,137
Sorties flown by USAAC: 1942-1945: 762,000
Tons of bombs dropped by RAF 955,000 ( 758,000 Bombs, 196,000 Incindiaries)
Tons of bombs dropped by USAAC: 1,400,000
Lancaster: Tons of bombs and incindiaries dropped, 600,000. (1940-1945)
Halifax: Tons of bombs and incindiaries dropped, 227,000. (1940-1945)
Boeing B17: Tons of bombs dropped: 640,000. (1942-1945)
Consolidated B24: Tons of bombs dropped: 460,000. (1942-1945)
*Note: The 8th Air Force alone, dropped more tons of bombs than the entire RAF and did it in 3 years compared to the RAF in 5 years!
Vinman.
References and sources: WW2 AIRCRAFT, The Allies: by Chris Chant.
1939-1945 war planes: by Andrew Kershaw.
Aviation Heritage: Black night for Bomber Commad by
N.W. Emmott.

[Jon]

Thanks Vinman.

You failed to mention if the B17 carried its full bomb load each time....the answer is no it didn't....so as i stated the LANCASTER CARRIED FAR BIGGER BOMB LOADS THAN THE BI7

Any chance you could answer my original question !!

Cheers.