Need assistance: Role of the Luftwaffe/Germany in the Battle of Britain?

[FalkeEins]

..agreed; I've said no different - the 'so-called' comes from the German historian already quoted here..

France as 'militarily weak' ? - on the basis that they capitulated within six weeks and that their military doctrines/aircraft industry (etc etc ) belonged essentially to another age & had only recently embarked on modernisation, yes....

perhaps not so weak insofar as the Luftwaffe in particular sustained considerable losses over-running them - not to mention destroying the infrastructure that would be needed to fight the Battle of Britain..

No doubt the British would have caved in to, but for the Channel. And Churchill's rhetoric has come to represent the battle, when really it was designed, as you say, for internal consumption ..and the Americans. In terms of industrial production German victories in 1940 were significant for the decisions they precipitated on the other side of the Atlantic, long before December 1941. The British were to inherit nearly 11,000 American a/c before then, not to mention ten times as much oil as the Germans received from Rumania

but while the Luftwaffe inflicted losses on the RAF that appear high during the battle, British production -on its own- was higher still...

what Tooze is saying essentially is that seen retrospectively the Germans hadn't got a hope of launching invasion.

I think that what some German viewpoints of the 'battle' express is that in terms of control of the air - a prerequisite for invasion - then that attempt could only be half-hearted at best......

[Six Nifty .50s]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

I am rapidly loosing any faith in Mr. Tooze's book when I see quotes likes this - I cannot help but to note that he has some sort of pre-conception

I've never read Tooze but the gist of his overall message, as it was explained to me here, is nothing new.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

I mean, 'militarily weak neighbours' - like France..?

If that is his statement, it is very accurate.

Who can dispute that compared to Germany, France was militarily weak in leadership, forming a national strategy, planning, communications, command and control, training, combined arms, use of airpower, and tactical employment of their forces.

You might be thinking about the paper strength of the French war machine, circa 1940, but that tells us very little about their true capabilities. And I'd rather not get into endless debates about the technical effectiveness of weapon systems, because that was the least of their problems.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

And what was 'extremely one sided' when the defender's losses practically matched that of the attackers (ie. ca 1600 RAF planes vs ca 1700 LW planes lost to all causes in the Battle)

Except that German flyers shot down over the U.K did not often return to fight another day. A very long period of time was/is required to properly train and replace experienced pilots and air crews.

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

As for the air forces, its debatable, but what now begins to appear to me as the standard Tooze nonsense about some sort of 'agricultural Germany' in the 1930s that lacks the industrial resources.. the political decision certainly was not taken to ramp up production - probably it was a mistake and would be needed to be made, not waiting until 1943 - still it seems it was sufficient to cover the losses.

Cover the losses when ... which factories and training bases could make this happen in 1940?

Never mind the calendar length of the air campaign, the loss rate per sortie is what counts. It's not realistic that the Luftwaffe could continue losing men and equipment at that pace and still maintain the size of their air fleets for anything but a short period.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Kurfürst

I am rapidly loosing any faith in Mr. Tooze's book when I see quotes likes this...

So the best thing to do would be to read the book and, if you disagree with what he says, follow up on the extensive source notes. Anything we say here will inevitably be a simplifiaction of what is a complex and carefully constructed argument made by Tooze.

[Jan Gazda]

I absolutely agree with Nick Beale here. As I said in another thread I do not know Tooze´s Wages of Destruction but I know other works of him and while he might not be an expert in the area of military operations he definitely has an expertise when economic history is in concern, especially when economic situation of Germany between wars is discussed. This thread has convinced me to move Wages of Destruction to the top of my "must-read-books" list.

Jan

[FalkeEins]

..absolutely...and if you can get through the 'pure' economics of the inter-war period (say from about P150 onwards), there's quite a bit of Luftwaffe content; Junkers take-over, procurement & development of the Me 210/He177, Speer & armaments production..to highlight just a few areas I've browsed - well it is 600+pages...Kurfürst will no doubt enjoy Tooze's description of the late Bf 109G variants on P504; " a horrible collection of lumps & bumps.."

[Ruy Horta]

People should never go to far from their expertise when they write a book, their mistakes will detract from the main thesis.

Can't say I am looking forward to reading my copy, but it at least promises to be an interesting read. I doubt wether I will share all his conclusions though.

[FalkeEins]

Originally Posted by Ruy Horta

People should never go to far from their expertise when they write a book, their mistakes will detract from the main thesis.

..I winced when I saw him quoting from Scutts 'Bf 109; the operational record'...just seems a little incongruous for such a 'blockbuster'

very good with the bigger picture though...the 'myth-busting' comes thick & fast...

[leonventer]

Originally Posted by wh0whatwhere

Does anyone have an reputable links in terms of primary sources (revolving around the Battle of Britain on the Axis end of things, mainly the Luftwaffe) or scholarly articles published in the last 20-30 years or so which can contribute to my paper?

Here's a worthwhile reference that hasn't been mentioned yet:

"Hitler on the Doorstep - Operation 'Sea Lion': The German Plan to Invade Britain, 1940" by Egbert Kieser, Naval Institute Press, 1997, ISBN: 1-557750-390-7, hardcover, 287 pages

A thorough and detailed look at the many phases and aspects of this operation from the German point of view. The book includes copies of Hitler's directives 16 and 17 (issued on Jul 16 and Aug 1 1940) for the preparation of a landing operation and the conduct of the air and sea war against England. It was interesting to discover that 'Sea Lion' was never officially called off -- it was in limbo right up until D-Day.

Did the Germans have any real intention of invading Britain? According to the author, the answer was both "yes" and "no" -- it would have depended on when and whom you asked. The concluding chapter summarises why the operation failed, and what the grave consequences of that failure were.

Leon Venter

[Franek Grabowski]

Does it mention elusive Operation Haifisch, which probably is even more interesting than Seeloewe?

[wh0whatwhere]

OK so they cost me about $65 CDN together buy I got what appears to be the most exhaustive (primary source) account of the events from a predominantly British perspective but should offer some insight from the German point of view.

"The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933-1945" published in 1948, from the national archives.

"Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945" by Williamson Murray should offer a better perspective from the German end.

Thanks to the person who directed me to these sources.

This should get me started seeing as I've got a reputable primary and secondary source, in addition to many others, that should provide me with an account from both sides.

I'd like to thank everyone else on here for all your help, discussion, and suggestions.

Much obliged.

PS. I am taking a look into the Tooze book as well.