Bodenplatte strategy

[andlug]

Originally Bodenplatte was supposed to precede the German ground offensive 'Wacht an Rhein'. However, bad weather on 16th December 1944 and the whole of the following week made it impossible. The actual Bodenplatte operation was executed on 1st January 1945. Yet the weather cleared earlier than that, on 23rd December, so why did the Germans delay?The delay had important penalties for them:because the attack was delayed till 1st January, the Allied bomber offensive crippled the German land supply routes, and the Allied fighters downed a lot of Luftwaffe fighters BEFORE the 1st January, making it less effective.

I have done some research on this topic, using the information in Danny Parker's book 'To Win the Winter Sky'. I think the reason the Germans picked the actual airfields targetted on 1st January was because they had a dense network of their own airfields up North (to deal with the bombing offensive on the Ruhr and other places in the industrial north). It also meant they could sneak over Holland which they still occupied, and come round the back of the Allied bases, which happened to be RAF ones up there.A further advantage could have been that amassing the attack units would be less suspicious since there was a good 'cover story' (defence against the Allied strategic bombers). Unfortunately for the Germans, the weather did NOT clear early on the 23rd at those northern Allied bases, and I think that is a prime reason that Bodenplatte was not launched on 23rd.

By the 24th, the Allied airforces were alert, and a surprise attack by the Germans was not possible.However, the weather closed in again after 27th December, and cleared on 1st January 1945, permitting the historical 'Bodenplatte' attack.

The question is: could a 'Bodenplatte South', aimed at USAAF bases have been logistically feasible? If so, the weather was clear early on 23rd at those locations, and so the strike could have gone in on 23rd. A possible 'cover story' for a southern deployment might have been to deal with the Allied bombers coming north from Italy. The Germans had fewer airfields in the south-west of Germany, and they were located further from the frontline. The attacks could have reached the USAAF fighter bases, but maybe not the bomber bases of 9th Air Force.However, without fighter support, the tactical bombers were very vulnerable to the Luftwaffe, so the bombers would have been restricted also.

I don't know if the German airfields were big enough to accommodate a 'Bodenplatte South', or whether the fighter units could have got there in time. Any comments?

Andrew Dlugolecki