German & Allied radar

[George Hopp]

Re: German & Allied radar
indeed an excellent overview for radar-specialists. Amazing the editors note at the end:

Editors note:
Despite Germanys large technical lead at the beginning of the war, the English
and the US caught up with Germanys radar technology in about 1942 by employing
hug amounts of resources. The MIT Radiation Laboratory alone spent over $2
billion over the five years during the war.6 Only the development of the atom bomb
during WWII could rival by cost an approximate equal amount.
The kill ratio in combat of German Air Force fighters in combat against Allied
aircraft was on the average of 7 to 1 although the Allied aircraft outnumbered the
German aircraft by as much as 10 to 1 and in some cases up to 100 to 1. It is
obvious that the war was not lost because of strategic mistakes or lack of technology
or valor. It was not a question of if the Allies would win the war, most Germans
during the war knew the answer, but “how long would the war last and what would

happen to Europe after the war?”

In fact, Germany did not have technical superiority at any time in the war. This is much like the myth of overwhelming German armoured superiority in the 1940 attack on the west, both in numbers and quality -- neither of which was true. Most of the tanks used by the Germans in that attack were Mk. 1 and Mk. 2 tanks that were only ever to be used for training. Nor did the Germans have numerical or qualitative superiority over the RAF during the Battle of Britain. And, of course, the British also had a complete radar intercept system (something the Germans would not have for another couple of years) in conjunction with its enigma interecepts. In fact, the Germans had lost that battle even before before it began. And, from then on things just went downhill for them.

The night fighter control of the Germans was far more complicated than the comparable British system. One British publication mentioned that this was due to the higher quality of training of British personnel. Their problem was not helped by the fact that their intercept system was basically set up for their Flak, and was not provided with 360 degree scan and PPI scopes for their Freyas which would have reduced the number of radars and personnel needed for interception purposes. But, the Germans bounced back quickly from the disaster of Window in July 1943 with both a new airborne intercept radar and two new types of intercept control. Which ain't bad. Of course, there was no way to recover from the loss of territory beginning in June 1944.

[Franek Grabowski]

Originally Posted by edwest

What's the mystery about pilotless drones? A few were sent against the U-boat pens in France, and a few were used in an operation called Noball against V-1 ski sites in France.



Ed

Well, this was so called Operation Aphrodite, hardly a British one. Otherwise it does not fit the description in the thesis.

[edwest]

Hello George,


Obviously a tangent for another thread, but I have just finished rereading a 1947 American publication outlining German technical (not numerical) superiority in the air war.



Regards,
Ed

[George Hopp]

Obviously a tangent for another thread, but I have just finished rereading a 1947 American publication outlining German technical (not numerical) superiority in the air war.

Undoubtedly an interesting read, Ed. But, you will notice that I defend the notion that any talk of German technical superiority is myth. I contend that we always feel better about ourselves when we can show that we won inspite of the technical superiority of the enemy.

As a simple example, there is always talk about what the great gun the German 88 was, and yet the Brits had a more capable 3.7 gun that they just didn't use in mobile land warfare. And that was where the 88 really made its reputation. First, as a last ditch anti-tank shield in the French (1940) campaign, using emplaced flak batteries of 88s against advancing British tanks (21 May 40, Arras), and then as a part of the mobile forces after that. So, not better technology, but better use of the technology they had.

All the best,
George

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by George Hopp

… Most of the tanks used by the Germans in that attack were Mk. 1 and Mk. 2 tanks that were only ever to be used for training. Nor did the Germans have numerical or qualitative superiority over the RAF during the Battle of Britain.

Not forgetting the Pz.Kw. 38(t) which was a Czech tank which they acquired through invading that country. You see a lot of them in the newsreel footage.

By what measures did the Germans not have numerical superiority in the battle of Britain, though? I agree that the Luftwaffe was not as big as the RAF originally thought and that German production didn't keep pace with losses, but still …

I think that you could argue technological superiority in the BoB in a narrow sense. The Ju 88 was probably the best medium bomber around (perhaps because it was the newest?) and the Bf 110 had no British equivalent. As for the rest, the fighters were closely comparable (with pros and cons to all of them) and in an He 111/Wellington/Hampden/Whitley or Do 17/Blenheim comparison — is the difference that marked?

[Bruce Dennis]

In my opinion, the two best studies of the 'myth v. reality' versions of the Second World War are ...

'BLOOD, TEARS and FOLLY: An objective look at World War 11' (1993, Jonathan Cape & 1995 Pimlico p/b) by Len Deighton

and

'BLOOD, SWEAT and ARROGANCE and the Myths of Churchill's War' (2006 Weidenfeld & Nicolson) by Gordon Corrigan

Both address the technology clashes and both, especially Deighton, are convincing in their conclusions. Corrigan (a lecturer at Sandhurst) has a bit too much fun with pulling Churchill's tail but both make it plain that it was the British systems INTRODUCED IN RESPONSE TO THE WAR that defeated the German systems which suffered fragmentation after a potentially dominant beginning.

(IMHO) they should be considered essential reading.

Bruce

[Kutscha]

Nor did the Germans have numerical, edit, over the RAF during the Battle of Britain.

I have seen this stated before and if one looks at the respective OoB it is true but the fighting was done over southern England mostly by 11 Group with some help from 10 and 12 Groups vs. Luftflotte 2 and 3, which certainly had a numerical advantage.

[edwest]

Originally Posted by George Hopp

Undoubtedly an interesting read, Ed. But, you will notice that I defend the notion that any talk of German technical superiority is myth. I contend that we always feel better about ourselves when we can show that we won inspite of the technical superiority of the enemy.

As a simple example, there is always talk about what the great gun the German 88 was, and yet the Brits had a more capable 3.7 gun that they just didn't use in mobile land warfare. And that was where the 88 really made its reputation. First, as a last ditch anti-tank shield in the French (1940) campaign, using emplaced flak batteries of 88s against advancing British tanks (21 May 40, Arras), and then as a part of the mobile forces after that. So, not better technology, but better use of the technology they had.

All the best,
George

Hello George,


As I wrote, you could start another thread. I've just read far too many references to buy the word myth. In fact, in my time researching this subject matter, seeing the word myth just spurs me on to look further. My own personal motto is: Look, and if there's nothing to find, you won't find anything. Case in point, last week, a large group of American OSS files were released. I'll be digging through them.



Regards,
Ed

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Bruce Dennis

… both make it plain that it was the British systems INTRODUCED IN RESPONSE TO THE WAR that defeated the German systems which suffered fragmentation after a potentially dominant beginning.
Bruce

Except that the British Chain Home radar-based defensive system was being installed before the war — in response to the threat posed by Nazi Germany. Whittle was working on jet engines before the war (as were the Germans, of course). The Spitfire and Hurricane were prewar types and the list goes on.

British work on the cavity magnetron (centimetric radar) was certainly stimulated by the outbreak of war and the Germans never came close. Gyroscopic gunsights - widespread use by the Allies, tentative and belated introduction by the Germans. Nuclear weapons? Programmable electronic computers?

If we are simply speaking about technology (rather than military organisation), in what areas did Germany have a significant lead on 1 September 1939? I would certainly expect Germany to have been more ready for war since national policy was directed toward having one (albeit in the east, not the west) and Allied policy in the 1930s was about trying not to. The Germans were certainly ahead with nerve gas, I'll grant you that. In infantry weapons the MG 42 and the Sturmgewehr 44 were probably ahead of the pack. Blind bombing aids were certainly a case of an initial lead that they lost during the war.

The book to read in my view is Adam Tooze's "The Wages of Destruction" which dispels a lot of myths about German industrial strength.

[Bruce Dennis]

I see I chose my words poorly, which is always a mistake when surrounded by people who know what they are talking about.

To clarify:
The systems to which I refer were those methods and means within both the Allied and Axis wartime organisations charged with (A) technical research and development and (B) integrating technical developments into the operational fields where they could produce the most benefit.
The Allies first: The British military and naval hierarchy was as hidebound as any other on earth and squandered many opportunities to use information (and equipment, such as the artillery already mentioned) available in the early part of the war. The intelligence and, for example, rdf resources of Britain at September 1939 were in essence underfunded ‘clubs’ of dedicated and knowledgeable amateurs guided by a few professional serving officers. Neither of these began the war with adequate resources or an organisational structure adequate for the immediate task, yet they both grew from a few people who knew what they were doing into large and ultimately successful organisations, with government support that was only forthcoming once the Munich Crisis made war inevitable. (Yes, I know Bawdsey was set up much earlier but it relied on volunteers and couldn’t afford coal for the hut’s pot-bellied stove)
Both intelligence and scientific research were enormously expensive in materials and tying up the best personnel yet they flourished in wartime and (here is the point) both made the most of the best people available, whether they were civilian, military, naval, Jewish, male, female, ‘unconventional’, foreign or previous political opponents. The main reason for the success of the Allied systems was patronage: Winston Churchill sat on committees that directed the British scientific efforts and he loved the ‘whizz-bang’ notions that were put before him, plus he recognised the need to exploit even modest gains in fighting effectiveness that might be gained. Through Lindeman and Tizzard, and later RV Jones, he had a constant view of the progress made (and also that which was deemed feasible pursue) in the area of technology. The same applied to the vast investment in intelligence technology maintained by the British until the American commitment was secured. Once the Washington Mission had achieved it’s goals of engaging the American scientific establishment in joint r&d ventures, the ‘open forum’ principals were quickly embraced in North America and progress was rapid.
This is quite different from the situation in Germany where political ideals were applied to scientific endeavours, and only contributions from acceptable sources were allowed. Germany entered the war well prepared for the immediate goals associated with a series of short, rapid advances, especially in the field of communication, but no central conduit for intelligence or military use of her scientific strengths. Germany had an incredible advantage in a war of technology, for she had overhauled her educational system to give the sciences and engineering priority two generations earlier. The two factors that stifled the enormous potential of the German scientific community were (1) directives from the top to limit research, and (2) segmentation of the whole process into ‘customer driven’ projects. Typically, a military or naval department would specify what they wanted and a research team would set about producing something to do the job, usually in isolation from other branches of the armed forces. This is in sharp contrast to the British, and later unified Allied, methods of pooling information and encouraging suggestions to be passed around, and the policy of interservice adaptations of basic equipment designs. (It was 1942 before the Kreigsmarine adapted an outmoded Luftwaffe nightfighter radar set for use in S-boote, despite her capital ships having been radar equipped since 1939).
The strengths and weaknesses are well illustrated by looking at the ‘window’ problem. By 1943, when both sides had known of the potential of this simple radar jamming device, but neither had used it, the British moved first. The British Chiefs of Staff, lead by Churchill, decided on June 23rd to use ‘window’. This was done at the direct urging of Dr RV Jones, invited to the meeting expressly to present an informed opinion on the pros and cons of introducing this new countermeasure. Churchill was swayed and gave the order. The result? Paralysis of the German radar system with disruption to both Wurzburg and Lichtenstein sets. Use of window became standard practice and Goering was quoted as saying “ …In the field of radar they [the British] must have the world’s greatest genius. They have the geniuses and we have the nincompoops…” It was November before an effective program to counter ‘window’ was in place.

The system used by the Allies was superior to the system used by the Axis. Therefore, the early advantages of the German Luftwaffe in blind flying and navigation, which were potentially huge, were lost. Likewise, the earlier German work on shorter wavelength radars, and the emphasis on portability that had been evident early on, was overtaken by British researchers because of a more efficient use of the research facilities and the knowledgeable people in them.

Nick, you are right to point out the the development of the cavity magnetron, but it is an excellent example of my theory on the superior Allied system: it stemmed from research funded since 1938 by the Admiralty to exploit microwave technology on behalf of all three services: there was no equivalent German interservice research project that I am aware of.



Bruce