German & Allied radar

[Ruy Horta]

Originally Posted by Kutscha

Now that wasn't very intelligent of the Germans to fly all those bombers over southern England even though they were filled with bombs. Without the bombers there would be no reason for defending fighters to take off. This was seen after the German defeat in BoB when RAF fighter sweeps of France went largely ignored.

Please skip the sarcasm.

I wrote that the fighters were of primary importance, I stand by those words. That doesn't mean that the bomber force didn't have a mission, or that it was of no importance.

As for FC numbers versus the Jagdwaffe, most force multipliers were enjoyed by the defending force. That would negate any numerical advantage the Jagdwaffe might have enjoyed in the early phase of the battle.

[Crumpp]

Now that wasn't very intelligent of the Germans to fly all those bombers over southern England even though they were filled with bombs. Without the bombers there would be no reason for defending fighters to take off. This was seen after the German defeat in BoB when RAF fighter sweeps of France went largely ignored.

Unfortunately this is a very poor example with little insight into the nature of war. It illustrates a violation of the Principle of War called "Mass". The RAF violated this principle by launching raids which could not inflict sufficient damage to the target. By violating mass, the RAF opened up the option for the Luftwaffe to ignore the raids.

A much better example would be the USAAF unescorted daylight bombing campaign. The USAAF adhered to the principle of mass forcing the Germans to counter the raids or suffer significant damage to the target.

However without fighter escort to win air superiority the USAAF unescorted daylight campaign was defeated.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

Approx. 1/3 of FC's ~1100 fighters (~366) were not in the battle area. This gives the Germans an approximate 3:2 advantage in s/e fighters and over 3:1 overall in the battle area.

Not according to the RAF's official history of the Battle of Britain.

[Franek Grabowski]

Official histories tend to be subjects of propaganda!

[Crumpp]

Official histories tend to be subjects of propaganda!

Conspiracy theory.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Conspiracy theory.

OK, then official histories tend to represent a state of knowledge that is later improved upon.

[Crumpp]

OK, then official histories tend to represent a state of knowledge that is later improved upon.

Certainly.

Each must be taken in its own light. The official history of the Battle of Britain is far from the popular version.

The popular version has the RAF heavily outnumbered with England's fate teetering on the actions of the few in Spitfires.

While there is little doubt the most important factor of the battle was the men who fought it doing their jobs. The official history combines their bravery on the battlefield with the fruition of pre-war planning, a numeric parity combined with good tactical use of force multipliers backed up by one of the most innovative logistical organizations of the day.

There is simply nothing to compare to the CRO in Europe in 1940 AFAIK.

The pre-war production planning ensured the production assets were in place to completely outstrip German production. It allowed the RAF to increase the size of the operational squadrons and the overall force in a very short time period.

The CRO ensured that these expanded squadrons were rarely below strength when German units were operating at greatly reduced strengths.

The RAF documentation on fighter establishment, strength, and wastage very much backs up the official history version.

Luftwaffe Order of Battle--August 1940
Establishment Strength Serviceability
Bombers 1,569 1,481 998
Dive-bombers 348 327 261
Single-engine fighters 1,011 934 805
Twin-engine fighters 301 289 224
Reconnaissance 246 195 151
Ground attack 40 39 31
Coastal 94 93 80
Total 3,609 3,358 2,550


Fighter Command Order of Battle--11 August 1940 [35]
Establishment Strength Serviceability
Hurricanes 723 721 656
Spitfires 366 374 334
Total 1,089 1,095 990

In fact the logistical groundwork which paved the way for England's victory is studied today by professional defense force logistical organizations.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBO/is_4_24/ai_74582443

The primary mission of the Office of the Air Force Journal of Logistics is to publish the Air Force Journal of Logistics, the Air Force's only professional journal for logistics, engineering, and services.

http://www.aflma.hq.af.mil/lgj/2_afjl_mission_page.html

All the best,

Crumpp

[Juha]

Hello Crumpp
the limiting factor for FC was the number of combat ready fighter pilots in sqns, IIRC there were over 10% defiency in pilots in mid Sept 40.

And thanks for the interesting link.

Juha

[Crumpp]

the limiting factor for FC was the number of combat ready fighter pilots in sqns, IIRC there were over 10% defiency in pilots in mid Sept 40.

I agree. I think all sides felt this constraint and not just the RAF. Facts are trained crews are the most difficult loss to replace in aerial warfare. The Germans had inadequate systems from the very beginning. They maintained inadequate training regiments throughout the war.

From Technical Training Within the German Luftwaffe, by Werner Kreipe and Rudolf Koester:







http://afhra.maxwell.af.mil/numbered_studies/468178.pdf

All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

That is 97% of the serviceable rate for German SE fighters!

Feldwebel Eric Bartel, who served as a Jagdgeschwader mechanic for much of the war, recalled that after just 17 days' action his staffel of 12 Bf 109Es from JG 77 had been reduced to just 5 or 6, including spares, mainly through mechanical failures and normal wear and tear, rather than enemy action.

In fact, as Figure 8 indicates, Fighter Command started with a distinct advantage in pilot numbers that only increased as the battle progressed. [46] Robin Higham argues that Fighter Command's effective strength was lower, between 900 and 950 operational pilots. [47] Even on this basis, in September 1940, Fighter Command was able to field 250 more single-seat pilots than the Luftwaffe. The cause was the Luftwaffe's systematic neglect of training, a chronic weakness that only worsened as the war progressed.

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/m...g=artBody;col1




http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ww2/batlbrit.pdf

All the best,

Crumpp