German & Allied radar

[Franek Grabowski]

You are entirely missing the point. The fact of availability of a number of fighters does not mean anything. Important is, where they are, ie. how many in reserve, how many in training units, how many in operational standard, how many actually engaged. There were two-three groups regularly involved in combats, those being 10, 11 & 12. Compare this number to the number of aircraft actually based on French coast.
Numbers of battle were a subject of several interpretations, depending on the need of the time. That is why BC and CC aircraft are usually omitted from statistics.
Oh, the fact that the paper comes from Maxwell does mean nothing.

[Crumpp]

You are entirely missing the point. The fact of availability of a number of fighters does not mean anything. Important is, where they are, ie. how many in reserve, how many in training units, how many in operational standard, how many actually engaged.

I think the whole point is the RAF had more fighters in operational standard to actually engage the Luftwaffe. That is what I gathered when I read my copy of the RAF's report on fighter strength, establishment, and wastage. This is also separately confirmed in the RAF’s won official history of the battle.

That is one of reports referenced in the United States Air Forces Journal of Logistics.

Obviously you don't like what you are reading from the RAF.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Kutscha]

The total number of fighter a/c the RAF had 'on the books' has nothing to do with how many were actually available to actually engage the enemy. The 10 airfields (15 Sqds) in 13 Group for example were too far removed from the action over south-east England to send a/c.

Luftwaffe Order of Battle--August 1940
Establishment Strength Serviceability
Bombers 1,569 1,481 998
Dive-bombers 348 327 261
Single-engine fighters 1,011 934 805
Twin-engine fighters 301 289 224
Reconnaissance 246 195 151
Ground attack 40 39 31
Coastal 94 93 80
Total 3,609 3,358 2,550

Aug 10 1940
Strength Summary

Number Type Strength Svcble
42 1/3 Kampfgruppen 1482 1008
9 Stukagruppen 365 286
1 Schlachtgruppe 39 31
26 Jagdgruppen 976 853
9 Zerstrergruppen 244 189
3 Nachtjagdgruppen 91 59
14 Seefliegerstaffeln 240 125
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaver...g40.html#13Aug

The LW had ~2700 a/c (bomber types and fighters) based in France vs how many RAF fighters in south-east England?

In mid Aug, 11 Group had 23 Sqds, 10 Group had 10 Sqds and 12 Group had 15 Sqds. Not all of 10 and 12 Group could be used. So around 600 fighters were available to intercept the LW attacks. The LW had, at a minimum, an advantage of 4:1.

[Crumpp]

The RAF paints a different picture of the use and reinforcement of its forces:







All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

Let’s do some rudimentary statistics based of the numbers presented in this thread:

RAF, using their figure for comparative burden of operations:

10 Group – 7 squadrons @ 22 A/C each

11 Group – 18 squadrons @ 22A/C each

12 Group – 9 Squadrons @ 22 A/C each

We will just pretend that 13 Group isn’t doing anything operationally despite RAF records contradicting this assumption.

34 Squadrons * 22 A/C each = 748 Single Engine Fighters

According to the RAF’s own paperwork, they were able to maintain extremely high operational strength of their squadrons due to the efforts of the CRO..

We will just use 80% although the Wastage report says this was higher.

748 A/C * .8 = 598 A/C available to combat the Luftwaffe.

Luftwaffe figures:

Luftwaffe Order of Battle--August 1940
Establishment Strength Serviceability
Bombers 1,569 1,481 998
Dive-bombers 348 327 261
Single-engine fighters 1,011 934 805
Twin-engine fighters 301 289 224
Reconnaissance 246 195 151
Ground attack 40 39 31
Coastal 94 93 80
Total 3,609 3,358 2,550

The Luftwaffe maintained a far lower serviceability rate hovering around 50%.

1011 Single Engine Fighters * .5 = 505 SE fighters.

The Luftwaffe had to maintain a serviceability rate at a minimum of 59% to match the RAF numbers. There is no source that shows the Luftwaffe was able to approach anything close to a 60% serviceability rate during the battle.

There is little doubt that as the RAF’s documentation says, the RAF started the battle with numerical parity in Single Engines fighters and quickly moved to numerical superiority.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Kutscha]

Sept 7 1940
on hand - serviceable

Single-Engined Fighters
Stab/JG 1Pas-de-CalaisBf 109E43 Stab/JG 3Pas-de-Calais33 I/JG 32314 II/JG 32414 III/JG 32523 Stab/JG 26Pas-de-Calais43 I/JG 262720 II/JG 26Northen France3228 III/JG 262926 Stab/JG 27Etaples54 I/JG 273327 II/JG 27Montreuil3733 III/JG 27Sempy3127 Stab/JG 51St. Omer54 I/JG 51St. Omer, St. Inglevert3633 II/JG 512213 III/JG 51Pas-de-Calais4431 Stab/JG 52Laon/Couvorn21 I/JG 522117 II/JG 52Pas-de-Calais2823 III/JG 523116 Stab/JG 53Northen France22 II/JG 53Wissant3324 III/JG 53Northen France3022 Stab/JG 54South Holland42 I/JG 542823 II/JG 543527 III/JG 542923 I/JG 77Northen France4240

Certainly better than the 50% you state Crumpp.

We will just pretend that 13 Group isn’t doing anything operationally despite RAF records contradicting this assumption.

No need to pretend. How much combat for 13 Group?

[Juha]

Hello Crumpp
where you got the number 22 a/c for FC sqns? It's not realisitic, the sqn was supposed to have IIRC 15 fighters plus 3 immediate reserves and on 14.9.40 11 Group Spit/Hurri sqns had between 10 to 19 serviceable Spits/Hurris each.

Juha

[Crumpp]

The with few exceptions, the squadrons in the combat box during the BoB were at 22 A/C each according to the RAF.




All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

Single-Engined Fighters
Stab/JG 1Pas-de-CalaisBf 109E43 Stab/JG 3Pas-de-Calais33 I/JG 32314 II/JG 32414 III/JG 32523 Stab/JG 26Pas-de-Calais43 I/JG 262720 II/JG 26Northen France3228 III/JG 262926 Stab/JG 27Etaples54 I/JG 273327 II/JG 27Montreuil3733 III/JG 27Sempy3127 Stab/JG 51St. Omer54 I/JG 51St. Omer, St. Inglevert3633 II/JG 512213 III/JG 51Pas-de-Calais4431 Stab/JG 52Laon/Couvorn21 I/JG 522117 II/JG 52Pas-de-Calais2823 III/JG 523116 Stab/JG 53Northen France22 II/JG 53Wissant3324 III/JG 53Northen France3022 Stab/JG 54South Holland42 I/JG 542823 II/JG 543527 III/JG 542923 I/JG 77Northen France4240

Source? Do you know what an outlier is and its meaning?

All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

No need to pretend. How much combat for 13 Group?

The numbers of operational sorties are listed by the RAF's documentation I posted.

It is pretty obvious from the comparative sortie rate that the RAF did reinforce as needed among the Groups.

On the 15th of August we can see the outlier for 148 Operational sorties for 13 Group, a significant contribution to RAF's effort.

All the best,

Crumpp