German & Allied radar

[Juha]

Crumpp, interesting!
in the evening of 14.9.40 of the 21 Spitfire/Hurricane sqns of 11 Group six sqns had 14 serviceable fighters, 5 sqns 15, 2 sqns 16, 2 sqns 19 and one sqn each 10, 11, 12, 13, 17 and 18 serviceable fighters according to Price’s Battle of Britain Day Appendix D and none had 22 a/c, best equipped was 607 Sqn which had 19 serviceable and 1 u/s Hurricane(s) . Seven sqns had 19 serviceable + u/s a/c. Altogether 11 Group had that evening 310 serviceable Spitfires and Hurricanes ie average 14,76 per sqn.

BTW 15 Aug was the only day when the Lfl 5 made a substantial attack from Norway, not a very representive day.

Juha

[Crumpp]

On the 15th of August we can see the outlier for 148 Operational sorties for 13 Group,

not a very representive day.

http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handb...ion1/prc16.htm

in the evening of 14.9.40

The CRO would make up 99% of the losses by morning. The RAF had a 1:1 exchange for airframes at the ASU. Units did not repair or "own" the individual aircraft. As they were damaged, they were exchanged for new/repaired aircraft. The CRO would then repair and recycle the airframe. This is why they could maintain such high serviceability during combat operations.


This is opposed to the Luftwaffe where each Geschwader was responsible for the repair of their own aircraft. The aircraft remained on the units books and did not fly until it was repaired. If it needed organizational level maintenance, then as I understand it, it remained property of the Geschwader until it was returned to service.

Only when the airframe was lifecycled or written off was it removed from the Geschwader's books.

All the best,

Crumpp

[Franek Grabowski]

It must be a joke. Some sort of unclear document pre-dating Battle of Britain as a proof of RAF strength? Already during the Battle there was a significant movement of aircraft between Squadrons due to lack of replacements, and as Juha points out, this should be investigated on individual basis. Sometimes Squadrons borrowed aircraft from other ones, so many shortages there had been.
It is obvious that various numbers appear here and there, those trying to prove effectiveness of British industry inflating the number, the ones trying to show desperate struggle doing exactly the opposite.

[Crumpp]

It must be a joke. Some sort of unclear document pre-dating Battle of Britain as a proof of RAF strength?

As I understand it, the document covers July 1940 thru Dec 1940 which in most definitions covers the battle during the battle.

Unfortunately the charts in the report are rather large documents that do not fit n the scanner very well.

The report is PRO AIR 20/307.

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=1762649&CATLN=6& accessmethod=5


All the best,

Crumpp

[Crumpp]

Already during the Battle there was a significant movement of aircraft between Squadrons due to lack of replacements, and as Juha points out, this should be investigated on individual basis.

The RAF had plenty of replacement aircraft. That is one reason why they could keep their servicabiity so high.

Juha quotes status reports made in the evening before the aircraft from the days battle are repaired or replaced.

[George Hopp]

Excellent material, Gene. Thank you for posting it.
All the best,
George

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

Source? Do you know what an outlier is and its meaning?

All the best,

Crumpp

Did you look at the link provided earlier? Would seem you did not as you would have recognized what was posted.

[Kutscha]

Originally Posted by Crumpp

The numbers of operational sorties are listed by the RAF's documentation I posted.

It is pretty obvious from the comparative sortie rate that the RAF did reinforce as needed among the Groups.

On the 15th of August we can see the outlier for 148 Operational sorties for 13 Group, a significant contribution to RAF's effort.

All the best,

Crumpp

Patrol flights around 13 Group and what Juha mentioned.

1210hrs: Radar stations and the Observer Corps along the far north east coast of England and southern Scotland reported that an estimated 30 enemy aircraft had been detected coming in from the North Sea. A few moments later, this was changed to 50+ aircraft. A number of squadrons in the north had already proved their worth, but generally most of the squadrons in the north were newly formed squadrons or training units. Little did the Luftwaffe know that a number of experienced fighter squadrons were at this time up north on a rest, including 72 and 79 Squadrons. 13 Group of Fighter Command scrambled 72 Squadron Acklington (Spitfires) to meet the enemy. Not too many large or frequent sightings had been made in this part of Britain as most of the action so far had taken place in the south with 11 Group, hence the radar operators were not as experienced as the radar operators in the south. The formation that they had estimated as being 30 aircraft, was in fact a formation of 65 Heinkel III bombers of KG 26 and 34 Me 110s from I/ZG 76 based in Norway (Len Deighton puts this figure at 72 He IIIs, 21 Me 110s and a decoy of Heinkel 115C Floatplanes coming in from the north) and a formation of 50 Ju 88s from KG 30 based in Denmark.
Whichever set of figures are correct, it has been verified that 13 Group did only estimate that the formation consisted of only 30 aircraft which later was corrected to 50+, which now turned out to be a mammoth task for 72 Squadron to undertake. Squadron Leader Collins ( Richard Collier claims this to be a Flight Lieutenant Ted Graham and this is backed up by Denis Newton) headed his squadron past the estimated vector point seeing the German formation well to his left, then turned through the broken cloud towards the direction of the formation from the sun. Approaching the enemy, a voice came over the radio " Haven't you seen them ?" to which a reply was forthcoming "Of course I've seen the bbbbbbastards, I'm trying to wwwwwwork out wwwwhat to dddddo." It wasn't that the leader had a sudden touch of bad nerves, but under strain it is said he stuttered badly.
In the meantime, corrections to the original estimate had been corrected and 605 Squadron Drem (Hurricanes) and 41 Squadron Catterick (Spitfires) had been dispatched to join 72 Squadron. It was a bad start for the Luftwaffe after their long journey across the North Sea. 23 German aircraft were shot down which included 8 He111s, 8 Bf110s and 7 Ju88s. It was a high price to pay for a little damage done to two airfields, although the German airman's account below states that the airfield at Driffield had been destroyed and 'was no more.' Records show that a number of Whitely's of Bomber Command at Driffield in Yorkshire were damaged. No other daylight raids on the north coast have ever been recorded.

http://www.battleofbritain.net/0026.html

[Juha]

Hello Crumpp

Quote: ” The CRO would make up 99% of the losses by morning.”

It should have but looking from scrambles of late morning of 15.9. it seems that that had not happened. Most sqns didn’t scramble the supposed 12 fighters but 10-11 fighters. Only 11 Group reserve sqns at Tangmere sent oversized sqns and they scrabled exactly same number of fighters than they had had serviceable in the evening of 14th.

Quote:” Units did not repair or "own" the individual aircraft. As they were damaged, they were exchanged for new/repaired aircraft. The CRO would then repair and recycle the airframe.”

I know and have known for years. Or IIRC more exactly sqns repaired their own a/c if they had capacity to do that, if not they exchanged damaged for new/repaired a/c.

Juha

[Crumpp]

know and have known for years. Or IIRC more exactly sqns repaired their own a/c if they had capacity to do that, if not they exchanged damaged for new/repaired a/c.

Juha, I think you are thinking of the old system the RAF used. That system was changed before the battle and was modified again after or during the battle depending on whose dates you use.

Prior to this period, each flight within a squadron was a self-contained unit for repair and maintenance, up to write-offs. This was altered to a three-flight arrangement under which two flights undertook day-to-day maintenance and the third flight all major inspections and repair. This system remained in force during the first year of the war, but experience in the Battle of Britain exposed significant weaknesses. As the operational tempo increased, squadrons were moved at more frequent intervals. The result was that squadrons became increasingly detached from their support staff. In some cases, they found themselves distributed across three stations. In December 1940, it was decided to transfer the bulk of the squadrons' servicing personnel to station maintenance units, significantly increasing the mobility of the Fighter Command squadrons. [24] These arrangements, with some refinements, rema ined in place until the end of the war.

Each squadron had three maintenance flights which rotated duties. The flight which was responsible for major repair and inspection did not perform major repair but was responsible for the exchange of aircraft.

This is why FC could maintain such high serviceability.

It could be argued that a better test of relative strength is serviceability. The comparative rates for Fighter Command and the Luftwaffe are shown in Figure 7. The Fighter Command data have been extracted from an analysis produced in 1945 on production and wastage during the Battle of Britain. [40] The levels appear to be higher than those quoted in other sources. [41] Another source states that Fighter Command serviceability rose from 70 percent at the outbreak of war to 80 percent by November 1939 but, having fallen to 76 percent in July 1940, recovered to 80 percent by September where it stayed for the remainder of the year. [42] All in all, it seems safe to conclude that serviceability remained fairly constant in Fighter Command throughout the battle, somewhere between 80 and 90 percent. [43]

It should have but looking from scrambles of late morning of 15.9.

Be careful with status reports. I have made this mistake before too but would have to see the specific reports before I definitely concluded you have also made the same mistake.

It was common for squadrons to make multiple sorties from early in the morning on. By the morning status, some squadrons were embarking on their second combat of the day. Battle is a dynamic state while the status is frozen in time.

The status reports used for PRO AIR 20/307 are gathered at midnight.

The Allies made this mistake at Deippe proclaiming they had destroyed a significant portion of the Luftwaffe.

All the best,

Crumpp