VIIIUSAAF and BC failures at the Wesel bridges.

[Dave Wallace]

There was also a sizeable daylight attack (298 aircraft) on Feb.17 that was also a failure. While 7 of the 12 Oboe Mosquitoes acting as primary markers dropped their target indicators succesfully, only 8 Halifaxes had bombed when the Master Bomber called it off because of 10/10ths cloud.
On March 6th the Oboe Mosquitoes from 109 and 105 Squadrons led formations of Mosquitoes from the LNSF (608,571 & 128 Squadrons were involved,possibly others) on "Oboe Leader" attacks on Wesel.
From the 105 Squadron ORB:
"Six aircraft, 3 primaries and 3 reserves, led three formations of non-musical Mosquitoes for an afternoon attack. All of the primaries coped and the formations were satisfactory. Cloud was 10/10ths in the target area, and as our troops were in the vicinity, sky marking was considered too dangerous, and so the two Oboe squadrons were given the task of bombing the concentration of German armour in the area."
At 109 Squadron, the other Oboe Squadron, they had been given orders to "stand down" for the day at 10 am. At 10:30 they were told to stand by for an urgent call, at 11:00am they were called to provide 3 primaries and 3 reserves for the Oboe Leader formation attacks in the afternoon and at 11:30 am they were called on for 25 aircraft for another attack on Wesel that night (as was 105 Squadron), marking for 87 Lancasters of 3 Group.
In the afternoon attack 109 Squadron's primary and reserve Mosquitoes in one formation collided, killing S/L GM Smith and F/L WA Jones DFC in MM193.
Regards
Dave Wallace

[tcolvin]

The Russians claimed that the IL-2 could destroy bridges. Oleg Rastrenin's book, 'IL-2 Shturmovik Guards Units of WW2" mentions the destruction by IL-2s of;
- all of the bridges on the Belynichi-Berezina road on June 29/30, 1944, including a concrete road bridge over the Berezina which is pictured
- the wooden bridge over the River Prut, also pictured.
Rastrenin, however, also states that in 1942 the GAF and Flak successfully defended German bridges over the Severiskiy Donets, Tavolzhanka and Staritsa. This failure was the subject of a report by Gen Falaleev, GOC South-western Front aviation, that criticised the tactics employed.
The impression given is that the use of ground attack for bridge destruction worked for the Red Air Force in the latter part of the war when they could reliably achieve local air superiority.
AFAIK, 2TAF, even with air superiority, did not use ground attack aircraft for bridge destruction after the Fairey Battle fiasco, which points up the difference in equipment choice between armoured and unarmoured aircraft, also engraved on the RAF's tombstone.

It could be interesting to analyse how the GAF went about destroying their three bugbears; the Nijmegen road and rail bridges, and the Remagen rail bridge. I shall raise that matter in the GAF section.

Tony

[tcolvin]

"Operational Research Section Report Number 28, The Use of Mobile Control Posts for Air Support of the Army" included a Part II that was issued also as a Joint Report by ORS 21 Army Group and ORS 2nd TAF entitled "Note on the Accuracy of the MRCP".

Background; From Feb 8 to March 5, No 1 MRCP controlled 409 planes, medium and fighter bombers, in 9 raids which dropped 1,478 bombs (348 tons) on targets requested by the army. In the latter part of the period, the MRCP was at Materborn near Main HQ 2 Canadian Corps, close to Kleve and 37kms from the Wesel bridges. (By the way, Churchill, Brooke and Montgomery visited this HQ on the morning of March 4. Churchill was provided whisky in a tin mug of 'tea' by order of Simonds who got him volubly merry. Montgomery fumed).
All missions were flown in conditions when without radar they would have not been attempted.
Aircraft flew at 10,000 ft above light Flak, usually in 10/10th cloud.
On March 5;
a) 42 Mitchells loaded with 500 lb MC bombs (Medium Capacity, streamlined bombs with a charge to weight ratio of 40-50%) were targeted at the Wesel rail bridge and achieved a displacement of Mean Point of Impact (MPI) of 460 yards and 480 yards, checked from photographs and not ground checked.
b) 36 Mitchells with same bombs as above targeted the Wesel road bridge with a displacement MPI of 400 yards and 480 yards, also calculated from photographs.
Report conclusions;
- average MPI displacement of all nine raids was 300 yards
- this accuracy is comparable with those achieved by visual methods in level bombing
- this accuracy means that such targets can safely be engaged closer to our own troops than by any other existing radar means.
Source: 'Montgomery's Scientists', edited by Terry Copp

Tony

[Bill Walker]

The conclusions drawn are accurate enough, but what is really interesting is what is not said:

500 lb bombs, with low percentage charge and no special penetrating characteristics, will require large numbers of direct hits to damage a concrete or steel bridge.

With a 300 yard MPI, the percentage of direct hits is very low.

The end result is that the best technology available to the Allies at the time was very ineffective in destroying bridges. However, scattering bombs like this for a few hundred yards around a heavily used bridge would certainly disrupt the German supply efforts, at least temporarily. I suspect that when they say "such targets" they are referring to more than just the bridge itself.

[tcolvin]

This will illustrate what MRCP achieved, and is taken from ORS Report No. 28 in Montgomery's Scientists, edited by Terry Copp.
The target is Till, 2.5kms NE of Moyland, and 5kms from the Rhine's normal bed, which had overflowed up to the dike in the south-east corner of the picture.
On February 9, 12 Spitfires of 84 Group 2TAF dropped 250 and 500lb bombs that landed at B with a displacement of MPI of 486 yards.
On February 11, 8 Bombphoons of 84 Group dropped 1,000lb and 500lb GP bombs at A with a displacement of MPI of 433 yards, and No. 17 cluster bombs around the cross roads, which was the aiming point, with a displacement of MPI of 100 yards.
The bomb craters at A are visible on Google Earth. The site of B is now part of the GolfPark am Schloss Moyland, of bloody infamy to 3 Canadian Infantry Division who captured it on February 21.
Tony

[flyingbomb]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

...The bomb craters at A are visible on Google Earth. The site of B is now part of the GolfPark am Schloss Moyland, of bloody infamy to 3 Canadian Infantry Division who captured it on February 21.
Tony

many thx for pic, sometimes I will go there and watch the ground around Till