Vengeance vs Typhoon, and associated matters

[Graham Boak]

John's decision to close the 262 Jabo thread (which I approve of) left me with unvoiced comments, after yet a third posting had disappeared due to being expelled from the site whilst typing. So I have opened this separate thread, repeating TColvin's last mailing to set the scene a little. Partly because there does seem to be a significant number of interesting points being discussed, but mainly just to get stuff of my chest, ok?

TColvin, mainly to me:

Your jaundiced view of the Vultee Vengeance would not survive a reading of Peter C Smith's book, would it? He persuaded me.
2. The fact is that the RAF was completely prejudiced against all dive bombers for a simple reason. They were specically designed for army support, and no self-respecting airman would accept that as part of his job description, which was to bomb German civilians until morale cracked. The army could then be despatched in soft-skin vehicles to occupy Germany. Anyone who talked to the Army about their needs was a traitor. Beaverbrook oredered the Vengeances, and the RAF ensured they were never used - except in the East where they became a raging success such that the RAF had to suppress the information and quickly scrap them before their embarrassment became public. That was the background to making the Vengeance tow targets.
3. And your statement that there was never any serious argument about the superiority of guns sounds to me like re-writing history. Apart from all the other evidence available that the RAF wanted RPs to succeed because they could strap them cheaply under Typhoons in the belief that speed rather than armour provided security over the battlefield, why would the Typhoon pilots have tried to sell Rudel on the benefits of RP, I wonder?

It may surprise you, but I have been reading and appreciating Peter Smith’s books since Destroyer Leader, many years ago. I would even recommend his book on the Vengeance as the best work on the aircraft (but note qualification). However, it did not convince me. Peter Smith never yet met a dive-bomber he didn’t like, and this bias has long influenced his judgement. It doesn’t take a lot of reading elsewhere to see what Smith fails to give due credit to, or even fails to mention at all.

There were a great many airmen who had other ideas about their job description: I could mention the Flying Boat Union, or the whole of Fighter Command. It is true that Army Co-operation (as it was called) was fairly low down the pecking order, but it was not ignored. The five years before the start of WW2 saw the Audax, the Hardy, the Hector and the Lysander enter service. Not perhaps the most inspiring collection but signs that someone somewhere was considering the matter, and funding was being made available. As for interest in dive-bombers in particular, the Skua was built when the RAF ran the Fleet Air Arm, and the Henley was on its way when WW2 appeared. It was the necessary concentration on fighter production, and Beaverbrook’s 1940 restriction of production to types already in service, that killed the Henley, and with it any prospect of a British dive bomber.

However, where Peter Smith sees the success of the Stuka, the RAF saw its vulnerability to flak and fighters demonstrated in the Battle of Britain. A dive-bomber is necessarily a single role machine, with a high call on training and resources. Without air superiority, it was heavily dependent upon fighter cover. The lessons of the war in the Middle East, where relations between the RAF and the Army were very different to your vituperative caricature, confirmed and hardened this opinion. The best solution available for air support of ground troops was a mix of medium bombers and fighter-bombers. Not necessarily ideal in all conditions, but flexible and good enough. This is the background to the rise of the fighter-bomber in allied operational planning.

You seem to be confusing an arguable case against the fighter-bomber with the Typhoon itself. (You also seem to be confusing the advantages of the dive-bomber and the armoured attack aircraft - not the same thing at all.) The Typhoon may not have been the finest interceptor, but it was rugged, a good load carrier, had excellent firepower and was arguably the finest performer at lower altitudes in the world. That seems like a pretty good set of requirements for a fighter-bomber to me. Yes the engine was temperamental and required excessive maintenance: it also provided more power than anything else in the inventory of any nation. Oh, and it was perfectly capable of operating away from hard airfields, as many photos of the Normandy and subsequent operations show.

It is hardly surprising that a front-line officer fresh from victory would believe that his piece of kit was better than the opponents: Rudel’s position is scarcely different. "This worked for me…. " Nonetheless, he carried out most of his final missions in an Fw 190. The Luftwaffe were not stupid enough to risk the Stuka over Western Europe in 1944. Either way, the opinions of a junior officer in the front line was not the deciding factor. The accuracy of the gun was well known to the designers and engineers in the industry, with the experienced pilots and fellow engineers in the test establishments, the "movers and shakers" whose analysis of the alternatives in trials would influence the decision makers in the Ministries. The rp was adopted because it was cheap, it required minimum training and could be carried with minimum effect on the performance of the platform. It was less accurate than a well placed bomb - which does not actually demand vertical delivery - and much less accurate than a gun, but it also kept the firing aircraft away from the "Landser with an MG42" and could be made available in huge numbers. It would also penetrate whatever thickness of armour it was presented with - unlike the only available gun.

The gun is more accurate than the bomb which is in turn more accurate than the unguided rocket. Not re-writing history, but a simple statement of physical principles. But accuracy is not the only requirement in war. The much-abused leaders had to consider Flexibility, Survivability, Purchase Cost, Availability, Serviceability, Operating Cost, Training need, Manpower drain, amongst many others.

I’m not sure what would be the criteria for a "raging" success, but it hardly describes the Vengeance’s single tours of duty in either India/Burma or New Guinea. Meritorious enough, yes, but not worth of repetition. That speaks for itself. Whatever, these operations were some years after the decisions that needed to be made for the Normandy landings. The dive bomber was vulnerable, expensive to build, operate and support, inflexible and soaked up fighter support required elsewhere. Had an aircraft of the quality of the Skyraider been available…but that was even more years away, and not even a gleam in its designer’s eye.

Speed superior to armour over the battlefield - oh yes indeed, as demonstrated ever since. The slow armoured attack aircraft can only survive given air superiority if not supremacy - as well illustrated by the massive losses suffered by the Il 2 on the Eastern front.

[Jukka Juutinen]

Very much disagree. And since when did the "ultimate weapon", according to zillions of Aeroplane Monthly articles, 60 lb rocket, become capable "penetrating whatever thickness of armour it was presented with"? Are you seriously claiming that it could e.g. penetrate 100 mm of armour?

[CJE]

The French received in North Africa a certain quantity of Vengeances that were quickly relegated to training and target-towing, as they were judged unsuitable for front line operations.

[Jim Oxley]

The Air Ministry and the RAF are on public record as being determinedly opposed to the concept of the dive bomber. They constantly belittled the effectiveness of the Ju87 on both land and sea. Even belittled the effectiveness of both the IJN and USN dive bombers. The Air Marshal's and the Ministry wanted big strategic bomber fleets, not to be tied down to Army co-operation.

A classic example fo this view is contained in a letter from Margesson (War Office) to Beaverbrook (MAP) on 11 March, 1941.

" We have agreed with the Air Ministry that it is, at present, most undesirable to order bomber types which are suitable for one purpose only, and which cannot be used for general operations. Dive bombers would not be suitable for any operations except those closelt connected with the Army; and until that demand arises they would lock up valuable men and maintenance effort without any useful operational results. Moreover they would not contribute to the general RAF effort. It is for this reason that we have set our faces against any insistence on a dive bomber type."

A classicly disingenuous statement, one that had been pushed by the Air Marshal's since the early '30's. After all, all aircraft are built with a main purpose/role in mind. That professed view also flies in the face of the proven success of the Ju87 in leading the Germans success across France and the Low Countries, in Norway, against the RN in the Mediterranean and spearheading Rommel's drive in the Desert. As it would again in the Wehrmacht's drive into Russia, aginst the Malta convoy's, in Greece, Yugoslavia, Crete and throughout the Desert campaign.

And that viewpoint goes against the British Army's continual cry for an effective dive bomber to support their efforts; arising first in France, Greece, Crete and in the Desert.

[BillG+4]

"......The proven success of the Ju87......" was only gained in areas where fighter opposition was either non-existent or was thin. The fate of the Stuka in the Battle of Britain is an illustration of that. Whilst the dive-bomber may well have been successful in close support of ground forces, it was vulnerable at the bottom of its dive and where there was strong fighter opposition this fact was quickly ceased upon. The Luftwaffe were not slow to realise the limitations of the Stuka over England and withdrew it quite early on in the battle. They appreciated the fact that whilst the Stuka could hit targets with a degree of accuracy, it would be beneficial if the aircraft could also return to base to be used again.

[Graham Boak]

The Army did not need a dive bomber, they needed close air support. The dive bomber was seen as an intrinsic part of the successful German CAS, which indeed it was, the RAF were not at the time providing adequate CAS, and the divebomber was a gap in the RAF inventory. QED? Not really. The dive bomber was only one solution to the problem, and its drawbacks have been discussed above (and in the previous thread). The RAF developed its own highly successful methods of CAS, resulting in the Army being unable (or at least unwilling) to advance in its absence.

[RodM]

Hi,

a very emotive issue....

With these rather bold and defamatory statements:

...and no self-respecting airman would accept that as part of his job description, which was to bomb German civilians until morale cracked.

Anyone who talked to the Army about their needs was a traitor. Beaverbrook oredered the Vengeances, and the RAF ensured they were never used - except in the East where they became a raging success such that the RAF had to suppress the information and quickly scrap them before their embarrassment became public.

...prove it!

I am sure that the Fairy Battle may also have proved to be a 'raging success' in the Far East, away from enemy fighters and really strong ground defences, but everyone knows what happened to these aircraft over the European battlefield...and I would expect that this, along with the fate of the Stuka over England, had a profound effect upon the RAF's way of thinking about the survivability rates of any form of close support aircraft.

And that viewpoint goes against the British Army's continual cry for an effective dive bomber to support their efforts; arising first in France, Greece, Crete and in the Desert.

Wanting is one thing, but winning the air superiority (and the resources that this entails) for such aircraft to survive in France, Greece, Crete et al in 1940/41 is another matter...


Rod

[Jukka Juutinen]

Originally Posted by Graham Boak

...CAS, resulting in the Army being unable (or at least unwilling) to advance in its absence.

Just a statement that would fit Aeroplany Monthly. Are you seriously suggesting that had all aircraft in the world mysteriously been rendered inoperative in June 1944 no British Army operation would have been succesful?

[Graham Boak]

No, but if you read the campaign histories you will find that the advance was slower than expected (and planned) because of the tendency of the leading units to stop upon reaching opposition and call up the fighter-bombers. Generals require a certain amount of "press-on-itis" from their troops and some of the more veteran British units were thought lacking. Which is one way to become a veteran rather than a casualty, of course, but can tend to extend the war.

[Jim Oxley]

Originally Posted by RodM

Hi,
Anyone who talked to the Army about their needs was a traitor. Beaverbrook oredered the Vengeances, and the RAF ensured they were never used - except in the East where they became a raging success such that the RAF had to suppress the information and quickly scrap them before their embarrassment became public.

...prove it!
Rod

Oh dear Rod, that's very easy as it's all on public record!

With the operational use of Vengeances in Burma AHQ India sent in several glowing reports to London of it's success compared to both fighter-bombers and medium bombers. The Air Ministry's response??
Here's one - AIR 20/4249 dated 8 April 1943:

"You will of course appreciate that we are employing the Vengeance dive-bomber in India with no little success and we shall therefore have to be careful in our references to it not to amplify it's success given our view of the ineffectiveness of the dive bomber and it's alleged obsolence."

Another response by the Air Ministry to AHQ India (Sec.X.49 dated 15 June 1943) stated:

"Regarding public policy aspect you will remember dive-bombing has been teh cause of acute and misguided controversy here and when release is first made it will be most important to frame publicity so as not to cause renewal of misapprehensions and controvsery here.

We therefore think that the best line to this end is to point out the flexibility of the Vengeance as a light bomber capable of the different methods of attack and concentrate on the successful achievements of the Vengeance rather than on the success of the dive bomber technique as contrasted with other methods."

Not surprisingly AHQ India was not happy with this 'suggestion', and replied on 30 June (AOC 561):

"Existing Vengeance as dive bomber widely known here and use. Suspicion can do more harm than good if our release of information pretended that it was anything else. Moreover after months of hard work maintenance and aircrews have overcome several technical difficulties and perfected Tactical technique. They would be quite unable to understand any belittling results of their efforts."

The Air Ministry remained unmoved and in the secret memo 'Note on Tactical Qualities Of The Dive Bomber', dated 9 September 1943 stated:

"It is considered that the employment of the dive bomber of the Vengeance type would be most uneconomical if used against targets in Europe. The conversion of existing units to the specialised dive bomber of the Vengeance variety against targets such as enemy transport or troop concentrations is not justified given the time and effort recently placed in the development of the fighter bomber. Especially so given that the fighter is more easily converted into a fighter bomber with only little training required of pilots, and that fighters are in infinitely more plentiful supply. The dive bomber qualities of greater accuracy and range are of lesser account than the readily available numbers of fighters and fighter bombers in current operational squadrons."