Japanese Effectiveness Against B-29 Raids

[Jim Oxley]

Have just finished reading two fascinating books on the B-29 raids over Japan - Birds From Hell by Wilbur Morrison and the excellent Blankets Of Fire by Kenneth Werrell.

Twenty Air Force lost a total of 414 B-29's in combat: 148 to enemy action, 151 to operational causes and 115 to causes unknown. The actual loss rate was a low 2.78% overall, much lower than that suffered by the 8th AF or 15th AF in Europe.

What struck me throughout both books were the very poor results obtained by both the IJAAF and the IJNAF. Of the two the IJAAF was the more effective but even so, the great majority of B-29's lost to Japanese aircraft action were a result of ramming (111 known ramming attacks) rather than shoot down's. By far the greatest danger seemed to be flying the massively overloaded B-29 itself.

Granted daylight operations/intercepts took place high in the jetstream at around 9000m to 10,000m. And that the Japanese fighters were not well suited to high altitude fighting. Also the B-29 was a technical marvel, very fast, armoured and well protected by defensive fire. And was escorted by P-47N and P-51D's from April onwards. Nevertheless one can't help comparing unfavourably the Japanese efforts against the 20th AF to the Luftwaffe's efforts against the 8th and 15th AF.
Nor wondering if the Luftwaffe would have done any better against the B-29.

[Nick Beale]

Just a thought... given that the Japanese Home Islands are long and narrow, how long on average would a B-29 raiding force spend over enemy territory?

The 8th AF could be over German-occupied Europe for several hours per raid, perhaps giving the defenders more opportunities to inflict losses on them than the Japanese had.

[Jim Oxley]

Good point Nick. A trip to Tokyo took roughly 13 to 14 hours there and back, just under a 3,600 mile round trip. Which was pretty much the limit for the B-29. Actual time over the defended territory was approximately 2 to 3 hours, dependant on the strength of the jet stream. Targets lower down on the island of Honshu, or Kyusho, meant longer time over enemy territory

The Japanese usually had adequate warning, as they had radar sites all along the coast, and out to sea on small islands Hachijo-Jima. This site allowed a three hour warning to fighter defense units, giving ample time for fighters to scramble and gain maximum altltude

[Laurent Rizzotti]

I think that Japanese fighters defences were rather inefficient around 30000 feet, where the B-29s flew. But B-29s were also rather inefficient until they switched to night low alt incendiary bombing in March 1945.

So if the presence of Japanese fighters was the reason the B-29 flew at high alt, such increasing jetstream effect and ops losses and reducing the precision of the attack, at least these fighters had a greater influence that their A2A kills will show.

[ArtieBob]

Rather than wander through speculation, try locating the Japanese section of the USSBS (United States Strategic Bombing Survey). There are some well documented analysis of most of the questions one might pose on the bombing campaign against the Japanese homeland.


Best regards

Artie Bob

[Volari]

Credit the B-29s and their escorts for the lop-sidedness. Against unescorted B-24s and B-17s the Japanese would have done better, though not quite as good as the Luftwaffe.

[drgondog]

A couple of factors were different.
First the Japanese really didn't have fighters fast enough or high altitude capability to really threaten the B-29 daylight ops until the Shiden and Raiden fighters came into production.

When the B-29's went low as Curtis LeMay decided to do in March 1945, he did so for five reasons:
1. The Japanese had neither night fighters nor adequate radar directed anti-aircraft
2. Much of Japanese industry was scattered/distributed within the cities and surrounded by wood dwellings and very susceptible to fire
3. The B-29's could take bigger loads when they weren't required to climb to 25-30,000 feet.
4. LeMay did not believe that the Fire defense capabilities were adequate to control fire raids.
5. Until the Battle of Iwo Jima was over (March 26,1945), the USAAF did not have an adequate capability to support P-51/P-47 escorts over Japan in daylight.

The truly amazing aspect of B-29 operations were:
1. They were relatively ineffective at high altitude in context of precision attacks despite being the most advanced bomber in the world
2. The guy that decided to 'go low' was the very same guy who was the key leader in the development of 8th AF combat formation structure, lead crew doctrine to improve day to day performance, and the mandate to let the lead crews take control during the bomb run(i.e not take evasive action to improve Norden performance).. in a very different 'hostile' environment defended by the Luftwaffe. LeMay truly 'thought out of the box'
3. The B-29's virtually wiped out Japanese industry doing low level attacks at night..
4. With the advent of fighter escort from Iwo, the B-29's during daylight ops dropped to 20-25K range and improved daylight results with HE, when HE was required.

Interesting how the Luftwaffe and JAF (Navy and Army) had serious blind spots that cost them dearly. The GAF didn't believe and never reall developed Heavy Bombers. The JAF didn't focus on high altitude performance and stuck with the Zero too long.

The USAAF wasn't well prepared either and didn't develop a long range escort by design until reality over Europe reared its ugly head (the P-38 was originally designed as an Interceptor, and really wasn't effective as an escort until dive brakes were factory installed on the P-38J)

[Artist]

I am friends with a pilot who flew over fifty B29 missions over Japan.( Has a list of missions flown, and an unbelievable private photo album of his unit on Guam.) He says they realy never worried about Japanese fighters, but about the reliability of the B29 engines. Had to plant it in the Ocean off the coast of Japan once because of engine trouble. Bob

[Pathfinder]

Fascinating thread, if I may say so. I have more of a knowledge with regards to the ETO and MTO, and most of my paintings are depicting aircraft and scenes from this theatre of operations.

However, I am most interested to learn more about the B-29 and how she performed over Japan and the islands, and about the Japanese fighters that enagaged them.

Can anyone recommend any memoirs about this topic?

Also, have any of you read ''Fire, Fear and Guts: The B-29 and Her Gallant Crewmen'' ? If so, would you recommend it?

Regards
Pathfinder

[Jim Oxley]

The only two books on the B-29 campaign that I was aware of Pathfinder are those mentioned in the first post. there are a lot of pictorial books around, but very few on the campaign itself.Which when you consider that the 20th Air Force at the end of WWII was almost as large as the 8th is quite surprisingI hadn't heard of the one you mentioned. I'll have to see if I can get my hands on a copy.