Me-410 vs Mosquito combat

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Juha

Of course much depends how one define effective but IIRC Do 217s of KG 2 shot down or crippled several night fighters.

Hello Juha,

Thank you for mentioning a case of which I was not aware. Do you know of any good sources which describe KG 2's encounters with night fighters? This is not something I have read about in detail before, so any hints would be helpful.

Originally Posted by John Beaman

Positive propaganda and illusions of success are more important in wartime than the truth.

Hello John,

You are right to an extent, but it can be safely said that it is not possible to win a war with "illusions of success" . The fact that the 8th and 15th Air Force bombers could inflict constant, if relatively minor, losses on German fighters is in fact a demonstration of the enormous degree of US technical superiority during the war. No other combatant could hope to achieve anything similar, the Augsburg raid by Lancasters in 1942 being just one illustration of the very heavy losses experienced on daylight raids. To put it explicitly, the USAAF had the equipment to do almost anything it wished, even in 1942. It was only when the 8th set itself extraordinary objectives, like bombing Schweinfurt, that it suffered unbearable losses. The RAF and especially the Luftwaffe would never have been in that position in the first place, since they did not posess the numbers of high-quality aircraft that US industry could produce.

Regards,

Paul

[Juha]

Originally Posted by Paul Thompson

Hello Juha,

Thank you for mentioning a case of which I was not aware. Do you know of any good sources which describe KG 2's encounters with night fighters? This is not something I have read about in detail before, so any hints would be helpful...

Hello Paul
Ulf Balke: Der Luftkrieg in Europa Teil 2 (1990). It is the second part of the Balke's excellent history of the KG 2.

HTH
Juha

[Richard Aigner]

Rawnsley was John "Cat Eyes" Cunningham's radar operator.
HTH, Richard

[Chris Goss]

Richard: You had me confused until I noticed you had changed the title-perhaps you should have said that in the text?

Paul: When you talk about KG 2, are you must talking V/KG 2? A good book is Simon Parry's Intruders over Britain-a latter chapter covers the missions. I have listings of all losses and kills plus combat reports. Trouble is there were very few German survivors

[MW Giles]

Have to take issue with:

To put it explicitly, the USAAF had the equipment to do almost anything it wished, even in 1942. It was only when the 8th set itself extraordinary objectives, like bombing Schweinfurt, that it suffered unbearable losses.

In 1942 it could do "anything it wished" - except bomb Germany
In 1943 it could do "anything it wished" - except when it bit off more than it could chew - Schweinfurt etc
In the second half of 1944 it really could do anything it wished. The achievement was great but not as straightforward or predestined as you think

Regards

Martin

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Juha

Hello Paul
Ulf Balke: Der Luftkrieg in Europa Teil 2 (1990). It is the second part of the Balke's excellent history of the KG 2.

HTH
Juha

Hello Juha,

Thank you, I will look up Balke in the next couple of months.

Originally Posted by Richard Aigner

Rawnsley was John "Cat Eyes" Cunningham's radar operator.
HTH, Richard

Hello Richard,

Thank you for the tip!

Regards,

Paul

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Chris Goss

Paul: When you talk about KG 2, are you must talking V/KG 2? A good book is Simon Parry's Intruders over Britain-a latter chapter covers the missions. I have listings of all losses and kills plus combat reports. Trouble is there were very few German survivors

Hello Chris,

I started off talking about V/KG 2, but I am wondering about all of KG 2 now, on the specific subject of their succeses against night fighters. That book looks like it will be very useful, thank you. It is great that this part of the air war has been thoroughly researched! As in the case of the bombing campaign, I wonder what the Germans were trying to achieve with these small-scale intruder operations. They might have been quite useful on the Eastern front, against the technologically inferior Soviet air force, but in the West these missions were almost suicidal, as you noted.


I have sent you a PM.

Regards,

Paul

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by MW Giles

In 1942 it could do "anything it wished" - except bomb Germany
In 1943 it could do "anything it wished" - except when it bit off more than it could chew - Schweinfurt etc
In the second half of 1944 it really could do anything it wished. The achievement was great but not as straightforward or predestined as you think

Regards

Martin

Hello Martin,

Thank you for your thoughts, glad to get more members interested! You are correct to point out that the operational limitations on the Eighth disappeared only gradually, as it increased in strength and received escort fighters. However, my point stands in the sense that even in 1942, the Eighth had technical capabilities which no other belligerent would fully match until the end of the war, especially the P-38F and B-17F.

I suggest that the phrase "bit off more than it could chew" is a succinct explanation of the main problem the USAAF experienced, which was over-optimistic and insufficiently detailed planning. They could have inflicted great damage on the German war effort as early as autumn 1942, but they used their forces ineffectively.

I would argue that USAAF effectiveness was significantly over-determined, since the USA was the world's dominant industrial power during the war. Measured by airframe weight or total horsepower, US aircraft production far exceeded that of any other power, so it is difficult to argue that the Axis could have resisted this force succesfully, once it was correctly deployed.

Regards,

Paul

[Nick Beale]

"the Eighth had technical capabilities which no other belligerent would fully match until the end of the war, especially the P-38F and B-17F."

Depends on which capabilities you mean, really. The P-38 exchanged some of the agility of a single-engined fighter for greater range, the B-17 was much better armed for defence than a Lancaster but at the expense of bomb load. The USAAF in Europe did become very well equipped for its chosen method, daylight attack, just as the RAF finally acquired an unmatched capability for night bombing.

[Paul Thompson]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

The P-38 exchanged some of the agility of a single-engined fighter for greater range, the B-17 was much better armed for defence than a Lancaster but at the expense of bomb load. The USAAF in Europe did become very well equipped for its chosen method, daylight attack, just as the RAF finally acquired an unmatched capability for night bombing.

You are right that these aircraft were technical compromises, Nick. What made them exceptional is that they had turbosuperchargers for their engines, the B-2 model on the B-17F and the B-13 on the P-38F, as far as I remember. The two-stage supercharger on the Lancaster's Merlin 22 was essentially a generation behind this technology. Partly as a result of this, the USAAF could routinely operate at high altitudes, which the bombers of other air forces could not do.

This doesn't mean that the American aircraft were perfect, far from it. Bomber Command aircraft had a variety of modern electronic equipment towards the end of the war, including H2S and Monica. The problem is that this superiority in radar and associated technology could not compensate for the absence of a performance margin, as became clear when the Germans began to home on RAF electronic signals.

Regards,

Paul