Werner Baumbach ship destroyer

[knusel]

Good evening,

the other day I read that Werner Baumbach sank at least 300.000 tons of shipping. Is it known how many ships he has sunk ?

Michael

[Broncazonk]

I own a copy of his book, "Broken Swastika." I just thumbed through it to see if he mentions his combat record and he does not.

Here are his victory markings, (date unknown) which will get you started.

Bronc

[Simon Schatz]

Michael and Bronc,
The photographs show the plane flown by Hptm Helmuth Orlowski.
See here: http://forum.12oclockhigh.net/showthread.php?t=44084
Cheers, Simon

[Broncazonk]

Well, laugh out loud...

Thank you, Simon.

All of the attached images, including the model box art says this aircraft was flown by Werner Baumbach, I/Kampfgeschwader 30 'Alder Geschwader'!!!

So where are the photos of Baumbach's aircraft?? (Something is amiss.)

Bronc

[Stig Jarlevik]

Somewhere I agree with Bronc

This is said with my pants a bit around my knees...
I know frightfully little about the Lw recce units!

If Helmuth Orlowski was such a good 'vessel destroyer' why was he not transferred to a bomber unit? I cannot find him listed as a KG pilot receiving the RK. I suppose in Luftwaffe anything was possible, but were there anyone else in the Aufkl units who laid claim to some 15 vessels?

According to Ed this is a mod Ju 88 A to D. Did the Aufkl units seek out surface vessels in their D-models loaded with bombs and actively tried to sink these vessels? Maybe they did, but then I have missed something and (as a second thought) why should that have been their primary job? Somehow I cannot visualise a recce pilot overstep his 'job' boundary over and over again to claim 15 vessels and get away with it.

I have no idea what it took to rebuild an A model to a D and the detailed circumstances, but is it possible the paintings on the tail is a remnant from a previous life and in fact has nothing to do with Orlowski?

Am I and Bronc the only ones who feel a bit uncomfortable with this situation?

Those who know more, could they use small calibre flak please and not 88 mm...

Cheers
Stig

[Andrew Arthy]

Hi Stig,

Luftwaffe reconnaissance pilots regularly carried out anti-shipping attacks, at least in the early war period, so it was not overstepping any boundaries to do so. A few examples from February 1941:

07.02.41: A.Gr. 22 attacked a Handelsschiff with two SC 250 bombs.
11.02.41: 1.(F)/121 attacked two vessels in the Mediterranean
13.02.41: 3.(F)/22 attacked an English submarine
14.02.41: 1.(F)/120 attacked a 600 ton vessel
26.02.41: 3.(F)/22 attacked a 3,000 ton vessel in Moray Firth
27.02.41: 1.(F)/120 attacked a 4,000 ton vessel north of Aberdeen
etc. etc.

Cheers,
Andrew A.
Air War Publications - www.airwarpublications.com/earticles

[Stig Jarlevik]

Thanks Andrew

I didn't know that. After all it must have interfered with their main job and in my view also compromised it. Presumably these attacks were a kind of
'opportunity knocks' moments, or was there possibly a pattern?

When you say regularly should that be interpreted as if these units in fact had a dual mission role from the outset? In my mind that would make their missions very complex and not very useful. To me, basically what you are saying is that Luftwaffe then considered their anti-shipping units to be inadequate and they had to ask recce units to step in and help out.

Sorry if I am straying from the main topic here but if these vessel victories were by an individual who obviously stayed within the reconnaissance field during his career we then seems to have that same man outshining his colleagues dedicated to the anti-shipping role.

Are more recce pilots known to have scored in such missions or was Orlowski a 'one man wonder'?

Cheers
Stig

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Andrew Arthy

Hi Stig,

07.02.41: A.Gr. 22 attacked a Handelsschiff with two SC 250 bombs.

Cheers,
Andrew A.
Air War Publications - www.airwarpublications.com/earticles

Handelsschiff = merchant ship, if anyone was wondering.

it must have interfered with their main job and in my view also compromised it. Presumably these attacks were a kind of
'opportunity knocks' moments, or was there possibly a pattern?

When you say regularly should that be interpreted as if these units in fact had a dual mission role from the outset? In my mind that would make their missions very complex and not very useful. To me, basically what you are saying is that Luftwaffe then considered their anti-shipping units to be inadequate and they had to ask recce units to step in and help out.

Stig: Just a matter of making the most of available assets, I would think. Someone had to decide to send the aircraft out with bombs on board, so such armed reconnaissances must have been planned.

In the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre report "The History of FAG 122 in the Mediterranean" there is reference to Ju 88s of the unit escorting convoys with 2 x 250 kg bombs for use against submarines wit one confrmed sinking on 30 March 1943 and another (unconfirmed) on 29 April. I can't find a British submarine loss on either date, nor any for March/april 1943 in the Med attributed to air attack.

[Graham Boak]

We know that the Germans did not have "adequate" anti-shipping forces from the start of the war, and never did. Those they did form during the war seem (open to correction) to have been mainly dedicated shipping strike units. I wonder if we are just seeing a difference in emphasis here: that Germans always considered maritime reconnaissance just as part of the job of a reconnaissance unit. On the other side, the RAF did not have dedicated maritime recce-only units either. Such units as they did have went out with bombs to attack targets of opportunity, and this is just what we see happening here.

[Broncazonk]

Soooo...where are the photos of Werner Baumbach's aircraft??