Which Units clashed with US. 4th FG in April 8. 1944?

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by Oberst

Why is when it comes to Luftwaffe, everybody wants proof, whereas when it comes to P-51 & USAAF, no proof required. It boggles my mind.

Anyways, read 'JG 11' by Marek J. Murawski, lots of answers in their. Lots of other books on this subject too.

Personally, I want proof (especially in the form of contemporary documentation) whichever airforce is involved. Are you able to say how much original research Mr Murawski did for this book, and which sources he used?

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Oberst

Bill aka drgongog always say how usaaf were always out numbered by the luftwaffe fighters, simply not so. even is the winter/spring of 1944. Just reading JG 11 diary tells me LW always behind the 8 ball vs usaaf heavies & escorts. Other West front JG units same deal.

Kind regards.

I say it and I back it up. If you will personally start getiing and reading 8th AF Mission Summaries, spend the time looking at any FG Mission Board for those missions, note the P-47 Group limitations to go to Dummer Lake and return - or pick up returning bombers at Dummer Lake to Meppen - you will note how each long range escort fighter group is spread out to allocate group level resources along individual bomg divisions - each splitting up to branch to each separate target.

Failing to perform the diligence use logic and recall the mix of fighters available to the US 8th AF and further recall range limitations. Once you have grasped the fact that the P-47D short of the -25 (june 1944) was strictly limited to Meppen/Dummer Lake while flying escort, and Brunswick when untehered and flying a sweep. The reflect that even the P-38 could only get to Berlin while flying directly there with no weaving in close escort. Then reflect that only the Mustang could escort over Berlin, Posna, Brux, Schweinfurt and note the ORB for Mustang units in December, 1943 through May 1944

Next step, calculate the spread of Mustangs in coverage along a 100 mile stream inbound, along different target branches which spread the coverage out to one to two long range fighter groups per Division (250-400 bombers in a 30-40 mile trail - and figure out what the coverage/odds were when the controller put 200-250 fighters in a 5 cubic mile volume along the 40 mile trail.

The Luftwaffe controllers massed different Gruppes to attack points lightly defended, and did so successfully.

I don't have any images on photobucket so I can't show you what I mean.

I can upload on aircraft of WWII or armyairforces.com.

[Juha]

I haven't see Murawski's JG 11 book, but I own copies of his JG 1, JG 27 Vol IV and JG 301 books, in fact booklets and those are based on rather limited number of second hand sources, there are 7 books in the bibliographia of JG 1 booklet, 9 books in the bibliographia of the JG 301 booklet and there is no bibliographia in JG 27 Vol IV but 34 endnotes at the end. Murawski seems to be very productive writer. At least his booklets are cheap and in the JG 27 booklet had mostly relied on Prien et al books on JG 27

Juha

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Oberst

Bill aka drgongog always say how usaaf were always out numbered by the luftwaffe fighters, simply not so. even is the winter/spring of 1944. Just reading JG 11 diary tells me LW always behind the 8 ball vs usaaf heavies & escorts. Other West front JG units same deal.

Kind regards.

Why do Luftwaffe apologists always believe they were badly outnumbered by USAAF escorts? Is that the only way to explain defeat? Is it possible that they were consistently outfought - fighter to fighter - from November 1943 forward?

[drgondog]

Nick - if you will PM your email I will send you examples of Mission Summary reports (although Tony Woods has April 8, 1944 on his website.) and individual Mission Board maps.
http://don-caldwell.we.bs/claims/tonywood.htm
http://www.box.com/shared/5bbh5gc971

Regards, Bill

[Oberst]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Why do Luftwaffe apologists always believe they were badly outnumbered by USAAF escorts? Is that the only way to explain defeat? Is it possible that they were consistently outfought - fighter to fighter - from November 1943 forward?

Explain their defeat? You don't know? They were hammered into submission by the USAAF, combined with idiotic decessions from Goring/Hitler. Simple I would think.

As far as documents.. well, I do not know where Mr. Murawski got the information for his books, other then First Hand accounts from Luftwaffe fighter pilots, Second hand accounts, Units diaries and so forth.

Recent coversation with a good friend of mine:

"So where are we? only talking about p-51? I don't think so, more then a P-51 threat in the skies of Germany. More then just Allied fighters. Its the whole. And pilots think.. what to do? Engage escorts, engage heavies? Sometime you make the decission, sometimes the USAAF makes the decission. Either way I thought, this might be my last day. Either way, you can't make the right decission. Either way you just fight to live."

He went on about 2:1, 5:1, 10:1 ( including bombers ). But I think I missed the point of numbers. I just remember the sacrifice. My mistake and appologies for bring it up, carry on.

[drgondog]

Originally Posted by Oberst

Explain their defeat? You don't know? They were hammered into submission by the USAAF, combined with idiotic decessions from Goring/Hitler. Simple I would think.

As far as documents.. well, I do not know where Mr. Murawski got the information for his books, other then First Hand accounts from Luftwaffe fighter pilots, Second hand accounts, Units diaries and so forth.

Recent coversation with a good friend of mine:

"So where are we? only talking about p-51? I don't think so, more then a P-51 threat in the skies of Germany. More then just Allied fighters. Its the whole. And pilots think.. what to do? Engage escorts, engage heavies? Sometime you make the decission, sometimes the USAAF makes the decission. Either way I thought, this might be my last day. Either way, you can't make the right decission. Either way you just fight to live."

He went on about 2:1, 5:1, 10:1 ( including bombers ). But I think I missed the point of numbers. I just remember the sacrifice. My mistake and appologies for bring it up, carry on.

Including bombers, the LW was outnumbered always by the 8th AF. The distinction is that the LW could engage or not - based on the conditions. When escort fighters entered the equation, the decisions much more complex - whether the numerical advantage was favorable or not.

One thing I will NEVER question is the courage or the skills of the German fighter pilot.

Having said that I see a lot of comments that denigrate the skill and courage of the US fighter pilot - particularly in the early days of long range escorts when they were not only fighting as 'underdogs' in context of numbers of fighters - but also flying 5 to 7 hour missions in lousy weather and tempermental airplanes - then dropping to the deck to attack heavily defended airfields.

The latter was twice as deadly to Mustangs as the 109/190 combined. Virtually 90% of the US Fighter Aces lost in combat were to German 20mm flak.

Very little credit is given concerning skill in taking off in low visibility, assembling in an organized way, achieving rendezvous, flying through bad weather and landing in bad weather and poor visibity - particularly when the training was largely in clear skies in the US.

As to achieving surprise or tactical advantage - only when sweeping ahead and catching LW assembling or taking off, or when landing - due to the extraordinary loiter time. Otherwise the LW controllers knew when the bombers were taking off, had a good feel for the fighters timetables and the fighters were always tethered to 0-5K altitude from the bombers and German fighters could normally assemble and climb an intercept course and time to be 2000-7000 feet above the American escorts and choose to fight - or not.

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by drgondog

Nick - if you will PM your email I will send you examples of Mission Summary reports and individual Mission Board maps.
Regards, Bill

Cheers Bill, but no need. I've looked at few (single figures!) 8th AF mission reports myself, in the UK National Archives. I entirely get the point you're making. Alfred Price published a very enlightening USAAF diagram of the distribution of escorts many years ago in "Battle Over The Reich" which put a whole different slant on commonplace statements in books like "X hundred bombers took part, escorted by Y hundred fighters."

I do not know where Mr. Murawski got the information for his books, other then First Hand accounts from Luftwaffe fighter pilots, Second hand accounts, Units diaries and so forth.
Oberst

That kind of makes my point for me: the more you know about an author's sources the better able you are to judge the points they make. I posted before about perceptions of numerical inferiority which frequently feature in participants' accounts. Those accounts tell you how people felt, they don't necessarily tell you how things were. That's why some researchers spend years digging through files.

Mr Murawski is a very prolific author which doesn't suggest that he would be able to spend a vast amount of time researching any given title. Now this may be unfair: he could have an unusually high capacity for such work; he could have a team researching for him; he may have spent many years accumulating research which is only now appearing in his books. Nevertheless, my experience and that of other researchers I know is that original research takes a very long time to do.

[Erick88]

Originally Posted by Oberst

Why is when it comes to Luftwaffe, everybody wants proof, whereas when it comes to P-51 & USAAF, no proof required. It boggles my mind.

Anyways, read 'JG 11' by Marek J. Murawski, lots of answers in their. Lots of other books on this subject too.

Being an amateur military aviation enthusiast, my prime object of being part of this forum and discussion is to learn and absorb knowledge in the most possible objective and unbiased way by individuals who have a vast amount of knowledge and have been studying and scrutinizing this extremely complex subject for a very long time, perhaps longer than I’ve been alive.
I would like to reiterate the last statement on my earlier post, the value of reliable documentation to show the complete picture of events.
I thank you for the source you have offered me and will definitely take it into account.

[Erick88]

Originally Posted by drgondog

That is a tricky question.

If the LW was tasked to intercept 8th AF over Lowlands and France - then the LuftFlotte 3 was inferior numerically in Sept/Oct 1943 as all of 8th FC was capable of going to German border. In October 1943 the 4th, 56th, 78th, 352nd and 355th were operational - all P-47C/D's.

If the LuftFlotte Reich was the primary axis of dayfighter strength over Germany - and they delayed engaging until the P-47s were turning back from Dummer Lake to Frankfurt, then 8th FC reached 10-11 Long Range escort operational Groups by Ovtober 1944 - enabling approximately 500-550 long range escorts to be dispatched to deep targets.

If the question is Local superiority in which the LW could concentrate 200-250 s/e fighters on one or two bomb wings (like November 26 - Misburg) then only 40-100 USAAF fighers would be in position to defend, then I would say December/January marked the end of consistent ability to achieve local superiority anywhere in Germany.

After Bodenplatte and approximately mid January, 1945 the LW moved many squadrons to a line from Steinhuder Lake to Schweinfurt/Lechfeld.
That would be the point in time when nearly every mission, with the help of target area recon by the three Scout forces enabled concentrations of 3 or more long range fighter groups to bear anywhere along the bomber stream quickly. It is in this timeframe that the LW lost even local superiority.

The dominant factor in the crucial losses to USAAF in December 1943 through May 1944 (IMO) was the stupid directive from Goering to Not fight the US Escorts - go strictly for the bombers. The US fighter pilot became very accustomed to being the Aggressor which encouraged even smal formations of US fighters to attack - no matter the odds. The very tough and talented LW was by and large emasculated by that directive... then as losses skyrocketed in January through May - the replacement training was inadequate and the LW could not convert many bomber pilots to fighters because of Hitler.

Game of attrition over by April/May, 1944.

Quite a load of information you have posted drgondog, perhaps much more complex for me to comprehend and analyze in a single read =)

To paraphrase and simplify things a little bit: number of bombers, escorts, their max operational range and distances were variables which dictated if LW fighters could achieve air superiority above specific points in the bomber streams or find themselves at a numerical disadvantage against US escorts given the statement that the combined bomber/escort armada always held a numerical superiority over the LW interceptor force.

When it comes down to the distance issue in raids deep into Nazi Germany, I can see how pivotal was the boost 8th FC received in terms of longer-range escort fighters than the early P-47 marks and their steady built-up in small numbers from early 1944 all the way to early 1945 when almost all FG had converted to P-51s, longer-range P-47s and P-38s.

I believe your last point about Hermann Goering and his ill-advised directive of not engaging escort fighters helped greatly in eroding the effort and effectiveness the LW could have achieved in this critical period of the air war over Germany when longer-range escorts were becoming available to 8th FC.

I would to thank you for taking your time in your reply and subsequently offer you my e-mail address in a PM in case you agree to send me the files you offered Nick.


Erick