Placing the Fairey Battle.

[RodM]

Originally Posted by tcolvin

The policy of 'Limited liability' meant that almost all the money went to the RAF throughout the 1930's rearmament. The RAF got what it wanted. That is the basis of the charge of incompetence. The RAF was not constrained. They wanted Fairey Battles and they got them; Blenheims, Hampdens, Wellingtons, Spitfires, Hurricanes - anything they wanted, and as many of them as they wanted.

The army got very little until the last moment. The RAF fought against all attempts by the army to get money, and they succeeded. The RAF claimed it could sink battleships, so the RN did not need money for new battleships. That was why Bismarck and Tirpitz were the largest battleships in the world when they were launched. Think of that. And how long did it take the RAF to sink the Tirpitz? You know the answer. Was it 5 years?

The RN was convicted of incompetence over the Channel Dash. But where were the bombers that the RAF promised could sink any battleship nearing Britain's shores? The money had been spent on bombers. Where were they?

The sinking of POW and Repulse was due to the weakness of the RAF in Malaysia. There were masses of RAF fighters whiling away the time on tarmac in Britain with nothing to do because their enemy was fighting the Russians. The RAF should have been in Malaya.

The RN lacked escorts in 1939-41 to sink U-boats. Churchill begged FDR for 50 rust bucket three-stackers from FDR. Why was the RN short of escorts? You guessed it. They had been denied the funds because the RAF had to have the money, and with it the RAF would destroy any threat up until the moment they were sked to deliver on their promises Then, oops, the excuses started, such as the excuse that the Fairey Battle was obsolescent.

As I have been saying all along; air was too important to be left to the RAF.

Hi Tony,

yes, yes, it is obvious where you think all ills with British arms lay, but no consideration as of the state of army/navy doctrines (strengths and weaknesses) and arms (strengths and weaknesses) at the start of the war has been presented to provide context.

The weakness with the Prince of Wales and Repulse did not lie with the RAF, but rather with inadequate anti-air capability within the RN, just as the same lack of capability was an early weakness of the army.

While the RAF wasn't successful during the Channel Dash, the RAF is not to blame for the lack of success of the navy.

Considering the increase in strength of the Luftwaffe in the late thirties, it is hardly surprising that an air arms race in terms of quality and quantity developed between Britain and Germany - yet you seem to be suggesting that Britain should have done nothing to counter the German air arm other than to concentrate on CAS aircraft. Thus, I don't believe some arguments have been presented in a full context.

If naval-history.net is to be believed, the British/Commonwealth had the largest navy in the world in September 1939; Britain did not have the largest air force. Again, what is the true context of the rapid increase in the RAF in the late thirites, and how well prepared was the 'largest navy in the world' to confront the operational requirements that it would be faced with?

"As I have been saying all along; air was too important to be left to the RAF"

While this is arguably true for army co-operation and the role played by the FAA, such a generalisation isn't worth further comment.

The Battle aircraft was a failure; it wasn't the first weapon to prove to be such at the start of the war and it wasn't the last - that is the nature of warfare - and to rag solely on the RAF for such a failure (ignoring the subsequent development of successful weapons and without the benefit of a major scientific study that looks at the percentage of operational failure of all arms produced in the UK during the war to provide a wider context), as part of an overall campaign to completely discredit the RAF, is hard to justify.


Well, at least these threads remain highly interesting.

Cheers

Rod

[Juha]

Tony
I agree with Rod and to add a few thinks. Naval AA was weak because of the wrong HA fire-control system selected and wrong weapons. 133mm gun (5,25 inch) and its twin turret were too heavy but admirals insisted them because its shell had more stopping power against enemy destroyers and 2pdr pom-pom had too low muzzle-velocity and .5 inch mg was simply too ineffective against modern a/c. I think its wrong to blame RAF for those mistakes.

In Britain there was no eagerness to massive land operations in Continent and French army had the reputation of being best in the world, so it was not surprising that British army has not high priority before the war. When the BEF went to France it was IIRC the most motorized army in the world. That generals had put so much of effort to motorization wasn't RAF's fault. On the other hand France and British were the countries which had largest proportion of their tanks designed to be well armoured, British infantry tanks were only tanks in service in 1939 that fullfilled your wishes. Soviet and Germans were occupied by Blitzkrieg or deep strike theories which you seems to dispise. OK I admit you have noticed that the key of German success was the all arm idea. That is right. British formations were too tank heavy and French too specializes. But still in 1940 the side with flimsier tanks which were concentrated for deep trust clearly won the enemy with better armoured tanks of which great portion was dispersed for close infantry support. How this could happen?

Juha

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Juha

In Britain there was no eagerness to massive land operations in Continent and French army had the reputation of being best in the world, so it was not surprising that British army has not high priority before the war. When the BEF went to France it was IIRC the most motorized army in the world. That generals had put so much of effort to motorization wasn't RAF's fault. On the other hand France and British were the countries which had largest proportion of their tanks designed to be well armoured, British infantry tanks were only tanks in service in 1939 that fullfilled your wishes. Soviet and Germans were occupied by Blitzkrieg or deep strike theories which you seems to dispise. OK I admit you have noticed that the key of German success was the all arm idea. That is right. British formations were too tank heavy and French too specializes. But still in 1940 the side with flimsier tanks which were concentrated for deep trust clearly won the enemy with better armoured tanks of which great portion was dispersed for close infantry support. How this could happen?
Juha

The British gave no priority to the army or to all-arms because of RAF politicking by the usual suspects.
Gp Capt Harris, the later Butcher, wrote this in September 1936 to Ellington about the Air Staff's veto the Army's plane for a force to occupy the Low Countries to prevent a knockout blow by the LW against London. Harris said the RAF wuld not need the Low Countries for long because of the increasing range of the new bombers. He called the army's sneaky plan, "a Bogey employed to stampede us into maintaining the intention and cadre of a future national army....The War Office would be bound to experience natural difficulties in obtaining sufficient morons willing to be sacrificed in a mud war in Flanders in endless marching upon short rations with an mg bullet in the stomach and a shell hole to lie in as the only possibility of relief". In 1936 the RAF helpfully suggested that the army should be trained for "protecting our naval and air bases". The RAF sold a prospectus to politicians which had a big bomber force and no army, because Britain could not afford both.
The RAF refused to believe the evidence from many sources and from its own discussions by the Secretary of State for Air with Stumpf in 1937 that the Germans planned no knockout blow. And not until well into 1938 did the Germans begin to think of strategic bombing, and then only when they realised how terrified the British were of it. That was the real reason behind Munich and Peace In Our Time because Hitler realised he could play on this British fear which Hitler knew was irrational. Hitler said in 1939 (quoted in Galland) that "a country cannot be brought to defeat by an air force. If the LW attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate". But the British, and Ismay said as much, always believed that Germany MUST be planning a knock-out blow. They thought the bomber would always get through, and the only defence against it was deterrence. Hence the order for 2,500 Battles and an AASF stationed around Lille for strategic retaliation against the Ruhr.
How, you ask, could it happen that balanced all-arms Blitzkrieg could defeat a fractured scratch British force in the early stages of rearming with few modern Bren guns and 25-pdrs, and no 5.5-inch or CAS like the Stuka, and few Matildas. And this was the state of affairs because Britain had spent its resources on a bomber force to retaliate against a non-existent threat of a knockout blow. You only have to phrase the question properly to answer it for yourself.

[tcolvin]

Sorry for the garbled second sentence. It should have read:

Gp Capt Harris, the later Butcher, wrote this in September 1936 to Ellington about the Air Staff's veto of the Army's plan for a force to occupy the Low Countries to prevent a knockout blow by the LW against London.

[CJE]

And not until well into 1938 did the Germans begin to think of strategic bombing

This not quite right.
The first chief of staff, Walther Wever, launched a programme, called "Ural Bomber", which led to the Do 19 and Ju 89, both "stragetic bombers".
The programme was cancelled after Wever's death in 1936.
Better read (again) Williamson Murray.

[Kutscha]

I would say that tcolvin does not know that that the Ju-87 began having its dive brakes removed and became a level bomber beginning around the time of Kursk (July 1943).

On Oct 5 1943 dive bombing was officilly abandoned by the LW, with units having their designator name changed from StG to SG to reflect their new role of low level ground attack.

Increasingly, the Ju-87 was being replaced by Fw190 fighter bombers in the daylight attack role.

[Graham Boak]

Tcolvin: Please read at least one book on the RN's ship building policy, particularly battleships, between the wars before blaming everything you see as wrong with British war preparedness on the strategic bombing policy. The newer British battleships were designed within the constraints of international treaties, in the context of a shipbuilding industry (and national economy) in deep depression, in a reluctance to invest in new gun and armour foundries, with the constraint of the lack of large drydocks in and outside the UK, and even a fear of torpedo boats. There were enough funds between the wars to build some new battleships: their size was chosen for doctrinal and industrial reasons rather than because of specific funding limits caused by the handful of heavy bombers. I rather doubt that the entire RAF Strategic Bomber force in 1935 cost as much as one battleship.

Perhaps you could also quote the real ratios of funds given to the Army, navy and AirForce in the 1930s?

You seem to have lost contact with reality. No one can just take an aircraft in use for target towing, strap a bomb on it, find some convenient airmen and send them out against an inconvenient bunker! You want a dive bomber force (in itself an perfectly arguable option) then you start preparing for it two years in advance to select the aircraft (which the RAF had, as a back-up policy), then select and train your crews. Could you perhaps tell us the thickness of this bunker, and then let us judge whether the bombs from any divebomber could have made any impression at all? If the firepower from the massed ranks of warships could not have been brough to bear because of the loss of the ground control, how was this nebulous force of divebombers with non-existing concrete-busting weapons to be brought to bear?

[Juha]

"Gp Capt Harris, the later Butcher, wrote this in September 1936 to Ellington about the Air Staff's veto the Army's plane for a force to occupy the Low Countries to prevent a knockout blow by the LW against London"

Tony, read a good book on British political history on 30s and you will see that the possibility to get funding for a ground force to invade the Low Countries was nil in 1936. RAF meddling or not.

"from its own discussions by the Secretary of State for Air with Stumpf in 1937 that the Germans planned no knockout blow"

Now do you really believe that if the LW had had plans for a knockout blow against UK, Stumpf would have admited it to British in 1937 when asked on it? So if Stumpf said that LW had not such a plan, it didn't matter.

Remember, Germans defeated both the French and British armies and the British were very junior partner in ground war then. Just as the British had hoped. It's not because of RAF, historically British didn't like permanent armies and over that came the experiences of WWI trench warfare.
IIRC Germany had 136 divisions, British had 10-12 in France. BEF was small as it had been in 1914, the idea was that the French carried the main burden of ground warfare, after all the fight was in France. BEF role was to show commintment to common cause, of course also to help French, but its role was that of minor partner.

And the French had more guns and clearly more heavy guns than Germans and lot of tanks which were better armoured than the best of German tanks and most of their tanks were designed to use as infantry support vehicles, so what went wrong?

Juha

[tcolvin]

Originally Posted by Juha

"from its own discussions by the Secretary of State for Air with Stumpf in 1937 that the Germans planned no knockout blow" Now do you really believe that if the LW had had plans for a knockout blow against UK, Stumpf would have admited it to British in 1937 when asked on it? So if Stumpf said that LW had not such a plan, it didn't matter.

Oh dear. It wasn't just Stumpf. Canaris and Milch said the same to Col Malcolm Christie. Maj Desmond Morton was reporting the same. Hitler said it also, and offered to exchange production data with the British to prove it. And it was also true. And the RAF toured German factories, and watched their manoeuvres in which they practised all-arms with the LW giving tactical support. It was obvious then and it's obvious now.

What is your problem? Do you thnk the RAF was right to believe the Germans were hatching a knockout blow and were right to believe all the evidence against it? If you must argue each point please say why. Don't just repeat RAF propaganda. It is obvious in hindsight that the RAF played politics, and would say anything to keep money coming in to pay for their Bomber Command fantasy. Even if it meant Britain had no army.

Originally Posted by Juha

Tony, read a good book on British political history on 30s and you will see that the possibility to get funding for a ground force to invade the Low Countries was nil in 1936. RAF meddling or not.
Remember, Germans defeated both the French and British armies and the British were very junior partner in ground war then. Just as the British had hoped. It's not because of RAF, historically British didn't like permanent armies and over that came the experiences of WWI trench warfare.

Juha.
You're wrong and all other contributors who deny it are also wrong; the army suffered because of RAF promises. Germany very nearly won the war because of RAF promises that were not worth a damn.

From 1933 to 1936 Montgomery-Massingberd was CIGS. He wrote this: "I feel that the biggest battle I have had in the last three years is against the idea that on account of the arrival of air forces as a new arm, the Low Countries are of little value to us and that therefore we need not maintain a military force to assist holding them. Those belonging to this school of thought desire therefore to concentrate all our efforts on a strong air force firstly to act as a deterrent to Germany, and if that fails as our sole contribution to making good our guarantee under the Treaty of Locarno. The dangers of such a policy and the importance of the Low Countries to us I have pushed forward again and again, but the elimination of any army commitment on the Continent sounds such a comfortable and cheap policy to those who are ill informed as to its real implications, that from time to time it gains fresh adherents especially amongst the air mad".

Do you recognise yourself as being "amongst the air mad"? If not, then perhaps you and the others can agreed that air madness is perhaps the longest-lived delusion of all time. It continues to this day.

[Juha]

Tony
now Hitler was a reliable fellow? Read all things he promised in 30s.

Now if Hampden and Wellington could be used in knockout blow what prevent use of Do 17 and He 111 in a like attack? British knew that Germany had a lot of twin-engined bombers.

Happened You notice that British had the BEF, almost totally motorized force, so it had a army after all.

Have You notice that most of your premises had proven to be wrong? Was that Rod who wrote that at that situation is time to check your hypothesis. Not meaning your opinion on Battle, I also think it was a product of bad specification, but most of your claims are shown to be wrong, from vulnerabilyty of Typhoon to German fighters to invulnerability of Il-2s and to the claim that all British tanks in 40 were flimsy cruisers. British army had in France only light and infantry tanks, 1st Armoured Div was still training in GB. Not to say a word on your naval claims.

Juha