Need assistance: Role of the Luftwaffe/Germany in the Battle of Britain?

[Adam]

Moving away slightly from the RAF v. Luftwaffe operations, but still focusing on that period and giving good food for thought is

Derek Robinson Invasion, 1940 Robinson, London, 2005

It deals more specifically with the planned invasion, but does address certain aspects of what it seems to be you are looking at with regards to a somewhat mishaped and at times aimless approach by the Germans to the air battle.

[FalkeEins]

Originally Posted by Nick Beale

To say the Germans didn't lose implies that they attained some definable objective. What then was that objective and in what sense was it attained? What did Germany achieve by fighting the battle? What was gained for the expenditure of about 2000 aircraft and their crews?

..Isn't the absence of a strategy perhaps an indication that the 'battle', as we Brits like to understand it, was never any such thing in German eyes..ie the Luftwaffe didn’t lose the ‘battle’ (at least that is my understanding ) because there was no ’battle’ worthy of the name. In this respect Galland’s memoir ‘The First and the Last’ comes in for sharp criticism from the source mentioned in my previous post. While Galland writes that Luftwaffe fighter pilots regularly flew two or three sorties/day throughout the course of the battle, Prien puts forward the following figures which paint a completely different picture; that the average Jagdflieger flew no more than 50 sorties during an 85 day period from 8 August to 31 October, contacting the enemy on only around 20 of these; that for around 20 days at the supposed height of the Battle there were no German aircraft at all in the skies of England; that when the bombers turned on London in September the 1,000 Luftwaffe aircraft of the British ‘official’ history were never more than 400; that on only two occasions (7 & 15 September) could the Luftwaffe put more than 300 bombers in the air; that on nearly 20 days of the ‘battle’ the Luftwaffe flew less than 200 sorties..all pretty minor league stuff as Meimberg points out in his memoir, especially in comparison with the later battle over the Reich. This was no attempt to bring Britain to her knees by an overwhelming application of force. The 'so-called' Luftschlacht über England was ‘a relatively small affair..’ (Prien quoting AJP Taylor..), perhaps no more than Hitler’s attempt to exert some political pressure on British public opinion in order to strengthen the hand of the ‘peace faction’ in particular..

Continental authors are scathing too at what they see as the ‘mythification’ of the ‘battle’ (cf Jean-Louis Roba's recent 'La bataille d'Angleterre'); the notion of the ‘The Few’, the Churchillian propaganda of the ‘We shall fight them etc..’ - I think Bungay is too though IIRC. The RAF fighter force was patently not 'The Few' - certainly not being inferior numerically to the Luftwaffe's, which had just lost 25% of its strength on the Continent. Churchill in particular (as former First Lord of the Admiralty responsible for the Dardenelles fiasco) knew full well that there was no chance of a sea-borne invasion prior to 1941 at the earliest, even if such a scheme was ever seriously contemplated (statements from Goebbels diaries suggest it wasn’t).

[Franek Grabowski]

Even if we assume there was no intention to land on the British soil (which seems logical), there is no reason to claim there was no Battle at all.
Mentioned statistics may be misleading, and I would not be surprised if average number of sorties for a RAF airman was lower than 50 (this will be different for Allies, as being more experienced they usually remained longer on operations). Nonetheless, there were days they were flying four times a day, in constant presence of Luftwaffe. Both period accounts and memories of Allied pilots mention, the period was particularly hard and exhaustive. Also, I would not say that loss of over 10 aircraft per day for both sides was insignificant. It was a major effort of the period, and cannot be compared to later 1000 aircraft raids.

[PeterVerney]

I would reiterate my previous post. Why fill the canal ports with several thousand barges stripped from every river and canal in west Europe? Was it a fun exercise to make us laugh? At least it made a target for our bombers.

I lived about 7 miles from Dover, and 8 from Folestone, at that time. There were extensive preparations made for an invasion which was expected shortly because of the barges and the air activity. We were warned not to leave the village when the Huns came so that the army could have freedom of movement. They had seen the shambles in Belgium and France in May. I also remember being told (I was 8 years old at the time) "When (note when, not if) the Jerries come, you boys are to put sugar in their petrol tanks".

To us there was definitely an intention to invade, which they chickened out of when the 'invincible' Luftwaffe could not live up to the fat mans boasts.

[John Vasco]

Ah, the 'sogennante' Battle of Britain rears its head again, with an extensive 'lift' from one of the Prien/Rodeike/Stemmer/Bock books. Franek has got it spot on in his second paragraph. And an earlier poster poses questions regarding supplies/barges etc on the Channel coast in August/September 1940. Hmmm, let's waste a lot of staff time and aircrew time by fitting the Bf 110s of 1./Erpr. Gr. 210 with the Seilbomben device control box in the cockpit, and the frame and other accoutrements in stock on the airfield, and devote training time to teaching the crews how the device works, and issue them with maps of southern England showing the exact layout of the HT cable network and what the exact targets would be once the invasion was given the green light. Were the Germans just messing around doing such things? Or was it more a case of them being caught on the hop by the speed of their victory in the Western Camapign of May/June 1940, and so plans to subdue Britain permanently had not reached any kind of advanced stage? I tend to think it was the latter. Some pour scorn on the tenor of some of Churchill's speeches, but when he said (in so many words) that Hitler knew that he must defeat Britain or lose the war, he had it 100% correct, because simply by remaining in conflict with Germany it was going to result in the US of A entering the war sooner or later with the inevitable consequences that would entail given their industrial might.

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, particularly when one wants to strike out with a 'revisionist' theory, which can be twisted every which way to suit an individual's particular taste.

Go to Cannock Chase, or the many cemeteries around Britain where the young RAF men were buried, and then say there was no Battle. Don't make me laugh...

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by FalkeEins

..Isn't the absence of a strategy perhaps an indication that the 'battle', as we Brits like to understand it, was never any such thing in German eyes ... the Luftwaffe didn’t lose the ‘battle’ (at least that is my understanding ) because there was no ’battle’ worthy of the name.

I repeat, what were they trying to achieve and did they achieve it? If the latter, was the gain proportionate to the human and material resources expended — let alone the economic cost of pulling all those barges off Europe's inland waterways and assembling them as sitting targets for the RAF bombers?

As for the "myth" the primary sources leave no doubt whatsoever that the British believed the threat to be absolutely real and imminent and deployed their resources accordingly. Maybe the Luftwaffe weren't trying their hardest but they were still losing aircraft faster than they could produce them and they appear to have gained absolutely nothing in return.

[Ruy Horta]

Peter,

Your reaction seems to illustrate the potency of the popular view of this period. Alone in the war, defiant in face of invasion and victorious in the air against all odds. The situation was just perfect, it is hard not to become mythical. It is unfortunate that this makes it difficult to accept any evidence to the contrary even if based on the highest echelons of the Nazi regime, military leadership or hard statistics.

At least one must accept that to fully understand the Battle of Britain also requires the German view of events, even if it doesn't fit the myth.

In the end few will disagree that the German effort was half hearted at best.

Prien is refreshing, so was the coverage in the new Werner Moelders biography by Kurt Braatz.

[John Vasco]

Ruy,
Perhaps you should answer this: "...Why fill the canal ports with several thousand barges stripped from every river and canal in west Europe? Was it a fun exercise to make us laugh?..."
and this: "...Hmmm, let's waste a lot of staff time and aircrew time by fitting the Bf 110s of 1./Erpr. Gr. 210 with the Seilbomben device control box in the cockpit, and the frame and other accoutrements in stock on the airfield, and devote training time to teaching the crews how the device works, and issue them with maps of southern England showing the exact layout of the HT cable network and what the exact targets would be once the invasion was given the green light. Were the Germans just messing around doing such things? Or was it more a case of them being caught on the hop by the speed of their victory in the Western Camapign of May/June 1940, and so plans to subdue Britain permanently had not reached any kind of advanced stage?...

You see, when you have discussed the latter issue with the Adjutant of the said unit at the time, you do tend to get the whole story of what was going on, and what was intended, the 'bigger picture' so to speak. Believe me, Wolfgang Schenck had the whole lot on it, wrote it down in detail for me. Karl Stoff, a 1. Staffel Bordfunker who would have operated the control box, was able to draw a diagram of the frame that was to be bolted to the underside of the Bf 110, and how the Seilbomben would be in place and released.Would the Germans go to this much trouble for no intention? I very much doubt it.

And you say: "...to fully understand the Battle of Britain also requires the German view of events..." Well, there's a German side of events that I would welcome your comment on (even if it doesn't fit the current myth of no invasion whatsoever).

Over to you, Ruy.

[PeterVerney]

Sorry Ruy, I was just telling it as an 8 year old child experienced it. We knew we were always going to win because Churchill told us so. Sorry to be simplistic but we were bombed and strafed and needed to believe or we were lost.
To my mind there is no myth, the Germans lost a very, very close run battle, which they tried their hardest to win. We have to thank the foresight of setting up a proper control and command system, Fighter Command, and the English Channel for our survival.
The Germans may not have had the capability to have invaded but, at the beginning, they certainly thought that they could.

[Ruy Horta]

John,

I don't have the energy to go 12 rounds on this one and thus am only willing to give some weak sparring jabs. Perhaps I am cynical but isn't history full of half hearted efforts that cost the lives of young men and look like the real deal from the bottom up?

For those who did the dying it was real enough, I give you that.

Not the first time the Nazi regime rode on a gamble, it needed blood and some substance to have any chance of succeeding.

Remember that although I may think the above, it doesn't mean I am blind to the suffering nor unwilling to recognise the effort, valor etcetera etcetera of the ordinary man on the ground or in the air. End of disclaimer.