Need assistance: Role of the Luftwaffe/Germany in the Battle of Britain?

[Ruy Horta]

Originally Posted by PeterVerney

Sorry Ruy, I was just telling it as an 8 year old child experienced it. We knew we were always going to win because Churchill told us so. Sorry to be simplistic but we were bombed and strafed and needed to believe or we were lost.

Peter,

On second glance I would have chosen my words somewhat differently, not as condescending. For me it is an "academic" discussion, for you it is your past and to some extend still part of your present. Be sure that it was not my intent to be condescending.

Ruy

[John Vasco]

Still no substantial reply to Peter's invasion barges, nor to my Seilbomben...

[wotan]

What was in all those 'barges'?

[Ruy Horta]

Originally Posted by John Vasco

Still no substantial reply to Peter's invasion barges, nor to my Seilbomben...

John,

Thanks for the extra challenge, you are not getting a substantial reply, so feel vindicated...

[David Ransome]

As far as I am concerned the German intention to invade was there, the spirit to do so was sadly lacking in some of the Wehrmacht hierarchy.

The only area that the Heer couldn't fight on was the English Channel and that is why control of the air was crucial. The major failings of German air intelligence only became obvious to them later on in the Battle period after which the cohesion of the Wehrmacht arms of service, that had worked fairly well together up to June 1940, began to fail. I feel certain that Goering honestly thought that the Luftwaffe couldn't fail to achieve their ultimate objective and, being the type of person he was at this stage of the war, had the energy, charisma and backing of the Fuhrer to convince his Generals of this.

Too many people studying this part of the war fail to consider many of the other things going on behind the scenes with other elements of the German state, things which took up a lot of manpower and other resources, which point to a genuine intention to invade. I don't want to even try to justify my comments on this here but suffice it to say that Kriegsmarine, Heer, SS, DRK and RAD records - to name but a few - are definitely worthy of study for this period.

By any stretch of the imagination the Battle of Britain, or whatever one wants to call that period, was indeed a battle even based purely on the amount of men, women, children, property and materiel lost.

David

[Nick Beale]

"...Why fill the canal ports with several thousand barges stripped from every river and canal in west Europe? Was it a fun exercise to make us laugh?..."

Which, as I understand was the 1940 equivalent of taking most of the 44-tonne trucks off today's roads and assembling them in about half a dozen large car parks near the channel coast so that people can drop bombs on them.

[Six Nifty .50s]

I have read that a greater application of air power by Germany might make a difference. But it doesn't quite ring true. I did not know that some German pilots implied that the Battle of Britain was a minor skirmish. So I must ask, how many more planes needed to crash before it became a real shooting war?

I have yet to see it proven that flying more missions will compensate for a bad strategy or lack of one. I have seen it proven that such an approach will lead to higher losses.

The number of German aircraft and trained air crew that failed to return does not suggest their losses were sustainable without accepting a crippling decline in quality, quantity, or both. Had the Germans mounted combat flying sorties at a significantly higher rate, and for a longer period, the consequences would have been disastrous for the Luftwaffe and their plans on other battle fronts. They were about to be stretched thin, and a battering ram approach over England would only accelerate that process.

Revisiting the real or imagined intentions of Hitler and his gang is fascinating for the sake of argument, but it does not change that the Luftwaffe failed to gain air superiority over the United Kingdom in 1940.

[FalkeEins]

Originally Posted by John Vasco

Ah, the 'sogennante' Battle of Britain rears its head again, with an extensive 'lift' from one of the Prien/Rodeike/Stemmer/Bock books. Franek has got it spot on in his second paragraph. And an earlier poster poses questions regarding supplies/barges etc on the Channel coast in August/September 1940. Hmmm, let's waste a lot of staff time and aircrew time by fitting the Bf 110s of 1./Erpr. Gr. 210 with the Seilbomben device control box ...

re the 'lift' - don't know whether you're trying to rubbish me or Prien with that comment - but at least I've read (& understood) his arguments in the original German, which is probably more than most can manage here, as the last poster has just indicated. I've often wondered how many of his readers actually share them. As Ruy says they're pretty interesting though (the stats especially). Be aware that there is a completely different view out there to yours, the original poster's & the 'standard' literature; a number of German authors (& German veterans) do have this view of the BoB as a 'minor' skirmish...as for the activities of 1./Erpr. Gr. 210 ..a small 'experimental' Staffel..the bigger picture..? I think not..

..as for the 'barges' argument. If I was presenting a less conventional view (cf. Jean-Louis Roba, 'La Bataille d'Angleterre') I suspect that the whole 'point' of the 'barges' was again as a means of exerting some 'political' pressure. Hitler's 'last appeal' etc indicates that the Germans were aiming at a 'peace' settlement- not invasion. Your point about the rapid end of the Westfeldzug is a good one - the Germans really didn't know what to do next with Britain, because they hadn't even planned for such an eventuality; they certainly didn't have the means to launch a full scale invasion when the priorities for Russia had already been defined..the British were simply expected to sue for peace at this stage, a process that could no doubt be aided by a 'demonstration de force'; harassing shipping in the Channel, sending a few hundred bombers & fighters over now & again and drawing up loads of barges where they could be photographed was all the Germans could do to try and influence such an outcome...

BTW I don't think these views diminish the achievements of the RAF one iota - the Luftwaffe got a bloody nose & Britain & Churchill weren't cowed but stayed in the war..until we were joined by the Russians a year later and the US 18 months after that..

[Nick Beale]

Originally Posted by FalkeEins

a process that could no doubt be aided by a 'demonstration de force'; harassing shipping in the Channel, sending a few hundred bombers & fighters over now & again and drawing up loads of barges where they could be photographed was all the Germans could do to try and influence such an outcome...

"A few hundred" - oh, is that all? Given that a Gruppe could wreck an aerodrome or an aircraft factory, such numbers were hardly negligible.

"Now & then" - on how many days when weather permitted was at least one substantial raid not mounted?

Does anyone dispute that German fighter production was being outstripped by losses during the Battle? Did Fighter Command's strength increase or not?

And is anyone arguing that the Luftwaffe was the only air force in history to go over to night bombing because their daylight operations had been such a success?

P.S. the barges were not only photographed, they were taken out of productive use and were being converted to "landing craft." Troops were being trained for landing operations, something the British picked up from Ultra (which the Germans knew nothing of) rather than photo opportunities.

[John Vasco]

Falck Eins,
Not trying to rubbish either you or Jochen on the point. I've read the Prien/Rodeike/Stemmer/Bock volume in which they comment on the 'sogennante' (sp?) BoB, and if you were on this forum in its earlier guise, you will know that there was quite a heated discussion about the subject. Suffice it to say that the statistics show one side of an argument, but the authors conveniently omitted to say that NO fighting unit would be able to sustain combat every day for months, so their argument that only a certain percentage of days being used means that there was really no large scale battle is a total red herring (a load of bollocks in my parlance), and it should be held up as such.

It's great that you dismiss the Seilbomben with 1./210 as a 'small experimental Staffel', but you do not explain away what I have set down. Are you trying to dodge the issue completely, or just doing a diplomatic sidestep and hoping it will go away? You cannot dismiss out of hand the planning that took place within 1./210 with regard to a potential invasion. And I suppose in that vein, the words of Wolfgang Schenck mean nothing, simply because they do not accord with your (and possibly others) pre-determined views on the BoB? You can speculate all you want, but you cannot dismiss facts. If you know more than I do, then please tell me.
And the reason a lot of German authors dismiss the BoB as a minor thing is because their cherished Luftwaffe actually got their arse kicked, and they cannot stomach that happening so early in the war. Believe me, I've met some of them, and it beggars belief some of the views that were expounded to me (no names, no pack drill on this one). I know I've just written something that may not be totally acceptable to some people, but the fact is in recent years we've been railroaded by many outside factions, first in a total character assassination on Bomber Harris, and latterly on this revisionist shite that the BoB was only a minor skirmish, and the Luftwaffe didn't actually lose any kind of battle in the skies of England in 1940. I call bullshit on that, totally.

Ruy,
You got me on that last comment - brilliant!